Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

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Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

This is a forum. Not a blog.

I was thinking, what the possibilities of Iranian-Armenian military cooperation if the nuclear talks pull through Mher? I know both Iranian and Armenians share common cultural aspects, and that on an infantry level cooperation might be beneficial.

Armenia is a big potential for iran right now since iran is srounded by American allies and Turks pushing panturkism on their throats and claiming lands,now Russia is irans only way out for survival since Russia is not also in the best shape they both share the same mutual goals.armenia has many important roles for iran 1:Armenia is the antidote to Azerbaijan while Iran can concentrate on turkey and conflicts on the gulf,armenia is the corridor to russia and Russian bases in case of direct military support.armenia is more useful for Iran in importing energy as well.iran need Armenia now more than 20 years ago,if Iran helped Armenia during first war pursuing its anti panturkism,they would help even more now since Azerbaijan is getting out of control

[Shant03]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Didn't Iran sell nakhchivan to Turkey?

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Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Didn't Iran sell nakhchivan to Turkey?

They sold a little part of their border with Nakhichevan to turkey so Nakhichevan can have border with turkey,something they must regret now,perhaps some one can help to recall the date can't remember if it was during soviet era or after

[Mher]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Armenia is a big potential for iran right now since iran is srounded by American allies and Turks pushing panturkism on their throats and claiming lands,now Russia is irans only way out for survival since Russia is not also in the best shape they both share the same mutual goals.armenia has many important roles for iran 1:Armenia is the antidote to Azerbaijan while Iran can concentrate on turkey and conflicts on the gulf,armenia is the corridor to russia and Russian bases in case of direct military support.armenia is more useful for Iran in importing energy as well.iran need Armenia now more than 20 years ago,if Iran helped Armenia during first war pursuing its anti panturkism,they would help even more now since Azerbaijan is getting out of control

A few recent developments that favor us:

This from today: Turkey comes out strongly anti-Iranian and staunchly supporting Saudis in Yemen
Turkey supports Saudi mission in Yemen, says Iran must withdraw

http://www.france24.com/en/20150326-turkey-support-saudi-yemen-erdogan-interview-france-24/

This from mid January: Iran and Russia increasing military cooperation
Russian, Iranian Defense Ministers Vow "Accelerated" Military Cooperation

http://www.eurasianet.org/node/71691

This from this month: Iran shifting in a more nationalistic and less religious direction.
General Soleimani storms into Iranian national consciousness

http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/general-soleimani-storms-iranian-national-consciousness-927310364

I think there is serious of potential there. During the last 10 years, out of necessity as a result of sanctions, Iran has built up a defense industry that's unmatched outside of the dozen or so traditional global military producers. Combined with the fact that new tensions are rising against Turkey, and the fact that Russia is expanding relations with Iran out of necessity, I think Iran can provide a major boost to us both by their available products, but more so because of how closely our interests are aligned. While the existence and survival of Armenia might be a nice convenience and a benefit to Russia, it's close to crucial for Iran. Artsakh represents the only obstacle to Syunik being overran and Iran being shut off by a Turkic belt and essentially shut out from Russia and Europe.

here's a solid example

Here are some Iranian plate carriers that Armenia can purchase, they are used by the IRGC. Purchase them and only use the front pocket, while having the options for other plates on the side and back. Although, Id prefer the polish lubawa flakjacket plate carriers:

[argin]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

A few recent developments that favor us:

This from today: Turkey comes out strongly anti-Iranian and staunchly supporting Saudis in Yemen
Turkey supports Saudi mission in Yemen, says Iran must withdraw

http://www.france24.com/en/20150326-turkey-support-saudi-yemen-erdogan-interview-france-24/

This from mid January: Iran and Russia increasing military cooperation
Russian, Iranian Defense Ministers Vow "Accelerated" Military Cooperation

http://www.eurasianet.org/node/71691

This from this month: Iran shifting in a more nationalistic and less religious direction.
General Soleimani storms into Iranian national consciousness

http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/general-soleimani-storms-iranian-national-consciousness-927310364

