Wikileaks

[Vrej1915]

Re: Wikileaks

C O N F I D E N T I A L YEREVAN 000517

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SNEC (MANN) AND EUR/CACEN
EUCOM FOR POLAD SNELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2015
TAGS: PREL PARM MARR AM AJ
SUBJECT: ARMENIAN DEFMIN ON POW'S, CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS


Classified By: Ambassador John Evans for reason 1.4 (b), (d)

Summary
-------

¶1. (C) Armenian Defense Minister Serzh Sargsian told the
Ambassador that Azerbaijan was to blame for the recent
increase in cease-fire violations on the line of contact with
Azerbaijan. If the International Community was now concerned
about the effect of violations on the negotiation process,
then Azerbaijan had achieved its goal. Azerbaijan sought to
encourage the negotiators to press Armenia for concessions in
order to assuage Azerbaijan's hard-liners, Sargsian claimed.
Sargsian said that the incidents were provoked by Azerbaijani
forces attempting to improve their tactical position at
points along the line; such tactical shifts were not in
Armenia's interest, which would be best served by maintaining
the status quo. Sargsian confirmed that Armenia continued to
hold prisoner three Azerbaijani soldiers who had wandered
across the line of contact in February. The three would be
returned, but the delay in handing them over was intended as
a response to Azerbaijan's delay in returning Armenian
prisoners in January. End Summary.

Delay in POW returns is tit-for-tat
-----------------------------------

¶2. (C) In a March 21 meeting with Sargsian, the Ambassador
pressed Armenia to move forward with the release of three
Azerbaijani soldiers captured along the line of contact on
February 15. Sargsian confirmed that he had been in contact
with OSCE Special Rep Andrzej Kasprzyk and that Armenia would
return the prisoners, but he did not agree to a specific
date. He said that for the past three years, Armenia had
"without condition" returned captured Azerbaijani soldiers
promptly, but this practice was not reciprocal. Sargsian was
bitter about Azerbaijan's long delay in returning three
Armenian soldiers. He said that Azerbaijan had held the
soldiers for two months and 20 days; it was 15 days before
the GOAJ even admitted to holding the soldiers, although the
GOAM had solid intellligence that the GOAJ knew about the
capture right away. Sarsian said Azerbaijan added insult to
injury by returning the prisoners on January 28, Armenia's
Army Day.

Cease-Fire Violations
---------------------

¶3. (C) The Ambassador raised the issue of the recent
increase in cease-fire violations in N-K and expressed
concern that they could adversely affect the productive
course of negotiations supported by the Minsk Group
co-chairs. Sargsian said that "if the International
Community has the view that there is an increased likelihood
of a resumption of hostilities and if this view will affect
how you approach negotiations, then Azerbaijan has achieved
its purpose in instigating these cease-fire violations."
Sargsian said Azerbaijan had two goals as it continues to
provoke cease-fire violations. First, he explained, was a
message to the Minsk Group. Negotiators are intended to draw
the conclusion that unless talks produce a prompt result
which is favorable to Azerbaijan, a resumption of open
hostilities could be imminent. Second, Azerbaijan sought to
improve its tactical position and several places along the
Line of Contact. When Azerbaijani movements make Armenian
positions vulnerable, Armenian troops must engage, Sargsian
insisted.

¶4. (C) Sargsian said that the current tactical situation was
similar to that of 2001. At that time, he continued, Armenia
had asked Minsk Group co-chairs to use their satellite
surveillance capability to demonstrate which side was
responsible for troop movements and cease-fire violations; he
repeated that request to the Ambassador. "Calm and the
status quo are in Armenia's interest," said Sargsian, "we do
not seek a conflict."

¶5. (C) The Ambassador said that that cease-fire violations
were not in anyone's interest and urged Armenia to show
restraint. Sargsian expressed serious concern about what he
viewed as new level of bellicose Azerbaijani rhetoric,
including on the part of President Aliyev.
EVANS

[Vrej1915]

Re: Wikileaks

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000846

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DS/CR/VF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2015
TAGS: KFRD PGOV ASEC TU AM RU
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON ARMENIAN BORDER
SECURITY

Classified By: DCM A.F. Godfrey for reasons 1.4 (b, d)

¶1. (C) A Russian Border Guard (RBG) official posted in
Armenia contends that the border with Turkey is porous and
that locals easily cross at will. On the margins of a
routine meeting to discuss consular fraud prevention, he told
us he was concerned about the possibility of corruption at
the airport and emerging fraud trends among Iranian
travelers. End Summary.

-------------------------
POROUS BORDER WITH TURKEY
-------------------------

¶2. (C) The RBG monitors Armenia,s 268 km land border with
Turkey as well as Armenia's international border with Iran.
On the Turkish border, RBG and Armenian Border Security
personnel jointly occupy guard towers that are located
approximately every 2 kilometers along the border. As of
mid-March 2005, RBG Major Vitali Borodkin (please protect)
asserted that, despite RBG efforts, the Armenian/Turkish
border was porous and that ethnic Kurdish farmers were able
to transport livestock back and forth across the border. He
believes that while it is probable that RBG personnel are
being bribed to allow passage, he thinks that it is also
possible to cross the Armenian/Turkish border undetected.

¶3. (S) Borodkin stated that in the early 1990s, he heard
rumors that the Kongra Gel (KGK) had sent people across the
Armenian/Turkish border. He stated that while he had no
specific information that this was still continuing, he
believed that KGK personnel may still covertly cross the
border to seek temporary refuge from Turkish authorities.

-------------------------
CORRUPTION AT THE AIRPORT
-------------------------

¶4. (SBU) Borodkin stated that travelers offer RBG personnel
bribes daily at Zvartnots Armenian National Airport to
overlook photo-substituted or fraudulently issued travel
documents. He stated that one common service for petty
bribery is to backdate entry stamps for travelers who have
overstayed on U.S. visas and were returning to Yerevan.
Borodkin candidly admitted that while he does his best to
monitor and prevent passport control personnel from taking
bribes, it was most likely a common practice. (Comment: The
number of backdated stamps among visa applicants at CONS
Yerevan has dropped since 2002. We continue, however, to
identify this fraud on a routine basis. End Comment.)

