War in The Middle East

[D3ADSY]

Re: War in The Middle East

Greater Armenia is essential for our long term survival as a viable nation within the region.

In what way?

I also realize that we can only liberate the land through armed conflict. Geopolitics change all the time, I am sure we will one day be able to liberate western Armenia.

We could never do this by ourselves. But I know you are smarter than that, so who do you see alongside us? And after that, what happens to the people currently occupying these lands?

I agree, but what numbers do we have to fill those lands? That's where I see the ultimate problem.

My thoughts exactly.

The solution is either armed conflict, or do what the Mexicans are doing here in the American southwest.

"Modern" Turks in the big cities would have none of this, do you think a bunch of rural Turks and Kurds are going to let some Armenians move in next door? Or am I misinterpreting what the mexicans are doing in the southwest?

[Otto3]

Re: War in The Middle East

what are mexicans doing down there?

[Armenian]

Re: War in The Middle East

"Khaybar 1" rockets hit Israeli city of Affoula announcing the begining of the "beyond Haifa" phase

28/07/2006

The Islamic Resistance said in a statement Friday afternoon that its fighters fired a barrage of "Khaybar 1" rockets against the Israeli city of Affoula. It is the first time this city, that is located south of Haifa, is targeted thus announcing the phase of "beyond Haifa", as stipulated in the last speech of Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah. Israeli security sources quoted by Yediot Aharonot said that for the first time since the fighting began, five long-range missiles carrying a greater amount of explosives than the "Fajer" rockets of the type that has been fired so far.

According to Yediot, the missiles are equipped with more explosives, some 100 kg each, and can travel to longer distances than the rockets used until now. Security officials that arrived at the missiles' landing site said they have never encountered such missiles before. Firefighters in Afula are still trying to extinguish the fires that broke out as a result of the 'Khayba 1" rocket barrages. Light planes are assisting the firefighters. Yediot also said that three Israeli soldiers were injured by a Katyusha rocket that landed in northern occupied territories.

Shortly after the missiles landed in Afula, four rockets landed in and around Nahariya. Earlier, Islamic Resistance rockets hit the Israeli northern settlements of Akko, Safad and the settlements of Kiryat Shmona, Maalot, Naharya, Snir, Carmeil as well as the Israeli intelligence Delton base. Acording to the Yediot Aharonot internet site, a major fire broke out in the Rosh Pina and Western Galilee settlements, after Hezbollah rockets targeted the region. Israeli sources also said that two settlers were injured in Keryat Shmona and another ten in Maalot. Ten other settlers were injured in Hezbollah bombing, one seriously in Safed.

Islamic Resistance fighters were in the meantime achieving another victory when they forced Israeli occupation forces out of the Mas'oud hill in Maroun el-Ras towards the Israeli settlement of Avivim. In a statement, the Islamic Resistance said that the Israeli army admitted withdrawing from the hill following a surprise attack by resistance fighters. The Israeli army claimed that the withdrawal is "tactical." Security sources said that heavy clashes took place near Maroun el-Ras and Bint Jbeil. The Islamic Resistance had earlier announced that its fighters attacked ten Israeli tanks and directly hit them. http://www.almanar.com.lb/NewsSite/N...px?language=en

[Armenian]

Re: War in The Middle East

I agree, but what numbers do we have to fill those lands? That's where I see the ultimate problem. The solution is either armed conflict, or do what the Mexicans are doing here in the American southwest.

You are thinking in the short term. In the short term, perhaps during the next 50-100 years, our western lands need to remain within our collective memory and within our political formulations.

However, in the long term, I see Armenia prospering and growing within the next 50-100 years. We will need our western lands for agriculture, natural resources, population settlement and strategic/political value. Obviously, we also have a moral obligation to liberate the lands and we have an ideological/sentimental attachment to the lands as well.

With economic growth and stability within the Armenian Republic you will get a natural population growth. So, what better lands than your own to expand into. What's more, due to its rocky tarrain arable land in Armenia is scarce, 85% of the land can't be used for agriculture. The fertile Aratat valley is too stressed as is and Artsakh is not large enough. Also having a larger land mass also rises your political stategic value within the region within the eye of major powers. As long as you are a tiny and landlocked nation you are insignificant and the "big" boys will not take you seriously.

