The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

The rhetoric is beginning to take shape: Yerevan is forcefully seeking peace while Baku is threatening force, and the Russian Federation may be using the standoff between Azerbaijan and Armenia to expand its presence in the South Caucasus. Despite its outwardly appearances, however, the Armenian Republic today, in my opinion, enjoys a better standing in the region than its wealthier neighbors. War games carried out in Nagorno Karabagh and Medvedev's successful visit to Armenia were very symbolic in that they stated to the world - Armenia won't be defeated due to its military strenght and its close alliance with Russia. I firmly believe that Moscow wants and needs a viable Armenia, and a viable Armenia is dependent on Nagorno Karabagh. I firmly believe that Armenia is to play even a greater role in the region. I firmly believe that the current administration in Yerevan headed by President Sargsyan is fully capable of handling these crucial and complex geopolitical matters.

Armenian

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WILL RUSSIAN PEACEKEEPERS LIFT BLOCKADE OFF KARABAKH?

RUSSIA UNDERTAKES TO SETTLE THE CONFLICT OVER NAGORNO-KARABAKH; Presidents of Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan will meet to discuss Nagorno-Karabakh. Toting up results of his visit to Yerevan, President Dmitry Medvedev said the leaders of Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan would meet soon to discuss the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. Armenia is one of the victims of the South Ossetian conflict. Ferry to Poti, Georgia, is the only alternative to expensive shipment of cargo by the air. The ferry makes the trip once a week these days - too infrequently even for so small a country as Armenia is. Political difficulties meanwhile are even more formidable. Moscow's ally as it is, Yerevan is supposed to support recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It cannot do so. Supporting recognition of the former Georgian autonomies, it will have to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as well. Failure to do so will frustrate Armenian general public. Recognition on the other hand is not something Azerbaijan will put up with. Skirmishes between Armenian and Azerbaijani border guards are too frequent as it is. "Armenia is ready for the negotiations," President Serj Sarkisjan announced. He said, however, that Armenia intended to take into account Nagorno-Karabakh's right to self-determination. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said several days ago that Karabakh conflict settlement was making progress and that a couple of nuances only had to be addressed now. Yerevan took offense. It decided that what Lavrov was saying was that abandonment of claims for Nagorno-Karabakh would make it easier for Armenia to get out of the transport blockade. What information is available to Izvestia, however, indicates that Lavrov reassured his Armenian colleagues and said that he had only wanted to focus attention on some practical issues. Including, one might think, the recent improvement of the relations between Armenia and Turkey. What will happen now? Some experts assume that deployment of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh is a definite possibility (there are no legal obstacles to it, as matters stand). Others believe that another Russian military base may be established in Armenia, a means to change the correlation of forces in the region in Moscow's favor.

Source: http://groong.usc.edu/news/msg248321.html

What effect will the meeting between Armenian, Azerbaijani and Russian Presidents have?

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has always been a format of rivalry between Russia and the United States. Russian President Dmitri Medvedev’s Yerevan statement on his intention to invite the Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents to Moscow for the regulation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was not an unexpected move. After the August events it became clear to everyone in the Region that Russia would not content itself with «compelling Georgia to peace»; there would also be other steps directed to the consolidation of cracked Russian positions in the South Caucasus. That Russian positions cracked in the Region is quite a fact, and the regional states will hardly seek repetition of the Georgian scenario. Especially at the time of financial-economic crisis the policy of twisting arms, which, by the way, neither bypassed Russia, cannot lead us to a silent consent with the Russian viewpoint. However strange it may sound, Armenia found itself in a more advantageous position than Georgia or Azerbaijan. It has neither oil, nor passage to the Black Sea, but it has a great desire to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with minimal losses. Now we shall not dwell on the fact that doing it behind the back of Nagorno Karabakh is not ethical at all. That's not the point. Yerevan has simply received a certain impulse and a little freedom of manipulation in the painful issue. Now the future of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and that of Armenia itself depend on how Armenia will make use of the situation, and Yerevan cannot but realize the real value of the moment. The Region is changing rapidly, and quite soon we shall have to deal with a fairly new South Caucasus. It presupposes new relations too: Russia-South Caucasus, USA-South Caucasus, and Turkey-South Caucasus. As for the Karabakh conflict, it has always been a format of rivalry between Russia and the United States. This rivalry has always existed, but it has become more intense now, and the latest events are the proof of it: the Washington meeting of Armenian Prime-Minister Tigran Sargsyan with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the one-day visit of US Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried, and before it - visit of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. However, Russia faces a serious problem after the «five-day war»: its image has been thoroughly destroyed in the eyes of the world community, and now Russia has to prove that militant solution of the South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflict was just an exception and that the Russian Federation is potent enough to solve its problems in some other ways too, i.e. through negotiations. “The events of August 2008 have created a new platform for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijan will never become a completely pro-western country, like Georgia is. Moreover, the latter has been disvalued as an oil and gas transit country and the world powers have given a fresh look at Armenia, whose ‘football diplomacy’ produced the desired effect. Turkey had started developing its Caucasus stability and cooperation pact still in spring of the current year and the five-day war in South Ossetia just pushed Ankara to action. Thus, the Turkish initiative has not only played its role in the Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, but it has also changed the whole situation in the region,” considers political analyst Sergey Minasyan. Minasyan also notes Russia’s «strange» intention to speed up the Nagorno-Karabakh process. “Presently Russia is imitating the Ramboullet and Bucharest scenarios. However, for the conflicting sides maintenance of the status quo and assistance from the U.S. and EU is more preferable. I am not sure that speeding up the process is in Russia’s interests,” Minasyan says. According to Head of the Russian Duma Defence Committee Viktor Zavarzin, the intended meeting between Armenian, Azerbaijani and Russian Presidents will convey a new impulse to the Karabakh talks and will help to ease the stress in the Region. “Resolution of the conflict is possible only on the negotiation level with observation of international norms, and it should satisfy all the interested parties,” Zavarzin concluded. One point, however, remains incomprehensible – how is it possible to satisfy all the interested parties of the conflict?

