Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

[ArmeniaR1]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

And Turkey can't do much. Attack Armenia is out of option, 93 showed that. What are they going to do close the border with Armenia? They have already done everything they could without starting a war.

No they cant attack, it would be theyr biggest mistake ever. and i think if they do, it would be better for Armenia... the only thing they can do is helping azerbaijan, what they already do...

[arakeretzig]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

To hit Baku we need rockets that have a range of approximately 250 km.

But Armenia already has Scud B, it can atleast do 300km, right?

see down bellow..

Armenian SCUDs Threaten Azeri Oil Sites
ARMENIAN SCUDS THREATEN AZERI OIL SITES

United Press International, USA
March 13 2006

BAKU, Azerbaijan, March 13 (UPI) -- Since the collapse of communism
in 1991, Azerbaijan has moved closer to NATO and the United States
as its oil exports have soared.

Azerbaijan is a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace affiliate
program and has hopes of joining the alliance.

Austrian Eutema Technologie Management GmbH EMTECH project manager
Martin Marek says that Azerbaijan's main adversary, Armenia, has
deployed Soviet-era Scud-B ballistic missiles in the disputed Upper
Karabakh region, which are capable of striking Baku's oil facilities.

On March 13, AssA-Irada news agency quoted Marek as saying, "The
Scud-B missiles are aimed at oil fields, pipelines and refineries in
Azerbaijan, which could bring about a disaster."

On Aug. 23, 1997, the xxxish Institute for National Security Affairs
quoted Science Applications International Corp. Strategic Assessment
Center analyst Glen E. Howard as saying that Russia had shipped
Armenia as many as 32 Scud-B ballistic missiles and eight launchers
as part of a Russian 1994-1996 arms deal worth $1 billion.

In May-June 1996, Armenian personnel were trained to operate Scud-Bs at
Russia's Kapustin Yar firing range. Scud-Bs have a range of 200 miles.

Marek observed that Western investment in Azerbaijan reinforces the
current "de-facto independent status of Upper Karabakh," and that
"Baku is also aware that if the war resumes, these companies will
freeze their investments in the country."


Also, see this

http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/missiles

[Davo88]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Reset the Russian Reset Policy
While the Obama Administration praises soft power, Moscow still speaks the language of arms.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev recently proclaimed Eurasia a Russian "sphere of exclusive interests." Moscow has backed up those words with every available foreign-policy tool: diplomacy (including recognition of breakaway republics), arms sales, defense pacts, base construction—even regime change.

This month marks the second anniversary of the Russian-Georgian war, a conflict that put Tbilisi's NATO and European Union ambitions on hold while cutting off for good the pro-Russian secessionist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

To further strengthen its dominance in the region, Russia was intimately involved in this April's overthrow of Kyrgyzstan President Kurmanbek Bakiyev. The move was a payback for his refusal to evict the U.S. airbase at Manas airport and a lesson to those in the region who buck the Russian diktat.

Russia is also pressuring Belarus to jettison strongman Alexander Lukashenko in favor of a more pliant, pro-Moscow, but not necessarily more democratic, leader. And just last week, Russia tightened the screws on Georgia and Moldova by ordering its customs-union partners Kazakhstan and Belarus to stop importing Georgian mineral water and Moldovan and Georgian wines.

The U.S. response to all this has been confused at best. During her recent visit to the Caucasus, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton did call the Russian presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia "occupation" of Georgian territory. But she spent most of the time stressing the importance of "soft" over military power, which still plays a key role in the region.

Unfortunately, the Obama administration rarely goes beyond rhetoric, jettisoning 20 years of often muscular pursuit of a bipartisan freedom agenda, which included opposition to Russia's military presence in the post-Soviet space, support of Georgian integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures, and boosting ties between post-Soviet states from Uzbekistan to Ukraine and Moldova.

While the Obama administration praises soft power, Russia still speaks the language of arms. In the past two years it has built five military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Later this month, during President Dmitry Medvedev's visit to Yerevan, Moscow will provide military guarantees to Armenia, assuming a "joint" responsibility to protect the country's borders against Azerbaijan and Turkey. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has prepared a draft protocol for President Medvedev's signature that would commit Russia's troops at its military base near the Armenian city of Gyumri to the country's defense and sell advanced weapons to Yerevan. Baku and Ankara must be livid.

