Regional geopolitics

[UrMistake]

Re: Regional geopolitics

Vrej Italy and other of the time Western super powers during WW1 helped Turks in their hardest moments of regrouping.

As for the soviet chrushik and other mentioned mentalities i havent heard such things among armenians even when my grandpa lived in yerevan.\
You like to see our future ? Go affiliate yourself with our young generation born from the 80's and after.re
We are getting stronger and smarter and shourly more divert and multidimensional.. just like in this forum with different views of same problem.

[Vrej1915]

Re: Regional geopolitics

Vrej Italy and other of the time Western super powers during WW1 helped Turks in their hardest moments of regrouping.

As for the soviet chrushik and other mentioned mentalities i havent heard such things among armenians even when my grandpa lived in yerevan.\
You like to see our future ? Go affiliate yourself with our young generation born from the 80's and after.re
We are getting stronger and smarter and shourly more divert and multidimensional.. just like in this forum with different views of same problem.

Italy or Westerns powers helped Turkey when? On wich front?

[UrMistake]

Re: Regional geopolitics

Italy or Westerns powers helped Turkey when? On wich front?

Treaty of Lausanne my friend plus the english and german help to industrialize Young Turks Turkey giving them enormous boost ,such kind of help that all the balkans and immediate allies like Greece would never be given ,resulting even though they were winners they stand to loose more in long run going behind turkey's capabilities economically and military.
If Soviet Bolsheviks gave turks the fish ..the europeans teach the young turks and kemal how to actually fish .

[Vrej1915]

Re: Regional geopolitics

Treaty of Lausanne my friend plus the english and german help to industrialize Young Turks Turkey giving them enormous boost ,such kind of help that all the balkans and immediate allies like Greece would never be given ,resulting even though they were winners they stand to loose more in long run going behind turkey's capabilities economically and military.
If Soviet Bolsheviks gave turks the fish ..the europeans teach the young turks and kemal how to actually fish .

You should not mix the chronology.
If there wasn't Lenin in 1917-18, the treaties of Maskwa and Kars, followed by the invasion of Armenia on two fronts first, then the Greek defeat with russian effective backing in Smyrnia, there wouldn't have been a treaty of Lausanne.
The one's who saved Turkey were the Russian Bolsheviks.

Now for what specific help you are talking when mentionning Germans?
Before 1918? If that is the help you are talking, it did not spare them capitulation of the Sultan...

For other points, please be more specific on dates, chronology.

My point was, without Lenin, Kemal would not exist.
And the fate of the Sultan's regime would have been the same as the Habsburgs...

Just to remind, that defeated sultan's regime did recognise the crime of the Armenian Genocide even if the word was not really invented, and did organise trials for some mid-level turkish criminals, even some Valis, like that of Yozgat were hanged...

So you may only imagine what kind of "Turkey" was to be created, if ever Lenin was not....

[Armynia]

Re: Regional geopolitics

So from this interview we know who the troublemaker is - Russia
And who the peacemaker is - the US

Would Azerbaijan with its billions accumulated thanks to massive US, British etc investment in its oil industry not buy weapons from any other source if Russia didn't sell? Isn't the US selling weapons to Greece and Turkey?

Do any of these morons realize that without the Russian base Turkey might intimidate, even attack?
A quick search on youtube on the Cyprus invasion.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MYJI4ubiiZY

Will 1in.am and the others even mention it?
Turkish massacres against the Kurds right now are ignored by the US and its media

Agree!

[Vrej1915]

Re: Regional geopolitics

The Logic and Risks Behind Russia's Statelet Sponsorship
By Reva Bhalla
Sept. 15, 2015


Mother Russia can be quite generous when it comes to her collection of
statelets. In the early 1990s, when a broken Russia had no choice but
to suck in her borders, a severely distracted Kremlin still found the
time and money to promote and sponsor the fledgling breakaway
territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia and
Transdniestria in Moldova. And as Russia became more economically
coherent over the years, the number of Russian troops in these
territories grew, and a bigger slice of the Russian budget was cut out
to keep the quasi-states afloat.

These post-Soviet statelets have a good deal in common. They are all
tiny--South Ossetia is roughly 3,900 square kilometers (1,500 square
miles) and has about 40,000 inhabitants, Abkhazia covers 8,500 square
kilometers and its population is about 240,000, and Transdniestria is
4,100 square kilometers and has a population of 555,000. They are also
all economically isolated, effectively run on black and gray
economies, and are largely dependent on Russia's financial largesse
for survival. Most important, from Russia's point of view, they each
occupy strategic spaces in the post-Soviet sphere where Russian troops
and thus the potential for further intervention can apply acute
pressure on Georgia and Moldova should they draw too close to the
West. The presence of Russian troops in these breakaway territories
forms the tripwire that any Western patron will be wary to cross when
it comes to defending those countries in their time of need. This,
after all, is the true deterrent value of statelet sponsorship.

