The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

This very interesting geopolitical analysis by Stratfor states that when Tbilisi commenced its invasion of South Ossetia officials in Baku feeling emboldened by Tbilisi's actions were seriously considering invading Nagorno Karabagh... If some of you recall, I had revealed from Yerevan on August 12 that couple of days prior to the date a successful military operation was carried out by Armenian forces against a strategic Azeri position in the Martakert region of Nagorno Karabagh. Here is the post: http://forum.armenianclub.com/showpo...postcount=2231 For some reason, the Armenian military operation was not reported on by any of the news agencies. Now having read this article, if I were to speculate, I would say that Yerevan was informed of Baku's hostile intentions (most probably by Russian intelligence) and decided to carryout a preemptive military strike on Azeri positions to diffuse the situation. Consequently, with Russia's quick and stunning victory over Georgia, coupled with Yerevan's bold action in Martakert, Baku, fearing a political disaster, abandoned their hostile intentions and decided not to respond to the Armenian incursion. Thus, it may not have been in the best interest of Baku to report on the military operation in question. Just my speculation, for what it's worth...

Armenian

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Azerbaijan: The Stark New Energy Landscape

Summary

Russia’s military defeat of Georgia puts Azerbaijan in a difficult position. With all of its existing energy export routes now back under Russian control, Baku faces a stark set of choices that may force it to reach an accommodation with Moscow.

Analysis

Azerbaijan is losing some $50 million to $70 million per day due to the closure of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, the Caspian Energy Alliance said Aug. 14, adding that Baku’s total losses from the closure amounted to some $500 million. The 1 million barrel per day (bpd) BTC line, which passes from Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia, was shut down Aug. 6 following an attack on the Turkish part of the line, claimed by a Kurdish separatist group. If not for that attack, however, it might well have been shut down anyway amid the military conflict in Georgia that began two days later. Azerbaijan exports oil and natural gas to Western energy markets via three pipelines — all of which pass through Georgia, and all of which experienced cutoffs in the past several days. Two of them — the BTC and the 150,000 bpd Baku-Supsa — carry oil. The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum line carries natural gas at 9 billion cubic meters per year. The pipelines were built to provide a transport route for Caspian Sea energy to reach Western markets without having to pass through Russia, which controls the majority of pipeline infrastructure into Europe. Now that Russia has established a firm military presence in Georgia, however, it is highly likely that all three lines will continue to operate, or not, at the pleasure of the Kremlin. This puts Azerbaijan in a predicament. With its export routes to the West blocked by the Russian presence in Georgia, Baku is carefully considering its options. Though other potential pipeline routes exist, they are plagued with problems that could prove insurmountable. Azerbaijan may have no real option but to try to reach some sort of accommodation with Moscow.

Initially, Baku was excited by the conflict in Georgia’s South Ossetia region because it provided a possible blueprint for dealing with Azerbaijan’s own restive separatist enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh — and for potentially imposing a new military reality on Baku’s regional rival, Armenia. If successful, such a campaign could have allowed Baku to use Armenian territory for a new energy export route. Sources tell Stratfor that, following the Georgian military’s Aug. 8 invasion of South Ossetia, Azerbaijan’s leadership convened an emergency meeting at which they reportedly gave serious consideration to invading Nagorno-Karabakh, contingent on the eventual success of the Georgian operation. However, the Georgian offensive not only failed, it resulted in the Russian invasion of Georgia proper — which has effectively suspended Tbilisi’s ability to control its own territory. Russia also used air bases in Armenia to assist in the Georgian intervention, which marked a significant change in the dynamic between Baku and Yerevan. Russia keeps military assets in both Azerbaijan and Armenia, and sells weapons to both — indeed, part of Moscow’s strategy in the Caucasus is to ensure that the two rivals remain distracted by their tense relations — but from Baku’s perspective, the Russian decision to activate its assets in Armenia means Moscow is choosing sides.

However possible it might have been for Azerbaijan to invade its neighbor, it has suddenly become inconceivable. For Baku, this is the worst-case scenario. Its energy lifelines, intended to circumvent Russian territory, are now under the overt control of the Kremlin, while its alternative of forcing a new path through Armenia is completely taken out. Baku also suddenly found itself trying to block the flood of Azeri volunteers heading to Georgia to fight the invading Russians. Azerbaijan’s government did not want to provoke Russia, especially with Russian tanks only a couple of hundred miles from Baku itself. For that matter, with a presidential election set for Oct. 15, Azeri President Ilham Aliyev does not want a security crisis on his hands. Even though Azerbaijan has been using its energy revenues to build up its military in recent years, it is nowhere near ready to defend itself from a Russian invasion. Its security situation is in many ways even more dire than that of Georgia (or even Ukraine).