I think there is serious of potential there. During the last 10 years, out of necessity as a result of sanctions, Iran has built up a defense industry that's unmatched outside of the dozen or so traditional global military producers. Combined with the fact that new tensions are rising against Turkey, and the fact that Russia is expanding relations with Iran out of necessity, I think Iran can provide a major boost to us both by their available products, but more so because of how closely our interests are aligned. While the existence and survival of Armenia might be a nice convenience and a benefit to Russia, it's close to crucial for Iran. Artsakh represents the only obstacle to Syunik being overran and Iran being shut off by a Turkic belt and essentially shut out from Russia and Europe.

here's a solid example

Very well said,Armenia balances their northern border and is the corridor to Russia and Europe like you mentioned,the more territory we gain towards east means less Azeri border acces to northern Iran Which will put end to panturkist Manifications,what Iranians would love to see.back in 2012 allegedly Israel launched many drones from Azerbaijan to Iran which were essentially shut down.all these if don't disturb the Iranian-Azeri relationships it certainly dosent make it better either.we are the winner in this battle my friend,it would be wise that we discuss Georgian role in a possible war,Georgia is our land acces to Russia and Europe and rest of the world if we consider Black Sea,their role is crucial,I honestly don't know what to expect from them during a supposed war

[Mher]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

They sold a little part of their border with Nakhichevan to turkey so Nakhichevan can have border with turkey,something they must regret now,perhaps some one can help to recall the date can't remember if it was during soviet era or after

that's actually an often repeated misconception, even by some historians. As is the case in most of our misfortunes of the time, we can thank our Soviet masters for that problem as well

Debunking a Caucasian Myth
Pietro Shakarian / February 23, 2015

One of the most enduring myths of Caucasus history involves the little-noticed and oddly placed border between Turkey and Azerbaijan. At first glance at any map, this border is not readily apparent and seems almost nonexistent. However, on closer inspection, one can see a small sliver of land jutting out from Turkey’s northeastern Igdir Province to the northern Sadarak and Sharur raions of Azerbaijan’s Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. This corridor is geographically defined by the Araks River to the north and the Lower Karasu River to the south.

How did this strange border come into being? A common misnomer among historians of the Caucasus is that the border emerged as the result of a territorial exchange between Atatürk’s Turkey and Reza Shah’s Iran in 1932. It was created, the narrative goes, by the cession of territories from Iran to Turkey in exchange for the cession of Turkish territories in the mountainous Kurdish districts further south to Iran. The intent for Ankara, the narrative asserts, was to create a direct link with the exclave of Nakhichevan, part of then-Soviet Azerbaijan.

Any review of the historical record will show that in 1932, Turkey and Iran did indeed delineate and finalize their border in what was known as the Tehran Convention. Naturally, this did involve exchanging small territories along the frontier between the two countries.


However, was the Araks corridor part of this territorial exchange? A look at the actual text of the Tehran Convention and historical maps of the Caucasus dating from the early 19th century indicate that this was not the case.

A series of pre-1932 maps of the Caucasus consistently show the Araks corridor, not as a part of Iranian territory, but as part of the Russian Caucasus, and the Armenian Erivanskaya Guberniya (centered on the modern Armenian capital Yerevan) specifically. Below are some examples:

Notably some relevant maps confirming the existence of the corridor prior to 1932 can also be found throughout Artur A. Tsutsiev’s Atlas of the Ethno-Political History of the Caucasus (both the original Russian edition and the English translation) and Robert H. Hewsen’s Armenia: A Historical Atlas.

