On Bruises, Beauties, and Makeup

[Gavur]

Fried in Turkey

National Review Online

August 2, 2005

Fried in Turkey

Is democracy on the outs?

By Michael Rubin

On June 8, 2005, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoًan visited
President Bush in the White House. Among the topics the two discussed were
freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. Speaking from the Oval Office, Bush
declared Turkey's democracy to be `an important example for the people of
the broader Middle East.'

Turkey remains an important ally of the United States despite recent
bilateral tensions over the Iraq war and its aftermath. Both Republican and
Democratic administrations have valued Turkey not only as a strategic
military partner in the Cold War but also, in recent decades, as a
democratic outpost in a region of dictatorships. The central tenet of
Turkey's democratic evolution has been an emphasis upon the rule of law.

Since his Justice and Development party (better known by its Turkish
acronym, the AKP), swept to power in November 2002, Erdo?an has traveled the
globe, burnishing his image as a statesman. In frequent media appearances,
he has sought to ensure both the United States and European Union that the
AKP respects Turkish democracy and has no desire to erode the secular agenda
upon which the Turkish republic was built. He has said he has abandoned the
excesses of the now-banned Islamist Welfare party to which he belonged while
mayor of Istanbul (1994-1998).

The fact that Erdo?an feels he needs to reassure Turks and foreigners alike
stems from the ideological dichotomy between AKP parliamentarians and the
Turkish public. While many AKP members are Islamist, most Turks are not. As
in any country, citizens of Turkey range from secular to traditional in
their religious practice. Many religious Turks enjoy the freedom to practice
their faith, even as they embrace separation of mosque and state.

Erdo?an's outreach also reflects the reality that his electoral mandate is
less solid than statistics reflect. The AKP's consolidation of parliamentary
control reflected not the Turkish public's endorsement for the AKP's
religious philosophy, but rather a general disdain for the inability of
feuding establishment parties to root out corruption. The AKP catapulted its
reputation for honesty into electoral power. The failure of many
establishment parties to surpass the ten-percent threshold needed to take
seats in parliament amplified the AKP's 34-percent vote into two thirds of
the parliamentary seats.

During his first three and a half years in power, Erdo?an has pursued an
ambitious agenda of economic stabilization, social change, and an overhaul
of foreign policy. While welcoming investment from the United States and
Europe, he has emphasized economic and political outreach to the Arab world.

In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Saudi businessmen
have shifted billions out of more tightly regulated U.S. bank accounts into
Turkey. Prior to entering Turkish politics, AKP Foreign Minister Abdullah
Gül worked eight years at the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia. The AKP has apparently used the influx of green money to underwrite
some economic reforms. On July 14, 2005, the Turkish daily Milliyet reported
that Arab states established approximately 200 companies in Turkey since
2003. The Dubai Islamic Bank opened a one-billion-dollar line of credit for
investments in Turkey. In the first six months of 2004 alone, the share of
Middle East-based companies in the Turkish economy increased 50 percent.

Erdo?an's political success has waned, though. Despite assurances that he
respects Turkey's separation of mosque and state, the AKP has introduced a
number of bills which would have blurred the distinction between religion
and state, or boosted the power of religious segments of society. Erdo?an's
social agenda has floundered. The Turkish judiciary has warned against or
stuck down attempts to equate religious qualifications with those of secular
curriculums in university admissions. Mustafa Bumin, chief judge of the
constitutional court, warned on April 25, 2005, that the AKP's proposal to
lift the headscarf ban at universities and state institutions would violate
the constitution.

In recent months, with its popularity starting to wane amid foreign-policy
setbacks on the European front and signs that inflation may soon resume, the
AKP has signaled increasing frustration with the democratic process. In May,
for example, AKP member and Parliamentary Speaker Bülent Arinç warned that
the AKP might abolish the constitutional court if its judges continued to
hamper AKP legislation with questions of constitutionality. While Arinç was
criticized for his bluster, Erdo?an has taken a quieter tact: He has pushed
a bill to lower the mandatory retirement age of judges, in effecting purging
the judiciary of 4,000 of its older, independent technocrats in order to
replace them with younger followers of his own party.

Judges have reacted with alarm. On June 6, 2005, Milliyet reported a
statement by elected members of the supreme court of judges that `the new
changes and arrangements made in the Judges and Public Prosecutor's Law...is
aiming to influence the judicial power.'

Rule of law is at the heart of democracy. Turkish civil society is beginning
to voice concern about Erdo?an's political arrogance and his disdain for
both free press and judicial independence. Over the past several months,
Erdo?an has launched a series of lawsuits against Turkish political
cartoonists who criticized him and his party. Last month, the head of the
Lawyer's Association criticized Erdo?an's government for intervening in the
judicial system to satisfy Islamists. On July 3, 2005, Hürriyet and
Milliyet, both establishment papers, criticized government interference in
the judiciary.