Turkey, Baku’s strongest ally in the region, theoretically would not stand by if Russia invaded Azerbaijan — but then, Ankara has been silent on the Russian intervention in Georgia. To the Azeris, this is a sign that they cannot depend on the Turks to commit themselves to a fight with Moscow if push should come to shove. Also, now that Georgia is under effective Russian military control, the only route for Turkish aid to Azerbaijan is cut off — neither Iran nor Armenia would provide passage. With the Russians in control of Georgia and with domination of Armenia out of the picture, Azerbaijan’s only other feasible export route would be southward through Iran, hooking into existing Turkish pipeline infrastructure or sending exports out via the Persian Gulf. The problem with this option is one of timing: Any move into Iran would have to wait for an accommodation between Tehran and the United States over Iraq, which appears to be getting ever nearer. At $50 million in losses per day, however, Azerbaijan does not have the time to wait for these pieces to fall into place and then build a new pipeline into Iran. A Russian move to cut off all three pipelines going through Georgia would make the cost unbearable. Baku counts on its energy export revenues in order to maintain military parity with Armenia, so a sharp drop in funding could quickly become a national security issue. That leaves one other option, which from Baku’s perspective is the least desirable but the most realistic: seeking accommodation with Russia.

Russia now effectively controls the entire already-built energy transport infrastructure between Baku and Western markets. Russia could accommodate transport of Azeri energy through Georgia for the right price. That price would be both financial and political: Azerbaijan would need to align with Moscow on matters of import in order to keep the pipelines open. Baku also could ship its natural gas through Russia proper via pipelines such as Baku-Rostov-on-Don, which used to provide Azerbaijan with natural gas supplies before it became a net exporter. There also is the Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline, which has a capacity of nearly 200,000 bpd, although very little Azeri crude normally goes through it. Azerbaijan has tried to avoid shipping its energy exports through Russian pipelines while other feasible options were open. But Baku may have to reconsider now that Russia holds all the cards.

Source: http://www.stratfor.com/analysisazer...ergy_landscape

This was the official Azeri reaction when Tbilisi first began their invasion of Ossetia.

Baku: Georgia proved that Azerbaijan "has the right to return its land by use of force"

Georgia has proved that peaceful talks is not the only way to restore territorial integrity, says a statement issued by the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry on the recent development in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone. It means that Azerbaijan "has the right to return its lands by use of force, the statement says, Bakililar.az reports.

Source: http://www.panarmenian.net/news/eng/?nid=26850

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Georgia Eager to Rebuild Its Defeated Armed Forces

Georgian soldiers passing destroyed Georgian vehicles as they retreat from their positions near the town of Gori

Just weeks after Georgia’s military collapsed in panic in the face of the Russian Army, its leaders hope to rebuild and train its armed forces as if another war with Russia is almost inevitable. Georgia is already drawing up lists of options, including restoring the military to its prewar strength or making it a much larger force with more modern equipment, like air-defense systems, modern antiarmor rockets and night-vision devices. Officials at the Pentagon, State Department and White House confirmed that the Bush administration was examining what would be required to rebuild Georgia’s military, but stressed that no decisions had been made. The choices each pose difficult foreign policy questions. Georgia’s decision to attack Russian and South Ossetian forces raises questions about the wisdom of further United States investment in the Georgian military, which in any case would further alienate Russia. Not doing so could lead to charges of abandoning Georgia in the face of Russian threats. In Moscow, President Dmitri A. Medvedev said Tuesday in an interview that he no longer considered President Mikheil Saakashvili to be Georgia’s leader, calling him a “political corpse.”

Russian soldiers transport Georgian prisoner of war in Poti

Georgian statements have hardened as well, even before the army has identified and buried all of its dead. “Our mission is to protect our country from Russian aggression,” Davit Kezerashvili, Georgia’s 29-year-old defense minister, said in an interview last week when asked what missions the military would be organized to perform. “Large-scale Russian aggression. The largest aggression since the middle of the 20th century.” Russian officials last week repeatedly expressed concern about the possibility that the United States would undertake a major effort to rebuild Georgia’s military. “The Americans will enter Georgia,” said Dmitri O. Rogozin, Russia’s representative to NATO. “I believe that soon there will be an American military base in Georgia, officially. And not only advisers. There will be a flag, tanks, artillery, aviation, even marines.” So far the Bush administration has chosen to trumpet its humanitarian efforts in Georgia, and has avoided publicly discussing efforts to study how best to rebuild the Georgian military. The official silence reflects worries in Washington about tensions between the United States and Russia, officials said, and explains why the Bush administration policy makers and military officers who discussed these efforts did so only after demanding anonymity.

Russian soldier guarding captured Georgian tanks

One brief, public discussion of American efforts came last Thursday, when Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at a news conference that Georgia was “a very important country to us” and that the United States intended to continue the military-to-military relationship. “It’s going to be very important that the government of Georgia makes some decisions about what they want to do, and then I think the U.S. would be in a position to respond to that,” he said. Military rebuilding will take years, which means that long-term decisions about American support to Georgia will fall to the next presidential administration. Republicans and Democrats alike have signaled strong support for Georgia. Mr. Saakashvili has cultivated close ties to both the McCain and Obama campaigns. Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr., the Democratic nominee for vice president, visited Mr. Saakashvili last month, as did Cindy McCain, the wife of Senator John McCain, the presumptive Republican nominee. Mr. McCain has been a vocal proponent of Mr. Saakashvili’s government, and a strong critic of the Kremlin. Defense officials in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, said that at a minimum they hoped to re-equip the army’s four existing brigades with modern equipment, and increase the size of the country’s air force. Georgia’s military now includes 33,000 active-duty personnel.