But Russia's strategy has also gotten to be a lot more burdensome and
much more complicated in recent years. In addition to readopting
Crimea (covering 26,000 square kilometers with a population of 2
million), Russia has added to its basket of statelets the
self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's
Republic (16,000 square kilometers collectively with a population of
1.5 million and 2 million, respectively) in eastern Ukraine. Though
exact figures are hard to come by, various compiled estimates show
Russia has annually been injecting about $300 million into Abkhazia
and at least $100 million into South Ossetia and Transdniestria each
to finance their annual budgets, provide cheap fuel, pay pensions and
so on. In addition, Russia has allocated at least $2.42 billion in
2015 to support Crimea (not including military costs) and, according
to a report written by Higher School of Economics analyst Sergei
Aleksashenko, Russia has allocated at least $2 billion in the federal
2015 budget to sustain its military support in eastern Ukraine, a
figure that continues to grow.

And the list is only getting longer. As the world has observed in
recent weeks, Russian military support for Syrian loyalist forces in
the coastal Alawite enclave of Latakia has dramatically increased,
with all signs pointing to a long-term stay. Knowing that any
negotiated settlement is likely to fall apart in the end, the Russian
plan is to help Syria's Alawites carve out a de facto state.
Meanwhile, back in the Caucasus, the long frozen conflict of
Nagorno-Karabakh may also be taking a significant turn in the coming
months. We see growing indications that Russia and Azerbaijan may be
collaborating to shake up the status quo between Azerbaijan and
Armenia, with Russia readied to send in peacekeepers and stay for the
long haul in a bid to tighten its grip in the region.

From eastern Ukraine to Alawite Syria to Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia
appears to be making a conscious effort to widen its footprint in
strategic spaces. This will be a pricey endeavor, but the geopolitical
logic behind these moves is not lacking.

Whether strong or weak, capitalist, communist or tsarist, Russia will
be compelled to anchor itself to natural geographic barriers for its
own security. In eastern Ukraine, the natural Russian extension is to
the Dnieper River, and short of reaching that river, Russia will try
its best to use the separatist regions to both undermine Kiev and
create an imperfect buffer against NATO's growing involvement with
Kiev. The Crimean Peninsula reinforces Russia's hold on its only
warm-water base at Sevastopol on the Black Sea, and naval projection
on the Black Sea gives Russia access to the Mediterranean. The ports
of Latakia and Tartus on the Syrian Mediterranean coast--an Alawite
stronghold now depending on Russian aid--gives Russia a physical
foothold in the eastern Mediterranean and a platform to influence
power plays in the Levant. In the mountainous Caucasus, where Russia
has already been strengthening its presence in Georgia's breakaway
territories and remains Armenia's only real patron, a developing
bargain with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh has the potential to
expand Russia's presence even more and thus reinforce a Russian buffer
to the south.

A Buffer in Eastern Ukraine

In order of priority, Russia's position in eastern Ukraine comes
first. Ukraine, from centuries past to today, forms the soft
underbelly of the Russian state that must be insulated at all costs.
If Ukraine comes under significant influence or control of a Western
power, the Russian southwestern flank will be laid bare. But Russia is
not strong enough to anchor itself on the Dnieper River and absorb
both the military and economic costs of such an endeavor. So Russia
must settle. The best Russia can do at this point is to try to
consolidate autonomy for the eastern rebel provinces, using its tight
grip over separatist commanders to dial up and down the conflict as
the need arises. If Russia feels as though its demands are being
ignored when it comes to NATO's buildup, sanctions or the like,
violence in eastern Ukraine flares up. Once the Germans and the French
get the message and start pressuring Kiev to make certain political
concessions, the fighting quickly de-escalates.

This is a pattern that all sides are getting used to, but it is still
far from ideal for Moscow. No matter what negotiations are in play,
Russia is not about to withdraw its military foothold in eastern
Ukraine. At the same time, that military dynamic provides the
foundation for a pro-West Kiev to lean on the United States for help
in defending itself against a persistent Russian threat. Russia must
therefore carefully calibrate its military moves in eastern Ukraine,
making clear that any Western push would risk a direct confrontation
with the Russians, but also not going far enough to where its actions
compel a U.S. response that could cause the Russian buffer to recede
even more in the end.