¶5. (SBU) Borodkin said that the flight from Yerevan to Moscow
to Los Angeles is notorious for Armenian nationals offering
bribes to RBG personnel. According to Borodkin, travelers
believe that if they can successfully board this flight, even
if US immigration officials eventually stopped them, they
could still apply for asylum and enter the US.

¶6. (SBU) Borodkin stated that the RBG arrested approximately
100 individuals who used fake, stolen or borrowed travel
documents in 2004. The majority of the individuals were
arrested at the Zvartnots Airport. He could only speculate
how many evaded arrest by using legitimate "borrowed" travel
documents, fraudulent documents, or by bribing RBG personnel.


------------------
IRANIAN CONNECTION
------------------

¶7. (C) Borodkin suspects that Iranian nationals may be using
photo-substituted U.S. and European travel documents as a way
to travel to the U.S. and/or Europe. He believes that one
common technique would be for the U.S.-based Iranian Diaspora
to send legitimate asylum documents to Armenia. Travelers in
Armenia either photo-substitute these documents or use
unaltered versions while traveling as imposters. Borodkin
added that members of the Iranian Diaspora in Germany might
be active in sending legitimate travel documents to Armenia
for Iranians to travel and/or immigrate to Germany.

¶8. (C) Borodkin noted that at the Armenian town of Meghri,
the major point of entry on the Armenian/Iranian border, RBG
personnel have noticed many suspicious travel documents used
by Iranian nationals to enter into Armenia. While he had no
specifics, Borodkin observed that many of these documents
appear to be issued in the same office, or printed by using
similar techniques.

¶9. (C) Borodkin stated that he has reliable contacts within
the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). He stated that
the FSB notifies the RBG in Armenia about madrases or
equivalent religious schools in the region, and, when
students graduate, their travel destinations. While Borodkin
was not worried about Muslim radicals traveling to Armenia,
he is concerned about the possibility of Armenia becoming a
corridor to the North Caucasus or Europe in the future.

-------
Comment
-------

¶10. (C) Borodkin,s comments are likely exaggerated in order
to convince us that Armenia would not be able to manage its
border without the RBG. However, his insights show that the
RBG is aware of Armenia,s problematic border control issues
and their implications for the region. While some of our
security assistance programs preclude participation by
Russian officials, we see cooperation with the RBG on fraud
prevention as very much in the USG's interest and will
continue our practice of including them in appropriate events.
EVANS

[Vrej1915]

Re: Wikileaks

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 YEREVAN 001717

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR EUR/SNEC, EUR/CACEN, AND EUR FRONT OFFICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS AJ AM OSCE
SUBJECT: DETAILS OF SHOOTING INCIDENT ON LINE OF CONTACT

REF: BAKU 1415

Classified By: CDA A.F. Godfrey for reasons 1.4(b,d).

-------
SUMMARY
-------

¶1. (C) The September 20 shooting incident on the line of
contact seemed clearly directed to disrupt N-K negotiations
and will certainly be raised at the OSCE Permanent Council.
While there is no way to determine which side fired, the
round -- which impacted about 20 meters from an international
monitor -- came from the direction of Azeri lines. This was
the message delivered by OSCE Monitor Peter Keay in a meeting
with CDA on September 23. A confidential report signed by
OSCE Special Rep Andrzej Kasprzyk of the shooting (text
below) will be delivered in the coming days to the OSCE
Permanent Council. Monitoring is suspended until Kasprzyk
has an opportunity to raise the incident with both sides
together with Minsk Group co-chairs. End Summary.

--------------------------------------------- -----
OSCE MONITOR CONFIRMS SEPTEMBER 20 SMALL ARMS FIRE
--------------------------------------------- -----

¶2. (C) Peter Keay, a UK national member of the OSCE group
led by Special Rep Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, met with the
CDA at the Embassy on September 23 and described events in
detail. Keay took part in the monitoring of the Line of
Contact (LOC) between N-K Armenian and Azerbaijani forces on
September 20 and was the first monitor out of the trench on
the N-K side. Amb. Kasprzyk was leading the party from the
Azerbaijan side of the LOC. The trench lines were about 1300
meters apart at the point of monitoring.

¶3. (C) The monitoring event had been proceeding according to
standard procedure. Positive contact had been made with
commanders of both sides and both sides provided assurances
that there would be no incidents. Monitoring groups were in
contact with hand-held radios. Keay emerged from the trench
on the N-K side of the LOC with the local N-K forces
commander. He could see Amb. Kasprzyk's monitoring party on
the Azerbaijan side of the LOC and made positive contact as
usual, by waving an OSCE flag. He was in discussion with the
local N-K commander, who was directing his attention to new
trenches extending toward the N-K lines from the Azerbaijan
side when he saw a round impact the dust about 20 - 30 meters
away from his position. He then heard the sound of a weapon
discharge which he described as the distinctive sound of a
7.62 mm Kalashnikov rifle.

¶4. (C) Keay said that although the round came from the
direction of the Azerbaijan side, the trenches at that point
of the LOC are so serpentine that it would be impossible to
determine with certainty which side fired. He immediately
returned to the trench on the N-K side and contacted Amb.
Kasprzyk, who discontinued the monitoring event and issued a
statement. (See para 6 below.)

¶5. (C) Keay said Amb Kasprzyk intends to raise the issue
with both sides at an upcoming meeting of the Foreign
Ministers together with the Minsk Group co-chairs. Keay
passed us a copy of a confidential report prepared by the
group which would be distributed in Vienna next week (see
para 7 below). Keay speculated that while it is remotely
possible that the round was fired by accident, it was most
likely an attempt to "throw a spanner in the works of
negotiations" just at a point where they appear most
promising. He asserted that tension along the LoC seemed to
be growing as the negotiators became more optimistic. "It's
very, very tense right now," he said.

--------------------------------------------- ---
OSCE PRESS STATEMENT FOLLOWING SHOOTING INCIDENT
--------------------------------------------- ---

¶6. (U) Begin text of Kasprzyk statement issued immediately
after shooting incident:

At approximately 1157 hrs during the course of the
Monitoring, following security guarantees issued by both
sides, after both monitoring teams were out of their trenches
on the open ground and visual contact between them had been
established, a single shot was heard by both teams. A field
assistant participating on the territory controlled by
Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) armed forces confirmed what appeared to
be a bullet strike the ground 20-30 meters in front and
slightly to the left of his position approximately one second
prior to the report. The Monitoring party immediately took
cover in the trenches.