Source: http://www.panarmenian.net/details/eng/?nid=943

BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST;
Armenia in the wake of the August events

President Medvedev visits Armenia; The state of the Armenian economy has deteriorated to the point where President Serge Sargsian even had to visit Georgia. President Dmitri Medvedev made an official visit to Yerevan yesterday, attempting to persuade Armenia that Moscow will come up with a solution. Russia's chief ally in the Caucasus region, Armenia, has found itself cut off from Russia since the Russian-Georgian war. Meanwhile, some progress has been observed in Armenia's relations with Turkey. The state of the Armenian economy has deteriorated to the point where President Serge Sargsian even had to visit Georgia. President Dmitri Medvedev made an official visit to Yerevan yesterday, attempting to persuade Armenia that Moscow will come up with a solution. A number of non-binding bilateral cooperation agreements were signed in the course of Medvedev's visit. The war in the Caucasus has left Russian diplomacy facing many problems. To date, not even Belarus - Russia's closest ally - has recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Armenia's position on the issue was best expressed by its president, who made an official visit to Tbilisi in September. Afterwards, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili declared that Sargsian had expressed support for Georgia's territorial integrity. Last weekend, Yerevan was visited by US State Department official Daniel Fried and Robert Simmons, NATO's special envoy for the South Caucasus. Afterwards, Sergsian stated that Yerevan regards NATO "as a component of our national security" - despite Armenia's military alliance with Russia. Moscow has a military base at Gyumri and a group of border guards; Armenia is a member of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization, which is often compared to NATO. Yerevan's actions have largely been prompted by Russia's actions. Essentially, Armenia now has only one ground corridor for access to the outside world: Iran. But this corridor is not fully available, since a number of leading Western nations are attempting to isolate Iran itself. And Armenia's other neighbors are Georgia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. Alexei Makarkin, deputy general director of the Political Techniques Center: "No matter how much it wants to, Russia cannot build a pipeline directly to Armenia or offer an alternative option for energy deliveries. This is politics, and Serge Sargsian has to seek ways of solving his country's problems in the current circumstances." RISI analyst Azhdar Kurtov says that Armenia is interested in unblocking the current situation - not only for Nagorno-Karabakh, but also with regard to Armenia's geographical isolation: "But Russia still isn't providing answers to all of Armenia's questions, so I think the geopolitical game will continue: Armenia will attempt to obtain advantages from both Russia and the West simultaneously."

Source: http://groong.usc.edu/news/msg248292.html

RUSSIA TAKES INITIATIVE IN INTERNATIONAL PUSH FOR KARABAKH PEACE

Russia has taken the center stage in international efforts to resolve the Karabakh conflict, which could yield a breakthrough before the end of this year. President Dmitry Medvedev is expected to host a potentially decisive meeting of his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts next month. Moscow may thus be trying to sideline the OSCE’s so-called Minsk Group on Karabakh, which it has long co-chaired with the United States and France. When he paid an official visit to Yerevan on October 21, Medvedev publicly urged Presidents Serzh Sarkisian of Armenia and Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan to meet in his presence in Russia. The Karabakh dispute was high on the agenda. “I hope that the three presidents will meet in the very near future to continue discussions on this theme,” he told a joint news conference with Sarkisian. “I hope that the meeting will take place in Russia” (Regnum, October 21). He noted that the Karabakh peace process now seemed to be “in an advanced stage.”

Medvedev discussed what the Kremlin described as preparations for the Armenian-Azerbaijani summit in a phone call with Aliyev the next day. Konstantin Zatulin, a Kremlin-linked Russian pundit, told Armenian journalists afterward that the crucial summit would likely take place in early November; but neither conflicting party has yet confirmed the meeting, let alone announced any dates for it. Aliyev’s chief foreign policy aide, Novruz Mammadov, has said only that it was “possible”. Armenian officials have not commented on the matter at all. Medvedev announced his initiative following unusually optimistic statements on Karabakh peace prospects that were made by his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov. In an October 7 interview with Rossiiskaya Gazeta, Lavrov spoke of a “very real chance” to end the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in the coming weeks. “There remain two or three unresolved issues that need to be agreed upon at the next meetings of the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan,” he said. He added that the future of the so-called Lachin corridor, which is the shortest overland link between Armenia and Karabakh, is now the main stumbling block in the peace talks. Three days later, Lavrov held a trilateral meeting with his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts on the sidelines of a CIS summit in Bishkek.

