Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

[ninetoyadome]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

whats the name of the thread? I found one about the Armenian military but it hasnt been active since feb.

[Pazooki]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums...light=Armenian Here you go but I can't take reading their responses xxxxing xxxxxxxs.

[ninetoyadome]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums...light=Armenian Here you go but I can't take reading their responses xxxxing xxxxxxxs.

thanks for the thread. i needed a laugh and that azeri, bolshoy, gave me a great laugh.its not worth arguing with people who r completely brainwashed and cant look at the facts.

[D3ADSY]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

The following is one of the few articles that can be found online concerning the air war over Artsakh. I will post part of the article here:

Air War over Nagorniy-Kharabakh, 1988-1994
By Tom Cooper
Sep 29, 2003, 11:48


Map of Armenia and Azerbaijan with main Air Bases left from the times of the USSR. (Map by Tom Cooper, based on Encarta 2003)

...

Serious fighting broke out in January 1992, and soon the AzAF began using Mi-8s and Mi-24s to transport reinforcements around the front. Due to the fluid situation on the battlefield, poor communications and training but lots of enthusiasm on the part of participants on both sides, an understandable chaos reigned within both military services, but especially so the Azerbaijani army and air force. Without surprise, they were much too often an easy prey for well-armed Armenians and Russian-supported Armenians. Already on 9 January, the Armenians claimed the first AzAF helicopter as shot down, and more claims followed on 24, 28 and 31 – all of them over Nagorniy Kharabakh, the last being a Mi-8 downed by MANPADs over the village of Huha. On the same day, 31 January, the Azeris also claimed their first victims, when they shot down two (Russian) Mi-8s that supported the first Armenian offensive.

After the initial chaos, the next two months were relatively quiet and there were only sporadic reports about the fighting. The only report known from this period is the one about the first combat sortie flown by AzAF Mi-24s, on 19 February, when two of them – flown by exSoviet Army mercenaries – attacked Armenian positions near Karagaliy. Obviously, both sides used this break to obtain more equipment, establish new units, build up stocks of supplies and improve their positions. The Russians used this period for evacuation of their nationals from the area. In most cases, helicopters had to be used, as numerous villages were cut off from the outside world. Exactly such an evacuation caused the first instance of air combat during this war.

On 3 March 1992, a RuAF Mi-26 – escorted by two Mi-24s – delivered 20 tons of food to the Kharabakh village of Gyulistan. On the return flight, the helicopter transported 50 Russian refugees (mainly women and children) from Stepankert to Yerevan. Before reaching the Armenian airspace, the formation was intercepted by a camouflaged AzAF Mi-8 that seems to have fired in the general direction of the Mi-26. Before any hits could be scored, however, the Azeri Mi-8 was driven away by escorting Mi-24s. Attempting to avoid a wider confrontation, the Russian pilots did not insist and gave up the pursuit.

Nevertheless, minutes later, the Armenians shot down the Mi-26s by a single 9K32/SA-7A over the village of Seydilyar, killing 12, and injuring 38. The RuAF immediately initiated a SAR operation, and two Mi-8s managed to extricate the injured survivors despite considerable difficulties caused by the deep snow in the area.

On the first view, the Azeri attack against this Mi-26 appears as an unprovoked slaughter of civilians, but it must be mentioned, that between the 23 February and 7 March, the Russian Army helicopters flew the whole 366th Mechanized Infantry Regiment to Stepankert, the capital of Nagorniy-Kharabakh. The Azeris - not without a good reason - considered this unit and helicopters that supported it as likely to support the local Armenians, and thus as a legitimate target. There were constant problems with identification of helicopters and aircraft deployed by all three involved parties, as most of these wore similar camouflage and markings. New markings of Armenia and Azerbaijan were largely unknown to helicopter crews and gunners on the ground. Finally, the Azeris were not that wrong with their assumption about what the Russian helicopters were actually doing in Nagorniy-Kharabakh: it is now known, that – between other supplies – the Mi-26s have transported a batch of 9K32 Strela/SA-7A MANPADS and several ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns (two of which were positioned in the hills over Mardakert with a special task of countering AzAF Mi-24s) to Armenian militia in Stepankert.