End Text

--------------------------------------------- --------
OSCE REPORT NO. 147 ON MONITORING THE LINE OF CONTACT
--------------------------------------------- --------

¶7. (C) Begin text of Text of "official incident report."
(Note internal paragraph markings and OSCE classification.)

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
The Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office on
the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference

CONFIDENTIAL

SIPDIS

Report No. 147 on Monitoring on the Line of Contact 20
September 2005

1 Basic Data on the Monitoring

1.1 Introductory remarks

The Monitoring on the Line of Contact (LoC) was initiated by
the Personal Representative (PR) of the Cia. The PR requested
the Monitoring to be held in the southern part of the LoC on
20 September 2005, in the vicinity of the village of
Karakhanbeyli in Fizuli Region. The last Monitoring in this
area took place on 01 June 2005 (MR 141) and on this exact
spot on 23 November 2004 (MR 130). The aim of the Monitoring
was to verify the current situation along this part of the
LoC.

1.2 Monitoring Requests and Security Guarantees

On 12 September 2005, a Field Assistant, on behalf of the PR,
presented a Monitoring Request to the Azerbaijani MFA. The
Azerbaijani side responded positively on 19 September and
offered security guarantees in their response. A
corresponding request was presented to the Nagorno-Karabakh
(NK) authorities on 13 September 2005. The NK side responded
positively on 19 September and also offered security
guarantees in their response.

1.3 Place of the Monitoring

The site of the Monitoring on the LOC was approximately 5 km
north-east of the village of Karakhanbeyli.

The positions of the Teams at the Monitoring site in the LOC
were:

Team No.1 (Azerbaijani side)
Lat. N 39 degrees 38 minutes, Long. E 47 degrees 18 minutes
(from map)

Team No.2 (NK side)
Lat. N 39 degrees 38 minutes, Long. E 47 degrees 17 minutes

The Teams were approximately 1300m apart.

1.4 Personnel

Team No.1 (Azerbaijani side)

OSCE Monitoring Team
Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk (Poland), Personal Representative
of the CiO
Miroslav Vymetal, Field Assistant (Czech Republic)
Maj Konstantinos Theodoropoulos HLPG, (Greece)

Escort Personnel
¶O. Ismayil-Zade, MFA
Capt R. Kerimov, MoD
Lt Col A. Seyidov, regional commander Lt Col A. Aslamov,
local commander

Team No.2 (NK side)
OSCE Monitoring Team
Lt Col Imre Palatinus, Office Coordinator (Hungary)
Peter Keay, Field Assistant (UK)

¶2. Detailed account of the Monitoring

2.1 Course of the Monitoring

The two Teams traveled in a total of five clearly marked OSCE
vehicles, three on the NK and two on the Azerbaijani side.
General visibility was good, up to 15 kilometres and weather
conditions were good. After security guarantees for crossing
open ground were given, the Teams moved to their covered
positions. After further security guarantees for the
Monitoring were exchanged, the Teams moved forward on foot to
the Observation sites. Once both were in position they
climbed out of the trenches with raised OSCE flags and
established visual contact. The distance between Teams was
1300m. Approximately four minutes after visual contact was
established a single shot was heard on both sides (at a
distance of 600-800 meters slightly to the left of the
Observation site on the NK front lines). The Monitoring
party immediately took cover in the trenches. A Field
Assistant from Team 2 confirmed what appeared to be a bullet
strike the ground 20-30 metres in front and slightly to the
left of his position approximately one second prior to the
report. Following VHF radio communication between the
Teams, the decision to halt the Monitoring was taken. All
personnel returned to their vehicles and left the area.

Team 1

Team 1 was given a briefing in Goradiz by the Head of the
Local Executive and the regional and local military
commanders. After the briefing, the two vehicles of Team 1,
escorted by two vehicles from the Azerbaijani side, moved to
a point approximately 3 km east of the Monitoring Site where
they stopped to exchange security guarantees before crossing
open ground and to confirm the exact locations for the
Observation sites. Team 1 then traveled to a covered position
at the Monitoring Site where further security guarantees for
the Monitoring were exchanged. After this, Team 1 moved
approximately 250 metres on foot to its Observation site, and
with an OSCE flag raised climbed above ground out of the
trenches, from where visual contact was established with Team
¶2. After a single shot was heard the Team moved back into the
trenches.

Team 2

Team 2 met with the local military commanders on the road
north of Fizuli and was given a briefing on the situation on
the LOC. After the briefing, the three vehicles of Team 2,
escorted by two vehicles from the NK side moved to a point
approximately 2 km north of Karakhanbey Ii where they stopped
to exchange security guarantees before crossing open ground
and to confirm the exact locations for the Observation sites.
Team 2 then traveled to a covered position at the Monitoring
Site where further security guarantees for the Monitoring
were exchanged. After this, Team 2 moved approximately 50
metres on foot to its Observation site, and with an OSCE flag
raised climbed above ground out of the trenches, from where
visual contact was immediately established with Team 1. After
a single shot was heard the Team moved back into the
trenches. All members of the Team 2 were able to agree on
the direction and approximate distance of the shot.

2.2 Information obtained during Monitoring as stated by the
respective Parties

Team No.1 (Azerbaijani side)

Cease-fire violations

The regional commander confirmed information given by Head of
the Local Executive that cease-fire violations are common and
the local population close to the LOC lives under the
permanent threat of shooting. He reported that 26 cease-fire
violations, took place on this part of the LOC since the
Monitoring on 1 June 2005. In some cases the Azerbaijani side
opened returned fire. As a result of sniper fire one
Azerbaijani soldier was reported to have been killed on 28
July 2005. Another incident was reported to have taken place
on 13 August when one soldier was killed while fetching water
and another injured when trying to remove the body.

Other Military Information

The regional commander stated that the NK side is constantly
improving its positions by building fortified positions at
intervals of 300-350 metres. He stated that this is in order
to improve control over the adjacent territory. Such
positions were pointed out to the Team while moving to the
Observation site. He also added that tracer rounds are used
to set fire to dry grass in no-man's land and as a result the
harvest close to the LOC is under threat.