Many analysts in the South Caucasus and the West have long contended that Russia was uninterested in a Karabakh settlement, lest it lose leverage against Azerbaijan and, even more, Armenia, its main ally in the region. Peace with Azerbaijan, they have argued, would reduce the significance for Armenia of maintaining close military ties with Russia and make the Armenian economy less dependent on Russian energy supplies. Medvedev’s desire to host the crucial Aliyev-Sarkisian encounter is, however, a clear indication that Karabakh peace is not necessarily incompatible with Russian goals and interests in the region, especially if Moscow plays a key role in a multinational peace-keeping force that would have to be deployed in the conflict zone. Armenia is rife with speculation that Moscow is trying to cajole Azerbaijan into agreeing to a Russian troop presence and pursuing a more pro-Russian policy on other issues, notably the transportation of Caspian oil and gas to the West. “To that end [the Russians] need to force Armenia into making essentially unilateral and absolutely unacceptable concessions on the Karabakh issue,” Yerkir, a Yerevan weekly controlled by the governing Armenian Revolutionary Federation party, wrote on October 24, reflecting the growing opinion among local observers.

[...]

Source: http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2373481

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Russia’s president, in Yerevan, sees quick action on Karabakh

President Dmitry Medvedev of Russia is looking forward to a meeting of the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Moscow, he announced during an official visit to Armenia on October 20-21. "I am hopeful that we are in the stage where progress is being made," he said in a joint press conference with President Serge Sargsian. "In any case, the two sides are prepared to look for solutions. I will not comment on the details of the negotiations because they are details of negotiations and that is their value. I hope that in the near future a meeting of three presidents takes place in the capital of Russia," he added. A large part of the discussions between Mr. Sargsian and Mr. Medvedev was dedicated to the resolution of the Karabakh conflict. Armenia is prepared to continue the negotiations on the basis of the Madrid principles," Mr. Sargsian said, referring to a proposal presented to Armenia and Azerbaijan by high officials from the United States, Russia, and France. "These are foundations, which make it possible to recognize Karabakh's right to self-determination and some other issues that are matters of principle for us," Mr. Sargsian added.

Moscow-Baku talks

After leaving Armenia, Russia's president spoke on October 22 to the president of Azerbaijan. Mr. Medvedev and President Ilham Aliyev discussed preparations for a meeting of the three presidents, Interfax reported. Mr. Medvedev had visited Baku on July 3. During that visit, he and Mr. Aliyev signed a Declaration on Friendship and Strategic Partnership. In the declaration, Moscow and Baku emphasized "the importance of speedily resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the basis of widely accepted norms and principles of international law, and first of all, maintaining and guaranteeing those of the sovereignty of states, their territorial integrity, and the unchangeability of their borders." The two presidents also pledged to promote military cooperation (Russia last year sold tanks to Azerbaijan for the first time since the mid-1990s) and to work against groups undermining the sovereignty of each of the two countries (with both sides stepping up attacks on Islamist groups in the border areas). But when Mr. Aliyev returned Mr. Medvedev's visit in September - after the war in Georgia - Mr. Medvedev did not repeat the verbiage about territorial integrity.

Madrid Principles

At a meeting in Madrid in November 2007, U.S. undersecretary of state Nicholas Burns, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, and French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner presented to the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan a document with their proposals for the resolution of the Karabakh conflict. The three officials represent the three states that co-chair the OSCE Minsk Group, which mediates the resolution of the Karabakh conflict. "It is the same document that has been on the table for about two years," Vartan Oskanian, Armenia's foreign minister at the time said after the Madrid meeting. "In those matters where there was no agreement, the co-chairs have added their own proposals to the sides, for consideration. That is the only detail of that document. For that reason it is important to be careful in one's assessment, because the level was high, and the expectations could also be high." The substance of the earlier document referred to by Mr. Oskanian, known as the Prague document, was made public in June 2006.

It was U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state Matthew Bryza, the U.S. co-chair of the Minsk Group, who disclosed the main principles of a framework peace accord. Under the principles, he said, Armenian forces would leave those territories of Azerbaijan in which they are now stationed; Armenia and Azerbaijan would normalize their economic and diplomatic ties; peace-keepers would be stationed; there would be international economic aid for Karabakh; and more. In the end, he said, there would be a vote on the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Mr. Bryza said the proposed vote would take place "at some point" in the future, after the liberation of Armenian-occupied lands in Azerbaijan, the deployment of an international peacekeeping force in the conflict zone, and the restoration of political and economic ties between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Official Yerevan responded quickly to the June 2006 disclosures, saying they were partial.

