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Re: War in The Middle East
While you are correct in that the attack and siege on Fallujah was a failure and a bad decision as it did nothing, but only incurred more losses, you have attributed the entire result to a matter of policy and politics as opposed to battlefield tactics, in which you have underestimated, and in fact dimissed the role that the insurgency played in it. That is why I have claimed that the result of the U.S. taking and relinquishing of Fallujah is not policy, but the inherent conflict and nature of 4GW. By leveling the city and destroying everything, is not exactly defeating the insurgents. You do not root out the problem, but only sweep it under the rug:
You can read the rest here:
It's good and interesting for you to argue with me about history since I actually studied it as it is intellectual stimulating, but by the above you yourself have only confirmed by my point: "History is written by the victors". If that is not an admission of interpretation and of officialdom transmitting and handing down the facts, then I don't know what is.
Read the article that I linked above. The city is a desolate waste completely destroyed as it was brought down to rubble by the Americans. Who reports are those who are there, the army. Those one or two journalists daring enough to do so, are usually well behind the lines, and even they only report what they are told by the army staff.
Heavy and low is a matter of perceptions, whether attributing it to your side or the enemies. Throughout war, numbers are always distorted, inflated, deflated, manipulated, misrepresented, although rarely indirectly, but mostly directly.
You seem to miss the point entirely, and this is where I believe your unfamiliarity with military history comes into play. How many wars can you name where occupiers who tried to subdue host populations were successful? How many can you name in which the efforts to impose domination were eventually thwarted?
Really? And how do you know they are "defeated"? Have you talked to them? The U.S. military would certainly love to believe that the 'insurgency is defeated' everytime they carry out these attacks. The insurgents apparently don't think so since they are still at it, wearing down the U.S. troops.
Welcome to fourth generation warfare, where the enemy so amorphous and able to disappear into the host populations hides itself. Hence why historically state and conventional armies have had poor track records defeating guerrillas and insurgencies because these populations, as in Vietnam and now in Iraq, utilize their surroundings to their advantage. There is no clear line of who is or isn't the enemy as the enemy is not clearly defined to begin with. You are not fighting a state or a state army, you are fighting disorganized, decentralized, horizontal combatants who report not to a government but to an idea.
By the above, you just highlighted the precise nature of fourth generation warfare, and which is why state armies' eventual frustration leads to the mentality of slaughtering civilians. As in Vietnam, it was similar where they had to "destroy the village in order to save it". Any sane person would see the twisted and idiotic nature of such policy, but that is what happens when you have no clearly defined enemy.
While things were hardly friendly, can you seriously state that this is supposedly better off? Even the most hardcore neoconservative anti-Baathist anti-Saddamist will surely admit that compared to now, Saddam's regime was heaven.
You are once again trying to rely on the arbitrary distinctions you create to advance your argument. In the end, it doesn't matter what you like to believe, or what you think is a matter of distinction, but the facts remain that the Chechens were a non-state army fighting a heavily conventional army and were able to wear down the big centralized state army.
Your initial qualm was that somehow tactics are different, or the same amount of casualties have not been caused, therefore the two are incomparible. What reason is there to suggest that somehow this is a valid distinction and not anything arbitrary that you made up in order to make a point? The casualties inflicted by the Chechens focused on Russian soldiers, the primary focus of insurgencies in Iraq are civilians. So because the focus is different they are incomparible? You are being to ideological about this particular point. This is what led me to state that because the internal delicacies are different and have always been different as nothing historically is uniform, we are still dealing with the same concept and system of warfare, where we pit a non-state army against a state army. Now, you do not have to like this because to admit to this perhaps makes your point irrelevant, but that is not a point of dispute. By your logic we can always find some marginal differences in every war and use that as a driving wedge to somehow disqualify this and that and every other war as an exception to fourth generation war and pretty soon nothing qualifies. In reality, fourth generation war is not defined, ironically you and state armies and governments are obsessed with definitions and these clearly set and cut rules, which do not exist in fourth generation warfare, other than the fighting shifts from conventional armies to one of a non-state army against that of a state army.
Oh so now we are moving in the chain of the blame game. First you blame the media, then policy and politics, and now me. This sort of childish inanity is so often the pastime of myopic central planners and those who believe in the omnipotence of conventional armies and cannot come to grips that conventional armies are very limited when confronted with the right style of fighting. Everything that has a strength, also has a weakness and history is our guide in this. In boxing and mixed martial arts, there is a concept that is known among fighters of "styles make fights". That is, if you pit certain fighters together, no matter how good they both may be against every other person they have fought, certain styles determine certain fights, i.e. someone who is a trained southpaw fighter will always defeat someone not trained in fighting southpaws. Someone who is a well versed grappler or wrestler can easily defeat a striker if he can take the fight to the ground.
If you think this is a waste of time, then why are you responding? Will you respond again if this is a waste of time? Please practice what you preach. Your childishness and naivity and your blind belief in the unhallowed glory of state armies is about as blind as Steve Wonder's vision.