Preparing for an Alawite Statelet in Syria

Russia's moves in Syria are deeply intertwined with this dynamic in
Ukraine. Even as Russia is locked into a long-term tug-of-war with the
United States over the former Soviet rim, Moscow needs mutual areas of
interest on the periphery to shape a dialogue with Washington. The
Russians see the conundrum the United States is in, trying to fight
the Islamic State with the help of regional powers while also trying
to avoid the messier process of wholesale government change. Since
early this year, Russia has been expending considerable effort to try
to cobble together a negotiation that would outline the shape of a
post-Bashar al Assad state, making itself appear as an indispensable
partner to Washington when it comes to finding an end to the civil
war. The United States needs this negotiation, and it needs the
backers of the al Assad government, Russia and Iran, to bring the
loyalists to the table. The more the United States depends on Russia
to facilitate the negotiation, so goes the Russian logic, the more
leverage Moscow has to negotiate limits on Western encroachment in
Russia's immediate backyard.

But Russia is also not under any illusions when it comes to bringing
peace to Syria's warring factions. Any negotiation is doomed to fail
so long as the more intractable and competent rebel factions prefer
the battleground to the negotiating table. Russia's strategy thus
comes in two parts--it must create a credible basis for a negotiation
over Syria that it can use as leverage with the United States, but it
must also prepare for the worst to protect its position in the eastern
Mediterranean for when that negotiation inevitably falls apart.
Russia's substantial military buildup at the ports of Latakia and
Tartus on the Alawite coast in recent weeks, to go along with its
existing naval depot at Tartus, speaks to both of these objectives.

For the Syrian government to be comfortable entering negotiations, it
needs to first feel secure in its core territory, running from the
south through Damascus up through Zabadani and parts of Homs and Hama
to the Mediterranean coastline. This is a plan that Russia and Iran
are working closely together on. (Qassem Soleimani, an Iranian major
general and the commander of the Quds Force, is rumored to have
traveled to Moscow earlier in September to meet with Russian President
Vladimir Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to discuss the
implementation of this strategy.) A look at the satellite imagery of
Russia's buildup so far shows airfield construction, possible control
towers and housing for troops. Russia appears to be building up the
logistical capability to stage aerial assets, such as fighter jets and
helicopters, to help reinforce the Alawite statelet. Stratfor sources
have indicated that Russia's military buildup in Syria so far has cost
around $500 million, sourced from the military budget of Russia's
Black Sea command, while the military equipment Russia is deploying to
Syria remains under Russian control. In essence, the Russian-Iranian
plan enables the Alawites to enter a negotiation on a stronger
footing, but also with the security that they will have a de facto
Alawite state to fall back on as the Syrian state formally fragments
with time.

A Shake-Up in the Caucasus?

Further under the radar, we can see Russia's strategy in the Caucasus
starting to evolve after more than two decades of frozen conflict
between the former Soviet states of Azerbaijan and Armenia over the
tiny enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. Nagorno-Karabakh (4,400 square
kilometers and now a majority Armenian population of around 150,000)
has been under the de facto control of Yerevan since a 1994 cease-fire
ended the war between the two foes. Economically isolated, Armenia
hosts some 5,000 Russian forces and sits firmly under the Russian
security umbrella, lacking alternative patrons. In contrast,
Azerbaijan, far less geographically constrained and endowed with
energy resources, likes to keep its options open, always opting for a
balance between the West and its former Soviet roots. That said,
Azerbaijan and Russia have been a lot cozier than usual in recent
months, raising questions in our mind whether Moscow has enticed Baku
with an offer pertaining to the fiercely nationalist topic of
Nagorno-Karabakh.

Azerbaijan is fed up with negotiations mediated by the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe and wants to see if it can put
its years of military preparations to work to retake the territory.
Armenia, occupying the territory's high ground and thus holding the
strategic advantage over Azerbaijan, would obviously prefer to keep
the status quo. The only way Armenia would likely be forced to
renegotiate terms on Nagorno-Karabakh is if hostilities resumed and
Russia, Armenia's sole patron, were to play a dominant role in
mediating their end. It is little coincidence that the Armenian rumor
mill has been buzzing with speculation that Russia and Azerbaijan are
developing an understanding that would have Russian peacekeepers
occupy and neutralize the territory. We are doubtful that this plan
could be imposed on Armenia solely through diplomatic means.

While we cannot be sure that this scenario will ultimately play out,
we have collected enough clues to date that put a Nagorno-Karabakh
shake-up high on our watch list. And with Nagorno-Karabakh on the list
of territories up for Russian adoption, Russia's commitment to
creating new footholds abroad has the potential to expand even more.