The matter of a referendum and that of handing the Lachin corridor and Kelbajar to Azerbaijan were the most contentious issues. As the negotiations continued, the co-chairs offered their own proposals - the Madrid Principles - for the resolution of the issues on which Yerevan and Baku could not agree. Since Yerevan had accepted the earlier document as a basis for negotiations and Baku had rejected it, the assumption was that the Madrid principles were more favorable to Azerbaijan. On October 7, speaking to the Russian daily Rossiiskaya Gazeta, Mr. Lavrov, the foreign minister, said, "There remain two or three unresolved issues which need to be agreed upon at the next meetings of the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan," Mr. Lavrov told the Russian newspaper. "The first among them is the Lachin corridor," he added. Working toward a settlement Mr. Bryza lately told the BBC, "The resolution of the Karabakh conflict must start with the principle of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. Other complementary principles can then be incorporated." He added, "We must say that yes, from a legal perspective, by law, Nagorno-Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan. But, after all, so that the negotiations result in an agreement, Armenia too must agree to it. We know that Armenia has a different position, and we must use very creative, constructive approaches so that Armenia and Azerbaijan find a common language."

Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried, in Yerevan on October 18, in response to a question from the Armenian Reporter's Armen Hakobyan, clarified current U.S. policy: "Territorial integrity is a recognized principle of international law. There are other principles, such as self-determination. Now we all know what we're talking about here. Bringing these principles together, reconciling these principles is extremely difficult and complicated." He added that the Minsk Group continues to work "to actually find a settlement." Mr. Fried gave no indication, however, that a settlement is imminent.

Source: http://www.reporter.am/index.cfm?obj...FABEB2CC3D0E97

In related news:

Serzh Sargsyan: "There is no alternative to the peaceful resolution of the Karabakh conflict"

"The resolution of the Karabakh conflict is possible only if Azerbaijan recognizes the right of the Karabakh people for self-determination", said Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan in his exclusive interview to Public Television of Armenia. "The resolution of the Karabakh conflict is possible in case Nagorno Karabakh has a land border with Armenia, if international organizations and leading states ensure the security of the people of Nagorno Karabakh and if Azerbaijan recognizes the right of the Karabakh people for self-determination", he said according to the press service. Sargsyan noted that after a long-lasting passive period the process of the resolution of the Karabakh issue has entered the active phase. "This is caused by at least two main aspects: first of all, both Azerbaijan and Armenia have completed the presidential elections and second, the well-known events, which occurred in the region, have again persuaded everyone that there is no alternative to the peaceful resolution of the conflict", said he. The President of Armenia considers that activeness is useful, along with the public discussions and he is confident that there will be a more active phase of public discussions. According to Sargsyan, discussions are always useful, but they must be based on the only interest - the interest of the Armenian people. "We have sacrificed much for the resolution of the Karabakh conflict to close eyes or ignore the facts of speculations. We are settling a sacred issue. We are settling an important historical task and it is immoral if someone tries to find out a different interest during its resolution", said Sargsyan.

Source: http://www.today.az/news/politics/48536.html

"NKR Defense Minister": "We will launch offensive for neutralization of the threat without waiting for the attack of the armed forces of "Azerbaijan"

"The tactical trainings with shooting, held in Nagorno Karabakh on Saturday, were of special nature", said the "defense minister" of the so-called "Nagorno Karabakh Republic" Movses Akopyan. He said the "defense army" of "Nagorno Karabakh Republic" arranged the trainings only for offensive. "We are preparing our servicemen for not waiting for Azerbaijan's attack, but, depending on the situation, for launching an offensive for neutralization of the threat to our security", said Akopyan.

Source: http://today.az/news/politics/48523.html

ANKARA CONCERNED OVER MEDVEDEV’S PROPOSAL OF ARMENIAN, AZERBAIJANI AND RUSSIAN TRILATERAL MEETING

It casts doubt on appropriateness of Turkish initiative to create a "Caucasian stability and cooperation platform" "The August events showed that every knotty problem should be solved based on Principles of International Law, through negotiations. What about the settlement stage, it is hard to maintain the level of agreements reached up to now. Anyhow, I hope that in the nearest future the meeting of the three presidents will take place in the capital of Russia in order to continue discussions of the issue", Russian President said October 21 in Yerevan at a joint press conference with RA President Serzh Sargsian. Turkish press touched upon Medvedev’s visit to Armenia from the aspect of the initiative to settle Karabakh conflict and strengthening of positions in the South Caucasus. It underlined the possibility of the trilateral meeting of the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Russian presidents in Moscow. In its October 22 issue Turkish "Radikal" threw light on Russian President’s visit under heading "Demand for Armenia increases". New York turkishny.com website mentioned that Medvedev organizes a meeting to settle Karabakh issue. Turkish Public TV also touched upon the visit without going into details. According to "Radikal", Medvedev’s visit to Armenia was qualified in the Russian press as a manifestation of "Calling Armenia to order". According to the Turkish newspaper, after settling accounts with Georgia, Russia gets down to a peacemaking mission between Armenia and Azerbaijan in order to weaken the influence of the West in the Caucasus. "Radikal" also concentrates attention on the circumstance that Medvedev’s visit took place after Gul’s visit to Yerevan, also several visits of the US diplomats –Mathew Bryza, Daniel Fried. On these grounds, the Turkish newspaper supposes that because of the South Ossetia War Armenia was compelled to find a new ally, and because of the Armenian neutrality Armenian-Russian relations stagnated. And Medvedev’s visit aim’s at weakening of the West’s influence on Armenia underlining that Yerevan’s only friend is Russia. In order to substantiate the above-mentioned suppositions "Radikal" quotes passages form Russian newspapers. Turkishny.com website also attaches particular importance to the proposal of Medvedev on trilateral meeting of the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Russian presidents. It may be explained by failure of Turkish Prime Minister Receb Tayyip Erdogan’s initiative to create a "Caucasian security and cooperation platform", as Medvedev’s proposal is quite realistic in contrast to Erdogan’s initiative, and Russia has the potential to realize it.