At times, Erdo?an's abuse of the judiciary appears to be the result of a
dangerous combination of vendetta and impatience with the compromises
inherent in democracy. His conflict with the Süzer Group provides one
important example. While mayor of Istanbul, Erdo?an clashed with Mustafa
Süzer, a Turkish businessman whose holdings include the Ritz-Carlton Hotel
in Istanbul, Turkish franchise rights to both Pizza Hut and Kentucky Fried
Chicken, and the Kent Bank.

As mayor, Erdo?an chafed at Süzer's unabashed pro-Americanism. While
president of the Foreign Trade Association, Süzer increased U.S.-Turkish
trade 350 percent. When Erdo?an demanded Süzer tear down the Süzer Tower
which Erdo?an said was four stories too high, Süzer refused. The grudge has
continued. In November 2004, Erdo?an rescinded participation in a financial
conference when he learned that the meeting would take place in the Süzer
Tower.

Erdo?an has used his powers to advance the vendetta at the expense of the
rule of law. During the 2001 financial crisis in Turkey, the left-leaning
government of Democratic Left-party Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit seized
several banks, including the Kent Bank, in effect freezing the assets of the
Süzer Group and several other conglomerates. When Erdo?an assumed power, he
sought to exploit the situation. After appointing a member of his party to
head the Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduati Sigorta Fonu,
TMSF) which regulates banking matters in Turkey, he had the TMSF sell Kent
Bank to a political ally. The Turkish supreme court, though, ruled in
December 2003, both that the government's seizure of Kent Bank and its
subsequent sale was illegal. The judiciary subsequently ordered Erdo?an's
government to unfreeze Süzer's assets and return the bank. More than a year
and a half later, Erdo?an's government refuses to comply with the court
order.

Süzer is one example of many. In recent months, the Turkish press has
reported that former President Süleyman Demirel, upset with both the
direction which the AKP seeks to take Turkey and the relative impotence of
the opposition, has begun to build a political coalition to rival the AKP.
In response, the AKP's government has moved to seize the assets of Demirel's
brother. Asked to comment on the government's legal proceedings, Süleyman
Demirel was blunt: `This is illegal, a kind of occupation of our companies,'
he told the Tercüman Gazete on June 28, 2005.

In a democracy, politics subordinates itself to the rule of law. While
sitting with Bush at the White House, Erdo?an told the assembled press,
`Turkey is open to any new investment as a county now of stability and
security.' Increasingly, though, his actions do not justify his rhetoric.
The best path to stability and security is through the rule of law and the
independence of the judiciary.

Michael Rubin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute is
editor of the Middle East Quarterly.

[Gavur]

Armenian time, Turkish time

Sunday, September 18, 2005

Armenians and Turks live in different eras. If we want to build a true dialogue between the two sides, it is this time-related fact that we first need to recognize. What happens when an Armenian girl speaks about her past with average Turkish women?

ELİF ŞAFAK
Armenians and Turks live in different eras. If we want to build a true dialogue between the two sides it is this time-related fact that we first need to recognize. What happens when an Armenian girl speaks about her past with average Turkish women? Below is an excerpt from an upcoming novel.

“Ask her what their family name is?” Grandmother Gülsüm asked Asya.

“Tchakhmakhchian,” Armanoush replied when the question was translated, adding, “My full name is Armanoush Tchakhmakhchian.”

Auntie Zeliha's face brightened as she exclaimed in recognition: “I've always found that interesting. The Turks add the suffix 'ci' to every possible word to describe professions. Look at our family name; it is Kazan-cı [1]. We are the cauldron makers. Now I see Armenians do the same thing. Çakmak [2]… Çakmakçı, Çakmakçı-yan.”

“That's interesting. Look, I have an address,” said Armanoush, who fished out a piece of paper from her pocket, adding: “My grandmother Shushan was born in this house. If you could help me with the directions, I'd like to go and visit it sometime.”

“So you came here to see your grandmother's house. Why did she leave?” enquired Aunt Zeliha.

Armanoush was both eager to be asked this question and reluctant to answer. Was it too early to let them know? How much of her story should she reveal? If not now, then when? Why should she have to wait anyway? In a listless, almost sapped voice she said, “They were forced to leave.”

As soon as she said this her weariness disappeared and she lifted her chin up as she continued: “It's a long story. I won't take your time with all the details. When her father died my grandmother Shushan was three years old. There were four siblings, she being the youngest and the only girl. The family had been left without its patriarch. My great grandmother was a widow now. Finding it difficult to stay in Istanbul with the children she sought refuge in her father's house in Sivas. But as soon as they arrived the deportations began. The entire family was ordered to leave their house and belongings behind and march with thousands of others to an unknown destination. They marched and they marched. My great grandmother died on the way and before long the elderly died as well. Having no parents to look after them the younger children lost each other amidst the confusion and chaos. But after months apart, the brothers were miraculously united in Lebanon with the help of a Catholic missionary. The only missing sibling among those still alive was my grandmother Shushan. Nobody had heard of the fate of the infant. Nobody knew that she had been taken back to Istanbul to be placed in an orphanage.”

Asya looked at Armanoush somewhat puzzled. Never before had she met someone so young with a memory so old.

Auntie Feride was the first to raise doubts and said: “But I don't understand. What happened to them? They died because they walked?”

“They were denied water and food and rest. They were made to march a long distance on foot. Women, some of them pregnant, and children, the elderly, the sick and the debilitated...” Armanoush's voice now trailed off.

“Who did this atrocity?” Auntie Cevriye asked as if addressing a classroom of ill-disciplined students.

“The Turks did it,” Armanoush replied without paying any attention to the implications.

“What a shame, what a sin. Are they not human?” Auntie Feride volleyed.

“Of course not, some people are monsters!” Auntie Cevriye declared without comprehending that the repercussions could be far more complex than she would like to handle. In twenty years in her career as a Turkish history teacher she was so accustomed to drawing an impermeable boundary between the past and the present, distinguishing the Ottoman Empire from the modern Turkish Republic, that she had actually heard the whole story as grim news from a “distant country.” The new state in Turkey had been established in 1923 and that was as far as the genesis of this regime could extend. Whatever might or might not have happened preceding this date was the issue of another era, and another people.

Armanoush looked at them one by one, puzzled. She was relieved to see that the family had not taken the story as badly as she had feared, but then she couldn't be sure that they had really taken it in at all. True, they neither refused to believe her nor did they retort with any counter argument. If anything, they listened attentively and they all seemed sorry. But was that the limit of their commiseration? And what exactly had she expected? Armanoush felt slightly disconcerted as she wondered whether it would be different if she were talking to a group of intellectuals.

Slowly it dawned on Armanoush that perhaps she was waiting for an admission of guilt, if not an apology. And yet that apology had not come, not because they had not felt for her, for it looked like they had, but because they had seen no connection between themselves and the perpetrators of the crimes. She, as an Armenian, embodied the spirit of her people from generations before whereas the average Turk had no such notion of continuity with his or her ancestors. The Armenians and the Turks lived in different eras. For the Armenians, time was a cycle in which the past incarnated itself in the present and the present begat the future, whereas for Turks time was a multi-hyphenated line where the past ended at some precise point and the present started anew with a fresh page with nothing but a huge rupture in between.

[1] Kazan: cauldron

Kazanci: cauldronmaker

[2] Çakmak: lighter

Çakmakçı: lightermaker

[Gavur]

ECHR's Decision to Affect 900 Minority Foundation Properties

09.22.2005 Thursday - ISTANBUL 01:36

By Emre Demir
Published: Wednesday, September 21, 2005
zaman.com


On Tuesday, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled for the return of real estate belonging to minority foundations.

In the first trial, Fener Greek Boy’s School Foundation and Yedikule Surp Prigic Armenian Hospital Foundation demanded the return of properties, which they owned between 1936 and 1974, but which were handed over to their previous owners following a Court of Appeals’ ruling in 1974. The decision will expectedly be announced in the upcoming months.

During yesterday’s hearing at the ECHR, lawyers represent the foundations claimed that Turkey had violated one of the articles of European Convention on Human Rights concerning the protection of properties.

In addition, they told i that the institutions defined as minority foundations by the Lausanne Treaty have the right to own property assets.

On the other side, Turkish legal representatives explained the necessary legal amendments were realized during Turkey’s European Union (EU) process, including the development of the Foundations Bill, which is now pending in the Turkish Parliament.

According to an arrangement dated 2002, religious minority foundations were entitled to own real estate.

The ECHR decision will determine the future of properties belonging to nearly 900 foundations, which changed hands following the decision by the Court of Appeals.

Since the General Directorate of Foundations does not disclose the number of real estate handed over to third persons due to confidentiality, it is not exactly known how many foundations’ properties will be affected by the ECHR decision.




Strasbourg

[Gavur]

ECHR Finds Turkey Guilty in 20 more Cases

09.22.2005 Thursday - ISTANBUL 01:37

By Emre Demir
Published: Wednesday, September 21, 2005
zaman.com


The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) concluded 22 cases opened against Turkey.

The court ruled against Turkey in 20 cases and ordered the country to pay 133,000 euros in compensation.


The most important case the ECHR concluded Tuesday was the case of Ahmet Dizman vs.Turkey.

Dizman took Turkey to the ECHR in 1994 claiming that he had been kidnapped by two police officers from Adana Counter-Terrorism Department who raided his house on the grounds that "he participated in the funeral of two members of the People’s Democracy Party" and that he was interrogated after having been taken to a deserted location.

The European Court reached the verdict saying Dizman underwent severe torture during the interrogation; therefore, the plaintiff should be paid 5,000 euros in damages as pecuniary compensation and 15,000 euros for moral damage.

As for the application against Turkey made by Democracy Peace Party former administrators of Diyarbakir, Abdulkadir Aydin, Edip Samanci, and Semir Guzel, it concluded with a friendly solution.

The ECHR found in favor of plaintiffs and rule against Turkey in 20 cases and ruled in their favor on only two cases. Three applications regarding the state paying land settlements late were also concluded against Turkey in favor of the plaintiff.

[Gavur]

Turkey's Brutal WWII-Era Wealth Tax

Copyright İ 2005 Tax Analysts
Tax Notes International Magazine

September 5, 2005

WORLDWIDE TAX OVERVIEW
by Cathy Phillips, editor of Tax Notes International


The voluntary tax systems of the United States and many other countries
aren't perfect, but they sure beat the heck out of the alternative.
Consider, for example, life under a regime where tax rates aren't made
public, assessments are arrived at in secret, and failure-to-comply
penalties include banishment to forced labor camps.

This week we present a fascinating article by DAVID JOULFAIAN on a
wealth tax adopted by Turkey in 1942 that included all of the above
unpleasantries. In the midst of World War II, Turkish citizens also were
victims of a monstrous tax system that they were powerless to change.
Joulfaian describes the discriminatory nature of the wealth tax, a
lopsided levy shouldered by the minority Christian and Jewish
populations in the predominately Muslim nation, and the misguided fiscal
policies that allowed the tax to take root in the first place (p. 915).


...


THE ULTIMATE DEATH TAX (page 915)



Wealth taxes are common in many countries, and represent one of the
oldest forms of taxation. Local governments in the United States, for
instance, levy annual property taxes. Annual wealth taxes are levied in
several European countries as well. The estate tax is the only wealth
tax levied by the U.S. government and applies to wealth held at death.
The wealthy are at times also taxed at progressive tax rates on their
earnings in addition to being exposed to wealth taxes. Governments levy
those taxes to diversify their sources of revenues, augment and protect
the income tax base, and regulate the distribution of income and the
concentration of wealth. Governments may resort to additional taxes in
times of national emergency.

A general guiding principle for any tax system is that it should be
sufficiently transparent to enable a taxpayer to construct the size of
wealth or income subject to tax, as well as the ensuing tax liability.
For local property taxes, for instance, cities inform property owners of
the assessed value of their real estate and the amount of tax they owe.
For income and estate taxes, taxpayers report the amount of income
received and the size of terminal wealth to the government. Once the
taxable amount is established, a tax rate schedule is applied to
determine the tax liability. Taxpayers are able to appeal assessments
and are given adequate time to prepare their documents and make
provisions for paying the amounts owed.

A student of taxation may encounter many fascinating features of the
various taxes levied throughout history, dating back to ancient Egypt
and the Roman Empire. Yet no tax system rivals the peculiarities of a
tax employed in the middle of the 20th century. On the morning of
November 12, 1942, the citizens of Turkey woke up to the most draconian
wealth tax ever envisaged. While the tax in theory applied to the entire
predominantly Muslim nation, in practice much of its burden rested with
the minority Christian and Jewish communities who primarily resided in
Istanbul, formerly known as Constantinople. Neither the rate of taxation
nor the taxable base and its derivation were made public. Tax
assessments were arrived at in secret, and individuals were directed to
settle their government assessed liabilities within two weeks, without
any appeal provisions in place. The penalty for Christians and Jews who
failed to do so within a month was deportation to forced labor camps in
eastern Turkey in addition to having their property confiscated. The tax
was initially also extended to Christian and Jewish schools, as well as
to churches and synagogues, but not to Muslim institutions, because they
were owned or funded by the government. As documented by Faik Okte, the
Turkish Ministry of Finance official in charge of implementing the tax,
assessments were determined arbitrarily because the authorities lacked
information on the income and properties of the minority groups./1/


Table 1: Statutory Tax Rates

Provision Applied to Applied to
Rate on wartime profit Muslim Turks Non-Muslims
12.5 percent 50.0 percent
Additional tax zero Up to 50 percent of personal wealth

Source: Faik Okte, The Tragedy of the Turkish Capital Tax.


Description of the Tax


The Turkish National Assembly passed the tax on November 11, 1942
(Law 4305/12.11.1942), and its decision to levy the tax was published
the next day in the government official newspaper, Resmi Gazete. The
details of the structure and inner workings of the tax were kept secret
by the government. The details, however, were revealed and made public
some five years after its enactment in a book authored in 1947 by Okte.
In that book Okte also traced the architects of the tax and named all
the governmental agencies and personnel engaged in administering the
tax.

In an otherwise officially secular state, taxpayers were classified
as Muslim and non-Muslim, denoted with the letters M and G,
respectively./2/ The latter included Jews and Christians, including
Armenians and Greeks. Assyrian Orthodox Christians also fell in that
class. An additional class of taxpayers were the Donme, denoted by D.
The Donme were Jews whose ancestors had converted to Islam in the 17th
century./3/ Like the Jews and Christians, the Donme were taxed at rates
higher than those that applied to Muslims. Foreigners were taxed at the
same rate as Muslim Turks.

During that period, Greeks were the largest minority group in Turkey,
and represented the heirs to Byzantium with Constantinople as its
capital. The Armenians originated from western Armenia or the eastern
half of Turkey, and represented the descendants of the first Christian
nation. The presence of the Jews also predates that of the Turks, whose
ranks had been augmented by Ladino Jews from Spain during the
Inquisition. The Assyrians are originally from southern Turkey and
modern-day Syria and Iraq; their presence also predates the arrival of
the Turks from central Asia. Combined, those non-Muslim groups made up
less than 1 percent of Turkey's population of 18 million in 1942.

The tax was initially envisaged as a tax on capital or wealth. It was
to apply to businesses and real estate (immovable property). By the time
it was enacted, it had expanded to include a tax on wages as well that
effectively applied only to non-Muslims in Istanbul. Taxpayers were
classified according to business type and property earnings. Within the
Ministry of Finance, once the size of income, wealth, and type of
enterprise were established internally, local assessment boards secretly
determined the amount owed by the taxpayer.

The Finance Ministry was responsible for setting the tax rates to be
used in computing tax assessments. Minorities were generally to be taxed
at 5 to 10 times the amount applied to Muslims with similar wealth.
Specifically, Muslims were to be taxed at the rate of 12.5 percent of
profits or earnings. In contrast, non-Muslims were to be statutorily
taxed at the rate of 50 percent of earnings plus an additional tax of up
to 50 percent of their wealth (Table 1)./4/ The reach of the tax also
extended to hospitals and educational institutions. The tax did not
extend to Muslim institutions, because they were owned or funded by the
government.

While internal "guidelines" set minimum and maximum limits, the local
boards at the Finance Ministry were free to choose any amount in
between. Indeed, they had complete discretion in setting assessments.
Information on income and wealth were obtained from Turkish national
banks, the Republican People's Party, and the Security Directorate,
which is equivalent to the U.S. FBI. Despite the lack of information on
the sources of wealth and income, taxpayer records were not requested or
considered when setting assessments.


Table 2: Initial Assessments in Istanbul (Constantinople)

Group Number of Taxpayers Amount (TRL millions)
Extraordinary Rich
Muslims 460 17.3
Non-Muslims 2,563 190.0
Those With Earnings Statements
Muslims 924 3.1
Non-Muslims 1,259 10.4
Profit Tax on Gross Earnings
Muslims 2,589 4.0
Non-Muslims 24,151 72.8
Wage Earners
Muslims -- --
Non-Muslims 10,991 6.9



Subtotal 42,937 304.5
Muslims 3,973 24.4
Non-Muslims 38,964 280.1

Source: Faik Okte, The Tragedy of the Turkish Capital Tax.


The assessed tax was due in cash within 15 days from its published
date of December 17, 1942. Payments could be postponed for another 15
days, but would face a charge of up to 2 percent interest. If the tax
due was not fully settled within 30 days of assessment, the taxpayer's
property was to be confiscated. Furthermore, the taxpayer was to be sent
to a labor camp until his debt was discharged, under Regulation 21/19288
approved on January 12, 1943.


The Taxpayers


By August 1943 the tax assessments stood at some TRL 335 million in
Istanbul alone, or about one-half the entire currency in circulation.
Indeed, those assessments represented as much as the entire budget
revenues of TRL 394.3 million for 1942 before enactment of the tax.
Table 2 provides a summary of the number of taxpayers assessed and the
amount of assessments in Istanbul. Some 42,937 taxpayers were assessed a
total of TRL 305 million, as shown in Table 2./5/ Of those, only 3,973
were Muslims, who were assessed a total of TRL 24.4 million. In other
words, minorities who made up less than 1 percent of the population were
assessed 93 percent of the liability. Table 3 further provides
assessments for churches, synagogues, and schools./6/

In a survey of foreign chambers of commerce at the time, C.L.
Sulzberger, writing for The New York Times in 1943, documented the
discriminatory nature of the tax./7/ As illustrated in Table 4, the
effective rates of assessments that merchants faced varied considerably
from a low of under 5 percent for Muslims to over 150 percent for
Christian Greeks and Jews, to well over 200 percent for Christian
Armenians. Similarly, in one large enterprise, only 1.2 percent of the
Muslim employees were assessed compared with 96.1 percent for minority
citizens.