In late February 1992, the Armenians readied two of their newly formed mechanized brigades for a new offensive with the task of establishing a corridor from the Armenian border to Nagorniy Kharabakh. The attack was initially successful, and a road connection – usually called “Lachin Corridor” - was established, resulting in the Russians now having some time to stand down from flying continuous supply sorties to the isolated enclave. By early March, the Azeris organized a counteroffensive on several places along the Armenian corridor.

During this operation the AzAF again deployed its helicopters, but a number of these was rapidly shot down by newly-reinforced Armenian air defences, now equipped with a considerable number of ZU-23-2s and 9K32 Strelas. On 5 March, another Mi-8 was shot down, followed by a Mi-24 on 28 March, shot down by SA-7s near Kapzchvan.

...

http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_280.shtml

[Joseph]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Great, that Azatavrear stole my whole post!!! Kind of an a-hole.

[Eddo211]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Your post and including others here needs to reach beyond just this website. I take no credit as who I post as other than some Armenian on these websites with traffic from people around the world. I did ask for permission a while back on this thread but maybe I should have been more clear. My bad.

[Federate]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

This IS a public forum just like all other forums, folks. Shouldn't be upset or surprised if you see other people using stuff you write since you are kind of releasing it to the public. On the contrary, you should be happy that people like and look up to what you write and that you are informing/helping your fellow Armenians.

[Joseph]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Your post and including others here needs to reach beyond just this website. I take no credit as who I post as other than some Armenian on these websites with traffic from people around the world. I did ask for permission a while back on this thread but maybe I should have been more clear. My bad.

No sweat. Didn't realize it was you. I really should have cleaned up that post. I made several gramatical and spelling errors.

[Joseph]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Everyone, I found this some time ago. It is not regarding NKR but interesting and in the same vein as this topic.



We begin by setting the stage. The region of South Ossetia is largely surrounded by nearly insurmountable mountains. Except for groups of mountain infantry without much by way of heavy equipment, and the odd mountain goat, the eastern and western sides of the roughly oval-shaped quasi-republic are quite impenetrable. In the south, a single pass leads into the region from the Georgian town of Gori, coincidentally Iosif Stalin's birthplace; this pass eventually exits into a hilly countryside and empties into something like a bowl-shaped depression, in the middle of which lies Ossetia's capital city of Tskhinvali (also pronounced "Tskhinval") - pre-war population of between 20 and 30 thousand. Beyond Tskhinvali, a single road leads north towards the only route navigable across the region's northern border by any sort of transport - the Rok Tunnel, which had been cut through miles of rock back during the Soviet days and connects directly with North Ossetia, an autonomous region of the
Russian Federation. The remainder of South Ossetians are scattered in villages around Tskhinvali, although before the war several ethnic Georgian enclaves also remained.

To the west, across the mountains, lies Abkhazia. It, too, has only a single navigable route leading into it from both the north and south, although the region's western border is the Black Sea itself, easing navigation somewhat. The southern route crosses the Kodori Gorge into Georgia proper, where it first encounters the town of Sugdidi.

Georgia itself is also roughly oval-shaped; to the south and west of Sugdidi are the main ports of Poti and, further south still, Batumi, which is especially vital to Georgia's oil transportation industry, while about 50 kilometers to the east of Gori is Georgia's capital, Tbilisi. From Gori to Tskhinvali to the Rok Tunnel is another 50 kilometers at the most - similarly from the regional center of Kutaisi to Sugdidi, through the Kodori Gorge and into the Abkhazi capital of Sukhumi. Finally, it should be noted that much of Georgia proper - from Poti and Batumi in the west to Tbilisi in the east - the terrain is generally even - far more suitable for mobile operations than the hilly Ossetia ringed by mountain ridges.

Deployment of the opposing sides prior to the conflict was as follows.

The Georgian military before the conflict numbered approximately 20,000 combat troops, with another 10,000 logistical and administrative personnel and a further 7,000 of Interior Ministry troops (glorified SWAT teams with armored vehicles). Equipment was generally of Soviet make, with official pre-war strength at 82 T-72 and 110 T-55 tanks of all marks with first-generation ERA (Explosive Reactive Armor); about 150 BMP armored fighting vehicles, another 80-100 medium and heavy APCs and at least 100 light wheeled APCs; roughly 40-50 self-propelled (all 152mm) and 130 towed (about 100 122mm, the rest 152mm) artillery pieces, plus 35-45 multiple rocket launch systems; 15-20 combat aircraft plus another 15 light jet trainers and roughly 80 helicopters of all types.

That's the official Georgian data per Tbilisi's various disclosures, e.g. to the UN. Unofficially, the numbers vary somewhat; for example, Russian data as of July 20 suggested that the Georgians had 165 T-72s (75 T-72M, the rest T-72 B1 and AV; the AV model has first-generation ERA, the T-72M is the export version with downgraded weapon systems, and the B1 has improved armor and fire control systems plus ERA but drops the ATGM capability) and 40 T-55-AM tanks (the modernized version but with a weaker engine than the current upgrade of T-55s), rather than 82 and 110, respectively ; 373 artillery pieces of all types excluding multiple rocket launchers rather than the 170-180 implied above; just over 20 combat aircraft (mostly Su-25s) plus 33 light attack aircraft (L-159 ALCA) and 25-26 rather than 80 combat helicopters; and a number of missile boats and patrol ships.

The numbers above should also be viewed in light of the following disclosures about arms shipments to Georgia over 2004-2008: 10 UH-1-H helicopters and 230 wheeled vehicles (including 15 Hummers delivered by AM General, LLC - a firm whose financials I know as intimately as is possible...) from the U.S., with 15 UH-60 Blackhawks on tap; 7 152mm self-propelled guns, 16 ZSU-23 AAA guns, and 300 RPG-7s, 500 "Igla" MANPADS (man-portable air defense systems) and 150 "Kornet" and "Konkurs" ATGMs, 4 SU-25 attack aircraft, two light troop ships, 10 thousand crates of AK-47 assault rifles and RPG 22s plus ammunition, and 650 tons of ammunition from Bulgaria; 66 APCs, 1186 AMD-65 assault rifles, 44 PKM machine-guns, 600 82mm mortar rounds and an unspecified amount of 7.62mm ammunition from Hungary; 1 missile boat and 2 patrol ships plus 60 mortars from Greece; 14 thousand AK assault rifles from Lithuania; 60 RN-94 APCs, 2 UH-1 helicopters, one patrol ship, 2,500 MP5A1(k) SMGs, 1,500 G3 A3 ass
ault rifles, 4,000 122mm rockets and 20,000 155mm artillery shells, plus a large amount of 7.62mm ammunition and hand grenades from Turkey; one multiple rocket launcher with 4 Mirage fighter aircraft, 2 missile boats and upwards of 60-65 "Mistrale" and "Mistrale-2" MANPADS from France; 120 T-54 or T-55 and 55 T-72 tanks, plus 24 "Dana" 152mm self-propelled artillery vehicles, 25 M-75 120mm mortars, 200 "Strela" MANPADs and more than 40 tons of ammunition of all types from the Czech Republic; 8 "Hermes-450" and "Skylark" unmanned recon aircraft from Israel; 45 120mm and 25 82mm mortars plus 500 262mm rockets from Bosnia & Herzegovina; 20 million 7.62mm bullets, plus 1,000 HEAT and 1,690 APFSDS tank shells and other ammunition from Serbia; 31 T-72s, 20 BTR-80s, 40 BMP-2s, 12 152mm "Akatsia" self-propelled artillery vehicles, 9 Mi-24, 2 Mi-8MT and 2 Mi-4 helicopters, 40 tons of ammunition, multiple other specialist vehicles and at least three "Buk"-M1-2 medium-range mobile SAM systems
(basically a next-generation version of the SA-11) from the Ukraine.

I'm not including hundreds of radios, a SIM-3C-10 computer platoon training simulator from Estonia, tons of spare parts, assorted odds and ends like engineering equipment, and, of course, training. The U.S. alone still had 95 advisors and 130 "civilian contractors" in Georgia when things broke out.