Source: http://www.azg.am/EN/2008102401

Azerbaijani Ministry Refutes Deployment of Russian Peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh

It is impossible to deploy peace peacekeeping forces of any country in Nagorno-Karabakh region, an inseparable part of Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense officially stated. “Any issue on Nagorno-Karabakh cannot be a topic of discussions without Azerbaijan’s participation. Foreign interference into sovereign and independent Azerbaijan is impossible,” Eldar Sabiroglu, the spokesman for the Ministry of Defense, told Trend News on 18 October. Negotiations are being held between official Moscow and Armenia to place peacekeeping forces of the Russian Army in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Russian media reports. These reports are of provocative character, Sabiroglu said. “It can be easily seen that these reports are false. I think Armenia cannot believe in this lie, as well. Armenia knows well that it cannot happen,,” he said. Armenia has occupied 20% of Azerbaijanїs lands including Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding seven regions. The occupation began in 1988. Azerbaijan lost the Nagorno-Karabakh, except of Shusha and Khojali, in December 1991. In 1992-93, Armenian Armed Forces occupied Shusha, Khojali and Nagorno-Karabakhїs seven surrounding regions. In 1994, Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a ceasefire agreement at which time the active hostilities ended. The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group ( Russia, France, and the US) are currently holding peaceful, but fruitless negotiations.

Source: http://news.trendaz.com/index.shtml?...323450&lang=EN

Armenians Launches Military Trainings in Azerbaijani Occupied Territories

The Armenian Armed Forces launched military trainings in the Azerbaijani occupied territories approximately at 11:00AM. According to the regional correspondent of Trend News, the trainings are held in the occupied Uzundara village. The blasted shells cause strong explosions. The sound of explosions is clearly heard in nearby villages. As the occupied territories are not controlled by Azerbaijan, the Armenian Armed Forces hold military trainings in the territory. Eldar Sabiroglu, the Head of the Defence Ministry press-service, said that this was not the fact of implementation of military trainings by Armenians in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani Armed Forces are not concerned with the fact and are ready to retaliate at any time.

Source: http://news.trendaz.com/index.shtml?...329261&lang=EN

[Armanen]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

2008 and the Return of the Nation-State
October 27, 2008

By George Friedman

In 1989, the global system pivoted when the Soviet Union retreated from Eastern Europe and began the process of disintegration that culminated in its collapse. In 2001, the system pivoted again when al Qaeda attacked targets in the United States on Sept. 11, triggering a conflict that defined the international system until the summer of 2008. The pivot of 2008 turned on two dates, Aug. 7 and Oct. 11.

On Aug. 7, Georgian troops attacked the country’s breakaway region of South Ossetia. On Aug. 8, Russian troops responded by invading Georgia. The Western response was primarily rhetorical. On the weekend of Oct. 11, the G-7 met in Washington to plan a joint response to the global financial crisis. Rather than defining a joint plan, the decision — by default — was that each nation would act to save its own financial system with a series of broadly agreed upon guidelines.

The Aug. 7 and Oct. 11 events are connected only in their consequences. Each showed the weakness of international institutions and confirmed the primacy of the nation-state, or more precisely, the nation and the state. (A nation is a collection of people who share an ethnicity. A state is the entity that rules a piece of land. A nation-state — the foundation of the modern international order — is what is formed when the nation and state overlap.) Together, the two events posed challenges that overwhelmed the global significance of the Iraqi and Afghan wars.

The Conflict in Georgia
In and of itself, Russia’s attack on Georgia was not globally significant. Georgia is a small country in the Caucasus, and its fate ultimately does not affect the world. But Georgia was aligned with the United States and with Europe, and it had been seen by some as a candidate for membership in NATO. Thus, what was important about the Russian attack was that it occurred at all, and that the West did not respond to it beyond rhetoric.

Part of the problem was that the countries that could have intervened on Georgia’s behalf lacked the ability to do so. The Americans were bogged down in the Islamic world, and the Europeans had let their military forces atrophy. But even if military force had been available, it is clear that NATO, as the military expression of the Western alliance, was incapable of any unified action. There was no unified understanding of NATO’s obligation and, more importantly, no collective understanding of what a unified strategy might be.

The tension was not only between the United States and Europe, but also among the European countries. This was particularly pronounced in the different view of the situation Germany took compared to that of the United States and many other countries. Very soon after the Russo-Georgian war had ended, the Germans made clear that they opposed the expansion of NATO to Georgia and Ukraine. A major reason for this is Germany’s heavy dependence on Russian natural gas, which means Berlin cannot afford to alienate Moscow. But there was a deeper reason: Germany had been in the front line of the first Cold War and had no desire to participate in a second.

The range of European responses to Russia was fascinating. The British were livid. The French were livid but wanted to mediate. The Germans were cautious, and Chancellor Angela Merkel traveled to St. Petersburg to hold a joint press conference with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, aligning Germany with Russia — for all practical purposes — on the Georgian and Ukrainian issues.