In addition, I also believe that sooner-or-later Turkey will fall apart, it has too many internal and external problems. If and when that day comes I would like us to be ready physically and spiritually to reclaim our western lands. The Kurds are another factor but they are the easiest to deal with.

I will post an essay I wrote about liberating Western Armenia later on today.

[Artsakh]

Re: War in The Middle East

In what way?

Is that like a serious question? You actually don't see the significance of Western Armenia to the well-being of the Armenian state?

We could never do this by ourselves. But I know you are smarter than that, so who do you see alongside us? And after that, what happens to the people currently occupying these lands?

No one but no one is going to liberate your lands for you. If you want it back, it will be at the cost of spilling blood. No one is going to spill their blood for you, understand that.

However, as in the past when the Russian army has entered Turkey, history just may repete itself, but this time around we have to be ready. Not only in terms of weaponary, but ideologically and spiritually. A soldier can be armed to the teeth, but without ideology and spirit, it will get its ass handed to him.

As far as "what happens to the people currently occupying these lands?", if you knew anything, then you would know that till the current day these lands, our lands in western armenian are still undeveloped and relatively empty of people.

[Anonymouse]

Re: War in The Middle East

"Modern" Turks in the big cities would have none of this, do you think a bunch of rural Turks and Kurds are going to let some Armenians move in next door? Or am I misinterpreting what the mexicans are doing in the southwest?

The Mexican population is expanding in the southwest and slowly and indirectly displacing everyone else.

[Artsakh]

Re: War in The Middle East

Originally Posted by Anonymouse
I agree, but what numbers do we have to fill those lands? That's where I see the ultimate problem.

I agree that the current Armenian Republic would not be able to effectively manage such a vast chunk of land as was envisioned in the Treaty of Sevres, HOWEVER, we certainly would manage and benefit greatly from the return of Kars and Ardahan- which legally are Armenian lands according to international law. We would benefit economically, and with the return of Mount Ararat, we would experience a spiritual revival.

But in the long run, the issue of "who will fill those lands" should not be a factor in our restoring authority over our lands. That logic is simply foul. Look at Mongolia, look at Turkmenistan--they encompass a huge land mass but their population is just a few million.

Furthermore, those lands which we speak of are still undeveloped and relatively empty of people--therefore, they can be just that under Armenian authority.

[Artsakh]

Re: War in The Middle East

The Mexican population is expanding in the southwest and slowly and indirectly displacing everyone else.

they even have their own schools that preach seperatism.

[Artsakh]

Re: War in The Middle East

Back to the topic:

Some what does everyone think, was the killing of 4 UN workers due to Israeli bombings intentional or "an accident"?

[Anonymouse]

Re: War in The Middle East

If anyone wants to read about the military side of the war on terror, of America in Iraq and Afghanistan and Israel now in Lebanon, I recommend this article which is very lucid, eye opening and as prescient as ever.

Morality and Fourth Generation War

by Michael S. Rozeff

Anyone who is anti-war will benefit from understanding the theory of war: why wars are fought, how they are fought, and how the peace is made and kept. The field manual of Fourth Generation war found here helps us understand many of the conflicts occurring around the world today and helps us glimpse the possible outcomes of these struggles. It applies to the war Israel is now fighting in Gaza and Lebanon. It sheds light on the difficulties that the American State and its soldiers face in fighting today in Iraq. Expect to find a document with many illustrations that explains how American soldiers should be trained to fight Fourth Generation war. But also expect a surprising emphasis on the moral level of war that connects directly to libertarian theory.

