Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

[TomServo]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

If you have access to a major academic database, the article can be found in the journal Iran and the Caucasus (2009).

No need. The article can be read here.

Btw, Asatrian's son, Mushegh, is also a scholar specializing in early Islamic (Shi'a) religious and intellectual history. He is a Yale graduate and his dissertation was entitled "Heresy and Rationalism in Early Islam: The Origins and Evolution of the Mufaḍḍal-tradition." I have no idea what that is, but good for him!

[Vrej1915]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

Land matters: Emergence of Kurdistan likely to have bearings on historical Armenian territories



By Naira Hayrumyan
ArmeniaNow correspondent
The establishment of an independent Kurdish state, or perhaps an ethnic supranational entity, is apparently becoming a reality. Notably, this entity is likely to be established also on some of the historical Armenian lands in what is known as Western Armenia (part of modern-day Turkey) today. In that case, the descendants of Armenians massacred and dispossessed during the years of the genocide back in 1915 may face another fact by 2015 – their historical homeland will be officially proclaimed Kurdistan. After the establishment of Iraqi Kurdistan, which has gained nearly a state status, Kurdish movements are also expected to prevail in Syria and Turkey. A few days ago United States Secretary of State John Kerry spoke to the president of the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, Massoud Barzani, about the ongoing crisis. At the same time, the national coalition of opposition and revolutionary forces of Syria elected ethnic Kurd Ghassan Hitto head of the provisional government in the territory of the country which is now controlled by the opposition, reports Anadolu news agency. Hitto is the second Kurdish oppositionist after the head of the Syrian National Council Abdulbasid Seid to have taken a top position in the ranks of the Syrian opposition. And if the fight against the Assad regime in Syria ends in favor of the opposition, the Kurds may insist on a division of the state or at least a confederation. Meanwhile, in Turkey, the government is trying to reroute a growing Kurdish movement into the channel of so-called ‘constructivism’. Kurds are building up resistance, and statements are already being made about a confederation and changes in the Turkish Constitution, repealing Article 66, which says that all citizens of Turkey are Turks. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, apparently worried over such developments, has established ties with leader of the Kurdish national liberation movement Abdullah Ocalan, who is serving a life sentence in a Turkish jail. Mixed reports have been made about agreements reached between the two parties. While Turkish media say Ocalan has urged his supporters to leave the territory of Turkey and go to Iraq or Syria, the Kurds deny the existence of any agreements. The Kurds themselves are demanding the release of arrested compatriots, including Ocalan. A Kurdistan Workers Party leader has called for a push for Ocalan’s release during the current celebration of Nowruz (Persian New Year), as well as a campaign for a constitutional status for Kurds in Turkey. (There is a small Kurdish community in Armenia that also regularly stages peaceful protests in Yerevan against oppression of ethnic kin in Turkey or elsewhere in the Middle East). Still a few years ago several American think tanks published a map, according to which an independent state of Kurdistan will be established on parts of the territories that belong to modern Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Remarkably, in accordance with the same map a part of Western Armenia is joined to the Republic of Armenia. And now there is some expert opinion that soon the heirs of the victims of the Armenian Genocide will have to negotiate on restitution and financial compensation for the genocide and demarcation of the border not with Turks, but rather with Kurds.

Source URL: http://www.armenianow.com/commentary...urkey_genocide

[Vahram]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

Nothing is finished!

[Vrej1915]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

Turkey's Ultra-Nationalists Playing With Fire

Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli addresses his supporters during an election rally in Istanbul, May 29, 2011. (photo by REUTERS/Osman Orsal )