The Araks corridor is often regarded as part of the historic region of Surmalu, centered on the city of Igdir, which now largely corresponds with Turkey’s present-day Igdir Province. Surmalu (also known as Surmali) takes its name from the ruined medieval Armenian city of Surmari, the castle of which remains standing today in the village of Sürmeli, near the salt-mining town of Tuzluca (historically known as Koghb or Kulp). Located on the Turkish-Armenian frontier, the castle is unfortunately inaccessible to travelers due to border restrictions.

The historic city of Surmari was described by many contemporary observers, including the Armenian historian Stepanos Orbelian and the Spanish ambassador Ruy González de Clavijo. According to Vladimir Minorsky in his Studies in Caucasian History, Antoine-Jean Saint-Martin in his second volume of Mémoires historiques et géographiques sur l’Arménie, and Guy Le Strange in his 1928 translation of De Clavijo’s Embassy to Tamerlane, the name “Surmari” is derived from the Armenian “Surb Mari,” or “Saint Mary.” Over time, this evolved into “Surmalu” and eventually was used to denote the entire surrounding region as opposed to the ruined city alone.

Under Tsarist rule, the Surmalu region was administered as the Surmalu Uyezd of the Erivanskaya Guberniya. Again, it is true that most of the uyezd’s territory does indeed correspond to Turkey’s present-day Igdir Province. Yet, within the administrative structure of the Erivanskaya Guberniya, the Araks corridor was actually not administered as part of the Surmalu Uyezd, but rather as part of the Erivan Uyezd.

The Araks corridor was merged with the Surmalu area during the cession of the two areas to Kemalist Turkey in accordance with Article IV and Annex I of the 1921 Treaty of Kars with Bolshevist Russia. The combined territory was initially administered by Ankara as part of the Agri Province. However, in 1934, it was removed from the administration of the Agri Province and was governed as part of the Kars Province until 1993 when it was detached and established as the Igdir Province.

In addition, Article V and Annex III of the Kars Treaty stipulated that the Nakhichevan region should be assigned to the Azerbaijan SSR and should include the northern Sharur district (today the Sadarak and Sharur raions), bordering the newly-acquired Araks corridor. This would allow Soviet Azerbaijan to share a small but strategically significant border with Turkey. The border was especially important to Turkish nationalists in Ankara, many of whom were part of the previous Ittihatist government, which sought to forge a connection with the Turkic-speaking peoples of Transcaucasia in their Pan-Turkist designs.

Given this evidence, where did the confusion emerge with the 1932 Tehran Convention? The source of this confusion was most likely the fact that another territory in the region—i.e., the remaining portion of the Ararat plateau—was among those exchanged between Iran and Turkey. The plateau was divided between the Persian and Ottoman Empires with the Treaty of Zuhab in 1639. This arrangement lasted until the Russo-Persian war of 1826-28. In 1828, by the terms of the Treaty of Turkmenchai, the greater portion of the plateau, including the northern slopes and peak of Greater Ararat, passed into the control of the Russian Empire. It initially became part of the short-lived Armenian Oblast and later the Erivanskaya Guberniya. The Persians retained administration over Lesser Ararat while the Ottoman Empire retained the southern slopes of Greater Ararat within the Sanjak of Bayazit (part of the Erzurum Vilayet). From 1828 to 1918, the plateau remained divided between the Russian, Persian, and Ottoman Empires.

For much of the period between 1918 and 1920, the Russian section of the plateau was controlled by the short-lived Democratic Republic of Armenia. However, after the Turkish-Armenian war and the Sovietization of eastern Armenia, it passed into the control of Turkey with the 1921 Treaty of Kars. From that time until 1932, the plateau was divided between two states: Iran and Turkey.