As illustrated by the head of the Finance Ministry and the person in
charge of implementing the tax, Faik Okte, assessments were determined
in arbitrary manners because the authorities lacked information on the
income and properties of the minority groups./8/ The arbitrary nature of
the tax is best illustrated in the treatment of the "extraordinary
rich." According to Okte, Mr. Bezmenler, whose ancestors converted from
Judaism to Islam in the 17th century and who was classified as a Donme,
was assessed TRL 1 million. In contrast, Dr. Cudi Birtek, an
extraordinarily wealthy Muslim, was assessed only TRL 25,000, a mere
fraction of the amount applied to the Donme./9/ In yet another example,
Osman Sakar, K.S. was originally assessed TRL 120,000. When Mr. Sakar
proved that he was a "pure Turk" or a Muslim, his tax liability was
adjusted downward to TRL 12,000 -- just 10 percent of the originally
published amount./10/ Those mistakes were not uncommon because all
citizens were forced to adopt Turkish-sounding surnames in 1935 and
because Turks have come to resemble more the Caucasians they conquered
and less their Asiatic ancestors from central Asia.


Table 3: Tax Assessments of Minority Institutions

Christian and Jewish Institutions/*/ Number Assessment (TRL)
Schools 88 227,550
Churches and Synagogues 27 119,200
Hospitals 7 86,750

/*/ Zero assessment for Muslim institutions, which numbered in the thousands.

Source: Faik Okte, The Tragedy of the Turkish Capital Tax.


The discriminatory and confiscatory nature of this tax is also
evident in the treatment of non-Muslim institutions. According to
Sulzberger, a poorly equipped Armenian hospital in Istanbul, for
instance, was assessed TRL 39,000 compared with an assessment of TRL
2,500 for a modern and thriving American hospital. Muslim institutions
avoided taxation altogether./11/

Tax assessments were seriously flawed in particular because they
failed to consider any documents from the taxpayer. The tax due from a
Christian Armenian timber merchant, for instance, was three times his
entire fortune. The tax administrator informed him that his deportation
to the labor camp could not be prevented, even after all his wealth had
been confiscated./12/ At times the tax burden widely diverged in its
arbitrariness. A Jewish taxpayer had his tax assessment increased simply
because he argued with an assessor. In another example, a Christian
Armenian "was taxed excessively at the rate of TRL 400,000," reflecting
"the false allegation that he was the leader of the Armenian Tashnag
Society, an old member of the Union and Progress Party," better known in
the West as the Young Turk regime that governed Ottoman Turkey from 1909
through the end of World War I./13/ At the other extreme, another
Armenian was exempted from the labor camp because he had written
"favorable articles promoting Turkish interests in the French
press."/14/

The punitive nature of the tax was at times also extended to
foreigners. While foreigners were supposed to be taxed at the same low
rate as Muslims, many in fact were taxed at the higher rates that
applied to minority citizens. According to Faik Okte, the principal
administrator of the tax, that treatment was deliberate. He reports that
tax administrators were instructed to deny the foreigners' "privilege"
to Jews from the Axis states./15/ In addition, and under "the pretext of
the poor registration system," the property of Greeks and Armenians who
had acquired foreign citizenship was immediately auctioned off./16/

Of the first 45 deportees to labor camps, 21 were Jews, 13 were
Greeks, and 11 were Armenian. After the first deportation, it was
decided that the "elderly, women, the sick, foreign residents . . .
would not be exempted from the forced labor obligations."/17/ However,
there are no records of any women or foreigners ever sent to labor
camps.



Table 4: Effective Tax Rates by Religious and Ethnic Affiliations

Merchants by Affiliation Tax Rates (percent)
Muslim 4.94
Greek Orthodox 156.00
Jewish 179.00
Christian Armenian 232.00

Source: C.L. Sulzberger, "Turkish Tax Kills Foreign Business,"
The New York Times, Sept. 11, 1943.


Concluding Comment


Shortly after the government published its declaration to levy the
wealth tax, a Turkish professor contacted the Finance Ministry to
inquire about the details of the new tax. "Have you all gone mad?" was
his response after confirming that the new law did not provide for
appeals nor did it indicate rate of taxation./18/ Despite its insanity,
the tax shook the economy to its foundations.

Many Muslims were enriched by acquiring non-Muslim property at
bargain prices. However, those fire sales, or outright "confiscation" by
state-owned enterprises, often hindered economic growth and
entrepreneurship. Consider the case of the Banzilar and Benjamen
Company, a shipping company owned by two Jews that was forced to turn
over all of its five ships to the state-owned Maritime Lines in lieu of
taxes totaling TRL 1.6 million. Despite the rising value of ships and
Turkey's vast needs, those ships, which were productively employed by
their previous owners, remained idle at port./19/ In another example,
the majority of textile factory owners at the time were either Jewish or
Donme converts from Judaism. Yet, after World War II and repeal of the
tax, non-Muslim textile start-ups came to a screeching halt./20/

The Turkish wealth tax was advanced as part of a strategy to control
prices during the inflationary early years of World War II. The thinking
was that the forced sale of property and inventory within a fortnight of
the assessments would depress prices. Yet not only did that misguided
strategy fail to depress prices, the discriminatory nature of the tax
and the taxation of an entrepreneurial group to certain bankruptcy led
to a serious loss of confidence in the state and rattled financial
markets for years to come.