Georgian military base after Russian troops leave

Mr. Saakashvili said he also planned to emphasize officer training in the years ahead. “We have no problem with the individual skills of soldiers,” he said in an interview. “We need to do this same thing with the officers.” Georgia also hopes to acquire an integrated air-defense system that covers the country’s entire airspace, to arm its land forces with modern antiarmor rockets, and to overhaul the military’s communication equipment, much of which was rendered useless by Russian jamming during the brief war. It also wants to distribute large numbers of night-vision devices to the country’s forces, which could help create parity in the field against the numerical superiority of Russian armored units. Russia’s military, while able to overpower and scare off the inexperienced Georgian Army, went into battle with aging equipment, including scores of tanks designed in the 1960s, and armored vehicles that broke down in large numbers along Georgia’s roads. One option, Mr. Kezerashvili said, would include creating up to four more combat brigades. He said that training and equipping new brigades, re-equipping existing forces and installing a modern air-defense network could cost $8 billion to $9 billion. “Together with Europeans and the United States, we have to rebuild our army and make it stronger, because it is in the common interest,” he said, adding that Russia could attack another neighbor, and must be deterred. “Who will be the next victim? Nobody knows.” But as Georgia and the West begin to discuss military collaborations, the conversation is informed by the events of last month, in which the Georgian military scattered under fire. Georgia’s own analysis is straightforward: its principal vulnerabilities, which it said proved decisive, were its comparative weakness to Russian air power and its inability to communicate effectively in combat.

Georgian soldiers bury their unidentified dead in a mass grave

These problems, according to Mr. Kezerashvili and Batu Kutelia, Georgia’s first deputy defense minister, could be remedied with investments in equipment. “We know 100 percent that we need a very, very sophisticated air-defense system, that is multi-layered, to defend all of our airspace,” Mr. Kutelia said. But interviews with Western military officers who have experience working with Georgian military forces, including officers in Georgia, Europe and the United States, suggested that Georgia’s military shortfalls were serious and too difficult to change merely by upgrading equipment. In the recent war, which was over in days, Georgia’s Army fled ahead of the Russian Army’s advance, turning its back and leaving Georgian civilians in an enemy’s path. Its planes did not fly after the first few hours of contact. Its navy was sunk in the harbor, and its patrol boats were hauled away by Russian trucks on trailers. The information to date suggests that from the beginning of the war to its end, Georgia, which wants to join NATO, fought the war in a manner that undermined its efforts at presenting itself as a potentially serious military partner or power.

Russian troops giving bread to stranded Georgian civilians on the road to Tbilisi

Mr. Saakashvili and his advisers also say that even though he has no tactical military experience, he was at one time personally directing important elements of the battle — giving orders over a cellphone and deciding when to move a brigade from western to central Georgia to face the advancing Russian columns. In the field, there is evidence from an extensive set of witnesses that within 30 minutes of Mr. Saakashvili’s order, Georgia’s military began pounding civilian sections of the city of Tskhinvali, as well as a Russian peacekeeping base there, with heavy barrages of rocket and artillery fire. The barrages all but ensured a Russian military response, several diplomats, military officers and witnesses said. After the Russian columns arrived through the Roki Tunnel, and the battle swung quickly into Russia’s favor, Georgia said its attack had been necessary to stop a Russian attack that already had been under way. To date, however, there has been no independent evidence, beyond Georgia’s insistence that its version is true, that Russian forces were attacking before the Georgian barrages.

A Russian military patrol in Tkhinvali walks past a destroyed Georgian tank

During the battle, one Western military officer said, it had been obvious that Georgia’s logistical preparations were poor and that its units interfered with each other in the field. This was in part because there was limited communication between ground forces and commanders, but also because there was almost no coordination between police units and military units, which often had overlapping tasks and crowded one another on the roads. One senior Western military official said that one of the country’s senior generals had fled the battle in an ambulance, leaving soldiers and his duties behind. Georgia’s Defense Ministry strongly denies this. No one disputes that the army succumbed to chaos and fear, which reached such proportions that the army fled all the way to the capital, abandoning the city of Gori without preparing a serious defense, and before the Russians had reached it in strength. It littered its retreat with discarded ammunition.

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/03/wo...html?ref=world

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

What better person than one of the world's most blood drenched criminals, Dick Cheney, reveal Washington's truest intentions towards Russia in the Caucasus region. I wonder why the Armenian Republic was bypassed by Washington once again... And we still have Armenians calling for cooperation with the US?

Armenian

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U.S. to Unveil $1 Billion Aid Package to Repair Georgia

BAKU, Azerbaijan — The Bush administration plans to announce a $1 billion package of aid to help rebuild Georgia after its rout by Russian forces last month, administration officials said on Wednesday, as Vice President xxxx Cheney arrived in the region to signal support for Georgia and other countries neighboring Russia. The aid — along with Mr. Cheney’s visit — is sure to increase tensions with Russia, whose leaders have accused the United States of stoking the conflict with Georgia over its two separatist regions, by providing weapons and training to the Georgians. President Dmitri A. Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin have also complained that humanitarian supplies delivered by the American Navy and Air Force since Russian forces routed Georgian forces and occupied parts of the country were a disguise for delivering new weapons. Administration officials have dismissed those accusations as baseless.