Mines

No mine related incidents were reported in this sector. The
regional commander stated that 12 mine explosions were heard
during the fire in no-man's land on 1-2 September.

Team No.2 (NK side):

Cease-fire violations

Team 2 was given a list of three cease-fire violations on the
whole of the LOC since the last Monitoring on 08 September
¶2005. Two of the violations were said to have taken place in
the Hadrut Sector and one in the Mardakert Agdere Sector. No
injuries were reported.

The local commander informed the Team that the situation on
the LOC is relatively calm and stable, with a reduced number
of reported cease-fire violations.

Mines

No mine incidents were reported on the NK side, but Maj M.
Arushunyan mentioned that on five occasions since the last
Monitoring, mine explosions had been heard on the Azerbaijani
side.

¶3. Conclusions

- The fact that the Monitoring was halted due to a shot being
fired towards OSCE monitoring Team brings into question the
security of the Teams. The exchange of guarantees prior to
Monitorings is meant to ensure the safety of OSCE personnel.
It is of paramount importance that escort personnel,
including local and regional commanders, should ensure that
every measure possible is taken to guarantee the safety and
security of OSCE personnel also by strengthening the
discipline among troops.

- It was not possible for the Teams to determine the side
from which the shot came due to the terrain and the nature of
the front lines.

- Parties should promptly investigate the incident and submit
relevant reports.

- The tension on the LOC observed at the last Monitoring
remains high. The increased number of casualties is a cause
for concern and should be addressed.

ANDRZEJ KASPRZYK
Personal Representative of the CiO

End text.
GODFREY

[Vrej1915]

Re: Wikileaks

UNCLAS YEREVAN 001842

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR DRL AND EUR/CACEN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL AM
SUBJECT: MURDER SUSPECT RE-ELECTED AS TOWN MAYOR


¶1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified. Please protect
accordingly.

---------------------------------------
MURDER CHARGES DON'T DISSUADE VOTERS...
---------------------------------------

¶2. (SBU) The campaign for mayor of the town of Nor Hajn
(about 20 minutes outside of Yerevan in the Kotayk
region) took a bizarre turn when the incumbent, Armen
Keshishyan, shot dead his friend-turned rival. Because
Keshishyan had not gone to trial before the election --
held on October 9 -- his name was not removed from the
ballot. Voters were evidently not dissuaded by
Keshishyan's actions and re-elected him, even though he
was in custody on the day of the ballot. At the time
of the shooting -- which took place in broad daylight
in front of witnesses -- Keshishyan was arguing with
his rival about pork-barrel projects with which the
mayor could not compete. While there were reports of
some electoral violations during last week's balloting,
the local branch of the election watchdog NGO "It's
Your Choice" told us that the voting was mostly fair.
Government contacts confirmed to us that Keshishyan's
opponent did not contest the results to Armenia's
Central Electoral Commission.

-------------------------------------------
...EVEN WHEN THE SMOKING GUN IS FROM THE PM
-------------------------------------------

¶3. (SBU) Local media seized on the story not only
because of Keshisyan's involvement in the bizarre
murder story but because of claims that the murder
weapon was a gift from Armenian Prime Minister Andranik
Markarian. An unidentified representative of the Prime
Minister's office later reportedly confirmed to the
media that Markarian often gives guns as gifts to close
friends and that he had distributed over 500 such
weapons during his ten years in office.

-------------------------------------------
COMMENT: FROM MAYOR'S OFFICE TO JAIL CELL?
-------------------------------------------

¶3. (SBU) Comment: This latest example of political
passions running wild in Armenia's regions comes at a
precarious time for Armenia. GOAM authorities are
facing heavy pressure to demonstrate mature democratic
institutions during upcoming local elections later this
month, the much-anticipated November 27 constitutional
referendum and the 2007 (parliamentary) and 2008
(presidential) elections. Armenian legislation allows
a criminal suspect to run for public office but
requires resignation if found guilty. The public and
donor community will be watching carefully to see how
the courts handle Keshishyan's case.
EVANS

[Vrej1915]

Re: Wikileaks

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 001940

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM AM
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED'S MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER SARGSIAN


Classified By: Amb. John M. Evans for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

USG Participants:

EUR A/S Daniel Fried
Ambassador Evans
EUR/SNEC Elizabeth Rood

Minister of Defense Serzh Sargsian
Lt. Hovhannes Ghazarian (interpreter)

----------------------
"UNREALIZED POTENTIAL"
----------------------

¶1. (C) Assistant Secretary Fried described for Defense
Minister Sargsian a sense in Washington that history in
Armenia's neighborhood is accelerating, for better or worse.
U.S.-Armenian relations, he said, have "unrealized
potential." The United States wants to work with all its
friends in the region. Whatever others might say, the U.S.
is not in favor of revolutions; rather we are interested in
strong reforms. Armenia is moving in a positive direction,
as its two nearest neighbors were also moving in interesting
directions.

-----------------------------------
U.S. NOT IN COMPETITION WITH RUSSIA
-----------------------------------

¶2. (C) Defense Minister Sargsian said that Armenia was headed
toward Europe, because Armenians considered themselves
members of the European family. But he said Armenia now
needed to find the answers to a number of questions. The
Minister said that for Armenia the optimal situation was when
relations between Russian and the United States were good.
Armenia had never sought to benefit from contradictions
between the two. Such a small and weak country was Armenia
that even small events could be critical; a country with only
one gas pipeline had to make all of its choices with that
pipeline in mind.

¶3. (C) Fried said that the United States had never regarded
Armenia as an object of competition between ourselves and the
Russians, and we do not want to develop our relations with
Armenia at the expense of Russia. It is good for Armenia to
have good relations with Moscow. We do not seek to weaken
Russia in this part of the world, but do want the countries
here to be sovereign and at peace. We want Armenia to
succeed, and would not ask Armenia to weaken its ties to
Russia. Armenia might, for that matter, help to show Russia
the way, by reforming and developing in a democratic
direction while being a friend to Russia. As the Europeans
are absorbed in internal issues at the moment, it is perhaps
easier for Americans than for the Europeans to see Armenia as
an eventual part of Europe. Washington did not see events in
the region as based on a zero-sum principle, although we do
sense that our Russian friends are nervous. Accusations that
U.S. policy is Trotskyite -- that is, favoring permanent
revolution -- is not serious. Reforms, though, are
necessary, which is why we place so much importance on the
referendum on the constitutional amendments in November.