However, by the end of the 1920s, Turkey was facing a major crisis in the Ararat region. Atatürk’s assimilationist “Turkification” policies had greatly angered local Kurds. Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, there had already been one major Kurdish uprising. This occurred in 1925, in the vicinity of Diyarbekir and was brutally put down. The rebel leader Sheikh Said was executed by hanging. The uprising in the Ararat region would be the second attempt by the Kurds to revolt against Ankara. A Kurdish Republic of Ararat was proclaimed in 1927 and an insurgent war broke out between the Turkish state and Kurdish rebels that lasted four years. The mountainous terrain and relative inaccessibly of the Ararat plateau worked in favor of the Kurds. Border security with Iran was not well-enforced and the Kurdish rebels could easily retreat to the Iranian section of the plateau.

Ankara decided to put an end to this and sought to extend its control over the entire Ararat region. In the course of the Kurdish revolt, in order to route the rebels, Turkey intervened in the Iranian section and remained “in actual occupation of this area for a considerable time.” However, to secure its position, Ankara decided to formalize this de facto arrangement.

Thus, it was the Iranian section of the Ararat plateau that became one of the main points of negotiation between Iranian and Turkish diplomats in the early 1930s. The resulting Tehran Convention of January 1932 determined that “the whole of Mount Ararat would be within the boundaries of Turkey, while, by way of compensation, a corresponding area further south would be transferred to the Persian side of the line,” in the words of a British diplomatic cable from Ankara. The same information on the Tehran Convention is confirmed on page 92 of the English translation of Tsutsiev’s Caucasus atlas (see full map here and detail here) and on page 243 of Hewsen’s Armenian atlas (see full map here and detail here).

According to a British diplomat in a confidential cable from Persia dated 1 July 1932, the border was “pushed eastwards so as to give an area of some 60 square miles to Turkey. This, the Northern Zone, is the most important strategically, as it gives to Turkey the control of the whole of Lesser Ararat, a cession which will, it is hoped, enable her to deal more effectively with the Kurdish tribes of the neighbourhood.”

The Kurdish Ararat rebellion may also explain why the nervous Turkish government removed the Surmalu region with the Araks corridor from the administration of the Agri Province in 1934. Meanwhile, no territorial changes in the vicinity of the pre-existing Araks corridor are mentioned in the Tehran Convention. The corridor did not concern the Turkish-Iranian agreement. Instead, it was primarily focused on the status of the remaining portion of the Ararat plateau, which until that time, was partially administered by Iran.

https://abovyangroup.org/2015/02/23/debunking-a-caucasian-myth/

[Mher]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Didn't Iran sell nakhchivan to Turkey?

No Iran wasn't ever involved in the process. Iran lost and regained the territory in the 16-19th century in various wars with the Ottomans.

In 1828 Iran ceded the area along with much of the south Caucuses to Russia after losing the 1826-28 Russo-Persian War
From 1850-1917 the region was part of the Erivan Governorate
At the start of the 20th century, Armenians made up about 42% of the total population
Despite earlier reassurances Nakhichevan, along with Artsakh and Kirovabad, was given to Azerbaijan
In about 5 years after taht, that 40% turned into 10%, and pretty soon zero after that
During the war, as the tide had turned in favor of Armenia, there was attempts to retake Nakhichevan as well, but they were shut because of hesitance by the Armenian govt, and pressure by regional powers.

If Armenia had taken Nakhichevan in 93-94, our fortunes would have been dramatically different today. All major Armenian Soviet transport routes (rail/highway) to Iran run through Nakhichevan. Whereas the Iranian-Armenian border is 35km of mountainous hell, Nakhichevan shares more that 200km of border with Iran. Billions would have been saved in attempts to build highways and rails in that impossible terrain, while boosting the Armenian economy massively from the start of independence.