The aid package, which is expected to include money for rebuilding Georgia’s infrastructure and its economy, is scheduled to be detailed in Washington later on Wednesday by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the official said. President Bush is also expected to release a statement. It is not clear whether the package will include any direct military support, which officials have acknowledged they are considering. The aid package reflects an intensification of the administration’s support for Georgia, though President Bush and his senior advisors have yet to settle on any punitive actions against Russia. Mr. Cheney arrived on Wednesday in Azerbaijan on the first of three stops in the region the Russians consider their “near abroad” in what one of his aides last week described as an effort to bolster countries in the face of their more assertive neighbor. Mr. Cheney is scheduled to visit Georgia on Thursday, followed by Ukraine. While Mr. Cheney’s plans to visit Azerbaijan and Georgia were made before Russia’s military operation in Georgia, the trip took on added significance following the conflict, which began on the night of Aug. 7, when Georgian forces tried to seize control of South Ossetia, only to be driven back when Russian forces poured into the country.

Although a ceasefire ended the fighting, Russian forces have still not withdrawn from parts of Georgian territory near South Ossetia and another breakaway region, Abkhazia. Russia last week recognized both as independent countries, a move that has failed to win any international backing. Azerbaijan, like Georgia, is a former Soviet republic that has sought closer ties to the West and the United States, and it is considered a vital crossroads for oil and gas from the Caspian Sea. Underscoring the point, Mr. Cheney’s first meetings here in Baku were with representatives of two international oil companies: William Schrader of BP Azerbaijan and Robert Satmalchi of Chevron, according to a spokeswoman, Megan M. Mitchell. She said they discussed “their assessments of the energy situation in Azerbaijan and the broader Caspian region — especially in light of Russia’s recent military actions in Georgia.”

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/04/wo...c75&ei=5087%0A

Cheney to `Stiffen the Spine' of Georgia, Ukraine

Vice President xxxx Cheney will reassure three former Soviet republics that the U.S. backs their pro-West aspirations in the highest-level American visit since last month's war between Russia and Georgia. On his first trip to the region, Cheney departs today for Azerbaijan and Georgia, which are crucial to the westward flow of energy via a corridor that bypasses Russia. He also will stop in Ukraine, whose desire to join NATO is opposed by Russia. "Cheney's mission is to stiffen the spine'' of the countries' leaders, said Mark Parris, a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey who also served as a diplomat in Moscow. "They'll want to know U.S. plans, and what's available, to ensure that Russia isn't able to throw its weight around more broadly in the region.'' Joining condemnations by President George W. Bush and other European Union leaders, Cheney called Russia's invasion of Georgia an "unjustified assault'' on Aug. 27. Russian troops attacked to counter Georgia's attempt to retake the pro-Moscow separatist region of South Ossetia by force on Aug. 7. Russia routed Georgia in a five-day war, occupied a third of it for days more, left behind peacekeepers to protect South Ossetia and Abkhazia, another breakaway, and then recognized their independence over the West's objections. "The overriding priority, especially in Baku, Tbilisi and Kiev, will be the same: a clear and simple message that the U.S. has a deep and abiding interest in the well-being and security in this part of the world,'' John Hannah, Cheney's national security adviser, told reporters last week. The journey, partly planned before the war, "has clearly taken on increased importance.''

Aliyev, Yushchenko

After meeting with the three presidents -- Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine, Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia -- Cheney will end his trip in Italy with a speech on security and meetings with Italian leaders. Cheney's trip starts a day after EU leaders met in Brussels and suspended trade talks with Russia without imposing tougher sanctions, signaling their limited appetite for confronting it too aggressively. NATO has halted cooperation exercises with Russia. The U.S. military has shipped humanitarian war-relief supplies to Georgia and is considering scrapping a planned nuclear cooperation deal with Russia.

EU Stance

"We welcome the European Union's decisions on Georgia today,'' White House spokeswoman Dana Perino said in a statement. French President Nicolas Sarkozy, holder of the EU's six-month presidency, will visit Russia Sept. 8 to demand that Russia pull back behind the pre-war lines. The EU summit "demonstrates that Europe and the U.S. are united in standing firm behind Georgia's territorial integrity, sovereignty and reconstruction,'' Perino said. Bush is awaiting Cheney's findings before deciding on what else, if anything, to do, Perino said Aug. 28. "This is not something we're rushing into,'' she said. U.S. officials have expressed concern that Russia may pose a threat to Ukraine, which is a conduit for Russian natural gas exports to other European countries. Russia cut off gas supplies to Ukraine in a 2006 dispute over a price increase, creating shortages in Hungary and Italy.

Putin on Ukraine

Russia's prime minister, Vladimir Putin, on Aug. 29 rejected suggestions that it may target Ukraine, saying his country has "long recognized'' its neighbor's borders, and said Russia will honor energy-export contracts. Yushchenko has supported Georgia in its conflict with Russia, joining leaders of Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia in a solidarity rally in Tbilisi on Aug. 14. He will press Cheney for "additional support from the U.S.'' as Ukraine seeks to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, said Olexiy Haran, a professor of comparative politics at the Kiev-Mohyla Academy in Kiev. Cheney's first stop, Azerbaijan, is the hub for the development of Caspian Sea oilfields. Its capital, Baku, is the starting point for a U.S.-backed pipeline that ships crude to a Turkish Mediterranean port via Georgia. The U.S. is also supporting the development of gas pipelines to connect Central Asian producers with European countries, skirting Russia.

'Understands Energy'

"Cheney understands energy,'' and "this is as much about the transportation corridors between East and West as it is about the military threat,'' said Ariel Cohen, an expert on Russia at the Heritage Foundation in Washington. Cheney was chairman of Halliburton Co., the Houston-based energy-services company, from 1995 to 2000, after serving as defense secretary during the 1991 war to evict invading Iraqi forces from Kuwait and its oilfields. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline carries about 850,000 barrels of crude a day -- as much as 1.5 percent of global oil flows, said Parris, now at the Brookings Institution in Washington. President Aliyev said after a visit from Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Aug. 21 that the Georgia-Russia conflict showed that stability in the region is "flimsy,'' according to Azerbaijan's state-run news service. Aliyev said he seeks friendly relations with Russia and Georgia and wants their dispute resolved through negotiations that would protect his country's energy exports. "The Russians have steadily strengthened their position on a whole range of strategic energy questions and put countries like Turkey and Azerbaijan under pressure to work with them, or at least not work against them,'' as the Russian energy giant OAO Gazprom expands, Parris said.

Source: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?p...g&refer=europe

[Armanen]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Saakashvili buried Georgia’s image of “democracy lamp”

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ The Georgian-Ossetian conflict showed how
tremendously ineffective the Russian war machine is, according to an Armenian expert.
“But it also showed that Georgia doesn’t have an army, despite up-to-date armament and long-term trainings of the personnel. Georgian soldiers failed to defeat 350 Russian peacekeepers, 200 Ossetian policemen and 200 servicemen,” Caucasus Institute Director Alexander Iskandaryan said during a round-table discussion today.

Russia’s will always be present in South Ossetia, according to him.

“Georgia will recover from the collapse but its image of “democracy lamp” has been buried forever. Moreover, no Georgian leader will dare to attempt to resolve the South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts by use of force.



Armenian, what do you make of the underlined statement by paron Iskandaryan? I think Russia did quite well, and they didn't even use their newest equipment which I think shows more on how poorly the georgians were trained but also the good marshalling ability of the Russian army brass.

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Armenian, what do you make of the underlined statement by paron Iskandaryan? I think Russia did quite well, and they didn't even use their newest equipment which I think shows more on how poorly the georgians were trained but also the good marshalling ability of the Russian army brass.

This Iskandaryan character, whoever/whatever he is, is not even worth commenting on. Regarding your comment: Not only did the Russian army do quite well, they were magnificent. Russia managed to route the entire Georgian military numbering around 30,000 with something like 10,000-15,000 troops, and they did this using their older Soviet era equipment. I guess they are saving their newer armaments for their more capable opponents.

Although western "specialists" and "analysts" are now trying very hard to find flaws in Moscow's war making capability, the Russian military campaign against Georgia will remain as one of the finest in modern history. I personally think, relatively speaking, Russia's recent military action in the Caucasus surpassed anything the US military has been able to do within the 20th century, including the wars in Iraq.

In two short days Russia's relatively small Soviet era equipped military totally routed Georgia's western trained, western funded, to some extent western equipped, well prepared and highly enthusiastic military. Despite western misinformation about Russia having a much larger military force than Georgia, the two opposing sides were in reality more-or-less equally represented on the field of battle, even if we take into account the pro-Russian Ossetian and Abkhazian fighters.

Here is how Russia did, in my view:

From the halls of the UN to the halls of the Kremlin, Russian diplomats/politicians were very effective and successful in making their case against Georgia.

Russia successfully engaged in espionage/intelligence gathering; they knew of the impending attack weeks and months ahead of time. Remember Moscow giving out Russian citizenship to South Ossetians months before the war? Remember Moscow evacuating Ossetian children several days before the war? Remember the BTC pipeline getting blown up a day before the war? Anyway, Russia's military/political officials were efficiently and calmly preparing the field for Georgia's historic blunder. I would even go as far as saying Moscow had/has agents working within all levels of Georgian government.

Russia successfully used its Black Sea fleet; sinking several Georgian warships including a highly touted missile boat.

Russia successfully used its air force (although several of their Soviet era aircraft were shot down); persistently attacking, virtually at will, numerous strategic locations throughout Georgia and providing very effective close air support for advancing Russian ground forces.

Russia successfully carried out electronic warfare against Georgia as well; knocking out Tbilisi's sensitive radar installations and jamming their military's command and control communications. The electronic warfare Russia employed seemed so effective that Georgian military units and their command had virtually no communication with one another, they were literally in the dark.

Russian tank forces (yes, obsolete tank forces) performed excellently, punching well into Georgia virtually non-stop and with relatively few loses.

Russian special forces (Spetznaz/GRU) seemed phenomenal, as usual, carrying out various highly sensitive military operations behind Georgian lines.