Addressing a rally of supporters in Bursa on March 23, Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), was met with chants of “Tell us to strike and we will strike! Tell us to die and we will die!” While such bloodcurdling chants are not uncommon at Turkish ultra-nationalist rallies, it was Bahçeli’s response that caused the uproar in Turkey. “Don’t worry, the time will come for that, too,” Bahçeli bellowed back at the crowd, sending shivers down the spines of those who remember the bad old days before 1980.
That was a time when the group associated with the MHP called “Ülkücüler” (“The Idealists”), who are also known widely as the “Grey Wolves,” were implicated in many murders against their opponents, who at the time were predominantly left-wing and liberal activists and intellectuals.
Mehmet Ali Ağca, who murdered Abdi Ipekçi, the liberal editor of daily Milliyet, in February 1979, and gained international notoriety after he tried to kill Pope John Paul II in May 1981, was also a member of the group. The military coup on Sept. 12, 1980, ended violence by this group to a great extent, as it did with violence by armed ultra-left wing groups.
Bahçeli, who took over the MHP in July 1997, following the death of its legendary leader Alparsalan Türkeş, had in fact been trying to change the image of the party into a more peaceful one free of the gun. The general outlook of MHP members nevertheless remains ultra-nationalistic, and its natural enemies still include left wingers, pro-Western liberals, Kurds, Armenians and Greeks.
Not surprisingly, the party is also against Turkey’s EU membership prospects, but in an effort not to appear a spoiler in terms of a drive that has been ongoing for nearly half a century, it has formulated a stance where is says it supports this membership as long as it is provided in an “honorable” manner. What this means is that EU membership must not water down the “Turkish” character of the state through criteria having to do with human rights and advanced democracy, which would also increase the rights of minorities. Bahçeli and his party, nevertheless, face a serious problem today.
The MHP and its supporters may be in near-panic over the process with the PKK, as well as the various openings initiated by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) for the Kurds and other minorities. But they face a prime minister in Erdogan who brought three successive election victories for the AKP.
Put another way, Bahçeli and the MHP are confronted with a party that garnered nearly one out of every two votes cast in the June 2011 general elections, while the MHP barely managed to get 13 percent of the vote, which is only three points above the nationwide electoral barrier that parties have to pass to enter Parliament.
What compounds the dilemma for Bahçeli and the MHP is the fact that it cannot point to the AKP as a party that is “fed from the outside by Turkey’s enemies” — its classic argument against leftists and pro-Western liberals. Instead, it faces an AKP whose grassroots strength comes from the support of the conservative and religious masses in Anatolia, where it has achieved much deeper political penetration among ordinary people than the MHP can ever hope to.
Analysts worry that the MHP’s helplessness in trying to prevent developments that Turkish ultra-nationalists vehemently oppose may prompt its supporters to resort to right-wing terrorism — to achieve by means of violence what is not possible to achieve politically through democratic channels.
The MHP’s grassroots support may not be very much when compared to the AKP, or even the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), which got 26 percent of the vote in June 2011. But experience has shown that maverick elements associated with the party can cause serious problems for Turkey.
Neither do these elements have to be officially registered members of the MHP, or of the “Idealists,” in order to openly sympathize with their cause. A case in point is Ogün Samast, the young killer of the Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, and those who egged him on to commit this murder in Istanbul in January 2007.
The leaking to the media of a photograph of Samast, within hours of his arrests, holding a Turkish flag while flanked by two admiring policemen, also showed the kind of penetration ultra-nationalists have within the state apparatus. As matters stand the Dink murder case has turned into a sham as a result of these elements that have also penetrated the judiciary.
Erdogan and AKP officials were of course quick to respond angrily to Bahçeli’s chilling Bursa remarks, which they generally termed “dangerous” and “irresponsible.” “There is no striking or killing in our book,” Erdogan said later, adding “We have come to give life,” and going on to castigate the MHP leader.
Others worried that there could be those who consider Bahçeli’s remarks as some kind of a signal to go ahead and attack people considered to be the internal enemies of Turkey. Cengiz Çandar, a prominent Turkish journalist and contributor to Al Monitor, is one of those expressing such concerns.
“Bahçeli has presented ‘striking and killing,’ in other words the aim of stopping the process (with the PKK), as a project that can be brought to life on his instructions ‘when the time comes.’ This brings up the threat of bloody inter-communal conflict in Turkey,” Çandar wrote in his column in daily Radikal.
The general consensus outside MHP circles is that Bahçeli is playing with fire, especially given the number of unemployed Turkish youths of the Ogün Samast mold, who are impressionable and looking for a mission to give meaning to their otherwise drab lives.
Bahçeli however remains defiant in the face of harsh criticism. He told his Parliamentary Group earlier this week that he used those words during the Bursa meeting “with determination,” and went on to remark:
“Today I stand behind my words till the very end. Everyone should know that when the place and the time come it will definitely be seen and fully understood what we will do, and what we are prepared to consider.”
Many see this as rabble-rousing and incitement to violence by an elected politician, and are worried because of the past history of the MHP and its supporters. But Bahçeli is faced with another dilemma here. Opinion polls indicate that wary as many may be about aspects of the current peace process with the PKK, there is still nearly 60 percent support for the government as it tries to end 30 years of terrorism by this group.
In many ways, Erdogan is at the stage that Tony Blair was in 1998 in relation to ending the terror campaign of the IRA. The bottom line is that most Turks want an end to PKK violence, and are prepared to give Erdogan and his government the necessary leeway for this.
Should Bahçeli and his party trigger right-wing terrorism at a time when efforts are continuing to achieve this, it could rebound on them politically, given that they have lots of anger but no answers to a very real problem. Whatever the case may turn out to be, one thing is certain. Bahçeli and the MHP are indeed playing with fire at a highly sensitive moment for Turkey.
Semih İdiz is a contributing writer for Al-Monitor’s Turkey Pulse. A journalist who has been covering diplomacy and foreign policy issues for major Turkish newspapers for 30 years, his opinion pieces can be followed in the English-language Hurriyet Daily News. He can also be read in Taraf.


Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/orig...#ixzz2OwA0x9Es

[Vrej1915]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

Geopolitical Shifts in Mideast
Will Benefit Kurds


By: Jihad el-Zein Translated from An-Nahar (Lebanon).
اقرا المقال الأصلي باللغة العربية
No matter where the rains fall in our region these days, the bloom is always Kurdish. In the Kurds’ view, be they elites or commoners, this political era is theirs — an era that would see the redressing of 90 years of injustices perpetrated against them since after the First World War. Here, then, is the Kurdish view of the situation in the region on this new-year celebration of Nowruz today.


In the last decade, the first truly independent Kurdish state in modern times was established under the formula of a “federal region” within the Iraqi state. Yet, if it weren’t for the region’s share of the central government’s oil, nothing would remain of this formula, except nominal ties marred by a relation of daily confrontations.
During the two years since the Syrian revolution erupted, Syrian Kurds in the extreme north and northeastern parts of the country have enjoyed self-rule in their areas, which extend discontinuously over hundreds of kilometers from Afrin to al-Qamishli along the border with Turkey. The term "Western Kurdistan" was even created during the Syrian revolution to describe these regions, which possess historical roots dissimilar to those of Kurdish areas in Northern Iraq. This is because a large portion of their inhabitants came from Turkey and took refuge there after World War I to escape the Kurdish-Turkish clashes that erupted in the first decade following the establishment of Kamal Ataturk’s republic.
Throughout the revolution, and despite the fact that control over Kurdish areas fell mostly to the Democratic Union Party — which does not agree, and even clashes, with the Free Syrian Army militias, especially the Islamic fundamentalist factions among them — the Syrian revolutionary leadership committees established abroad were always keen to give precedence to Kurdish individuals. This led to the appointment of Abdulbaset Sieda as head of the Syrian National Council and then Ghassan Hitto as head of the interim government for the liberated areas. It is also well known that many disagreements erupted within the opposition’s institutions between Arabs and Kurds concerning the future identity of Syria and its regime.
But the happiest development, which might turn out to be the most important event for Kurds in the region, is the ongoing transformation in the relationship between the leader of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), the imprisoned Abdullah Ocalan, and the ruling Justice and Development Party in Turkey, headed by Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Information in the Turkish press confirms that an agreement has been reached between Ocalan and Ankara, following negotiations started by members of the Kurdish bloc in Turkey’s parliament with officials from the country’s intelligence services, concerning a series of unprecedented steps to establish peace between the two sides, especially in southeastern Turkey. The whole of Turkey is now waiting for Ocalan to address his party’s fighters, instructing them to withdraw beyond Turkey’s borders (to the Kandil Mountains in Northern Iraq) on the occasion of the Kurdish Nowruz celebration on March 21, in return for Ankara’s consent to a series of steps that would strengthen the democratic gains achieved by Turkish Kurds on the political and cultural fronts. This would hinge on the condition that the PKK abandons its secessionist agenda.
This bold step by Erdogan would undoubtedly not have occurred — or hastened — had the situation in Syria not changed two years ago. It is true that Kurdish political and military pressure inside Turkey has a long history. It is also true that Erdogan strives to amend the constitution and instill a presidential system of governance with him as president. However, the situation that has arisen on the Turkish-Syrian border after March 17, 2011, pushed Erdogan, after much hesitation, into going further and implementing bolder steps in his negotiations with Ocalan. For Erdogan, two years ago, had gone so far as to adopt a hardline discourse against the armed Kurdish insurrection, similar to that espoused by extremist Turkish nationals against any form of recognition of a distinctive Kurdish political identity in Turkey.
The Syrian crisis has revealed, and the Turkish leader has discovered, that Turkey’s border with Syria — from Aleppo’s countryside to al-Qamishli (approximately 500 kilometers long) — is, in large part, Kurdish.
The practical experience gained on the ground during the last two years, and Erdogan’s orders to Turkish intelligence services to systematically take charge of the border region with Syria and help Syrian opposition forces spread their control over those regions or even “surrender” them to the opposition on the Syrian side, have made the Turkish president realize that his support of the Syrian revolution against the regime has given Turkish Kurds — and the PKK specifically — a source of backing and a demographic, political and military depth that he had not expected.
