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Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan
As Vafa Guluzade, former policy advisor to President Heydar Aliev, pointed out, Madrid Principles, if implemented in an agreement, can lead to “fragmentation” of Azerbaijan. He is correct. As things stand, Madrid Principles set out a blueprint for eventual independence of Karabakh and creation of a second Armenian state in South Caucasus. Those elements of the Helsinki Final Act that form the basis of Madrid Principles stipulate that:
1) Republic of Armenia recognises Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and forfeits any claims against Azerbaijan Republic, but does not and is not required to recognise Azerbaijani sovereignty over Karabakh.
2) The International community recognises Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity but does NOT recognise Azerbaijani sovereignty over Karabakh.
3) Azerbaijan forfeits its right under international law to use force in self-defence against Armenian occupation of Karabakh and other regions.
4) Armenian security is guaranteed through deployment of international peace-keeping force not just in Karabakh but in all of the territories of Azerbaijan currently under Armenian occupation – Azerbaijan will not be allowed to deploy its own troops in regions such as Agdam or Fizuli.
5) Azerbaijani sovereignty over Karabakh is de facto and de jure negated by establishment of an interim status for Karabakh, probably under the auspices of OSCE and direct control of that organisation – similar to the interim status offered to Kosovo by UN prior to that region’s declaration of independence.
6) The final issue of sovereignty over Karabakh will NOT be decided by the warring parties, through negotiations between Baku and Yerevan, but through a referendum to be held at some point in the future – when will this be is irrelevant since legal standards will be upheld indefinitely.
A recent change in Azerbaijani constitution (adopted through a rigged referendum) has transformed a constitutional requirement for all referendums to be held on national basis – the current text of Azerbaijani constitution requires as few as 40,000 people to demand a referendum on a local issue, for it to be triggered.
7) Article VIII of HFA (The Right to Self-determination) reads that “…all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development. As such there is absolutely no legal basis to claim that Armenian population of Karabakh cannot demand full independence when the referendum is eventually held.
It would have been possible to prevent the “independence option” being included into the referendum if the agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia was to be based on Article I of HFA (Sovereignty). Azerbaijan could have then legally challenged any independence demands, since Article I require the agreement of a state for its frontiers to be changed. But as Article I is not included in the Madrid Principles there is no legal recourse for Azerbaijan – there is nothing in the three elements of Madrid Principles which would prevent Karabakh Armenians demanding independence through a referendum in accordance with Article VIII (Self-determination). As stated above, the principle of territorial integrity (Article IV) does not apply to relations within member-states of OSCE, but only to relation between such states.
The importance of Article I and the issue of sovereignty become even more apparent when comparing Madrid Principles with other legal documents and agreements based on Helsinki Final Act. For instance, both the Dayton Accords and the Armenian- Turkish Protocols are based explicitly on Article I (Sovereignty).
The question to the Aliev administration is this - why have they agreed to a legal framework that explicitly challenges Azerbaijani sovereignty over Karabakh and removes the final status issue from its traditional place as subject to bilateral negotiations between Baku and Yerevan? Azerbaijan was invaded by Armenia and our territories are occupied by that foreign power. Independence of Karabakh was not the demand when the conflict flared up in 1988 – the original demand was annexation of Karabakh by Armenia. The right to self determination was articulated only after the collapse of Soviet Union as a means to legitimise the aggression perpetrated by the Republic of Armenia. Azerbaijan always insisted that the status of Karabakh should be settled through negotiations between the governments of two warring states. To remove that precondition is to play a dangerous game with the future of Azerbaijani statehood – one that is immaterial without sovereignty over Karabakh.
The paradox of Madrid Principles is that they are opposed most forcefully by Armenians, whilst many in Azerbaijan are euphoric in their delusions about the nature of the legal principle of territorial integrity.
As Vafa Guluzade, former policy advisor to President Heydar Aliev, pointed out, Madrid Principles, if implemented in an agreement, can lead to “fragmentation” of Azerbaijan. He is correct. As things stand, Madrid Principles set out a blueprint for eventual independence of Karabakh and creation of a second Armenian state in South Caucasus. Those elements of the Helsinki Final Act that form the basis of Madrid Principles stipulate that:
1) Republic of Armenia recognises Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and forfeits any claims against Azerbaijan Republic, but does not and is not required to recognise Azerbaijani sovereignty over Karabakh.
2) The International community recognises Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity but does NOT recognise Azerbaijani sovereignty over Karabakh.
3) Azerbaijan forfeits its right under international law to use force in self-defence against Armenian occupation of Karabakh and other regions.
4) Armenian security is guaranteed through deployment of international peace-keeping force not just in Karabakh but in all of the territories of Azerbaijan currently under Armenian occupation – Azerbaijan will not be allowed to deploy its own troops in regions such as Agdam or Fizuli.
5) Azerbaijani sovereignty over Karabakh is de facto and de jure negated by establishment of an interim status for Karabakh, probably under the auspices of OSCE and direct control of that organisation – similar to the interim status offered to Kosovo by UN prior to that region’s declaration of independence.
6) The final issue of sovereignty over Karabakh will NOT be decided by the warring parties, through negotiations between Baku and Yerevan, but through a referendum to be held at some point in the future – when will this be is irrelevant since legal standards will be upheld indefinitely.
A recent change in Azerbaijani constitution (adopted through a rigged referendum) has transformed a constitutional requirement for all referendums to be held on national basis – the current text of Azerbaijani constitution requires as few as 40,000 people to demand a referendum on a local issue, for it to be triggered.
7) Article VIII of HFA (The Right to Self-determination) reads that “…all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development. As such there is absolutely no legal basis to claim that Armenian population of Karabakh cannot demand full independence when the referendum is eventually held.
It would have been possible to prevent the “independence option” being included into the referendum if the agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia was to be based on Article I of HFA (Sovereignty). Azerbaijan could have then legally challenged any independence demands, since Article I require the agreement of a state for its frontiers to be changed. But as Article I is not included in the Madrid Principles there is no legal recourse for Azerbaijan – there is nothing in the three elements of Madrid Principles which would prevent Karabakh Armenians demanding independence through a referendum in accordance with Article VIII (Self-determination). As stated above, the principle of territorial integrity (Article IV) does not apply to relations within member-states of OSCE, but only to relation between such states.
The importance of Article I and the issue of sovereignty become even more apparent when comparing Madrid Principles with other legal documents and agreements based on Helsinki Final Act. For instance, both the Dayton Accords and the Armenian- Turkish Protocols are based explicitly on Article I (Sovereignty).
The question to the Aliev administration is this - why have they agreed to a legal framework that explicitly challenges Azerbaijani sovereignty over Karabakh and removes the final status issue from its traditional place as subject to bilateral negotiations between Baku and Yerevan? Azerbaijan was invaded by Armenia and our territories are occupied by that foreign power. Independence of Karabakh was not the demand when the conflict flared up in 1988 – the original demand was annexation of Karabakh by Armenia. The right to self determination was articulated only after the collapse of Soviet Union as a means to legitimise the aggression perpetrated by the Republic of Armenia. Azerbaijan always insisted that the status of Karabakh should be settled through negotiations between the governments of two warring states. To remove that precondition is to play a dangerous game with the future of Azerbaijani statehood – one that is immaterial without sovereignty over Karabakh.
The paradox of Madrid Principles is that they are opposed most forcefully by Armenians, whilst many in Azerbaijan are euphoric in their delusions about the nature of the legal principle of territorial integrity.
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