FOOTNOTES


/1/ Faik Okte, The Tragedy of the Turkish Capital Tax, translated
from the Turkish Varlik Vergisi Faciasi by Geoffrey Cox, Croom Helm,
1987.

/2/ G denotes Gayrimuslim, or "other than Muslim" in Turkish,
borrowed from the Arabic ghayr Muslim.

/3/ The Donme, which means "apostates" in Turkish, are the followers
of the mystic Shabbetai Tzvi who converted to Islam on September 16,
1666. Tzvi was arrested in Constantinople on December 30, 1665, after he
announced that he would seize the crown of the Ottoman sultan and
reestablish the kingdom of Israel.

/4/ Okte, supra note 1, at 43. The wage tax was set at TRL 500 for
those with monthly wages under TRL 100, TRL 750 for those with wages of
TRL 101 to TRL 500, and so on.

/5/ Plus another TRL 30 million when taxpayers with omitted
affiliation are considered. See Okte, supra note 1, at 48.

/6/ Okte, supra note 1, at 60.

/7/ C.L. Sulzberger, "Turkish Tax Kills Foreign Business," The New
York Times, Sept. 11, 1943, p. 7, column 1.

/8/ Okte, supra note 1, at 33.

/9/ Id. at 47.

/10/ Id. at 62.

/11/ Sulzberger, supra note 7.

/12/ Okte, supra note 1, at 69.

/13/ Id. at 47.

/14/ Id. at 74.

/15/ Id. at 37.

/16/ Id. at 57.

/17/ Id. at 72.

/18/ Id. at 29.

/19/ Id. at 95.

/20/ See Edward C. Clark, "The Emergence of Textile Manufacturing
Entrepreneurs in Turkey: 1804-1968" (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton
University, 1969).

[Gavur]

Turkish court bans massacre conference

By Vincent Boland
Published: September 23 2005 03:00 | Last updated: September 23 2005 03:00

A Turkish court last night ordered the cancellation of a conference in Istanbul on the massacre of Armenians in 1915.


The governor of Istanbul's office announced that permission had not been given for the conference to go ahead as planned today and over the weekend. The court case was brought the Turkish Lawyers' Union, a hardline nationalist organisation.

Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan reacted with dismay to the court's decision. "This decision has nothing to do with democracy and modernity. I condemn this decision," he said. Vincent Boland, Istanbul

[Gavur]

What happened to Mr.invincible Gul?

[Gavur]

In Turkey, a first-ever debate about Armenian mass killings

On eve of EU accession talks, a conference on the World War I massacres stirs controversy.

By Scott Peterson | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

ISTANBUL, TURKEY – Opposition to a conference about mass killings of Armenians moved from Turkish courtrooms to the street over the weekend as scholars discussed the World War I massacres publicly for the first time on Turkish soil.
Turkish nationalists, who back the official line that there was no Armenian genocide, sought to make their views embarrassingly plain by hurling eggs and tomatoes outside Istanbul Bilgi University, a back-up venue used to skirt a court order Thursday that sought to shut down the conference at another location.

But participants cast the event as a breakthrough for expanding civil society - a key issue as Turkey prepares to open talks Oct. 3 over accession to the European Union. "The most important thing is that this [conference] is happening at all," said Cengiz Candar, a prominent columnist for Bugun newspaper, who was hit by an egg as he spoke outside the conference. "It will help to recoup some of Turkey's negative image and, more fundamentally, its commitment to the EU and democracy."

Potential EU membership has prompted a raft of democratic changes in recent years - including more freedom of expression. EU officials say they view the conference as a benchmark for tolerance, warning after the court ruling of a "provocation" that could hurt Turkey's case.

Armenians say that 1.5 million Armenians (historians often count 1 million) died in the first systematic genocide of the 20th century, at the hands of Ottoman Turkish forces.

In Turkey, the official version holds that some 300,000 Armenians died as they took up arms to push for independence and sided with invading Russian armies. The partisan conflict, Turkey has argued, took just as many Turkish Muslim lives.

Questioning that version can lead to prosecution of people considered traitors, the term used by nationalist lawyers who petitioned for the conference closure. Well-known novelist Orhan Pamuk faces trial in December for "denigrating" the Turkish state by mentioning an Armenian and Kurdish death toll during an interview.

Last May, the justice minister said the conference was a "stab in the Turkish nation's back," prompting it to be postponed, and tapping into hard-line elements.

"Laws change during a war, and when some of your citizens, on your soil, hit you in the back, then any nation on earth would punish them," says Volkan Ekiz, a protester whose group lobbed eggs and tomatoes this weekend as police looked on.