---------------------------------------
PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH
---------------------------------------

¶4. (C) Fried noted that a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement would
open up interesting possibilities for Armenia. He asked what
the Minister thought of the situation and how the United
States might help. Sargsian recalled the recent meetings of
the Armenian and Azeri presidents and said that the way
forward that was currently on the table was "optimal." There
was no other way forward. This "compromise solution" was the
only possible solution.

¶5. (C) The A/S agreed that there was wisdom in discussion and
compromise, and that to speak in terms of victory and defeat
makes no sense. Azeri Foreign Minister Mammadyarov is a
serious person, and we are encouraged enough to think that
2006 should be the time for a major step forward on N-K. We
will do all we can, but ultimately it would be up to the
parties to reach an agreement.

¶6. (C) Sargsian said he had doubts about whether the Azeris
really wanted to make the deal that was on the table work.
He stressed he was not particularly worried by this
possibility, as he had observed the problem at all stages of
its development. It was not necessary to speak of
"compromise;" one could talk about a "solution," if that were
easier. The important thing was that the situation not
revert to conflict.

¶7. (C) Fried agreed, saying that conflicts keep countries in
the region vulnerable and weak. What the Central and Eastern
Europeans had achieved in their region since 1989 was a
positive example that opened their door to Europe.

------
TURKEY
------

¶8. (C) Turning to Turkey, Fried said that Prime Minister
Erdogan was doing a good job, despite some difficulties in
our relationship. He has dealt with a number of difficult
questions. Armenia's leaders should keep in mind that Turkey
is changing. The fact that Turks are now thinking about
Armenia is progress. Absent an agreement on N-K, however,
there was not much Turkey could do. Still, the situation is
much improved as compared to even five years ago.

¶9. (C) Sargsian said that the prosperity of Armenia
ultimately depended on the opening of the border with Turkey,
which would "make us three times freer than we are." He
added that Armenians living abroad did not have to face such
fateful decisions as did the GOAM.

---------------------
MOVING TOWARD EUROPE?
---------------------

¶10. (C) Fried said that, as Armenia continued to emerge and
head toward Europe, we wanted our relations to develop.
Every country in the region, e.g., Georgia, had its problems.
He told Sargsian he was glad he understood that the U.S. was
not trying to exclude Russia from the region. Looking around
the region, it was clear that fearful leaders make mistakes.
Reform through constitutional processes makes good sense.

¶11. (C) Sargsian noted how useful it would be for all
countries in the region to have the railway through Abkhazia
reopened. After some sharing of impressions of personalities
in Georgia (A/S Fried's next stop), the meeting concluded.

¶12. (U) EUR/FO has cleared this cable.
EVANS

[Vrej1915]

Re: Wikileaks

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000688

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR A/S DAN FRIED FROM AMBASSADOR EVANS
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/SNEC AND EUR/CARC
NSC FOR MERKEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV OTRA OSCE AJ AM
SUBJECT: GOOD POLITICAL CLIMATE IN ARMENIA FOR A DEAL ON N-K

REF: STATE 78834

Classified By: Amb. John M. Evans for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

¶1. (C) We look forward to welcoming you to Yerevan again.
Given your familiarity with the Nagorno-Karabakh
negotiations, we would like to take this opportunity to
update you on domestic political developments, some of which
may influence Armenian decision-making with respect to N-K.

¶2. (C) Despite the pending resignation of National Assembly
Speaker Artur Baghdasarian and his party's withdrawal from
the governing coalition (ref B), Armenia's political scene
remains remarkably calm, a testament to the power President
Robert Kocharian wields. As Armenia's N-K
negotiator-in-chief, and as an N-K veteran, Kocharian is
well-positioned to both accept a settlement and enforce its
conditions. A USG-funded national voter survey concluded May
7 found Kocharian's approval rating remained strong, as did
public concern about the consequences of a failure to
peacefully resolve the N-K conflict. The survey found
respondents feared the potential for Azeri military build-up
and overwhelmingly favored a quick, peaceful solution to the
N-K conflict through negotiation rather than force. The time
for settlement was now, respondents told pollsters, a strong
argument for your May 25-26 discussions in Yerevan. End
Summary.

--------------------------------------
KOCHARIAN MAINTAINS FIRM GRIP ON POWER
--------------------------------------

¶3. (C) On May 12, National Assembly Speaker Artur
Baghdasarian formally announced his party's withdrawal from
the governing coalition and his intention to step down as
Speaker. His announcement ended intense speculation about
his falling out with President Robert Kocharian and his
party's (Orinats Yerkir) hemorrhage of members in the
National Assembly. Orinats Yerkir's departure from the
governing coalition neither hinders the government's ability
to push through its programs nor changes Kocharian's personal
control of key issues, including N-K negotiations. The
almost certain government nominee for Speaker is current
Deputy Speaker Tigran Torosyan, a member of the Republican
Party (Prime Minister Andranik Margaryan's party), who
recently told us that he believed the government should do
more to prepare the public for an N-K settlement.

¶4. (C) The crowded constellation of small political groupings
emerging ahead of the 2007 parliamentary and 2008 president
elections has not affected Kocharian's decision-making or
authority. Local business tycoon Gagik Tsarukian, former
"Nagorno-Karabakh Minister of Defense" Samvel Babayan, and
supporters of Prosecutor General Aghvan Hovsepian have gone
public with their plans to mobilize constituents and
negotiate with other political parties about possible
alliances. Far from a threat to Kocharian's power base,
however, these new groupings are based primarily on the
business or personal connections of their founders, and none
of them opposes the current power structure.