The Russian foot soldier performed admirably as well; expressed high moral, seemed highly proficient, revealed good command & control attributes and they looked quite menacing as well. Actually, it's funny how some of them looked like a bunch of armed-to-the-teeth rednecks on a happy hunting trip.

Keep in mind that Russia did the above in mountainous/forested terrain, to some extent in foreign/hostile terrain, and in two/three short days.

Total Russian loses are now said to be 64 servicemen killed. Georgia's final military death tally has not yet been reported, but I have a feeling it will be between 500 and 1000. Nonetheless, the Georgian military has been decimated. It will have to restart from scratch.

Please do yourself a favor and not pay too much attention to western military "analysts," they are talking out their asses because they are trying to alleviate fears. The western military establishment, the supposed master of shock and awe in the battle field, was shocked and awed by Moscow...

Due to its many similarities, sociopolitical, military equipment and terrain, it's a good idea to compare Russia's recent military performance in Georgia with how NATO forces, lead by the US, performed against Serbia in 1999.

Due to its mountainous/forested terrain and the tenacity of Serbian fighters, western forces did not dare carryout a ground attack in Serbia fearing heavy loses. So, that they did was what they do best, they carried out a massive aerial bombardment of Serbia for over thirty days. Friendless at the time, Serbia eventually capitulated not because it was unable to fight NATO forces on the ground, but because it could not tolerate the destruction to its civic infrastructure. Nevertheless, after the war it was revealed that NATO's massive aerial bombing campaign had only managed to knockout about a dozen or so Serbian tanks... Not to mention that there was no Albanian genocide, either. Remember NATO military officials pointing to satellite images of Kosovo and stating that they have discovered mass graves containing the bodies of a hundred thousand Albanian civilians...

But that's another story.

[Armanen]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Yes, I agree with all of the above, but Iskandaryan doesn't seem like he is the typical "western" analyist, he has said many other things which many of us would agree with. So I wouldn't put him up there with ArmeniaNow director aka horse faced hughes, onik or richard.

On a side note, Something I don't like about panArmenian articles are that they are too short and often do not give enough additional info like the other media outlets in Armenia or abroad.


And by the way, while georgia's military was trained and financed by nato, I don't think they were that "enthusiastic", I mean fleeing and not even attempting to defend Gori; they make azeri's look like good fighters, which is hard to do.

[Federate]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

On a side note, Something I don't like about panArmenian articles are that they are too short and often do not give enough additional info like the other media outlets in Armenia or abroad.

I agree. My personal favourite is Armenialiberty's coverage of news... even though it has often been biased and I suspect it to be Western tool. They cover very important stuff and their articles are typically long and informative.

[North Pole]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Putin Clinches Deal For Uzbek Pipeline

03 September 2008

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on Tuesday secured agreement from Uzbekistan to start building a new gas pipeline to Russia in a deal that bolsters Moscow's sway over Central Asian energy supplies.

In the wake of Russia's war with Georgia, it also strengthens Moscow's hand with the European Union, which has been looking to secure energy supplies that bypass Russia.

Uzbek President Islam Karimov, after meeting with Putin in Tashkent on Tuesday, announced that the new pipeline would carry up to 30 billion cubic meters of gas from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, boosting Russian imports by 50 percent.

Gazprom will set up a joint venture with Uzbekneftegaz to construct the Uzbek leg of the pipeline along the existing transit route that begins in Turkmenistan and runs through Kazakhstan before reaching Russia, the Russian company said in a statement.

The four countries adopted a plan in May 2007 to expand that route, and Uzbekistan, which is sandwiched between Turkmenistan to the south and Kazakhstan to the north, was the first Tuesday to move ahead with the plan.

"We are interested in this both in commercial terms and as part of the responsibilities that we have as Russia's ally," Karimov said, Interfax reported.

The existing transit pipelines in the area, known as the Central Asia-Center and Central Asia-Urals pipelines, have the capacity for 54 bcm, Karimov said. Putin said Turkmen and Uzbek export potential was growing.

"We have a common interest in implementing this project," he said of the effort to expand the pipelines.

Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan plan a separate pipeline that would also take Turkmen and Kazakh gas north to Russia. That pipeline would transport 20 bcm, and construction is scheduled to start late this year or early next year, Gazprom said on its web site.

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who has been among the strongest European critics of Russia's military actions in Georgia, on Sunday called for an end to the "energy stranglehold" of Europe by Russia in a commentary in The Observer.

Gazprom and LUKoil, Russia's second-largest oil producer, are carrying out gas production and exploration projects in Uzbekistan. LUKoil is planning to invest $5 billion over the next seven years to bring gas production there to 12 bcm, company president Vagit Alekperov confirmed in Tashkent on Tuesday.