William S. Lind and experienced soldiers co-authored the Fourth Generation war field manual, which is a work in progress. He invites comment. Using the Fourth Generation model, Lind accurately assessed events in Iraq early on and predicted the current civil strife occurring there now. In his article of November 26, 2003, for example, he forecasted that "non-state forces will come to dominate" in both Iraq and Afghanistan because of basic American blunders. In his words: "In Iraq, the two fatal early errors were outlawing the Baath Party and disbanding the Iraqi army. Outlawing the Baath deprived the Sunni community of its only political vehicle, which meant it had no choice but to fight us. Disbanding the Iraqi army left us with no native force that could maintain order, and also provided the resistance with a large pool of armed and trained fighters." Lind has continued with many insightful articles that are archived on LRC.

The rudiments

Fourth generation wars are currently defined as wars fought by non-state forces against states. (I am not sure what wars fought by non-state forces against each other are called.) The states have greater resources if one simply counts armed forces, matériel, and money. The non-state forces are weaker, yet they can win as Fidel Castro showed in Cuba. They tend to be guerillas and use guerilla tactics, so that Fourth Generation warfare is virtually guerilla warfare.

Guerilla warfare is not terrorism. "Terrorism is an enemy special operation, a single tactical action designed to have direct operational or strategic effect. Because targets that have such direct operational or strategic effect are few and are usually well-protected, terrorism normally plays a minor role in Fourth Generation conflicts – though when it does occur the effects can be wide-ranging."

Most of the manual, through case study examples, advises Marine (or Army) forces how to integrate or interact with the local population in order not to drive them into the arms of the enemy and in order to gain effectiveness against the enemy. For example, the manual counsels against the instinct to escalate force. It advises de-escalation, being very patient, talking with locals and opponents, and not wanting to fight. It talks of withdrawing at times and not fighting every fight, not killing innocent people, and using cash for a host of issues including blood money. The recommended soldierly behaviors are many quantum leaps beyond giving chocolate bars to children or cigarettes to adults.

The moral level

Libertarians will find interesting the pervasive emphasis on the moral element of war as contrasted with the physical and mental levels. The word "moral" appears almost 50 times. The moral level of war is described as the most powerful level, the decisive level, the dominant level, and the all-important level. Battles can be won like leveling Fallujah or creating buffer zones in Lebanon while being a disaster at the moral level and thence a disaster in terms of the war’s ultimate outcome.

The term "moral" has several meanings in the manual. It does not here mean rejecting an entire war as illegitimate, unjust or immoral. It can’t because the manual is designed to nurture an armed force that supports its State. One thing it means is following the non-aggression axiom or respecting the legitimate rights of the population and the Marines’ opponents, including when they are taken prisoner. This includes but goes beyond the Geneva Convention. The authors write: "In terms of ordinary, day-to-day actions, there is a Golden Rule for winning at the moral level, and it is this: Don’t do anything to someone else that, if it were done to you, would make you fight."

Another thing that moral means in the manual is respecting the population as persons. This rule goes beyond the non-aggression axiom. It means soldiers not acting as if they are superior. It means Marines responding to the values of the local culture. If American bases replicate American living standards and locals are not allowed on them except in service roles or if soldiers do not respect traditional values of pride and honor or if soldiers inadvertently insult local people, all these things contribute to losing at the moral level.

It is gratifying to find support for basic libertarian doctrine in a manual that distills the accumulated wisdom, drawn from the experiences of fighting men, of what works and what does not work in wars that directly involve populations. This confirms the universality and practicality of rights embodied in the non-aggression axiom. It confirms that people everywhere hold common ideas of justice and fairness that soldiers (and others) cannot violate without negative consequences.

Although the manual suggests that warfare is reverting to pre-1648 modes, in some respects it calls for movement away from unlimited warfare and a return to the rules of eighteenth century war as discussed in Guglielmo Ferrero’s Peace and War. For example, it calls for limited engagement of armed forces and occupying a foreign area only as a last resort. It recommends not destroying or disbanding the armed forces of the enemy State, not humiliating the enemy, and treating them with the honors of war. The manual recommends not using the maximum of force and engaging the enemy in more lightly armed ways.

The moral and the practical

There are very good practical reasons for all of the manual’s advice and for limiting war, the main one being that it helps to win at relatively low cost and to keep the subsequent peace. Yet at the same time, the recommendations are more consistent with libertarian theory of war and peace (see Rothbard) than existing practices. One cannot expect a libertarian condemnation of war in a war field manual, but the movement toward a lower, more humane, and more sensible level of war is a big plus.