--------------------------------------------- -------------
GENERAL PUBLIC OVERWHELMINGLY FAVORS PEACEFUL SOLUTION NOW
--------------------------------------------- -------------

¶5. (C) Kocharian's approval rating remains favorable,
according to an International Republican Institute (IRI)
Armenian voter survey funded by the USG and conducted by the
Gallup Organization. According to respondents, only
unemployment outranked the N-K conflict as "the most
important issue facing Armenia." Eighty-five percent of the
respondents said they favored a peaceful solution to the N-K
conflict through negotiation rather than military force.
Seventy-one percent said they were optimistic that a peaceful
settlement could be reached and virtually all respondents
said they thought it was important to solve the N-K problem
in the near future. No respondents, however, favored
"returning" N-K to Azerbaijan. The survey provides you a
solid argument, and Kocharian good political cover, to push
the tough decisions that would settle the conflict now.
(Note: The Gallup Organization designed, coordinated, and
analyzed the USG-funded study, which included face-to-face
interviews with 1200 Armenian residents aged 18 years and
older, from a representative cross-section of society.
According to IRI and Gallup, the margin of error did not
exceed three percent. End Note.)

YEREVAN 00000688 002.2 OF 002



--------------------------------------------- -------
OPPOSITION NOT TO "STAND IN THE WAY" OF A SETTLEMENT
--------------------------------------------- -------

¶6. (C) Privately, opposition leaders including Stepan
Demirchian (People's Party), Artashes Geghamyan (National
Unity), Aram Sargsyan (Republic Party), and Vazgen Manukyan
(National Democratic Union) have told us they would not stand
in the way of a settlement, a significant departure from past
opposition platforms that would have painted any concessions
on N-K unpatriotic. Though Kocharian knows this, you might
find it useful to remind him. Conscious of his place in
history, N-K resolution is Kocharian's best, most significant
opportunity to forge a lasting legacy. (Note: Like Gallup
Survey respondents, opposition leaders have told us they are
concerned about Azeri President Ilham Aliyev's pledge to
dramatically increase defense spending. End Note.)

---------------------------------------------
COMMENT: NO BETTER TIME FOR N-K NEGOTIATIONS
---------------------------------------------

¶7. (C) President Robert Kocharian maintains his firm grip on
all aspects of governance in Armenia. He enters this round
of negotiations well-positioned, having demonstrated his
ability to hold course with or without governing coalition
partners. Public opinion, as judged by the Gallup
Organization, strongly favors a near-term settlement,
strongly fears the potential of Azeri military action, and
favors negotiation over military action. Likely coming to
the same conclusions about public opinions on their own,
opposition leaders privately confided they would support a
settlement. You may wish to underscore favorable public
opinion for a negotiated settlement by delivering the
N-K-specific results of the study (see para 5 above) to
Kocharian at your May 25 meeting.
EVANS

[Vrej1915]

Re: Wikileaks

C O N F I D E N T I A L YEREVAN 000819

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2016
TAGS: NATO PGOV PREL TU AM
SUBJECT: TURKISH MP'S VISIT TO ARMENIA MARRED BY HEATED
COMMENTS ON EVENTS OF 1915

Classified By: Amb. John M. Evans for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

-------
SUMMARY
-------

¶1. (C) A member of the Turkish parliament made Armenian news
June 13 when he got into a verbal scuffle with Armenian
National Assembly Speaker Tigran Torosyan during a rare visit
to Armenia. Twenty parliamentarians visited Armenia June
12-14 on an information-gathering trip managed by the NATO
international staff. MP Vahit Erdem, vice president of the
NATO PA and one of three Turkish MPs in the group (the other
two being Faruk Unsal and Muharrem Karsli) said during a
closed meeting with the Speaker that there was no official
Ottoman government order to kill Armenians in 1915, and that
therefore, the events cannot be considered genocide.
Torosyan countered that Erdem had no right to assess the
events of 1915, nor to judge the countries that have
recognized them to be a genocide. The contretemps was the
subject of news reports by two media outlets, despite the
fact that delegation staffers cleared all journalists from
the room before the meeting took place. The same Turkish MP
also made heated comments about Armenian-Turkish relations
during a panel discussion with Armenian NGO representatives
held at the U.S. Embassy. End Summary.

-----------------------------
1915 COMES UP IN CONVERSATION
-----------------------------

¶2. (C) Vahit Erdem (Justice and Development Party/AKP) made
Armenian news June 13 when he got into a verbal scuffle with
Armenian National Assembly Speaker Tigran Torosyan. Erdem
was one of the leaders of the NATO PA delegation that visited
Yerevan June 12-14 on a fact-finding mission. One of the
delegation's staffers characterized the group as "reasonably
educated generalists trying to broaden their knowledge." In
addition to their meeting with Torosyan, the parliamentarians
met with representatives of the OSCE, visited the MFA, the
National Security Service, the National Assembly and the MOD,
and attended two panel discussions with Armenian NGO
representatives at the U.S. Embassy.

¶3. (C) According to press reports corroborated by delegation
staffer Zachary Seldon, during the June 13 meeting with
Torosyan, the delegation presented the Speaker its draft
regional report, which said vaguely that international
supporters of Armenia had recognized the Armenian "genocide."
Torosyan suggested the language be changed to reflect
specifically that EU member-states and the European
Parliament had recognized the "genocide." After that, Erdem
said no genocide ever occurred, that there was never an
official order to kill Armenians, and that the Armenians,
egged on by the Russians, had "attacked the Turks first."
Torosyan interrupted Erdem, and said that, as a member of an
international delegation, Erdem had no right to assess the
events of 1915, nor to judge the countries that had
recognized them to be a genocide. According to the group's
interpreter, who is known to Post as a reliable source,
Torosyan kept his cool throughout the exchange. Some members
of the NATO-PA delegation reportedly shared Torosyan's
sentiment and later criticized Erdem for taking a national
position while acting in his role as a leading member of an
international delegation. Seldon noted privately that the
parliamentarian had stepped clearly beyond the bounds
appropriate to his position in the delegation.

----------------------------------
ANTI-TURKISH STORY LEAKED TO PRESS
----------------------------------

¶4. (C) The exchange was reported June 14 in the state-run
newspaper Hayastani Hanrapetutiun (Armenian Republic), and in
Regnum, an online Russian-language media outlet. Seldon
noted that there were four journalists in the meeting room
before the meeting began, but that they had complied with his
request to leave. He said he was dismayed that the story had
leaked out, and noted that no other members of the Armenian
National Assembly were present at the meeting. It is unclear
whether Torosyan had any aides with him during the meeting.

¶5. (C) Erdem also became heated during one of the panel
discussions with Armenian NGO representatives that took place

at the U.S. Embassy June 12. During the discussion, Armenian
Atlantic Association Executive Director Tevan Poghosyan,
whose NGO aims to foster better understanding among Armenians
of NATO's mission and activities, accused Turkey of accepting
the status quo of Armenian-Turkish relations, rather than
working to normalize them. Erdem countered that Turkey was
doing everything in its power to normalize relations. The
rest of the delegation remained somewhat awkwardly silent.

-------
COMMENT
-------

¶6. (C) It is rare that Turkish officials visit Armenia, and
the atmospherics vary by case. Turkish Ambassador Daryal
Batibay was here a year ago with the Council of Europe's "Ago
Group" and there was no contretemps of any kind. But it is
not only the visitors who vary case by case. Former National
Assembly Speaker Artur Baghdasarian spoke often and with
conviction about the need for Armenia to "get aboard the
train to Europe that is Turkey," rather than "lying on the
tracks in front of it." He boasted of his relationship with
his Turkish opposite number, with whom he claimed to be
planning to move relations forward through
intra-Parliamentary contacts. Baghdasarian is now out of the
Speakership, and it remains to be seen whether Torosyan, who
lacks as yet the broad international contacts cultivated by
his predecessor and has a much less outgoing persona, will be
willing or able to use his new office to good effect on the
frustratingly unhappy state of Turkish-Armenian relations.
The exchange of invective reported above probably will not
encourage the new Armenian Speaker to reach out to his
Turkish counterparts, at least in the short run. END COMMENT.

EVANS

[Vrej1915]

Re: Wikileaks

UNCLAS YEREVAN 001062

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON EMIN EINV AM
SUBJECT: BASE METALS LLC TO INVEST USD 20 MILLION IN NAGORNO
KARABAKH

Sensitive but unclassified. Please protect accordingly.

¶1. (U) Base Metals LLC., an Armenian-registered and
Lichtenstein-based private company, announced plans to invest an
additional USD 20 million in its copper and gold mining operations
in the village of Drmbon in Nagorno Karabakh (NK). According to
press reports, the company employs a majority of the village
population and is the most lucrative business and largest taxpayer
in the region. Base Metals belongs to the Vallex Group of companies
which also includes the Armenian Copper Program (ACP), Vallex
Mining, Vallex Stone, Vallex IT, and the Mining and Metallurgy
Institute.

¶2. (SBU) Base Metals conducted a geological survey of the Drmbon
deposit in 2002 and completed construction of an ore-dressing plant
at the site in September 2003. The company's press secretary is
quoted in the press saying that at end of 2005, Base Metals had
invested a total of USD 15 million in NK. Head of the ACP Planning
Department Artak Manukyan told us (during a conversation on other
issues) that the Drmbon plant's current monthly output amounts to
1,200 tons of copper concentrate, which is then transported to the
ACP-owned smelter in Alaverdi, Armenia, for further processing. The
final product of the Alaverdi smelter, gold-rich blister copper, is
primarily exported to the European market.

¶3. (U) According to a recent press statement made by Executive
Director of Base Metals LLC Artur Mkrtumyan, the mine is one of the
largest foreign investments in NK. The mine employs approximately
1,000 people at an average monthly salary of USD 300 and operates on
a 24-hour schedule. Mkrtumyan estimated that the deposits at the
site were sufficient to support expanded operations for the next 20
years and told the press that Base Metals was continuing to explore
for new deposits throughout NK.

EVANS

[Tigranakert]

Re: Wikileaks

Hurray for Mr. Kocharian for not making "concessions" because of the supposed Azeri "military-build up" which would have altered the military balance in the future "significantly". The result, no surrender of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the military-balance is still not altered as Armenia saw different ways to keep up with Azergayjan. Thank you Mr. Kocharian and thank you Mr. Sargysyan, as other anti-Armenian opposition members would have ceded Nagorno-Karabakh a long time ago, and we would have the problem of Turkey and Azerbaijan claiming Syunik, after which we should cede parts of Syunik, and afterwards they will claim Yerevan, after which we should cede parts of Yerevan, and afterwards they will claim every Armenian life, after which we should (a) commit suicide (b) walk into the desert (c) be killed.

[Vrej1915]

Re: Wikileaks

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 YEREVAN 001249

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC
OSD FOR DASD JIM MACDOUGAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR AM IR
SUBJECT: DEFMIN SARGSIAN REVEIWS N-K, IRAN, AND ELECTION
ISSUES DURING AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL


Classified By: Ambassador John M. Evans, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Sargsian lauded the growing bilateral defense
relationship, before complaining about Azerbaijan's approach
to the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations. He said that
Azerbaijan constantly revises its demands, and called for the
Minsk Group Co-Chairs to demand greater consistency from the
Azerbaijani side. Ambassador called on Sargsian (as a top
ruling-party leader) to weigh in for clean elections in 2007,
to which Sargsian agreed. Sargsian took the Ambassador's
point about arms-length relations with Iran, and commented
the Armenian-Iranian relationship was superficial and driven
mostly by Armenia's critical energy needs. Ambassador advised
of EUCOM GEN Ward's upcoming visit, which Sargsian welcomed.
END SUMMARY

--------------------------------------
GOOD TIMES IN THE DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP
--------------------------------------

¶2. (C) The Ambassador's September 5 farewell call on Defense
Minister Serzh Sargsian found the minister in good spirits
about the growing warmth in the bilateral defense
relationship. Ambassador reviewed some of the key landmarks
during his tenure: U.S. assistance in the development of
Armenia's new National Security Strategy (NSS), the
successful deployment of Armenian troops in Iraq and Kosovo,
and growing momentum in the FMF/IMET programs. He thanked
the minister for his personal support for these initiatives,
which began with Sargsian's decision to support a Defense
Assessment, and noted his expectation that this cooperation
should continue, full steam, notwithstanding his own
departure. The Ambassador assured Sargsian that
Ambassador-designate Hoagland was a consummate professional,
and predicted the two would get along well. He also advised
Sargsian of the 19-20 September visit of EUCOM Deputy
Commander GEN Ward, commenting that Ward enjoyed a sterling
reputation. The ambassador proposed that Sargsian explore
the feasibility of visiting the Armenian troops deployed in
Iraq.

¶3. (C) Sargsian responded in kind, with effusive appreciation
for the deepening bilateral defense relationship, and for the
Ambassador's role in fostering it. He expressed hope that
Ambassador-designate Hoagland would call on him soon after
arrival, and continue the tradition of close cooperation.
Sargsian said his ministry had made a policy of complete
openness with the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. advisers on the
NSS, hiding nothing. He welcomed the many seminars and
training opportunities the U.S. has provided the MOD. He
stated that Armenia wanted to give NATO a warm reception.
Sargsian said he would inquire with GEN Ward about the
possibility of a visit to Iraq.

---------------------------
BEWARE THE PERSIAN NEIGHBOR
---------------------------

¶4. (C) The Ambassador cautioned Sargsian--in his role as
chairman of Armenia's National Security Council--to be
cautious about Armenia's ties with Iran, and especially to
consider the bad optics of broadening or deepening those ties
as the UN Security Council deliberates on sanctions against
Iran. At the same time, he encouraged Armenia to look for
opportunities, during its routine contacts with its southern
neighbor, to encourage Iranian officials to turn aside from
the country's defiant posture against the international
community. Sargsian was dismissive of the Armenian-Iranian
relationship. He said that some trade was inevitable,
particularly to satisfy Armenia's critical needs for
diversification of energy sources. Sargsian said that the
bottom line was that Armenia is dependent on gas, and it was
"better to have two pipes than one." Beneath these
superficial commercial relationships and certain
people-to-people connections at the grass-roots level, the
two governments had quite different values and interests,
precluding a close friendship. Sargsian felt that neither
Armenia nor Russia would have any success in altering Iran's
outlook.

--------------------------------------------- --
N-K: THE EVER-SHIFTING POSITIONS OF AZERBAIJAN
--------------------------------------------- --

¶5. (S) The Ambassador broached Nagorno-Karabakh, urging
Armenia to stick with the Minsk Group (MG) negotiation

YEREVAN 00001249 002 OF 003


process, even if (when) the talks hit rough patches. He
pointed out that a credible negotiating process is a
stabilizing factor in the region; should that process break
down, that fact alone could have destabilizing consequences.
Sargsian agreed, but confessed his government sometimes toyed
with the idea of just such a dramatic gesture of displeasure
as withdrawing from the MG process. He thought the
negotiations might be a waste of time if Azerbaijan refused
to deal seriously, and was pessimistic of the chances for a
near-term solution. The minister suggested that the U.S.
review its own satellite imagery over the last few years and
examine the positions of the two sides, defensive
entrenchments. He said such a review would show the
inexorable advance of Azerbaijani positions, moving the Line
of Contact toward the Armenian side.

¶6. (S) Sargsian complained at some length that Armenia could
not trust the Azerbaijani leadership to negotiate in good
faith and keep its word. Azerbaijan's demands constantly
shift, always demanding some new concession. He predicted
that even if a peace deal were agreed between the two sides,
Azerbaijan would keep coming back for more concessions. He
called for the MG co-chairs to get tough with Azerbaijan, and
not tolerate this continual shifting of the goalposts.
"Speaking quietly to Azerbaijan is like not speaking at all"
he commented, saying Azerbaijan only hears firm and forceful
interventions. Sargsian also complained about the steady
stream of bellicose rhetoric from Baku this year, contrasting
it with Yerevan's restraint, and taking this as further
evidence Azerbaijan is not serious about negotiating with
Armenia, but only posturing. Ilham Aliyev says one thing in
MG negotiations, and then goes straight home to make
inflammatory proclamations in Baku. Sargsian supported the
co-chairs' publication of the basic principles after the
latest round of negotiations, commenting that this level of
public transparency was helpful. Sargsian also stated he was
convinced the co-chairs should have published this
information much earlier.

¶7. (S) Sargsian thought renewed military conflict unlikely,
because Armenia would not launch hostilities, and (he
asserted firmly) Azerbaijan was quite incapable of doing so.
Sargsian expressed appreciation for U.S. leadership in the
South Caucasus. He said that the level of sniping incidents
on the Line of Contact had decreased sharply following
President Aliyev's trip to Washington. He offered this as an
example to prove that forceful engagement works well with
Azerbaijan.

-------------------
THE DEMOCRATIC ROAD
-------------------

¶8. (C) Noting Sargsian's role as a top official of the ruling
Republican Party, the ambassador affirmed the need for
Armenia to perform much better than in the past in the
conduct of elections. Sargsian agreed this was imperative,
and said President Kocharian clearly understood the great
importance of fair elections. He went on to complain of the
irresponsible and destructive behavior of Armenia's fractious
opposition parties, who boycotted parliament and had refused
to play their appointed role in the constitutional
referendum. He said opposition leaders failed to comprehend
they had an important civic role to play even when they are
not in power. The opposition parties just wanted to boycott,
criticize, and obstruct anything the government tried to
undertake, regardless of its merit. They thus abdicated the
role that a political opposition was supposed to fill: to
have a valid debate on issues. Sargsian warned that no
matter how properly the elections are conducted, there would
be local politicians who would seek to inflate minor
violation and discredit the process.

¶9. (C) In an odd tangent, Sargsian related with sardonic
humor a telephone conversation he said he had had with an
Armenian journalist who had published (supposedly) unfounded
accusations against him. What was he supposed to do, he
asked the journalist, in response to such scurrilous
reporting? Should he send thugs to the journalist's house to
seek retribution? No, that's out of bounds. Could he seek
redress in the courts? No, the courts were corrupt and
ineffective. He was powerless to respond effectively to his
name being unfairly blackened.

---------------------
DEALING WITH SARGSIAN

YEREVAN 00001249 003 OF 003


---------------------

¶10. (C) Well-turned out in a fashionable suit-and-tie,
Sargsian was friendly, frank, and engaging, with both sides
speaking exclusively in Russian. He was fully confident on
all topics from defense issues to democratic process.
Normally the most even-tempered interlocutor, on this
occasion Sargsian grew more animated in his irritation with
Azerbaijan's recent behavior.

EVANS