The bottom line is - we're talking about potentially enough heavy equipment for a U.S. mechanized division plus some "walking" infantry formations (or, put differently, five mechanized brigades - which, coincidentally, corresponds to the nubmering that the Georgian army uses, i.e. 1st Brigade through 5th Brigade). Not inclusive of the 2,000 or so troops sent to Iraq at some point in the past few years (one of the five brigades, but without most of its heavy equipment). Precise comparison is difficult to make due to the variations in just how many AFVs and IFVs the Georgians could have had at the outset. Plus a small-ish airforce, almost all of it ground-attack oriented; it should be noted that during the Soviet days, Tbilisi was the home of the USSR's main Su-25 manufacturing plant, which explains why such a small republic had 20 of the things still operational (at least 5 upgraded by the Israelis with new avionics and targeting systems). [For those who don't know - the Su-25 is th
e Soviet version of the A-10 Warthog ground attack aircraft, except it looks more like a conventional fighter-bomber, and has had considerably more combat experience. Specifically, flying 60,000 sorties for 21 combat losses during the Afghanistan bru-ha-ha in the 1980s, then thousands more during the many wars that followed the USSR's collapse, e.g. the two Chechen conflicts, as well as 900 sorties during the Iran-Iraq War. Basically very effective at wiping out ground troops and armor when the pilot has any degree of skill, but not a totally unforgiving bird either.]

On the other side of the mountains, we have Abkhazia with between 5,000 and 10,000 regular troops (the number varies year-to-year) plus 28,000 reservists; roughly 60 tanks, about 40 of them T-72s and the remainder T-55s; 116 APCs and BMP IFVs; 85 artillery pieces and mortars (total); 5 SU-25 aircraft, about a half-dozen other fixed-wing and 2 rotary aircraft, and 21 patrol boats. Think - a brigade, maybe two, with modest armor and artillery support.

Finally, pre-war South Ossetia - a region with a total population of significantly lower than 120,000 (just how much lower depends on whether one counts the ethnic Georgians, most of whom have now surely fled; 70,000 to 80,000 is likely the "real" number here) - had 3,000 regular troops and 15,000 reservists (pretty much any male old enough to hold a gun and not yet so old as to preclude him from using it effectively), plus 200 "militarized SWAT" and 900 police; nominally 75 T-72s and 12 T-55s, 80 BMP-1 and BMP-2 IFVs and 85 BTR-70 and BTR-80 APCs; 42 122mm and 152mm "Gvozdika" and "Akatsia" self-propelled artillery vehicles plus another 80 towed artillery and mortar pieces; a few ZSU-23 "Shilka" and towed 100mm AAA, plus "Igla" MANPADS, an unspecified amount of RPG-7 and RPG-22 weapons, and 4 Mi-8 helicopters. There may have been a few more combat helicopters, including - ground reports indicate - at least 3 American UH-1s (don't ask me how they got there...). Basically, one briga
de, plus or minus. As it turned out, "minus", due to the issue with Ossetia's tanks and BMPs (see below).

These are totals, of course. Recall that the leading edge of any engagement actually involves considerably fewer troops and tanks on either side.

And oh yes - the Russians. The Russians, as it happened, had designated the entire area as the "Caucasus Military District", with the bulk of the military forces therein provided by the 58th Army, with air support provided by the 4th Air and Air Defense Army. The 58th's somewhat-dated OOB included the 19th Motor Rifle Division, the 205th Motor Rifle Brigade, the 136th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, the 135th Motor Rifle Regiment, the 291st Artillery Brigade (equipped with towed 152mm 2A65 guns); the 943rd Multiple Rocket Launcher Regiment (220mm "Uragan" MRLS); the 1128th Anti-tank Regiment; the 67th AA Rocket Brigade (first- and next-generation SA-11); and the 487th Helicopter Regiment (Mi-8 and Mi-24 "Hind" helos). The 19th Motor Rifle includes 3 Motor Rifle regiment (each with a tank battalion), a separate tank regiment (mostly T-72s, I believe), an "Akatsia" 152mm SP artillery regiment; and organic air defense. Prior to the conflict, apparently the 58th Army was reinforced with so
me of the newer weapon systems in the Russian arsenal, such as the S-300 long-range SAM, the new MRLS system (forgot the designation, but makes the 220mm Uragan pale by comparison), etc. The 4th Air Army has several regiments of Mig-29 (F-16-like) and Su-27 (F-15-like) fighters as well as Su-24 (F-111 equivalent), Su-25 (A-10-like) and Tu-22 bombers and recon aircraft, plus Mi-24 Hinds and a bunch of transport helicopters.