The single most important effect of Russia’s attack on Georgia was that it showed clearly how deeply divided — and for that matter, how weak — NATO is in general and the Europeans are in particular. Had they been united, they would not have been able to do much. But they avoided that challenge by being utterly fragmented. NATO can only work when there is a consensus, and the war revealed how far from consensus NATO was. It can’t be said that NATO collapsed after Georgia. It is still there, and NATO officials hold meetings and press conferences. But the alliance is devoid of both common purpose and resources, except in very specific and limited areas. Some Europeans are working through NATO in Afghanistan, for example, but not most, and not in a decisive fashion.

The Russo-Georgian war raised profound questions about the future of the multinational military alliance. Each member consulted its own national interest and conducted its own foreign policy. At this point, splits between the Europeans and Americans are taken for granted, but the splits among the Europeans are profound. If it was no longer possible to say that NATO functioned, it was also unclear after Aug. 8 in what sense the Europeans existed, except as individual nation-states.

The Global Financial Crisis
What was demonstrated in politico-military terms in Georgia was then demonstrated in economic terms in the financial crisis. All of the multinational systems created after World War II failed during the crisis — or more precisely, the crisis went well beyond their briefs and resources. None of the systems could cope, and many broke down. On Oct. 11, it became clear that the G-7 could cooperate, but not through unified action. On Oct. 12, when the Europeans held their eurozone summit, it became clear that they would only act as individual nations.

As with the aftermath of the Georgian war, the most significant developments after Oct. 11 happened in Europe. The European Union is first and foremost an arrangement for managing Europe’s economy. Its bureaucracy in Brussels has increased its authority and effectiveness throughout the last decade. The problem with the European Union is that it was an institution designed to manage prosperity. When it confronted serious adversity, however, it froze, devolving power to the component states.

Consider the European Central Bank (ECB), an institution created for managing the euro. Its primary charge — and only real authority — is to work to limit inflation. But limiting inflation is a problem that needs to be addressed when economies are otherwise functioning well. The financial crisis is a case where the European system is malfunctioning. The ECB was not created to deal with that. It has managed, with the agreement of member governments, to expand its function beyond inflation control, but it ultimately lacks the staff or the mindset to do all the things that other central banks were doing. To be more precise, it is a central bank without a single finance ministry to work with. Unlike other central banks, whose authority coincides with the nations they serve, the ECB serves multiple nations with multiple interests and finance ministries. By its nature, its power is limited.

In the end, power did not reside with Europe, but rather with its individual countries. It wasn’t Brussels that was implementing decisions made in Strasbourg; the centers of power were in Paris, London, Rome, Berlin and the other capitals of Europe and the world. Power devolved back to the states that governed nations. Or, to be more precise, the twin crises revealed that power had never left there.

Between the events in Georgia and the financial crisis, what we saw was the breakdown of multinational entities. This was particularly marked in Europe, in large part because the Europeans were the most invested in multilateralism and because they were in the crosshairs of both crises. The Russian resurgence affected them the most, and the fallout of the U.S. financial crisis hit them the hardest. They had to improvise the most, being multilateral but imperfectly developed, to say the least. In a sense, the Europeans were the laboratory of multilateralism and its intersection with crisis.

But it was not a European problem in the end. What we saw was a global phenomenon in which individual nations struggled to cope with the effects of the financial crisis and of Russia. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, there has been a tendency to view the world in terms of global institutions, from the United Nations to the World Trade Organization. In the summer of 2008, none of these functioned. The only things that did function effectively were national institutions.

Since 2001, the assumption has been that subnational groups like al Qaeda would define the politico-military environment. In U.S. Defense Department jargon, the assumption was that peer-to-peer conflict was no longer an issue and that it was all about small terrorist groups. The summer of 2008 demonstrated that while terrorism by subnational groups is not insignificant by any means, the dynamics of nation-states have hardly become archaic.

The Importance of the State
Clearly, the world has pivoted toward the nation-state as the prime actor and away from transnational and subnational groups. The financial crisis could be solved by monetizing the net assets of societies to correct financial imbalances. The only institution that could do that was the state, which could use its sovereign power and credibility, based on its ability to tax the economy, to underwrite the financial system.

Around the world, states did just that. They did it in very national ways. Many European states did it primarily by guaranteeing interbank loans, thereby essentially nationalizing the heart of the financial system. If states guarantee loans, the risk declines to near zero. In that case, the rationing of money through market mechanisms collapses. The state must take over rationing. This massively increases the power of the state — and raises questions about how the Europeans back out of this position.

The Americans took a different approach, less focused on interbank guarantees than on reshaping the balance sheets of financial institutions by investing in them. It was a more indirect approach and less efficient in the short run, but the Americans were more interested than the Europeans in trying to create mechanisms that would allow the state to back out of control of the financial system.

But what is most important is to see the manner in which state power surged in the summer and fall of 2008. The balance of power between business and the state, always dynamic, underwent a profound change, with the power of the state surging and the power of business contracting. Power was not in the hands of Lehman Brothers or Barclays. It was in the hands of Washington and London. At the same time, the power of the nation surged as the importance of multilateral organizations and subnational groups declined. The nation-state roared back to life after it had seemed to be drifting into irrelevance.