While the previous contract called for the Gyumri base to be dismantled in 2015, the new protocol will allow Russia to stay there until 2049. The arrangement is similar to the renegotiated lease for the Sevastopol naval base in Ukraine, which is extended to 2042 as it, too, prevents the country's future membership in NATO.

Russia's pledge to defend Armenia puts Azerbaijan in an untenable situation. It's a clear warning against any Azeri attempt to regain the secessionist Nagorno-Karabakh region or its seven Armenian-occupied districts. The subtext is clear as well: Azerbaijan should scale back cooperation with the West or face the consequences. The Russian-Armenian protocol makes Russia the dominant power in South Caucasus, as the U.S. and NATO are unwilling to commit to long-term military presence there.

Baku's efforts to reach out to Russia by selling gas and buying sophisticated weaponry so far have not borne fruit. At the same time, Russia is skillfully playing both sides and may have found a way to sweeten the Armenian defense pact for Baku. Russia's Vedomosti newspaper reported last month that Moscow has sold Azerbaijan the state-of-the-art S-300 anti-aircraft missile system. While Russia's Defense Ministry denied the report, the Azeri Defense Ministry did not. If the S-300 sale went through, it probably contributed much to Baku's surprising silence on the Russian-Armenian defense protocol.

While extending its military reach, Moscow is simultaneously trying to assume the role of primary mediator in the territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh. Moscow hopes to retain its historic ally, Armenia, while wooing a new partner, Azerbaijan. That's not to say Moscow is intent on resolving the conflict. Rather, it pursues greater cooperation with Yerevan and Baku—including military cooperation—as a means of increasing its leverage and arms sales to both sides.

The growing tension over Iran's nuclear program may have also played a role in Russia's extension of its lease in Gyumri. In case of a "hot" conflict, Russia would be able to stop the deployment of U.S. military and allied forces in the Caucasus, including the use of air bases. Russian control of South Caucasus airspace from bases in Armenia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia could deny U.S. air operations there without Moscow's consent.

Meanwhile, Washington seems content with preaching the importance of "soft power." Its pseudo-Realpolitik approach of "seeing no evil" only encourages Moscow to expand its hegemony.

To roll back the Kremlin's growing regional influence, Washington should expand its political-military cooperation with the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus; lift the de facto weapons embargo on Georgia; and engage in meaningful efforts in the realms of energy, security and good governance. Washington should explore sales of Patriot missiles and modern military equipment to Azerbaijan; boost support for the Nabucco and trans-Caspian gas pipelines in coordination with European capitals; and promote greater transparency, democracy and the rule of law in the region. The Obama Administration, in short, needs to reset its Russian reset policy to protect America's interests in Eurasia.

Mr. Cohen is senior research fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy at the Heritage Foundation.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704164904575420983022047918.html?mod=googlenews_wsj#articleTabs%3Darticle%26mg%3Dcom-wsj

[londontsi]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

But Armenia already has Scud B, it can atleast do 300km, right?

see down bellow..

Armenian SCUDs Threaten Azeri Oil Sites
ARMENIAN SCUDS THREATEN AZERI OIL SITES

United Press International, USA
March 13 2006

BAKU, Azerbaijan, March 13 (UPI) -- Since the collapse of communism
in 1991, Azerbaijan has moved closer to NATO and the United States
as its oil exports have soared.

Azerbaijan is a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace affiliate
program and has hopes of joining the alliance.

Austrian Eutema Technologie Management GmbH EMTECH project manager
Martin Marek says that Azerbaijan's main adversary, Armenia, has
deployed Soviet-era Scud-B ballistic missiles in the disputed Upper
Karabakh region, which are capable of striking Baku's oil facilities.

On March 13, AssA-Irada news agency quoted Marek as saying, "The
Scud-B missiles are aimed at oil fields, pipelines and refineries in
Azerbaijan, which could bring about a disaster."

On Aug. 23, 1997, the xxxish Institute for National Security Affairs
quoted Science Applications International Corp. Strategic Assessment
Center analyst Glen E. Howard as saying that Russia had shipped
Armenia as many as 32 Scud-B ballistic missiles and eight launchers
as part of a Russian 1994-1996 arms deal worth $1 billion.

In May-June 1996, Armenian personnel were trained to operate Scud-Bs at
Russia's Kapustin Yar firing range. Scud-Bs have a range of 200 miles.

Marek observed that Western investment in Azerbaijan reinforces the
current "de-facto independent status of Upper Karabakh," and that
"Baku is also aware that if the war resumes, these companies will
freeze their investments in the country."


Also, see this
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/missiles

If this is in fact true then Armenia is doing a great favor to Azerbaijan by refraining them from doing something stupid.

[Eddo211]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Valid points regarding what more can turkey do that hasn’t been done if the BTC pipeline is sabotaged by NKR forces.....however considering we could loose any support we may have had from the West and even Russia (They would be against this as well) Turkey can setup a indiscriminate shelling of Artsakh from Nakishevan under Azeri disguise and this time it will not stop no matter what we say.

I hope we realize that the significant of an attack on BTC goes far beyond Turkey and Azerbaijan. British Petroleum heads the BTC consortium and, besides operating the pipeline, has a 30 percent share while Azerbaijan owns only 25 percent. Other Western investors include Chevron (9 percent), Norway (8.7 percent), Turkey (6.53 percent), Italy and France Total (5 percent apiece), Japan (6 percent), and the American Hess Corp. (2.4 percent), etc. The West receives 75 percent of BTC's revenues.

For Turkey, BTC's transit revenues are payback for supporting Western sanctions since 1991's Operation Desert Storm as Turkey claims that it had lost $80 billion in transit fees due to cooperating with Iraqi sanctions.

You wanna hurt Azerbaijan?….you need to bomb their oil fields and the associated infrastructure. Four to eight SU-25s flying along the Azeri Iranian border (maybe even allowed to refuel in Iran) and then using mountain covers along the coastline to the north (while NKR ground forces start a diversionary attack) can get the job done.
Unfortunately not enough emphases are put on how effective and game changing a strong airpower can be compared to loading up on Russian made missiles going up against Russian made air defenses.

[arakeretzig]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Valid points regarding what more can turkey do that hasn’t been done if the BTC pipeline is sabotaged by NKR forces.....however considering we could loose any support we may have had from the West and even Russia (They would be against this as well) Turkey can setup a indiscriminate shelling of Artsakh from Nakishevan under Azeri disguise and this time it will not stop no matter what we say.

I hope we realize that the significant of an attack on BTC goes far beyond Turkey and Azerbaijan. British Petroleum heads the BTC consortium and, besides operating the pipeline, has a 30 percent share while Azerbaijan owns only 25 percent. Other Western investors include Chevron (9 percent), Norway (8.7 percent), Turkey (6.53 percent), Italy and France Total (5 percent apiece), Japan (6 percent), and the American Hess Corp. (2.4 percent), etc. The West receives 75 percent of BTC's revenues.

For Turkey, BTC's transit revenues are payback for supporting Western sanctions since 1991's Operation Desert Storm as Turkey claims that it had lost $80 billion in transit fees due to cooperating with Iraqi sanctions.

You wanna hurt Azerbaijan?….you need to bomb their oil fields and the associated infrastructure. Four to eight SU-25s flying along the Azeri Iranian border (maybe even allowed to refuel in Iran) and then using mountain covers along the coastline to the north (while NKR ground forces start a diversionary attack) can get the job done.
Unfortunately not enough emphases are put on how effective and game changing a strong airpower can be compared to loading up on Russian made missiles going up against Russian made air defenses.

I agree, Baku's oil fields seems to be just south of the city, about 250km from artsakh. They also have the azeri oilfield 100km east of baku in the sea, which is further than 300km, but maybe a couple of eagles can do the job, albiet, more tricky.
While knocking out oilfields seems better politically and strategically, threatening their pipelines will mean, international oil companies will think twice before making new contracts in azerbaboonjan.

[londontsi]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Valid points regarding what more can turkey do that hasn’t been done if the BTC pipeline is sabotaged by NKR forces.....however considering we could loose any support we may have had from the West and even Russia (They would be against this as well) Turkey can setup a indiscriminate shelling of Artsakh from Nakishevan under Azeri disguise and this time it will not stop no matter what we say.

The distance between Stepanakerd and Nakhichevan is around 100 Km.
This will probably require scud type ( or better) missiles.
It will give Armenia "right" to defend itself with all the consequences.
All you have to do is remember Shusi.

I hope we realize that the significant of an attack on BTC goes far beyond Turkey and Azerbaijan. British Petroleum heads the BTC consortium and, besides operating the pipeline, has a 30 percent share while Azerbaijan owns only 25 percent. Other Western investors include Chevron (9 percent), Norway (8.7 percent), Turkey (6.53 percent), Italy and France Total (5 percent apiece), Japan (6 percent), and the American Hess Corp. (2.4 percent), etc. The West receives 75 percent of BTC's revenues.

The Kirkuk Cheyhan pipeline is sabotaged fairly regularly and it does not appear to create much noise.
Minimum we can do with regards BTC is to sabotage it and then deny access to repair by sniper or artillery.
No need to uproot the whole pipeline.

For Turkey, BTC's transit revenues are payback for supporting Western sanctions since 1991's Operation Desert Storm as Turkey claims that it had lost $80 billion in transit fees due to cooperating with Iraqi sanctions. .

SO WHAT !! Armenia was not party to that.

You wanna hurt Azerbaijan?….you need to bomb their oil fields and the associated infrastructure. Four to eight SU-25s flying along the Azeri Iranian border (maybe even allowed to refuel in Iran) and then using mountain covers along the coastline to the north (while NKR ground forces start a diversionary attack) can get the job done.

With regards destroying infrastructure I am sure it is built in the war scenarios with all necessary political consequences considered.
It may well be the first target, to avoid pissing about with piplines.

Unfortunately not enough emphases are put on how effective and game changing a strong airpower can be compared to loading up on Russian made missiles going up against Russian made air defenses.

Unfortunately one has to fight with what one has.

[KarotheGreat]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

Valid points regarding what more can turkey do that hasn’t been done if the BTC pipeline is sabotaged by NKR forces.....however considering we could loose any support we may have had from the West and even Russia (They would be against this as well) Turkey can setup a indiscriminate shelling of Artsakh from Nakishevan under Azeri disguise and this time it will not stop no matter what we say.

I hope we realize that the significant of an attack on BTC goes far beyond Turkey and Azerbaijan. British Petroleum heads the BTC consortium and, besides operating the pipeline, has a 30 percent share while Azerbaijan owns only 25 percent. Other Western investors include Chevron (9 percent), Norway (8.7 percent), Turkey (6.53 percent), Italy and France Total (5 percent apiece), Japan (6 percent), and the American Hess Corp. (2.4 percent), etc. The West receives 75 percent of BTC's revenues.

For Turkey, BTC's transit revenues are payback for supporting Western sanctions since 1991's Operation Desert Storm as Turkey claims that it had lost $80 billion in transit fees due to cooperating with Iraqi sanctions.

You wanna hurt Azerbaijan?….you need to bomb their oil fields and the associated infrastructure. Four to eight SU-25s flying along the Azeri Iranian border (maybe even allowed to refuel in Iran) and then using mountain covers along the coastline to the north (while NKR ground forces start a diversionary attack) can get the job done.
Unfortunately not enough emphases are put on how effective and game changing a strong airpower can be compared to loading up on Russian made missiles going up against Russian made air defenses.

arakeretzig posted an article talking about the fact that our missiles are not only pointed at the pipe line but also against the oilfields and other oil related buildings. So I hope that during a war we will take everything out at once. Let's see how they fight without oil.

[Tigranakert]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

But Armenia already has Scud B, it can atleast do 300km, right?

see down bellow..

The scuds could reach pretty far but are not so acurate, I was talking about accurate medium-range missiles who could precisely hit their targets, these are needed in a (possibly) short war. The scuds are good to bomb their cities with possible some nuclear waste in it if we want maximum damage, which we should do if they shell Stepanakert.

[KarotheGreat]

Re: Nagorno-Karabagh: Military Balance Between Armenia & Azerbaijan

The scuds could reach pretty far but are not so acurate, I was talking about accurate medium-range missiles who could precisely hit their targets, these are needed in a (possibly) short war. The scuds are good to bomb their cities with possible some nuclear waste in it if we want maximum damage, which we should do if they shell Stepanakert.

But the problem(it's not really a problem) is that we don't know what weapons Armenia has and weapons it can produce. If you remember the weapons expo a while ago. They showed some stuff on tv but what I want to know what they haven't shown. What is hidden in Artsakh that we don't know about and will be used during a war.