Oh yes - the final piece of the puzzle were the peacekeeper battalions - 500 Russians and 500 Georgians deployed in each "separatist region" - lightly armed, with only a few BMPs and transport helicopters in each.

Prior to August 8, the Georgians moved two combat brigades with perhaps half the republic's total number of tanks and IFVs, and what looks to be most of their artillery (certainly all of their MRLS systems) up from Gori and towards the gorge that led to Tskhinvali. Additional light infantry forces were activated in the Georgian enclaves inside South Ossetia proper. By this time, there had already been sporadic exchanges of fire between Georgia, Abkhazia and Ossetia for roughly a week, though nothing serious; the Abkhazians did, however, shoot down at least three of the Georgians' unmanned recon aircraft. Meanwhile, the Russians, not being blind, moved five battalions from the 19th Motor Rifle Division closer to the Russian entrance of the Rok Tunnel, and placed the remainder of the 58th Army on yellow alert. Apparently, several other Russian units were activated at this time, namely the two ethnic Chechen battalions ("East" and "West") and certain air assault formations. In additio
n, about half of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, having recently conducted maneuvers off the Abkhazian and Russian coastlines, remained in the area, within a few hours of the Georgian ports.

For their part, the Ossetians placed their forces on red alert and began evacuating civilians from the region (especially Tskhinvali) during the last few days before the war; while the Abkhazi activated their military units but did nothing else for the moment.
August 8-9.

The conflict began some time after midnight on August 8. The Georgians claim that they crossed into South Ossetia in response to an Ossetian attack; even if this had been the case, then the massed Georgian forces had been waiting for just such an opportunity - given their carefully prepared plans (see below).

[Joseph]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

The precise sequence of events here diverges based on whom one asks; the Georgians maintain that they first atempted to rush Tskhinvali with a column of troops and tanks, while the Ossetians suggest that the artillery and rocket barrage hit the town first. Notably, the Georgian artillery was already in position to open fire on Tskhinvali at the first sign of resistance before the conflict began, and so the Ossetian version rings truer. Regardless, it is indisputable that in the dawn hours of August 8, parts of Tskhinvali were pounded by Georgian artillery and rocket launchers deployed on the heights east, south, and west of the town, while a large group of Georgians smashed their way in along the southern road. Simultaneously, at least one or two reinforced battalions of the Georgians, plus an unspecified number of "Georgian special forces" (in practice, as it turned out, Georgian soldiers who had been trained not only how to march in time but also to fire their weapons in the gene
ral direction of a target) and a couple of artillery batteries attempted to cut the Tskhinvali-Rok Tunnel road some 10-20 kilometers north of the town itself. Other Georgian forces fanned out to attack Ossetian villages around Tskhinvali.

Georgia's plan was, per maps and documents that were later captured by the advancing Russians, to capture Tskhinvali within the first 5-6 hours of the conflict (another reason for why I would think the artillery barrage preceded the column that went into the town, since theoretically that makes more sense than calling in massed artillery bombardments after you're already enmeshed in street battles), establish a firm roadblock north of the town, use the daylight hours of August 8 to rush through most of the remaining Ossetian territory, and present the presumably stunned and bamboozled Russians not only with a fait accompli but also with the daunting proposition of having to smash their way into South Ossetia through a blocked-off choke-point under fire from tanks and artillery. At which point, too, they would be under untold political pressure from the U.S. to keep their paws off the "Democratic (capital D) Republic of Georgia".

It was a sound plan. It was a cunning plan. It was, for lack of a better descriptor, a stunningly brilliant plan. With only a few minor problems.

Problem 1. The Ossetians themselves.

It should be noted at this point that the Ossetians as a whole are a very proud people. Martially so, as well. It is said that during World War 2, the Ossetians earned the distinction of having the highest number of Heroes of the Soviet Union per capita, out of all of the USSR's 100 plus nationalities, including the Russians themselves. [The "Hero of the Soviet Union" is the rough equivalent of the Victoria Cross or the Congressional Medal of Honor - with potentially half or more of the awards being made posthumously.] Separately, the Ossetians are not a stupid people, certainly not in matters of war.

