Originally posted by Joseph
In addition, FBI work order documents concerning translations related to September 11th investigations were falsified and contained forgeries of Ms. Edmonds’ name and/or initials.
By letter dated May 8, 2002, Ms. Edmonds, through counsel, notified Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III, that as a direct result of the FBI’s failure to address or correct the serious misconduct and security breaches that were reported by Ms. Edmonds, the safety and security of Ms. Edmonds and her family has been jeopardized and that a foreign country has targeted Ms. Edmonds’ sister to be interrogated “and taken/arrested by force.” Ms. Edmonds’ counsel’s letter of May 8, 2002 to the Attorney General and FBI Director also provided them with a copy of the arrest warrant served by the foreign country at the residence of Ms. Edmonds’ sister in the foreign country together with a copy of the English translation of the arrest warrant.(4)
We believe that the warrant that was issued to Ms. Edmonds’ sister in the foreign country is the direct result of improper contacts between the xxxxersons and a foreign country, and was a result of the threats that were made by Mrs. xxxxerson when she threatened the lives and safety of Mrs. Edmonds and her family members, who were citizens of, and resided in, that same foreign country. In addition, we believe that the threats made by Mrs. xxxxerson, and the issuance of the arrest warrant, were the result of improper and undisclosed contacts by Mrs. xxxxerson and Major xxxxerson with a foreign official. Such acts taken by Mrs. xxxxerson (and other statements made and conduct by both xxxxersons) would indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States which would also make Major xxxxerson prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States, and such acts reflect a level of personal conduct and outside activities that raise a security concern that may be disqualifying. Our concern in this regard is heightened by the fact that it is alleged that Mrs. xxxxerson has maintained dual citizenship with a foreign country and has continued to possess a foreign passport from that same country as well as by the statements to others by both Major and Mrs. xxxxerson that they have financial or business interests in that foreign country.
It is inconceivable how the Department of Defense could tolerate permitting one of its military officers to have access to classified information under such circumstances, especially when that officer’s spouse is alleged to have: (1) threatened another person employed as a translator for the FBI on counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence cases; (2) committed other misconduct and serious security violations while employed by the FBI (such as having unreported contacts with one or more foreign officials while performing translation services for the FBI regarding conversations involving the same foreign officials); and (3) to make matters worse, carried out those threats by leaking information about the FBI translator to a foreign country (or agents thereof) so retaliation could be carried out against members of the FBI translator’s family who resided in that foreign country. Moreover, as outlined above, there is more than sufficient information to require a security investigation of Major xxxxerson based on foreign influence, foreign preference, personal conduct, security violations, and outside activities. See, e.g., Adjudicative Desk Reference (ADR), Adjudicative Guidelines, Version 2.2, pp. 3-13 (July, 2001) (Guidelines B, C, E, K, and L).5
Additionally, we do not believe that Major xxxxerson could be considered an “innocent spouse” and there is ample evidence that he was involved in (and/or had knowledge of and failed to report) many of the activities of his wife that comprise her acts of misconduct. Moreover, in light of the serious allegations raised against Mrs. xxxxerson, and the alleged involvement of Major xxxxerson in his wife’s nefarious activities with, or on behalf of, foreign interests, Major xxxxerson is vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure from foreign interests.
We do not believe that these matters could have been thoroughly or completely reviewed in the short time that AFOSI and the Air Force IG devoted to reviewing Ms. Edmonds’ letter of August 7th. After reviewing this matter further we believe that you will agree that Ms. Edmonds’ allegations of Personnel Security violations are very serious and that they warrant further investigation by your office. For all of the above reasons we hereby request that you re-open this matter and that the DOD OIG thoroughly investigate these matters.
Please direct all correspondence or communications about these matters to this office. If you, or anyone at the Department of Defense or Inspector General’s offices, has any questions regarding this matter please feel free to contact me. Thank you in advance for your attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
David K. Colapinto
Attorney for Ms. Edmonds
Enclosure
cc: Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee
Senator Charles E. Grassley, Senior Member, Senate Judiciary Committee
ENDNOTES
1.) Mrs. xxxxerson is believed to be a United States citizen, but maintains dual citizenship with a foreign country and she is believed to possess a passport issued by that same foreign country. In addition, Mrs. xxxxerson and her husband also are believed to have financial interests in that foreign country.
2.) We believe that the “contract monitor” mentioned by Senators Leahy and Grassley in their August 13th letter to Attorney General Ashcroft is Mrs. xxxxerson.
3.) A copy of the June 19, 2002 letter from Senators Leahy and Grassley to the DOJ Inspector General, which referenced this FBI confirmation, was attached to Ms. Edmonds’ original letter to DOD OIG of August 6, 2002.
4.) A copy of Ms. Edmonds’ counsel’s letter to the Attorney General dated May 8, 2002 was attached to Ms. Edmonds’ letter of August 7th.
5.) The Adjudicative Guidelines are the “official U.S. Government policy that guides decisions on an individual’s eligibility for access to classified information.” See, ADR, p. 1. The ADR was developed by the Defense Personnel Security Research Center. Id.
By letter dated May 8, 2002, Ms. Edmonds, through counsel, notified Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III, that as a direct result of the FBI’s failure to address or correct the serious misconduct and security breaches that were reported by Ms. Edmonds, the safety and security of Ms. Edmonds and her family has been jeopardized and that a foreign country has targeted Ms. Edmonds’ sister to be interrogated “and taken/arrested by force.” Ms. Edmonds’ counsel’s letter of May 8, 2002 to the Attorney General and FBI Director also provided them with a copy of the arrest warrant served by the foreign country at the residence of Ms. Edmonds’ sister in the foreign country together with a copy of the English translation of the arrest warrant.(4)
We believe that the warrant that was issued to Ms. Edmonds’ sister in the foreign country is the direct result of improper contacts between the xxxxersons and a foreign country, and was a result of the threats that were made by Mrs. xxxxerson when she threatened the lives and safety of Mrs. Edmonds and her family members, who were citizens of, and resided in, that same foreign country. In addition, we believe that the threats made by Mrs. xxxxerson, and the issuance of the arrest warrant, were the result of improper and undisclosed contacts by Mrs. xxxxerson and Major xxxxerson with a foreign official. Such acts taken by Mrs. xxxxerson (and other statements made and conduct by both xxxxersons) would indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States which would also make Major xxxxerson prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States, and such acts reflect a level of personal conduct and outside activities that raise a security concern that may be disqualifying. Our concern in this regard is heightened by the fact that it is alleged that Mrs. xxxxerson has maintained dual citizenship with a foreign country and has continued to possess a foreign passport from that same country as well as by the statements to others by both Major and Mrs. xxxxerson that they have financial or business interests in that foreign country.
It is inconceivable how the Department of Defense could tolerate permitting one of its military officers to have access to classified information under such circumstances, especially when that officer’s spouse is alleged to have: (1) threatened another person employed as a translator for the FBI on counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence cases; (2) committed other misconduct and serious security violations while employed by the FBI (such as having unreported contacts with one or more foreign officials while performing translation services for the FBI regarding conversations involving the same foreign officials); and (3) to make matters worse, carried out those threats by leaking information about the FBI translator to a foreign country (or agents thereof) so retaliation could be carried out against members of the FBI translator’s family who resided in that foreign country. Moreover, as outlined above, there is more than sufficient information to require a security investigation of Major xxxxerson based on foreign influence, foreign preference, personal conduct, security violations, and outside activities. See, e.g., Adjudicative Desk Reference (ADR), Adjudicative Guidelines, Version 2.2, pp. 3-13 (July, 2001) (Guidelines B, C, E, K, and L).5
Additionally, we do not believe that Major xxxxerson could be considered an “innocent spouse” and there is ample evidence that he was involved in (and/or had knowledge of and failed to report) many of the activities of his wife that comprise her acts of misconduct. Moreover, in light of the serious allegations raised against Mrs. xxxxerson, and the alleged involvement of Major xxxxerson in his wife’s nefarious activities with, or on behalf of, foreign interests, Major xxxxerson is vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure from foreign interests.
We do not believe that these matters could have been thoroughly or completely reviewed in the short time that AFOSI and the Air Force IG devoted to reviewing Ms. Edmonds’ letter of August 7th. After reviewing this matter further we believe that you will agree that Ms. Edmonds’ allegations of Personnel Security violations are very serious and that they warrant further investigation by your office. For all of the above reasons we hereby request that you re-open this matter and that the DOD OIG thoroughly investigate these matters.
Please direct all correspondence or communications about these matters to this office. If you, or anyone at the Department of Defense or Inspector General’s offices, has any questions regarding this matter please feel free to contact me. Thank you in advance for your attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
David K. Colapinto
Attorney for Ms. Edmonds
Enclosure
cc: Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee
Senator Charles E. Grassley, Senior Member, Senate Judiciary Committee
ENDNOTES
1.) Mrs. xxxxerson is believed to be a United States citizen, but maintains dual citizenship with a foreign country and she is believed to possess a passport issued by that same foreign country. In addition, Mrs. xxxxerson and her husband also are believed to have financial interests in that foreign country.
2.) We believe that the “contract monitor” mentioned by Senators Leahy and Grassley in their August 13th letter to Attorney General Ashcroft is Mrs. xxxxerson.
3.) A copy of the June 19, 2002 letter from Senators Leahy and Grassley to the DOJ Inspector General, which referenced this FBI confirmation, was attached to Ms. Edmonds’ original letter to DOD OIG of August 6, 2002.
4.) A copy of Ms. Edmonds’ counsel’s letter to the Attorney General dated May 8, 2002 was attached to Ms. Edmonds’ letter of August 7th.
5.) The Adjudicative Guidelines are the “official U.S. Government policy that guides decisions on an individual’s eligibility for access to classified information.” See, ADR, p. 1. The ADR was developed by the Defense Personnel Security Research Center. Id.
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