The Costs of Sponsorship

Russia's strategy may not be cheap, but it is entirely rational from a
geopolitical point of view. Russia is weakening internally at the same
time it is confronting a strong and growing threat from the United
States on its former Soviet doorstep. While Russia is still in the
game, it might as well create and reinforce as many perches as it can
in its near abroad to leverage against the West and maintain whatever
influence it still holds in preparation for much more difficult years
to come. Thus, the bill that Moscow is footing for its statelets, even
factoring in a volatile ruble, may still be quite reasonable from a
Russian perspective. Operating from a low and still rough estimate, we
can assume that Russia is spending at least $5 billion annually on
these quasi-states, which is still less than 3 percent of Russia's
2015 federal budget of $206 billion. This amount does not include the
large amount of pre-allocated defense budget that goes into the
Ukraine and Syria operations. There is also an opportunity cost to
bear in mind. Pre-allocated military resources cannot be redirected to
other purposes, such as procurement, training, and research and
development unless the defense budget as a whole continues to
increase.

However, the costs are not just financial. Nagorno-Karabakh is a
tinderbox; once the conflict resumes, it will not be easy to contain.
It is a region where both a resurgent Turkey and Iran will try to push
back against an overly ambitious Russia. In Syria, the threat of
mission creep is also real, since the loyalist government is combating
an assembly of Sunni powers with a shared interest to undercut Iran.
Moreover, with Russia preparing the ground for stationing aerial
assets, it must calculate the risks of operating in a crowded
battlespace, with U.S., Turkish, Israeli and potentially other
European and Arab coalition partners entering the fray. In Ukraine,
just as Russian sponsorship of eastern Ukraine incrementally
increases, a U.S. military buildup on Russia's European frontier will
grow in kind. Ultimately, this is Russia's backyard, and Russia will
be far more constrained than the United States when it comes to this
level of competition. A statelet sponsorship strategy can go only so
far.

https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/logic-and-risks-behind-russias-statelet-sponsorship

[Hakob]

Re: Regional geopolitics

Nah...
You are publishing here an opinion from American publisher purely consisting of Jewish personnel that has been known to serve only state departments needs.
Isn't it a propaganda again?
I asked you fiew posts before, what are your handlers preparing for Armenia and Russia generally lately?
Play with Armenians fears right?
For over a decade, all respectable think tankers say that any war in Artsakh is not benefitting Russia. It still hasn't changed.
A war runs the risk of getting out of hand and involvement of US/NATO in the area. It's hand is in turkey and Georgia, a few kilometers away.
This is bs that has been put to circulation in different shape for the past 20 years that "look Armenians, Russia is going to give away Karabakh to Azerbaijan".
xxxx,
I will get back with your part one lengthy post in which you still try to put some credibility in Russia ever saving turkey.
Against whom did Russia save turkey? Armenian republic?
Can our actions, as Armenian republic allied itself with allied powers " Antant" they called, have anything to do with it?
Just 3 years before Russia was in war with turkey.
You drop lenin's name to make it sound right?
Russia has never save turkey. You and your clan spread this bs and then change and twist it to fit.
On contrast, England and France really saved turkey in 1923/24 Greco/ Turkish war when turkey was loosing all of Trakia to Greece.
It's pure propaganda. I don't see anything beneficial neither for Armenia or Armenians anywhere.

[Hakob]

Re: Regional geopolitics

Looool...
Look Russia always saved turkey. U.S. And Europe are trying to isolate turkey(by Igor mouradian) but Russia will save it. Russia will save Azerbaijan too. See? It is going to pull out of armenia(since we could not make you take the bait all those years and kick them out like Georgians and Azeris did, we will convince you that Russians will leave you themselfs).
Russia will establish its bases in Artsakh(so 180years old base in gumri does not count).
You are landlocked, out of options and UNDERSTAND that Russia is not an ally but your enemy.
Your only future lies with US NATO. Seeee...
Loool, who do you think you are fooling? Do you think that we are the same like in 1918? That you can use it and then loose it....