All you have done in this discussion is create strawmans and have inserted things in my argument I have not made, you have never made any mention of "what claims" you want me to back up, when it has been you that has engaged in circular reasoning and begging the question, and several times in your own words only proving my point. I can sit here like you and whine and say "Oh I stated many things that have not gotten proper refuting". It sounds this is more about your ego than an actual discussion. When you are mature enough and ready to actually engage in a discussion as opposed to making it more personal as you go along and eventually making me the subject and the reason for the failure of state armies, you can come back and try at a discussion, until then, all your efforts are juvenile at best.
Originally posted by D3ADSY
Fallujah: City Without a Future?
By Michael Schwartz
In November, after three weeks of "precision" bombing, 10,000 American soldiers and 2,000 Iraqi national guards marched into Fallujah. They had five goals:
First and foremost, free Fallujah from the grip of the insurgents and allow its citizens to participate in the January 30 elections;
Second, kill or capture the guerrilla leadership in its "safe haven," particularly Abdul Musab al-Zarqawi, the accused mastermind of the resistance;
Third, "so damage the insurgency" that it would be reduced to "containable levels through 2005";
Fourth, teach Fallujans (and the rest of Iraq) that "harboring" the mujaheddin resistance would provoke the full force of the American military. (On this point, an anonymous Pentagon official told New York Times reporters Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt: "If there are civilians dying in connection with these attacks, and with the destruction, the locals at some point have to make a decision. Do they want to harbor the insurgents and suffer the consequences that come with that, or do they want to get rid of the insurgents and have the benefits of not having them there?");
Fifth, rebuild Fallujah, now cleared of guerrillas, as a showcase for the rest of the country to admire and emulate. (As Colonel John R. Ballard, a military planner, told the New York Times "The best place to bring a model town into place is Fallujah.'')
Did the attack on Fallujah accomplish these ambitious goals?
By Michael Schwartz
In November, after three weeks of "precision" bombing, 10,000 American soldiers and 2,000 Iraqi national guards marched into Fallujah. They had five goals:
First and foremost, free Fallujah from the grip of the insurgents and allow its citizens to participate in the January 30 elections;
Second, kill or capture the guerrilla leadership in its "safe haven," particularly Abdul Musab al-Zarqawi, the accused mastermind of the resistance;
Third, "so damage the insurgency" that it would be reduced to "containable levels through 2005";
Fourth, teach Fallujans (and the rest of Iraq) that "harboring" the mujaheddin resistance would provoke the full force of the American military. (On this point, an anonymous Pentagon official told New York Times reporters Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt: "If there are civilians dying in connection with these attacks, and with the destruction, the locals at some point have to make a decision. Do they want to harbor the insurgents and suffer the consequences that come with that, or do they want to get rid of the insurgents and have the benefits of not having them there?");
Fifth, rebuild Fallujah, now cleared of guerrillas, as a showcase for the rest of the country to admire and emulate. (As Colonel John R. Ballard, a military planner, told the New York Times "The best place to bring a model town into place is Fallujah.'')
Did the attack on Fallujah accomplish these ambitious goals?
Originally posted by D3ADSY
Originally posted by D3ADSY
Originally posted by D3ADSY
Originally posted by D3ADSY
Originally posted by D3ADSY
Originally posted by D3ADSY
By the above, you just highlighted the precise nature of fourth generation warfare, and which is why state armies' eventual frustration leads to the mentality of slaughtering civilians. As in Vietnam, it was similar where they had to "destroy the village in order to save it". Any sane person would see the twisted and idiotic nature of such policy, but that is what happens when you have no clearly defined enemy.
Originally posted by D3ADSY
Originally posted by D3ADSY
Your initial qualm was that somehow tactics are different, or the same amount of casualties have not been caused, therefore the two are incomparible. What reason is there to suggest that somehow this is a valid distinction and not anything arbitrary that you made up in order to make a point? The casualties inflicted by the Chechens focused on Russian soldiers, the primary focus of insurgencies in Iraq are civilians. So because the focus is different they are incomparible? You are being to ideological about this particular point. This is what led me to state that because the internal delicacies are different and have always been different as nothing historically is uniform, we are still dealing with the same concept and system of warfare, where we pit a non-state army against a state army. Now, you do not have to like this because to admit to this perhaps makes your point irrelevant, but that is not a point of dispute. By your logic we can always find some marginal differences in every war and use that as a driving wedge to somehow disqualify this and that and every other war as an exception to fourth generation war and pretty soon nothing qualifies. In reality, fourth generation war is not defined, ironically you and state armies and governments are obsessed with definitions and these clearly set and cut rules, which do not exist in fourth generation warfare, other than the fighting shifts from conventional armies to one of a non-state army against that of a state army.
Originally posted by D3ADSY
Originally posted by D3ADSY
All you have done in this discussion is create strawmans and have inserted things in my argument I have not made, you have never made any mention of "what claims" you want me to back up, when it has been you that has engaged in circular reasoning and begging the question, and several times in your own words only proving my point. I can sit here like you and whine and say "Oh I stated many things that have not gotten proper refuting". It sounds this is more about your ego than an actual discussion. When you are mature enough and ready to actually engage in a discussion as opposed to making it more personal as you go along and eventually making me the subject and the reason for the failure of state armies, you can come back and try at a discussion, until then, all your efforts are juvenile at best.
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