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Re: Regional geopolitics
NUCLEAR TURKEY
Ara Marjanyan
07.05.2012
Expert, "Noravank" Foundation
A number of processes on domestic (national), regional and global
levels rise inclination of Turkey for the creation of the nuclear
capabilities of its own.
1. Geopolitical factors
On this level following circumstances should be singled out:
* Though the 5th article of NATO agreement provides protection for
Turkey by means of a nuclear umbrella, B. Obama's well-known "Provision
of global peace and security without nuclear weapons" initiative as
well as strengthening of isolationist moods among representatives of
both republican and democratic political wings, cause considerable
tension among the southern NATO member-countries and first of all
in Turkey (as well in Italy and partially in Greece). Besides, the
situation formed makes some Western European NATO partners (France and
Britain) form joint military strategic capabilities. Other countries
(Germany, the Netherlands) complying with the logic of intensification
of the tendencies ("no American bombs on our territories", "say no
to nuclear energy") are complied to free territory for the facilities
of their own, to create a fertile soil for the acknowledgment of the
necessity of their origination.
* The role in the creation of the US/NATO missile defence system
offered by the US to Turkey (and a number of Eastern European
countries) as a "consolation of their concern" cannot be considered as
good guarantee for national sovereignty provision as availability of
nuclear potential of its own. Even more, deployment of the elements
of missile defence by the US in Turkey causes serious concern in
Iran and Syria (in mid-term prospects in Saudi Arabia). It is known
from the lessons of the Cold War that missile defence contains
considerable destabilizing potential. This point is more than
reasonable in Turkey's regard; * Obstacles which came forward on the
way of political integration with Europe, unsuccessful negotiations,
which lasted for years, deepen Turkey's "disappointment in Europe" and
intensify its aspiration to rely only on its own powers, to establish
close cooperation with other regions (Asian-Pacific region) and powers
(Argentina, Brazil, Russia, China, Japan, etc.). All this questions
efficiency and geopolitical reasonability of Turkey's staying in NATO
military sector.
2. Regional factors
Here the following circumstances should be singled out:
* For decades Israel has been a nuclear power which consecutively
denies exerting international control over its nuclear programme.
This military and technology capability and this stance have provided
the national sovereignty of Israel amid rapid developments in the
region for decades. On the other hand Israel's example confirms the
steadiness of other countries to possess nuclear facilities of their
own as the highest guarantee of their national sovereignty.
* In recent decade Iran has consecutively developed elements of
the nuclear technologies and delivery means. Implementation of a
large-scale nuclear programme in Iran, technological progress and
other factors make Turkey realize necessity of balancing Iran in the
region, providing competitiveness and regional influence as well as
seeking for ways of carrying this all out [1]. The logic of symmetric
balancing makes Turkey acknowledge necessity for obtaining nuclear
capabilities of its own.
* Over a recent decade intensification of an armaments race or the
so-called "nuclear flourishing" has been observed in the region of Big
Middle East [2]. Nuclear energy, medical and other applied programmes
have been carried out in a number of Arab countries. Separate elements
of an appropriate infrastructure have been created. The development of
"Arab spring" in 2011 targeted first of all the countries of the region
which used to have and/or still have nuclear claims - Algeria, Tunisia,
Libya, Egypt, Syria and Iran. Moreover, in the expert community an
opinion was expressed that at the beginning of 2011 M. Kaddafi and
H. Mubarak regretted that they had renounced the idea of developing
nuclear military programmes of their own, i.e. they renounced the
only efficient leverage of their own national sovereignty amid the
"period of directed instability".
This acknowledgment was also substantiated by the example of the
personal fate of S. Hussein and national fate of Iraq.
3. National factors
Ideological component - "Turkish Gaullism" - In today's Turkey where
the processes of nationalization and Islamization can be observed,
acknowledgment of necessity of creation "strategic deterrence forces"
of its own, its ideological basis, political grounds and social order
are present.
According to some sources, the ruling JDP discusses Turkey's prospects
as a military component of NATO and issue of necessity of creation
of the "strategic deterrence forces" of its own [3].
>From ideological point of view convergence of traditional pro-western
"kemalist" heritage with more pro-Islamist and eastern-oriented
powers and ideas is taking plays. This third political, world outlook
and geopolitical direction was characteristically called "Turkish
Gaullism", which underlines its inheritance link to one of the mist
characteristic elements of Ch. De Gaulle's policy - strong orientation
to nationalism, alienation of NATO military component, development
of national nuclear military and economic facilities [4, 5].