Sound moral rules that are consistent with human nature are at the same time practical rules that enhance value creation. This holds in war as well as in peace.

Many of the manual’s examples that stress moral behavior for practical reasons of not alienating the population and turning them into fighters against Marines are also examples of rights violations. Killing and maiming innocent civilians are prime examples. Breaking into homes, terrifying people, and abusing or torturing prisoners are all rights violations.

The American mistakes of disbanding the Baath Party and Iraqi Army had practical consequences that Lind clearly pointed out. At the same time, I will stretch a point by suggesting that there were some moral problems as well. Imagine that an enemy conquered General Motors Corporation, broke it up, outlawed it, and all the employees lost their jobs. Employees do not have rights in their jobs in a free market, but an outsider who comes in and coercively breaks the agreements between them and their employer is violating rights and creating moral chaos. Neither all Iraqi soldiers nor the whole Sunni bureaucracy were guilty or equally guilty of crimes that required the punishments of losing their livelihoods. This meant a lot to them and they were performing services for the State. Of course, the Iraqi State and Sunni control over it were gone, but America then set about rebuilding a new one. I judge matters in that context. As usual, America did not create a free market. It set about hiring and retraining new bureaucratic workers and policemen to do much that was earlier done by those who had been fired. It relied on Shiites. The criteria it used are murky. It seems to have discriminated against Sunnis or those who had police or military experience. It then forcefully integrated communities by using Shiites to police Sunnis. This could do nothing but ignite strife and provide opportunities for Shiites to take revenge against Sunnis. To this day, many bombings are directed at American-trained police and many killings are attributed to various death squads. As at home, the American State went for social engineering, acted immorally, and failed to envision the consequences of its acts.

There were basically three paths that America could have followed in Iraq once it had made the mistake of conquering the country: break up the old State and reconstitute it, retain the old State, or retain the old State but shrink it or subdivide it while withdrawing as quickly as possible. The worst course, which America chose, was to break up the old State and reconstitute it. The Fourth Generation manual strongly suggests preserving enemy States which is the second path. This indeed is preferable to path one which has led to civil war. The third path, however, is best of all, although it is far from easy. Free markets, property rights, and economic prosperity are key elements in overcoming sectarian violence because they give the prospect of large material gains that outweigh the nonpecuniary gains of revenge or bloodshed. They change the game from a zero-sum game to a positive return game. De-nationalizing the oil industry and distributing shares to all Iraqis would have jump-started this process. Instead, Americans engaged in national economic planning with large contracts going to American companies.

Weakness and moral strength

One theme of the manual is there is power in weakness and that a strong force loses at the moral level when it bullies a weak movement. "We also see the power of weakness. In Fourth Generation warfare, the weak often have more power than the strong. One of the first people to employ the power of weakness was Mahatma Gandhi. Gandhi’s insistence on non-violent tactics to defeat the British in India was and continues to be a classic strategy of Fourth Generation war. Once the British responded to Indian independence gatherings and rallies with violence, they immediately lost the moral war."

The manual needs to clarify the dictum of power in weakness. It is not always so. It depends on the moral stature of the weak. Gandhi gained this stature by non-violent tactics and by personal abnegation. Other things being equal, Al-Qaeda (which is weak) loses at the moral level when it bombs and indiscriminately kills innocent civilians, whether they are voters are not. With all things not equal, Al-Qaeda’s strategy and tactics take calculated risks. While losing temporarily at the moral level, they may gain strategically if they unnerve their opponents and drive them into bad or immoral actions of their own. By the same token, strong forces that act morally and against clear injustices against them do not lose at the moral level. They lose if they overdo matters or harm innocent people while attempting to punish their enemies. In other words, what matters are violations of the non-aggression axiom and not simply weakness and strength per se.

....

The rest of the article can be read at the link below.

http://www.lewrockwell.com/rozeff/rozeff83.html