The year 1989 did not quite end the Cold War, but it created a world that bypassed it. The year 2001 did not end the post-Cold War world, but it overlaid it with an additional and overwhelming dynamic: that of the U.S.-jihadist war. The year 2008 did not end the U.S.-jihadist war, but it overlaid it with far more immediate and urgent issues. The financial crisis, of course, was one. The future of Russian power was another. We should point out that the importance of Russian power is this: As soon as Russia dominates the center of the Eurasian land mass, its force intrudes on Europe. Russia united with the rest of Europe is an overwhelming global force. Europe resisting Russia defines the global system. Russia fragmented opens the door for other geopolitical issues. Russia united and powerful usurps the global stage.

The year 2008 has therefore seen two things. First, and probably most important, it resurrected the nation-state and shifted the global balance between the state and business. Second, it redefined the global geopolitical system, opening the door to a resurgence of Russian power and revealing the underlying fragmentation of Europe and weaknesses of NATO.

The most important manifestation of this is Europe. In the face of Russian power, there is no united European position. In the face of the financial crisis, the Europeans coordinate, but they do not act as one. After the summer of 2008, it is no longer fair to talk about Europe as a single entity, about NATO as a fully functioning alliance, or about a world in which the nation-state is obsolete. The nation-state was the only institution that worked.

This is far more important than either of the immediate issues. The fate of Georgia is of minor consequence to the world. The financial crisis will pass into history, joining Brady bonds, the Resolution Trust Corp. and the bailout of New York City as a historical oddity. What will remain is a new international system in which the Russian question — followed by the German question — is once again at the center of things, and in which states act with confidence in shaping the economic and business environment for better or worse.

The world is a very different place from what it was in the spring of 2008. Or, to be more precise, it is a much more traditional place than many thought. It is a world of nations pursuing their own interests and collaborating where they choose. Those interests are economic, political and military, and they are part of a single fabric. The illusion of multilateralism was not put to rest — it will never die — but it was certainly put to bed. It is a world we can readily recognize from history.

[gmd]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Armenian, I am curious as to your opinion on how Russia wants the Artsak issue resolved. Trying to read between the lines of the various stories you have shared can be challenging. I specifically would like to know if you think Russia sees/supports a land bridge between Armenia and Artsak as being in its best interest.

[Armanen]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

RZD can join Iran-Armenia link construction but won’t finance it

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ Russian Railways (RZD) can join construction of the Iran-Armenia link but won’t finance it, President of the Russian monopoly Vladimir Yakunin said.

“Armenia supposes that a new link connecting it with Iran is essential. However, concession funds and RZD investments will not be spent on construction. I don’t think the Armenian side will be the only investor. To all appearance, it will be a financial consortium. We are ready to consider the possibility of our participation but other financial sources will be used for it,” he said, RIA Novosti reports

http://www.panarmenian.net/news/eng/?nid=27493

I can't really think of a reason why rzd wouldn't want to invest in this project, especially if others will be involved too. Hopefully they change their minds. Also, if the railway is built without their financial backing, I don't doubt that they will use the line too; rather shi*ty in my opinion. Anyway, this railway needs to be built asap!

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Armenian, I am curious as to your opinion on how Russia wants the Artsak issue resolved. Trying to read between the lines of the various stories you have shared can be challenging. I specifically would like to know if you think Russia sees/supports a land bridge between Armenia and Artsak as being in its best interest.

I don't know whether or not Moscow would like to see Armenia connected to Artsakh by a land bridge, or better... I'm not privy to the finer details of the negotiations process, nor am I privy to Kremlin insider information... I have a sense that, generally speaking, Moscow could care less about the matter. In final analysis, Moscow simply wants to resolve the on going crisis between Armenia and Azerbaijan under terms that appeal to its regional interests. So, if the connection in question suites its interests, it will support it. In my opinion, the primary responsibility of connecting Armenia to Nagorno Karabagh should be placed on our politicians. Instead of bitching and complaining and threatening to move closer to the West, as most Armenian "nationalists" tend to do when things don't go their way in Moscow, we Armenians need to draw on all our national assets to make a strong case in the halls of the Kremlin about the vital/crucial necessity of physically connecting Armenia to Nagorno Karabagh. We need to make a pan-national effort, a concerted/persistent effort, to convince Russians that Nagorno Karabagh's connection to Armenia should be, in the geostrategic sense at least, very important for them. This may be happening in Moscow, I just don't see it... What I readily see within our general population is a lot of ignorant/angry talk about Russians "betraying us" again, and I see our nation's representatives talking about moving closer to the West... This does not mean, however, that private talks between Armenian and Russian officials are not going on. Regardless of what we Armenians may or may not be doing in the Kremlin, I do have a strong feeling that Moscow would indeed like to see Armenia and Nagorno Karabagh connected. It's just a matter of getting the Azeris/Turks around to accepting the idea. To that effect, Moscow, Yerevan and Baku may decide to fabricate a fresh round of hostilities where Armenians win again, thereby convincing the Azeri population that the territory in question is lost for good. Believe it or not what I just stated is not a far-fetch scenario. Something similar may have occurred last August when Armenian forces quietly seized a large swath of land in the Martakert district.