Such development of the Turkish ideological and political fields is
based upon auspicious public opinion on rising independent role of
their country, intensification of its capabilities, taking a bigger
regional influence. And they feed each other reciprocally. According
to some independent public opinion polls, in 2011 more than 60%
of the population in Turkey supported the idea of obtaining more
independent and more influential role in the region. Besides, according
to large-scale public opinion polls held in the Arab countries of the
Big Middle East, Turkey is the country which played most constructive
role during the "Arab spring". Turkey received about 50% of votes of
the respondents, thus upstaging France, US and Russia [6].
Military component - The US/NATO nuclear and thermonuclear weapons
have been deployed in Turkey for decades. Currently there are several
dozens of B-61 tactical thermonuclear variable yield bombs1.
Turkey has accumulated experience of storage, security and service of
the nuclear weapons as well as experience of participation in NATO's
"joint nuclear missions". There is one active infrastructure of storage
of thermonuclear weapons (Icirlik) and four out of commission at four
air force bases2.
Infrastructural, scientific-technology and professional component -
Accumulation of critical mass of facilities and infrastructures,
satisfactory rate of economic development, which are enough for
developing nuclear capabilities, are observed in today's Turkey.
1. Thus, in Turkey the experience of small-scale and/or experimental
production of all the stages of nuclear fuel cycle has been developed
and accumulated for more than 30 years - uranium ore production,
processing, ("yellow cake"3), enrichment, creation of pellets and
rods. There are also infrastructures for small-scale processing and
long-term storage of nuclear waste, radiation dosimetry and security
services. Ramified and integrated Turkish Atomic Energy Agency (TAEK)
with its two main national nuclear centers and separate stations -
Nuclear Fuel Pilot Factory, Nuclear Waste Processing and Storage
Station, two research reactors - is working.
Besides TAEK there is MTA Technologies Lab which is specialized in
the issues of production and processing of nuclear fuel. Large-scale
research and experimental-design studies in the basic and practice
areas of nuclear physics, nuclear synthesis, laser technologies and
various practical aspects of accelerator physics are carried out.
Personnel are trained.
2. In 1996 under the patronage of the Scientific and Technological
Research Council of Turkey (TUBÄ°TAK) the Turkish Academic Network
and Information Centre (ULAKBIM) was founded. In 2003 TR-Grid Turkish
national network was established on ULAKBIM's initiative. It is
oriented on consolidation of all the designed capacities necessary
for scientific researches, computer modeling, which demands vast
information volume, arrange superfast information sharing. TR-Grid
includes 7 Turkish universities where programmes on atomic and nuclear
physics and other related areas are centered, ULAKBIM center and TAEK
with its structure and nuclear research centers.
3. Judging by the information brought in the open sources, Turkish
scientific, technology and innovation areas underwent unprecedented
progress in 1998-2009. Thus, over the aforementioned period:
* Gross expenditure on R&D (GRED) has almost tripled. From $2 billion
in 1998 they grew up to $9 billion in 2009 (the data is specified in
accordance with purchasing power, PPP, $) * GRED and GDP ratio has
doubled - 0.37% in 1998 and 0.85% in 2009. According to some official
sources in 2013 the volume of GRED will reach 2% of GDP.
* The number of the personnel and researchers involved in the R&D
areas tripled, the rate of the young specialists grew.
* The number of scientific publications quadrupled. Turkey takes
2nd place on the rate growth of the number of scientific publication
(the fist is South Korea).
* The number of certified national patents has grown tenfold; the
number of international patents also grew * There is a distinct
programme of nuclear energy development, which is now being
implemented.
Conclusion
As a result of combination of a number of factors a practical
possibility of implementation of the programmes on military and
peaceful usage of nuclear technologies has considerably grown.
Turkey's nuclear claims have almost a 50-years long history but current
situation should be considered unprecedented due to the simultaneous
availability of a number of factors and their synergy and reciprocal
intensification.
1The so-called dial-a-yield system. Let us mention that besides B-61
mod 3 and mod 4 variants, B-61 mod 11 war head belongs to the same
line; it is used with "Pershing II" ballistic missiles (W85) [7].