Uzbekistan also agreed to buy weapons from Russia and cooperate on space exploration.

http://www.moscowtimes.ru/article/1010/42/370620.htm

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

Geopolitical Diary: Turkey's Options

With Cold War tensions building in the Black Sea, the Turks have gone into a diplomatic frenzy. Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan had his phone glued to his ear on Thursday speaking to his U.S., British, German, French, Swedish and Finnish counterparts, as well as to the NATO secretary-general and various EU representatives. The Turks are also expecting Georgian Foreign Minister Eka Tkeshelashvili to arrive in Istanbul on Aug. 31. And Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is due to arrive for a separate meeting with Turkish leaders early next week. The Turks have a reason to be such busy diplomatic bees. A group of nine NATO warships are currently in the Black Sea ostensibly on routine and humanitarian missions. Russia has wasted no time in sounding the alarm at the sight of this NATO buildup, calling on Turkey — as the gatekeeper to the Dardanelles and Bosporus straits between the Black and Mediterranean seas — to remember its commitment to the Montreux Convention, which places limits on the number of warships in the Black Sea. As a weak naval power with few assets to defend itself in this crucial frontier, Russia has every interest in keeping the NATO presence in the Black Sea as limited and distant as possible.

Turkey is in an extremely tight spot. As a NATO member in control of Russia’s warm-water naval access to the Black Sea, Turkey is a crucial link in the West’s pressure campaign against Russia. But the Turks have little interest in seeing the Black Sea become a flashpoint between Russia and the United States. Turkey has a strategic foothold in the Caucasus through Azerbaijan that it does not want to see threatened by Moscow. The Turks also simply do not have the military appetite or the internal political consolidation to be pushed by the United States into a potential conflict — naval or otherwise — with the Russians. In addition, the Turks have to worry about their economic health. Russia is Turkey’s biggest trading partner, supplying more than 60 percent of Turkey’s energy needs through two natural gas pipelines (including Blue Stream, the major trans-Black Sea pipeline), as well as more than half of Turkey’s thermal coal — a factor that has major consequences in the approach of winter. Turkey has other options to meet its energy needs, but there is no denying that it has intertwined itself into a potentially economically precarious relationship with the Russians. And the Russians have already begun using this economic lever to twist Ankara’s arm. A large amount of Turkish goods reportedly have been held up at the Russian Black Sea ports of Novorossiysk, Sochi and Taganrog over the past 20 days ostensibly over narcotics issues. Turkish officials claim that Turkish trucks carrying mostly consumer goods have been singled out for “extensive checks and searches,” putting about $3 billion worth of Turkish trade in jeopardy. The Turks have already filed an official complaint with Moscow over the trade row — with speculation naturally brewing over Russia’s intent to punish Turkey for its participation in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and to push Ankara to limit NATO access to the Black Sea.

But the Russians are playing a risky game. As much as Turkey wants this conflict to go away, it still has cards to play — far more than any other NATO member — if it is pushed too hard. As Turkish State Minister Kursat Tuzmen darkly put it, “We will disturb them if we are disturbed. We know how to disturb them.” If Turkey gets fed up with Russian bullying tactics, there is little stopping it from allowing an even greater buildup of NATO warships in the Black Sea to threaten the Russian underbelly. The Turks could also begin redirecting their energy supply away from the Russians, choosing instead to increase their natural gas supply from Iran or arrange for some “technical difficulties” on the Blue Stream pipeline. The Russians also ship some 1.36 million barrels per day of crude through the Black Sea that the Turks could quite easily blockade. These are the easier and quicker options that Turkey can employ. But there are some not-so-quick and not-so-easy options for Turks to consider as well, including riling up the Chechens in the northern Caucasus or the Turkic peoples in Central Asia and within the Russian Federation to make trouble for Moscow. These are not options that Ankara is exactly eager to take, but they remain options, and will be on both the Turkish and Russian foreign ministers’ minds when they meet in the coming days.

Source: http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical...urkeys_options

[Armenian]

Re: The Rise of the Russian Empire: Russo-Armenian Relations

I agree. My personal favourite is Armenialiberty's coverage of news... even though it has often been biased and I suspect it to be Western tool. They cover very important stuff and their articles are typically long and informative.

What do you mean you "suspect" it to be a western tool; the site is a US government sponsored/administered news media.

Yes, I agree with all of the above, but Iskandaryan doesn't seem like he is the typical "western" analyist, he has said many other things which many of us would agree with. So I wouldn't put him up there with ArmeniaNow director aka horse faced hughes, onik or richard.

I never said he was a typical western analyst. However, his very foolish/stupid comment about the Russian military's performance in Georgia is not a very good indicator of his caliber as a political analyst.

And by the way, while georgia's military was trained and financed by nato, I don't think they were that "enthusiastic", I mean fleeing and not even attempting to defend Gori; they make azeri's look like good fighters, which is hard to do.

The Georgian military had and continues to have very high moral. A willingness to fight, as a matter of fact, was one of Georgian army's biggest assets. Generally speaking, ethnic Georgians are very nationalistic and they look down on Russians and Armenians. Georgia was itching for a fight. However, having high moral, wanting to fight, or being an ultra-nationalist in peacetime is one thing, during war it's another. Once bullets start to fly and bombs being to explode, it's a whole different world. In other words, it's easy being enthusiastic about fighting when there is no fighting. That is, in essence, a typical characteristic of Georgians.

Anyway, here is an article from the New York times that clearly depicts Georgian's fighting spirit as well as their stupidity:

Two Georgians Went to War but Never Got to Fight

Nika Kharadze was embraced by his mother, Khatuna, in Tbilisi, Georgia, last Wednesday
when he and his friend Giorgi Monasalidze returned from 19 days of captivity in Tskhinvali.