Going by what I see, and by reading between the lines of the diplomatic rhetoric we have been hearing as of late, I believe that the Kremlin is attempting to reestablish itself as the region's supreme power - politically, militarily and economically. The reasons why Moscow would want to reinsert itself in the Caucasus region is self explanatory. They wouldn't care how the dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia is resolved - as long as Azerbaijan or Armenia don't become too powerful as a result of it. As with all major powers, they want their sphere of influence populated by nation-states that are dependent on it. It's obvious that Russian policy makers don't want Armenia looking elsewhere for alliances and they feel threatened not only by NATO but by Turks in general as well. So, Armenia is one of their principal ways of retarding the spread of Turkish influence in the region. However, because Moscow has a very lucrative economic relations with Turks and Azeris, they cannot openly and flagrantly oppose them. While Moscow props up Armenia and ensures its security they also give Turks lip service and some leeway. Anyway, this is all just a nasty geopolitical chess game. As long as this game is being played our tiny, landlocked and impoverished Armenia will suffer stagnation and deprivation. This is why I am hoping for the quick and comprehensive takeover of the entire Caucasus region by Russia so that this xxxxing game would finally end and stability and economic progress could begin...

Armenian, what do you think of the impact of demographics projections for Russia over the next 50 yrs and the impact this will have on shaping future Russian societies' outlook towards the rest of the world? Specifically do you think Russian society will be more sensitive to its growing Muslim population and how it interacts with other Islamic nations such as Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Sorry for the late reply. The demographic situation in Russia is clearly a problem. Christians, or Slavs in general, seem to be on the decrease in Russia while Muslims are on the increase. This problem of theirs is clearly rooted in the socioeconomic collapse of the 1990s. Things are slowly turning around, however. As the Russian economy grows, as their standard of living grows, the problem may naturally correct itself. Government officials led by Putin have also been encouraging families to have more children. However, due to its geography and political history there will always be a potential for Turkic/Islamic problems in Russia. This looming threat over their heads may be indirectly helping us Armenians.

[Armanen]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

As long as this game is being played our tiny, landlocked and impoverished Armenia will suffer stagnation and deprivation. This is why I am hoping for the quick and comprehensive takeover of the entire Caucasus region by Russia so that this xxxxing game would finally end and stability and economic progress could begin...

I understand what you're saying, a less hostile and more 'eu style' region would greatly benefit Armenia. Yet, with the crappy circumstances faced by Armenia it has done quite well and isn't in stagnation at all, rather the opposite. It's ahead of its neighboring countries by quite a number of economic, social and poltical indicators. God Bless Armenia!

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

I understand what you're saying, a less hostile and more 'eu style' region would greatly benefit Armenia. Yet, with the crappy circumstances faced by Armenia it has done quite well and isn't in stagnation at all, rather the opposite. It's ahead of its neighboring countries by quite a number of economic, social and poltical indicators. God Bless Armenia!

I fully agree. Don't get me wrong, what Armenia accomplished under the dire circumstances of the past fifteen-twenty years is nothing short of a miracle. I would venture to guess that most other nations on earth would have perished had they endured what Armenia has endured not only during the last fifteen-twenty years, or the during last one hundred years, but during the last 'one thousand' years... However, one can only say today that Armenia is surviving. Armenia may be "surviving" very well - but it's still just surviving... Armenia can survive, but it can't 'prosper' under the region's current geopolitical circumstances. Our Armenia needs to thrive if we are to have any chance at realizing our nation's great potential. If we want Armenia to blossom economically, culturally and politically then we must simply look forward to regional stability - however not at the cost of our national interests. We need a fertile region, a region conducive to economic growth, for us to implement our natural talents. In my opinion, full Russian hegemony in the Caucasus region can provide us with the desperately needed stability we require to prosper as a nation.

[Armanen]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

In my opinion, full Russian hegemony in the Caucasus region can provide us with the desperately needed stability we require to prosper as a nation.

Right, more or less we need one power in the region rather than 3 or 4 we have now. Although it isn't the best comparison, I would liken Russian hegemony of the Caucasus to that of western europe and the u.s. Once the u.s. got germany and france interdependent and to a lessor extent the other nations, western europe got back to its pre ww2 levels. I don't want to see Armenia dependent on any nation, but if it must then only Russia, certainly not azerbaijan nor turkey.

[gmd]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

I would think Armenia's leaning to the west at least publicly may simply be posturing for political gain with Russia. As for the diaspora influencing Russia, is this realistic? I get the feeling Russia's politics are different then the U.S.. How can a lobbying efforts be as effective especially given that in reality any sane Armenian would realize that Russia can guarantee Armenia's security as compared to the US who supports directly the threat against Armenia. I am sure the Russian know this all to well and that is the ace they will always have over us.

My feeling is that we need within our ranks an extremist camp of dead enders which pose a serious threat to regional security. Only then will the powers have an interest in cooperating with Armenian authorities in order to prevent the spread of extremists within Armenian ranks. Regrettably I am not sure if this line of thinking is prevalent among Armenian communities.