2Erhac, Eskishir, Balikesir, Akinci (Murted):
3MTA Technology Lab - Uranium Ore Processing. NFCIS Facility Report.
http://nucleus.iaea.org.
Sources and Literature
1. Ulgen, Sinan, Turkey, Iran, and the Bomb. Euractiv, March 26, 2012.
2. Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran, ed.
Mark Fitzpatrick. London,The International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 2008.
3. Turkey exploits Â"window of opportunityÂ", moving rapidly to
acquire nuclear weapons. World News Tribune, Sunday, Jan. 16, 2011.
4. TaÅ~_pinar, Omer, The Rise of Turkish Gaullism: Getting
Turkish-Aamerican Relaitions Right. Insight Turkey, v. 13, No. 1,
2011. TaÅ~_pinar, Omer, The Three Strategic Visions of Turkey.
Brookings Institution, Center on the US and Eourope. March 8, 2011.
5. Õ~DÕ¡O~@Õ"Õ¡Õ¶ÕµÕ¡Õ¶ Ô±O~@Õ¡, ÔºÕ¡Õ¶ Ô²Õ¸Õ¤O~@Õ"ÕµÕ¡O~@Õ"
Â"Õ~MÕ"Õ´Õ¸O~BÕ¬ÕµÕ¡Õ¯O~@Õ¨Â" O~G Ô²Õ¡O~@Õ¡O~D Õ~UÕ¢Õ¡Õ´Õ¡ÕµÕ" Â"Medz
YeghernÂ"-Õ¨. Õ~DÕ¡Õ½ Ô². Â"le May 1968Â": Â"Õ~FÕ¸O~@Õ¡Õ¾Õ¡Õ¶O~DÂ"
Ô³Ô¿Õ~@, Â"21-O~@Õ¤ Ô´Ô±Õ~PÂ", #3 (43), 2012Õ©., Õ§Õ" 5-27:
6. Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey. A.Sadat Chair for Peace and
Development. University of Maryland, 2011. Kalyoncu, Mehmet, Why,
when and how Turkey becomes a nuclear power (Part 1 and 2).
&link=153561 7. U.S. Department of Defense. Nuclear Posture Review
Report, April 2010.
"Globus" analytical journal, # 4, 2012
NUCLEAR TURKEY
Ara Marjanyan
07.05.2012
Expert, "Noravank" Foundation
A number of processes on domestic (national), regional and global
levels rise inclination of Turkey for the creation of the nuclear
capabilities of its own.
1. Geopolitical factors
On this level following circumstances should be singled out:
* Though the 5th article of NATO agreement provides protection for
Turkey by means of a nuclear umbrella, B. Obama's well-known "Provision
of global peace and security without nuclear weapons" initiative as
well as strengthening of isolationist moods among representatives of
both republican and democratic political wings, cause considerable
tension among the southern NATO member-countries and first of all
in Turkey (as well in Italy and partially in Greece). Besides, the
situation formed makes some Western European NATO partners (France and
Britain) form joint military strategic capabilities. Other countries
(Germany, the Netherlands) complying with the logic of intensification
of the tendencies ("no American bombs on our territories", "say no
to nuclear energy") are complied to free territory for the facilities
of their own, to create a fertile soil for the acknowledgment of the
necessity of their origination.
* The role in the creation of the US/NATO missile defence system
offered by the US to Turkey (and a number of Eastern European
countries) as a "consolation of their concern" cannot be considered as
good guarantee for national sovereignty provision as availability of
nuclear potential of its own. Even more, deployment of the elements
of missile defence by the US in Turkey causes serious concern in
Iran and Syria (in mid-term prospects in Saudi Arabia). It is known
from the lessons of the Cold War that missile defence contains
considerable destabilizing potential. This point is more than
reasonable in Turkey's regard; * Obstacles which came forward on the
way of political integration with Europe, unsuccessful negotiations,
which lasted for years, deepen Turkey's "disappointment in Europe" and
intensify its aspiration to rely only on its own powers, to establish
close cooperation with other regions (Asian-Pacific region) and powers
(Argentina, Brazil, Russia, China, Japan, etc.). All this questions
efficiency and geopolitical reasonability of Turkey's staying in NATO
military sector.
2. Regional factors
Here the following circumstances should be singled out:
* For decades Israel has been a nuclear power which consecutively
denies exerting international control over its nuclear programme.