Giorgi Monasalidze and Nika Kharadze wandered into war singing Georgian patriotic songs, their heads filled with visions of military heroics. They ended up prisoners, compelled to clean up the debris that the fighting had left behind. With no military training — neither had ever fired a gun — the two young men left their homes in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, mere hours after Georgia launched its offensive against South Ossetia. In their enthusiasm, they fully expected to be embraced as comrades by Georgian soldiers at the front. Their war was over before it really began. When South Ossetian soldiers detained them only 24 hours after the fighting broke out, they were unarmed and on foot, groping in the dark to enter Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. No Georgian soldiers were to be seen.

“That,” Mr. Monasalidze said, “was the start of our adventure.”

In its impetuousness, the young men’s impromptu decision to go to war paralleled their young nation’s heady rush into combat while relying on an ill-prepared army. The one-sided conflict began less than four weeks ago with a barrage of Georgian artillery against Tskhinvali. It ended ingloriously for Georgia, with Russian air and ground forces pursuing Georgian soldiers who were retreating in such haste, they abandoned their dead. Even after Russian forces had gained control of large swaths of the country, Mikheil Saakashvili, Georgia’s president, was vowing to rebuild his nation’s fighting capacity. He has also suggested he may yet again push to gain control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the separatist enclaves. Mr. Monasalidze, 22, and Mr. Kharadze, 19, seem to have been motivated by such bravado when they began their quixotic march on Tskhinvali. “This is my land,” Mr. Kharadze said the other day, looking back with no apologies for the willingness to go to war. “I am a Georgian, and my friends were fighting,” he declared. He was speaking to a reporter in Georgian as his mother translated into Russian, a language that he, unlike many older Georgians, has never learned to speak.

To their parents’ dismay, as The New York Times reported on Aug. 12, the two men rushed off for combat in the grip of a warrior tradition that is rooted in centuries of Georgian national myth. The last their parents had heard from them was a phone call from Mr. Kharadze on the night of Aug. 8. Within hours they were prisoners. As the two entered Tskhinvali about 1 a.m. on Aug. 9, they sang patriotic tunes to avoid being shot by the Georgian soldiers they expected to be lurking in the dark. “We thought that when we arrived at the front, they would have to give us weapons,” Mr. Monasalidze recalled, chain-smoking Lucky Strikes in the living room of the house of Mr. Kharadze’s parents in Tbilisi. Instead of Georgian troops, however, they attracted the attention of a group of South Ossetian soldiers. “They asked what we wanted,” Mr. Monasalidze said. “I said: ‘I’m Georgian and this is our land. We want Tskhinvali.’ ” Not the right answer, it seemed. They were thrown into a vehicle, taken to Tskhinvali’s police headquarters and dropped in a cell. Soon, Mr. Monasalidze and Mr. Kharadze were at labor, forced to clean up the shattered capital. When not at work, they shared a suffocating cell with 21 other prisoners.

Both Georgian and Ossetian civilians suffered greatly in the conflict. More than 100 may have perished in the initial Georgian shelling of Tskhinvali, and many thousands were left homeless. The Georgian authorities say that over the course of the conflict, South Ossetian forces captured and imprisoned 176 civilians, many of them elderly men and women. South Ossetian irregulars are widely believed to have looted and burned some ethnic Georgian villages inside South Ossetia. It is still unclear, however, why Georgian civilians were rounded up. Like Mr. Monasalidze and Mr. Kharadze, the captives were put to work clearing rubble from the streets and repairing houses damaged by the shelling. According to some reports, civilian prisoners were also required to bury those killed in the fighting. Mr. Monasalidze and Mr. Kharadze said they were spared that ordeal. But they said that because they were able-bodied young men from Tbilisi, they were suspected of being Georgian Army reservists and singled out for special abuse. Mr. Kharadze’s ignorance of Russian, the language their captors insisted on using with the Georgian prisoners, caused him further problems, they said.

They told of being regularly kicked, punched and beaten with rifle butts. Mr. Kharadze displayed wounds on his arms that he said were from cigarette burns. On several occasions, they were dropped to their knees, as though about to be shot. “I’m 22, and I feel like I’m already a 70-year-old grandfather,” Mr. Monasalidze said. In South Ossetia, they clung together in mutual support. Mr. Monasalidze, who speaks broken Russian, acted as translator for his friend during interrogations. At one terrifying point, they said, with guns at their heads, each of them begged to be executed to spare the other. Though their captors treated them poorly, at least one was sympathetic, a man named Minzayev, who they surmised worked for the Russian Federal Security Service. He gave them extra food and cigarettes. After 19 days as prisoners, both were released along with 85 others last Wednesday, in exchange for 13 Ossetians held by the Georgians. On Wednesday evening, four buses ferried the freed Georgians to Tbilisi, where an elated crowd of relatives and friends greeted them with relief, many in tears.

“My suffering is over, but no one knows what will happen to Georgia,” said Khatuna Kharadze, Nika’s mother. “Of course I am a patriot and want my son to protect his motherland, but there was no point to this war.” Both men vowed to fight again if necessary, though next time they hope to be better prepared. And Mr. Kharadze said he would now like to learn Russian.

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/02/wo...html?ref=world