[Haykakan]

Re: Regional geopolitics

Yeh Vrej its always Russia's fault....The things you complain most about ironically enough happened because of the Bolshevik revolution. You know who funded that revolution? You know who gave refuge and funding to its leaders? Who gave them arms? Why Russia left WW1? I will give you a hint..it was not Russians. You go ahead and try to drive that wedge Vrej but those of us who know history and have learned from it will fight you tooth and nail! The fact is that it is the west that has always brought us doom with their false promises and backstabbing yet you are ready to bend over yet one more time...I guess you like that kind of thing but most of us do not. Go ahead take your money from whatever antiarmenian source you get it from. I am happy to protect my people from the likes of you and will do it for free so long as I breath.
Armenia does need to follow her interests but you must have the power to do that and power is what she does not have much of. Vrej thinks that spiting on Russia and kicking them out will somehow allow us to further our interests. Unfortunately he does not say how this will help us pursue our quest for sovereignty. Ok so we kicked out Russia...then what? This is the main problem with the likes of Vrej and pretty much most of the antirussian protesters in Yerevan. Ok Russia is gone..now what? Is Armenia safer? Is Armenia economically better of? Is Armenia less isolated? Any objective observer will say no to all of these questions. If Russia leaves what is to stop Azeris and the Turks from launching wars on both fronts? Europe and USA have proven that they will not stop Turkey. With Russia gone what will stop the Turk from finishing the genocide? You think we can beat both Turkey and the Azeris at the same time by ourselves? You think Iran will save us? Vrej loves talking out of his arse but when it comes to reality you can see that he is nothing more then hot air. Yeh sure Armenia needs to pursue her interests whenever she can and so should every other country on earth...there is nothing new here. To pursue ones interest one needs to be strong enough to do it. Armenia can pursue some of her interests today but not all of them because she is far from being a strong country. Russia can pursue many more of her interests compared to Armenia because she is much stronger. These are simple facts of life. Armenia has demonstrated that she can Pursue some of her interests (Kharabagh war) and has also demonstrated her weaknesses(Iranian relations). Sure Russia in pursuing her interests limits Armenia in this case from pursuing her interests. This is simply the law of the jungle...strong vs weak. Sure I want Armenia to pursue her own interests all the time but this is not possible today because she is still very weak. Realizing one's limitations are just as important as realizing and seizing one's opportunities. I think on the international Level Armenia's leaders have indeed done all they could to pursue her interests within their abilities. There seem to be new opportunities opening up for Armenia now because of various geopolitical reasons and I have no doubts that her leaders will seize the opportunities that arise and will have to pass on some because they are simply not strong enough to seize those. I have always stated that Armenia must seize her opportunities when doing so does not threaten her survivability. Pursuing interests that are out of reach or that put the existence of the nation at risk is playing with fire. Some of us learned this from our tragic history and some of us are much too stubborn to let history(or anyone else) teach them anything.
I want people to realize some very important things about risk(I actually teach about risk taking in college). Taking risks is necessary some times but taking risks always means you have the possibility of loss. The more often you take risks the greater the chance of loss. We sit back today and gloat about our victory in Kharabagh but we forget that things were so bad at one point that our president was ready to surrender. We forget the generation that grew up on candle light and kerosene. When you take risks your success is not guaranteed and the risk of loss (for the types of risks we are discussing regarding Armenia) can be total. When you take risks you want to make sure that the possible reward is greater then the possible loss. While Armenia today faces some opportunities, they all come with some level of risk. Based on previous actions I believe the present government is effective and evaluating which risks are worth taking and which are not. I only wish they were as good at resolving domestic issues.

[Vrej1915]

Re: Regional geopolitics

Nah...
You are publishing here an opinion from American publisher purely consisting of Jewish personnel that has been known to serve only state departments needs.
Isn't it a propaganda again?
I asked you fiew posts before, what are your handlers preparing for Armenia and Russia generally lately?
Play with Armenians fears right?
For over a decade, all respectable think tankers say that any war in Artsakh is not benefitting Russia. It still hasn't changed.
A war runs the risk of getting out of hand and involvement of US/NATO in the area. It's hand is in turkey and Georgia, a few kilometers away.
This is bs that has been put to circulation in different shape for the past 20 years that "look Armenians, Russia is going to give away Karabakh to Azerbaijan".
xxxx,
I will get back with your part one lengthy post in which you still try to put some credibility in Russia ever saving turkey.
Against whom did Russia save turkey? Armenian republic?
Can our actions, as Armenian republic allied itself with allied powers " Antant" they called, have anything to do with it?
Just 3 years before Russia was in war with turkey.
You drop lenin's name to make it sound right?
Russia has never save turkey. You and your clan spread this bs and then change and twist it to fit.
On contrast, England and France really saved turkey in 1923/24 Greco/ Turkish war when turkey was loosing all of Trakia to Greece.
It's pure propaganda. I don't see anything beneficial neither for Armenia or Armenians anywhere.

Ay mart, zzvtzrir.
Hayasdane pokr erkir a.
Vor klukhed mi kitch kor dass, hasdad ge jaress megin, vor midum gam bnum texte dessel a...
Mi had zanki ko hamar....