This military and technology capability and this stance have provided
the national sovereignty of Israel amid rapid developments in the
region for decades. On the other hand Israel's example confirms the
steadiness of other countries to possess nuclear facilities of their
own as the highest guarantee of their national sovereignty.
* In recent decade Iran has consecutively developed elements of
the nuclear technologies and delivery means. Implementation of a
large-scale nuclear programme in Iran, technological progress and
other factors make Turkey realize necessity of balancing Iran in the
region, providing competitiveness and regional influence as well as
seeking for ways of carrying this all out [1]. The logic of symmetric
balancing makes Turkey acknowledge necessity for obtaining nuclear
capabilities of its own.
* Over a recent decade intensification of an armaments race or the
so-called "nuclear flourishing" has been observed in the region of Big
Middle East [2]. Nuclear energy, medical and other applied programmes
have been carried out in a number of Arab countries. Separate elements
of an appropriate infrastructure have been created. The development of
"Arab spring" in 2011 targeted first of all the countries of the region
which used to have and/or still have nuclear claims - Algeria, Tunisia,
Libya, Egypt, Syria and Iran. Moreover, in the expert community an
opinion was expressed that at the beginning of 2011 M. Kaddafi and
H. Mubarak regretted that they had renounced the idea of developing
nuclear military programmes of their own, i.e. they renounced the
only efficient leverage of their own national sovereignty amid the
"period of directed instability".
This acknowledgment was also substantiated by the example of the
personal fate of S. Hussein and national fate of Iraq.
3. National factors
Ideological component - "Turkish Gaullism" - In today's Turkey where
the processes of nationalization and Islamization can be observed,
acknowledgment of necessity of creation "strategic deterrence forces"
of its own, its ideological basis, political grounds and social order
are present.
According to some sources, the ruling JDP discusses Turkey's prospects
as a military component of NATO and issue of necessity of creation
of the "strategic deterrence forces" of its own [3].
>From ideological point of view convergence of traditional pro-western
"kemalist" heritage with more pro-Islamist and eastern-oriented
powers and ideas is taking plays. This third political, world outlook
and geopolitical direction was characteristically called "Turkish
Gaullism", which underlines its inheritance link to one of the mist
characteristic elements of Ch. De Gaulle's policy - strong orientation
to nationalism, alienation of NATO military component, development
of national nuclear military and economic facilities [4, 5].
Such development of the Turkish ideological and political fields is
based upon auspicious public opinion on rising independent role of
their country, intensification of its capabilities, taking a bigger
regional influence. And they feed each other reciprocally. According
to some independent public opinion polls, in 2011 more than 60%
of the population in Turkey supported the idea of obtaining more
independent and more influential role in the region. Besides, according
to large-scale public opinion polls held in the Arab countries of the
Big Middle East, Turkey is the country which played most constructive
role during the "Arab spring". Turkey received about 50% of votes of
the respondents, thus upstaging France, US and Russia [6].
Military component - The US/NATO nuclear and thermonuclear weapons
have been deployed in Turkey for decades. Currently there are several
dozens of B-61 tactical thermonuclear variable yield bombs1.
Turkey has accumulated experience of storage, security and service of
the nuclear weapons as well as experience of participation in NATO's
"joint nuclear missions". There is one active infrastructure of storage
of thermonuclear weapons (Icirlik) and four out of commission at four
air force bases2.
Infrastructural, scientific-technology and professional component -
Accumulation of critical mass of facilities and infrastructures,
satisfactory rate of economic development, which are enough for
developing nuclear capabilities, are observed in today's Turkey.
1. Thus, in Turkey the experience of small-scale and/or experimental
production of all the stages of nuclear fuel cycle has been developed
and accumulated for more than 30 years - uranium ore production,
processing, ("yellow cake"3), enrichment, creation of pellets and
rods. There are also infrastructures for small-scale processing and
long-term storage of nuclear waste, radiation dosimetry and security
services. Ramified and integrated Turkish Atomic Energy Agency (TAEK)
with its two main national nuclear centers and separate stations -
Nuclear Fuel Pilot Factory, Nuclear Waste Processing and Storage
Station, two research reactors - is working.
Besides TAEK there is MTA Technologies Lab which is specialized in
the issues of production and processing of nuclear fuel. Large-scale
research and experimental-design studies in the basic and practice
areas of nuclear physics, nuclear synthesis, laser technologies and
various practical aspects of accelerator physics are carried out.