Somehow or another, it turned out that virtually all of Ossetia's armored vehicles were in "parade" mode, i.e. not battle-ready. Most were blown up by the Ossetians themselves in the first hours of the conflict, or else "evacuated" to the north ahead of time. This left roughly 3,000 light infantry with some marginal artillery and helicopter support. Still, this 3,000 would fight, most likely to the death, which was something the Georgian planners ought to have considered before tasking roughly two combat brigades with securing (securing!!) an area of nearly 4,000 square kilometers in under 18 hours. Even without any resistance (and believe you me, the Osseti population would most definitely attempt to resist, given the ethnic component of the conflict), this would probably have been a somewhat strenuous task, in particular given the limitations of having to move reinforcements and supplies into the region via a single not-very-wide roadway, to say nothing of Ossetia's hilly and les
s-than-tank-friendly terrain.

Problem 2. The plan's sheer brilliance.

Let's see. Time is of the essence. Speed is of the utmost importance. So let's send the main thrust of our attack straight into the enemy's main city.

Let me rephrase that. Let's ignore the fact that said city can be relatively easily bypassed and blasted to bits by tanks and artillery deployed on the heights around it. No. Let's go straight into the damn place. And actually capture every square inch of it. In about 5-6 hours.

You know, back during World War 2, the Russians learned very well the place of cities in strategic and operational warfare; speed traps. Actually storming one cost a lot of time and blood, while bypassing one and racing into the enemy's operational rear usually meant that a given garrison would be compelled to flee of its own volition. The Germans trying to physically capture Stalingrad, just as the Russians storming Kiev, Koenigsberg or Berlin, resulted in a total exhaustion of the besiegers; while bypassing all those cities and towns in Belorussia during the June 1944 Soviet offensive meant that the Germans barely had the time to abandon their heavy equipment and race to the rear; similar to what the Germans did to the Russians in June of 1941, before they bogged down in reducing centers of Soviet resistance.

Not that this means that there are no times in war when sieges and clearing operations need to be conducted - preferably by the second-echelon troops with ample artillery support (while the first echelon continues to mangle the enemy's operational depths). Yet in this case, speed was the key to the Georgian plan - Ossetia had to be defeated within scant hours, the road north cut and the Rok Tunnel sealed off, with nothing for anyone else to do other than bemoan the Georgian Blitzkrieg.

Ah. But instead, we're going to send our main column into an urban battle, granted, inside a town of 20,000 rather than a large city like Stalingrad. Still, narrow streets are bottlenecks and deathtraps to armored vehicles no matter what the scale.
Absolutely brilliant.

Problem 2.5 - the brilliance continues.

On top of everything said above, the Georgians also had to devise a way of dealing with the 500 Russian peacekeepers deployed in South Ossetia. So what did they decide? Bypass and isolate? No no - surround and assault! Presumably hoping that only a portion of a single combat brigade would suffice to overrun a full battalion of albeit lightly-armed (assault rifles, machine-guns, a few RPGs, a couple of BMP IFVs) peacekeepers while the rest of the force could proceed to subjugate South Ossetia while sticking to the Brilliant Master Plan's schedule.

Problem 3.

Absolutely no margin of error assuming a scintilla of intelligence on the side of the Russians. For, you see, any delay in the Grand Plan of Ossetian Subjugation meant that the Russians could (and did) race down the road from the Rok Tunnel and turn a would-be "fait accompli" into an actual slugfest. See Problems 1 and 2 above for potential sources of said delays.

Problem 4.

Apparently this whole concept of the Russian 4th Air Army was not even remotely considered. Let's see. A force with 20-50 ground attack aircraft, some helos and no meaningful AA except for three (3!!) systems which can actually touch medium-to-high altitude Russian aircraft and some ZSU-23s, taking on 3 whole fighter regiments and who knows how many ground attack aircraft. In daylight, for that matter. This definitely fell under the "brilliant idea" heading, unless, of course, the thought process was - we'll secure Ossetia so fast, that the Russians won't have time to get any birds up in the air.