[Spetsnaz]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

[Լրացված] Ադրբեջանական ոչ պաշտոնական աղբյուրներ. մարտական կորուստ Ադրբեջանի բանակում

Մարտ 27, 2015
Ադրբեջանական բաց, ոչ պաշտոնական աղբյուրներից Ռազմինֆոյին հայտնի է դարձել, որ մարտի 26-ին հայկական ուժերի հետ շփման գծում սպանվել է Գերանբոյի շրջանի Սեֆիքյուրդ գյուղից զորակոչված պայմանագրային զինծառայող Քազըմով Էթիբար Խուդավի օղլուն։

Զինծառայողի մահվան մասին սոցցանցերում հայտնում է նաև նրա ծանոթներից մեկը։
Քազըմովի մահվան մասին հրապարակումը «Մուսավաթի» կայքում

Քազըմովի մահվան մասին հրապարակումը «Մուսավաթի» կայքում

Հարկ է նշել, որ սույն տեղեկությունը ժամը 20:30-ին տեղադրվել է նաև ադրբեջանական «Մուսավաթ» թերթի կայքում, սակայն քիչ անց այն հեռացվել է՝ մնալով հասանելի Google որոնողական համակարգի տվյալների բազայում։ Սա թերևս Ադրբեջանում բանակի կորուստների թեմայով հրապարակումների պաշտոնական արգելքի հերթական ապացույցն է։

Զինծառայողի մահվան մասին հայտնող և այնուհետև հեռացված հոդվածում նշվում էր, որ Սեֆիքյուրդ գյուղի բնակիչները հավաքվում են շեհիդի հոր (Քազըմով Խուդավի Աբդուլլա օղլուի) տան մոտ։

Հավելենք, որ 2015 թ. մարտ ամսին սա ադրբեջանական բանակի՝ Ռազմինֆոյի արձանագրած 9-րդ կորուստն է։ Բացի այդ, հայկական կողմի պատասխան գործողությունների արդյունքում սպանված ևս 3 զինծառայողի մասին ավելի վաղ՝ մարտի 7-ին, հայտնել էր հայկական Times.am լրատվակայքը։ Ադրբեջանի ՊՆ-ն տեղեկությունը չէր հերքել։

Լրացում. (27.03.2015, ժ 13:10)

Ադրբեջանի ՊՆ մամուլի ծառայությունն ի պատասխան Trend գործակալության հարցմանը հաստատել է զինծառայողի մահվան մասին տեղեկությունը, սակայն պաշտոնական հաղորդագրությամբ դեռևս հանդես չի եկել։ Հարցմանն ի պատասխան նշվել է նաև, որ դեպքը գրանցվել է Թարթառի շրջանի Գափանլը գյուղի ուղղությամբ։

Նկատենք, որ պաշտպանական գերատեսչությունում պայմանագրային զինծառայող Էթիբար Քազըմովի մահվան փաստը հաստատել են միայն այն բանից հետո, երբ լուրը սոցցանցերում արդեն իսկ ստացել էր լայն տարածում։
Այս թեմայով.

http://razm.info/62051

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Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

No Iran wasn't ever involved in the process. Iran lost and regained the territory in the 16-19th century in various wars with the Ottomans.

In 1828 Iran ceded the area along with much of the south Caucuses to Russia after losing the 1826-28 Russo-Persian War
From 1850-1917 the region was part of the Erivan Governorate
At the start of the 20th century, Armenians made up about 42% of the total population
Despite earlier reassurances Nakhichevan, along with Artsakh and Kirovabad, was given to Azerbaijan
In about 5 years after taht, that 40% turned into 10%, and pretty soon zero after that
During the war, as the tide had turned in favor of Armenia, there was attempts to retake Nakhichevan as well, but they were shut because of hesitance by the Armenian govt, and pressure by regional powers.

If Armenia had taken Nakhichevan in 93-94, our fortunes would have been dramatically different today. All major Armenian Soviet transport routes (rail/highway) to Iran run through Nakhichevan. Whereas the Iranian-Armenian border is 35km of mountainous hell, Nakhichevan shares more that 200km of border with Iran. Billions would have been saved in attempts to build highways and rails in that impossible terrain, while boosting the Armenian economy massively from the start of independence.

Those were some good historical facts and great articles thx mher jan

[burjuin]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan