Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations
Georgia did not believe Russia would respond to its offensive in South Ossetia and was completely unprepared for the counter-attack, the deputy defence minister has admitted. Batu Kutelia told the Financial Times that Georgia had made the decision to seize the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali despite the fact that its forces did not have enough anti-tank and air defences to protect themselves against the possibility of serious resistance. “Unfortunately, we attached a low priority to this,” he said, sitting at a desk with the flags of Georgia and Nato (to which Georgia does not belong) crossed behind him. “We did not prepare for this kind of eventuality.” The Georgian military felt there was only a low probability of a massive Russian counter-attack, despite the bloody way in which Russia destroyed Chechnya, on the other side of the Caucasus mountains, in two wars during the 1990s and the fact that separatists in South Ossetia and Abkhazia had Russian backing. Georgian forces were unprepared when the Russian counter-strike came, Mr Kutelia said. “I didn’t think it likely that a member of the UN Security Council and the OSCE would react like this,” Mr Kutelia said. His amazement that Russia would use force against a smaller neighbour was echoed by David Darchiashvili, head of the parliamentary European integration committee. “No one expected Russia would mobilise and invade,” he said. Georgia’s 20,000-man army, built up at a cost of $2bn with the help of US trainers and cast-off Warsaw Pact equipment, was organised to deal with “brushfire” wars with separatist enclaves on its borders and to contribute to missions such as Iraq as a way of shoring up Georgia’s ties with the west, not to do battle with Russia. Mr Kutelia still puts blame for the war squarely on the Russians and their South Ossetian allies, saying that in early August Ossetian fighters began to shell Georgian positions and villages.
He said Russia had begun to move heavy armour through the Roki tunnel from North Ossetia before President Mikheil Saakashvili unleashed his military against the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali on August 7, but offered no evidence to back this up. Mr Kutelia said that the Georgians moved despite not having enough anti-tank and air defences, not expecting the Russians to react with overwhelming force.“At some point there was no choice,” he said. Mr Kutelia said damage to Georgia’s military infrastructure was “significant”, and it would take an enormous amount of foreign help to rebuild Georgia’s defensive capabilities, something the Russians have promised to flatten again if they feel it poses a threat. Russian troops have entered many of Georgia’s military bases, often under the eyes of a cowed Georgian army. They have confiscated US Humvee vehicles, blown up coastguard vessels and ransacked some of Georgia’s most modern military bases, destroying radar and other air defences, as well as reportedly capturing Georgian tanks, small arms and ammunition. So far Russia has made no move to return its booty. The cost of Georgia’s lack of preparation could be seen earlier this week, when seven soldiers killed in earlier fighting were buried in a cemetery on a dusty hillside outside the capital. About 20 troops in fatigues, and one in black track pants, watched from the shade of a pine tree as a bulldozer pushed sandy soil into the long trench holding the bodies.
Source: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0d8beefe-6...0779fd18c.html
When Russian troops eventually pull out of Georgian towns such as Gori and Zugdidi, ordinary Georgians will heave a sigh of relief. But that will also be the moment that they take on board the fact that the two territories at the heart of the conflict with Moscow, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, although formally still regarded internationally as Georgian territory, are now essentially lost to them. The people who will suffer most in the long term from this conflict are more than 20,000 ethnic Georgians from a mosaic of villages in South Ossetia who have now mostly fled. Relatively few Georgians left during or after the small-scale 1990-92 conflict over South Ossetia and despite intermittent skirmishes and incidents, neighbourly contacts continued. Reporters who have passed through many of the villages in the last few days say they are now in ruins. The Russian authorities and their South Ossetian allies are now saying that they will not allow the Georgians back any time soon. A Russian foreign ministry statement on August 18 said, "It is clear that some time and not a short period of time must pass in order to heal the wounds and to restore confidence. Only after this, the conditions will be created for discussing practical aspects related to the problems of refugees." Hundreds of South Ossetians also lost their homes in the Georgian military assault of 7-8 August and, it appears, in the ensuing Russian counter-attack - but they have the small consolation of knowing they can start rebuilding them.
Russian leverage
The prospect is also now much bleaker for the 240,000 or so ethnic Georgians who were registered as displaced from the 1992-3 conflict in Abkhazia. Their hopes of return were predicated on a successful peace agreement which now looks more elusive than ever. Around 50,000 Georgians live in Abkhazia's southernmost Gali district under an Abkhaz administration. So far they have managed to stay in their homes, but their future is also more precarious. It is not just a matter of Georgian control. It will also be harder now to maintain an international presence in the two disputed regions. The final point in the six-point ceasefire plan reads: "Pending an international mechanism [in South Ossetia], Russian peacekeeping forces will implement additional security measures." That effectively puts an end to the former Joint Peacekeeping Forces, which had a Georgian contingent. It also gives Moscow even more leverage than before over the shape of any security arrangements for the region. Moscow is already insisting it can have the only real security presence there. "We are of course not against international peacekeepers... but the problem is that the Abkhaz and the Ossetians do not trust anyone except Russian peacekeepers," Russian president Dmitry Medvedev told German chancellor Angela Merkel.
Unattainable dream
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the only international organization with a mandate in South Ossetia, wants to dispatch an additional 100 monitors to South Ossetia. But Russia has dragged its feet, saying it wanted to agree the terms of their deployment in more detail and the OSCE has so far agreed to send just 20 more monitors. The OSCE had just nine military monitors on the ground in South Ossetia when fighting started there on 7-8 August. The European Union, with French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner taking the lead, also says it want to provide peacekeepers, but Mr Kouchner's Swedish counterpart, Carl Bildt, admitted this might not work. "There are no signs of the Russians letting in anyone else," he said. In Abkhazia, the United Nations has a small contingent of around 130 unarmed monitors, who were bystanders in the recent crisis. When the Abkhaz, with Russian support, wanted to capture the mountainous Upper Kodori Gorge district from the Georgians, they merely gave the UN monitors there a 24-hour warning to leave. The EU has approved small aid programmes for both Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the last few years, but they have looked relatively modest when compared to the vast amount of Russian money coming into both regions. Abkhazia is bigger and more diverse than South Ossetia with a lively media and many non-governmental organizations. Many Abkhaz intellectuals dreamed of having some kind of independence free of both Georgia and Russia and with links across the Black Sea to the EU but that now looks unattainable.
'Double standards'
Internationally mediated peace talks over both disputes had stalled and there is little chance of them resuming properly any time soon. Faced with a tightening Russian grip, Western leaders can only fall back on expressing support for Georgia's right to these territories. US President George W Bush made this commitment on 16 August, saying: "Georgia's borders should command the same respect as every other nation's. There's no room for debate on this matter." This becomes a moral argument, with the Russians answering that after supporting Kosovo's unilateral secession from Serbia, the West is guilty of "double standards" in the Caucasus. Caught in the middle of these international wrangles are the current and former populations of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia Abkhaz, Ossetians and other nationalities such as Armenians on the one hand, and the displaced Georgians on the other. They often get along fine when they have a chance to engage in low-level meetings arranged by foreign organisations or across market stalls. Now, unfortunately, they are being wrenched apart further than ever by conflict.
Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7571002.stm
Tbilisi admits misjudging Russia
Georgia did not believe Russia would respond to its offensive in South Ossetia and was completely unprepared for the counter-attack, the deputy defence minister has admitted. Batu Kutelia told the Financial Times that Georgia had made the decision to seize the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali despite the fact that its forces did not have enough anti-tank and air defences to protect themselves against the possibility of serious resistance. “Unfortunately, we attached a low priority to this,” he said, sitting at a desk with the flags of Georgia and Nato (to which Georgia does not belong) crossed behind him. “We did not prepare for this kind of eventuality.” The Georgian military felt there was only a low probability of a massive Russian counter-attack, despite the bloody way in which Russia destroyed Chechnya, on the other side of the Caucasus mountains, in two wars during the 1990s and the fact that separatists in South Ossetia and Abkhazia had Russian backing. Georgian forces were unprepared when the Russian counter-strike came, Mr Kutelia said. “I didn’t think it likely that a member of the UN Security Council and the OSCE would react like this,” Mr Kutelia said. His amazement that Russia would use force against a smaller neighbour was echoed by David Darchiashvili, head of the parliamentary European integration committee. “No one expected Russia would mobilise and invade,” he said. Georgia’s 20,000-man army, built up at a cost of $2bn with the help of US trainers and cast-off Warsaw Pact equipment, was organised to deal with “brushfire” wars with separatist enclaves on its borders and to contribute to missions such as Iraq as a way of shoring up Georgia’s ties with the west, not to do battle with Russia. Mr Kutelia still puts blame for the war squarely on the Russians and their South Ossetian allies, saying that in early August Ossetian fighters began to shell Georgian positions and villages.
He said Russia had begun to move heavy armour through the Roki tunnel from North Ossetia before President Mikheil Saakashvili unleashed his military against the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali on August 7, but offered no evidence to back this up. Mr Kutelia said that the Georgians moved despite not having enough anti-tank and air defences, not expecting the Russians to react with overwhelming force.“At some point there was no choice,” he said. Mr Kutelia said damage to Georgia’s military infrastructure was “significant”, and it would take an enormous amount of foreign help to rebuild Georgia’s defensive capabilities, something the Russians have promised to flatten again if they feel it poses a threat. Russian troops have entered many of Georgia’s military bases, often under the eyes of a cowed Georgian army. They have confiscated US Humvee vehicles, blown up coastguard vessels and ransacked some of Georgia’s most modern military bases, destroying radar and other air defences, as well as reportedly capturing Georgian tanks, small arms and ammunition. So far Russia has made no move to return its booty. The cost of Georgia’s lack of preparation could be seen earlier this week, when seven soldiers killed in earlier fighting were buried in a cemetery on a dusty hillside outside the capital. About 20 troops in fatigues, and one in black track pants, watched from the shade of a pine tree as a bulldozer pushed sandy soil into the long trench holding the bodies.
Source: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0d8beefe-6...0779fd18c.html
Georgia facing reality of defeat
When Russian troops eventually pull out of Georgian towns such as Gori and Zugdidi, ordinary Georgians will heave a sigh of relief. But that will also be the moment that they take on board the fact that the two territories at the heart of the conflict with Moscow, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, although formally still regarded internationally as Georgian territory, are now essentially lost to them. The people who will suffer most in the long term from this conflict are more than 20,000 ethnic Georgians from a mosaic of villages in South Ossetia who have now mostly fled. Relatively few Georgians left during or after the small-scale 1990-92 conflict over South Ossetia and despite intermittent skirmishes and incidents, neighbourly contacts continued. Reporters who have passed through many of the villages in the last few days say they are now in ruins. The Russian authorities and their South Ossetian allies are now saying that they will not allow the Georgians back any time soon. A Russian foreign ministry statement on August 18 said, "It is clear that some time and not a short period of time must pass in order to heal the wounds and to restore confidence. Only after this, the conditions will be created for discussing practical aspects related to the problems of refugees." Hundreds of South Ossetians also lost their homes in the Georgian military assault of 7-8 August and, it appears, in the ensuing Russian counter-attack - but they have the small consolation of knowing they can start rebuilding them.
Russian leverage
The prospect is also now much bleaker for the 240,000 or so ethnic Georgians who were registered as displaced from the 1992-3 conflict in Abkhazia. Their hopes of return were predicated on a successful peace agreement which now looks more elusive than ever. Around 50,000 Georgians live in Abkhazia's southernmost Gali district under an Abkhaz administration. So far they have managed to stay in their homes, but their future is also more precarious. It is not just a matter of Georgian control. It will also be harder now to maintain an international presence in the two disputed regions. The final point in the six-point ceasefire plan reads: "Pending an international mechanism [in South Ossetia], Russian peacekeeping forces will implement additional security measures." That effectively puts an end to the former Joint Peacekeeping Forces, which had a Georgian contingent. It also gives Moscow even more leverage than before over the shape of any security arrangements for the region. Moscow is already insisting it can have the only real security presence there. "We are of course not against international peacekeepers... but the problem is that the Abkhaz and the Ossetians do not trust anyone except Russian peacekeepers," Russian president Dmitry Medvedev told German chancellor Angela Merkel.
Unattainable dream
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the only international organization with a mandate in South Ossetia, wants to dispatch an additional 100 monitors to South Ossetia. But Russia has dragged its feet, saying it wanted to agree the terms of their deployment in more detail and the OSCE has so far agreed to send just 20 more monitors. The OSCE had just nine military monitors on the ground in South Ossetia when fighting started there on 7-8 August. The European Union, with French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner taking the lead, also says it want to provide peacekeepers, but Mr Kouchner's Swedish counterpart, Carl Bildt, admitted this might not work. "There are no signs of the Russians letting in anyone else," he said. In Abkhazia, the United Nations has a small contingent of around 130 unarmed monitors, who were bystanders in the recent crisis. When the Abkhaz, with Russian support, wanted to capture the mountainous Upper Kodori Gorge district from the Georgians, they merely gave the UN monitors there a 24-hour warning to leave. The EU has approved small aid programmes for both Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the last few years, but they have looked relatively modest when compared to the vast amount of Russian money coming into both regions. Abkhazia is bigger and more diverse than South Ossetia with a lively media and many non-governmental organizations. Many Abkhaz intellectuals dreamed of having some kind of independence free of both Georgia and Russia and with links across the Black Sea to the EU but that now looks unattainable.
'Double standards'
Internationally mediated peace talks over both disputes had stalled and there is little chance of them resuming properly any time soon. Faced with a tightening Russian grip, Western leaders can only fall back on expressing support for Georgia's right to these territories. US President George W Bush made this commitment on 16 August, saying: "Georgia's borders should command the same respect as every other nation's. There's no room for debate on this matter." This becomes a moral argument, with the Russians answering that after supporting Kosovo's unilateral secession from Serbia, the West is guilty of "double standards" in the Caucasus. Caught in the middle of these international wrangles are the current and former populations of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia Abkhaz, Ossetians and other nationalities such as Armenians on the one hand, and the displaced Georgians on the other. They often get along fine when they have a chance to engage in low-level meetings arranged by foreign organisations or across market stalls. Now, unfortunately, they are being wrenched apart further than ever by conflict.
Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7571002.stm
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