Personnel are trained.
2. In 1996 under the patronage of the Scientific and Technological
Research Council of Turkey (TUBÄ°TAK) the Turkish Academic Network
and Information Centre (ULAKBIM) was founded. In 2003 TR-Grid Turkish
national network was established on ULAKBIM's initiative. It is
oriented on consolidation of all the designed capacities necessary
for scientific researches, computer modeling, which demands vast
information volume, arrange superfast information sharing. TR-Grid
includes 7 Turkish universities where programmes on atomic and nuclear
physics and other related areas are centered, ULAKBIM center and TAEK
with its structure and nuclear research centers.
3. Judging by the information brought in the open sources, Turkish
scientific, technology and innovation areas underwent unprecedented
progress in 1998-2009. Thus, over the aforementioned period:
* Gross expenditure on R&D (GRED) has almost tripled. From $2 billion
in 1998 they grew up to $9 billion in 2009 (the data is specified in
accordance with purchasing power, PPP, $) * GRED and GDP ratio has
doubled - 0.37% in 1998 and 0.85% in 2009. According to some official
sources in 2013 the volume of GRED will reach 2% of GDP.
* The number of the personnel and researchers involved in the R&D
areas tripled, the rate of the young specialists grew.
* The number of scientific publications quadrupled. Turkey takes
2nd place on the rate growth of the number of scientific publication
(the fist is South Korea).
* The number of certified national patents has grown tenfold; the
number of international patents also grew * There is a distinct
programme of nuclear energy development, which is now being
implemented.
Conclusion
As a result of combination of a number of factors a practical
possibility of implementation of the programmes on military and
peaceful usage of nuclear technologies has considerably grown.
Turkey's nuclear claims have almost a 50-years long history but current
situation should be considered unprecedented due to the simultaneous
availability of a number of factors and their synergy and reciprocal
intensification.
1The so-called dial-a-yield system. Let us mention that besides B-61
mod 3 and mod 4 variants, B-61 mod 11 war head belongs to the same
line; it is used with "Pershing II" ballistic missiles (W85) [7].
2Erhac, Eskishir, Balikesir, Akinci (Murted):
3MTA Technology Lab - Uranium Ore Processing. NFCIS Facility Report.
http://nucleus.iaea.org.
Sources and Literature
1. Ulgen, Sinan, Turkey, Iran, and the Bomb. Euractiv, March 26, 2012.
2. Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran, ed.
Mark Fitzpatrick. London,The International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 2008.
3. Turkey exploits Â"window of opportunityÂ", moving rapidly to
acquire nuclear weapons. World News Tribune, Sunday, Jan. 16, 2011.
4. TaÅ~_pinar, Omer, The Rise of Turkish Gaullism: Getting
Turkish-Aamerican Relaitions Right. Insight Turkey, v. 13, No. 1,
2011. TaÅ~_pinar, Omer, The Three Strategic Visions of Turkey.
Brookings Institution, Center on the US and Eourope. March 8, 2011.
5. Õ~DÕ¡O~@Õ"Õ¡Õ¶ÕµÕ¡Õ¶ Ô±O~@Õ¡, ÔºÕ¡Õ¶ Ô²Õ¸Õ¤O~@Õ"ÕµÕ¡O~@Õ"
Â"Õ~MÕ"Õ´Õ¸O~BÕ¬ÕµÕ¡Õ¯O~@Õ¨Â" O~G Ô²Õ¡O~@Õ¡O~D Õ~UÕ¢Õ¡Õ´Õ¡ÕµÕ" Â"Medz
YeghernÂ"-Õ¨. Õ~DÕ¡Õ½ Ô². Â"le May 1968Â": Â"Õ~FÕ¸O~@Õ¡Õ¾Õ¡Õ¶O~DÂ"
Ô³Ô¿Õ~@, Â"21-O~@Õ¤ Ô´Ô±Õ~PÂ", #3 (43), 2012Õ©., Õ§Õ" 5-27:
6. Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey. A.Sadat Chair for Peace and
Development. University of Maryland, 2011. Kalyoncu, Mehmet, Why,
when and how Turkey becomes a nuclear power (Part 1 and 2).
&link=153561 7. U.S. Department of Defense. Nuclear Posture Review
Report, April 2010.
"Globus" analytical journal, # 4, 2012
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