"It's not a scientific conference. It's the Turkish war of independence, and nobody can say that it's genocide," said Uckun Gerai, a central committee member of the nationalist Worker's Party of Turkey, outside the conference. "Turkey has a problem with the US and EU, but it's a political problem."

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, keenly aware of the challenges ahead in EU talks, spoke forcefully in favor of the conference after the Thursday court decision. Mr. Erdogan said he wants a Turkey "where liberties are practiced to the full."

Halil Berktay, coordinator of the history department at Sabanci University, says the opposition was not surprising. "This is a country of more than 70 million, with a strong nationalist past; there are strong forces opposed to the European Union, to democracy and opening up," he says.

But, he adds, "the question of what happened in 1915-1916 is not a mystery, it's not like we know just 5 percent. We know 85 percent, so the question is not finding more evidence. The question is liberating scholarship from the nationalist taboos...."

Finding the balance between modernizing Turkey - the eastern anchor of the NATO alliance - and dealing with its staunchly statist history has not been easy. A further challenge is overcoming reluctance in the EU to accepting a Muslim state.

"Turkey has to confront its history, and the fact of the violence of 1915 and 1916, and lack of accountability, sanctioned more [state] violence," says Fatma Muge Gocek, a sociologist at the University of Michigan and a conference adviser.

"The discourse is not new; the fact that it is said in Turkey is what matters," says Ms. Gocek. "They are great developments."

Candar shares the optimism. "The judiciary is one of the most reactionary and backward institutions in Turkey, and the illegal [court] verdict reflects the inherent problems," he charges. "But the fact that we are discussing this is ample evidence to be optimistic."

[Gavur]

Conference On Ottoman Armenians Continues In Istanbul

Conference On Ottoman Armenians Continues In Istanbul
Published: 9/25/2005


ISTANBUL - ''Ittihat & Terakki Party (Party of Union & Progress) had a plan to purify whole Anatolia from the non-Turks, starting from the Aegean Region, before the World War I, and this plan was carried out in entire Anatolia during the years of the war (World War I)'', argued associate professor Taner Akcam of Minnesota University.

Taking the floor on the second day of the Conference titled ''The Armenians during the Collapse of the Ottoman Empire'' held at Istanbul's Bilgi University, Akcam said that the relocation decision was made at the end of long discussions and debates.

''The Ottoman documents indicate that the decision to relocate the Armenians was made to end a deeper problem defined as the 'eastern problem' and to end the dissolution process of the Ottoman Empire. This decision was not a result of a need that erupted during the war. There are many documents in hand with respect to the destruction of Armenians,'' claimed Akcam.

On the other hand, Dr. Ahmet Kuyas of Galatasaray University referred to the four members of the Ittihat & Terakki Party, and said that a serious massacre was made those days. According to Kuyas, the architect of this massacre was Enver Pasha. Kuyas expressed his view that the other three people who were responsible for these massacres were Talat Pasha, Dr. Bahattin Sakir and Dr. Nazim.

Also speaking at the conference, professor Baskin Oran of Ankara University's Political Sciences Department said, ''concept of class, criticisms of Ataturk, Cyprus, socialism, communism and Kurdistan are no more taboos in Turkey. There was only one taboo left, and it was Armenian issue. Now, it is no more a taboo.''

Referring to Armenian Diaspora, Oran said, ''Diaspora talks about 'recognition, compensation and territory', and this prevents 'recognition'. Nobody in Turkey can think of paying compensation for things that an empire (Ottoman Empire), the alphabet of which you have abandoned, did. Moreover, territory claims are nonsense.''

Oran pointed out that assassins of Turkish diplomats should not remain unpunished, and added, ''assassins of 35-40 Turkish diplomats were not punished or sentenced to minor punishments. And, this caused as much reaction in Turkey as the 1915 incidents caused in Armenia. And, this was the factor which increased this taboo in Turkey.''

Before the conference started, a group of people who were the members of the Grand Unity Party (BBP) threw rotten tomatoes and eggs to participants and the building where the conference is being held. Also, the audience was protested by the group.

[Gavur]

Armenian Conference At Istanbul University In March 2006

Published: 9/26/2005
Latest wire from AFP


ISTANBUL - An ''Armenian Conference'' will take place at the Istanbul University in March 2006, said university sources today.

In a press release, the IU Rector's office said that Istanbul University will hold a conference on the Armenian problem by wide international participation and on basis of international criteria.

''The participants, including lawyers, scholars and politicians, of countries who have adopted resolutions accepting and remembering the so-called Armenian genocide will be invited.

The Istanbul University will study the matter based on its historical mission and with an objective look. The Armenian problem will not only be handled from an historical perspective but also from a legal, political and sociological perspectives.

''The participants will handle the topic from various angles possible scientifically,'' said the IU press release.