This means that Turkey, as it entered into this wide-ranging international and regional operation to curb Iranian influence over Damascus, not only found itself suddenly at loggerheads with the Russians and their decision to back the Syrian regime, but was also surprised by the negative developments taking place on its border. Ankara was worried about the growing possibility that a Western Kurdistan be established, affording the PKK fighters a safe haven at a time when Turkey sought to establish a buffer zone on its northern border with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. These developments manifested themselves through a dangerous escalation of armed Kurdish attacks inside Turkey, despite the fact that, in theory at least, the guerillas originated in Northern Iraq.
Through experience, Erdogan understood that preventing his policies toward Syria from mutating into a strategic burden for Turkey — in this, its most worrisome of internal affairs — requires that unprecedented initiatives be undertaken in his negotiations with prisoner Ocalan.
Turkey still awaits the results of this negotiating experiment between its strong government and the Kurds, which echoes the courageous decision that former French president Charles De Gaulle took to negotiate with the Algerian National Liberation Front after 1958. These negotiations led to very difficult times internally for France, culminating in a series of attempted coups d’état by extremist French colonial officers who were backed by a portion of French society unable to digest the idea of Algerian independence.
The fundamental difference in the Turkish case is that the reconciliation project completely precludes any secessionist proclivities by the Kurds, despite the fact that it remains unclear what agreements were reached pertaining to the manner by which the Turkish state’s Kurdish areas would be ruled.
The agreement is still in its infancy, yet its first victims were the female Kurdish leaders in Paris a short while ago. Nationalist Turkish factions, represented in parliament and the (politically impotent) army, are still observing the events unfold, and we still don’t have any indications as to the depth of the agreement. Thus, we cannot anticipate any final reactions to it; except to say that they range from caution (the Republican People’s Party) to rejection among hardline nationalists (the Nationalist Movement Party).
Turkey’s labor pains just started, but current events seem to indicate that the ensuing birth will be to the Kurds’ liking and will fulfill the nationalist interests that they aspire to.
As a result, the Kurdish elite finds itself needing to contend with the following issues:
The Kurds’ critics could claim that Kurdish aspirations can only be fulfilled at the expense of the “disintegration” of other nations, specifically Iraq and Syria. This means that, since their inception in 1920, Kurdish nationalist movements have always been reliant upon the need to dismantle the region’s countries.
In response, the Kurds could say that it was no accident that their political and economic rise occurred in the era of democratic changes in the Arab world, which means that the oppressive ruling regimes were responsible for Arab repression against them.
Both views are correct! Congratulations to the Kurds and Iranians on the occasion of Nowruz today, and condolences — on Mother’s Day — to all the grieving mothers of the victims of this upswell in nationalist, democratic, Arab, Kurdish, Turkish and Iranian sentiments.
The region has long exploited the Kurds. Now, their time has come to return the favor.


Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/poli...#ixzz2OwAl06qz

[Vrej1915]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

Why Erdogan Wants Peace With the PKK

The End of An Insurgency


Article Summary: Last week, Abdullah Ocalan, the jailed leader of the
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), declared a cease-fire in his party's
nearly three-decade-long struggle with the Turkish state. His
announcement came at an opportune time, not least because Turkish
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan seems ready to pursue peace with
the Kurds as a way to consolidate his own power. Still, regional
developments might be a stumbling block around which neither party can
maneuver.

Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2013

By F. Stephen Larrabee

Last week, Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party
(PKK), declared a cease-fire in his party's nearly three-decade-long
struggle with the Turkish state. Before then, the insurgency -- which
had claimed some 40,000 lives -- had seemed intractable. Ankara's
attempts to put it down had only inflamed Kurdish nationalism and made
the PKK stronger. But with Ocalan now apparently ready to try to
resolve differences peacefully, the prospects that the uprising will
come to an end have improved.

Ocalan's announcement came at an opportune time. Several factors had
already made the moment ripe for peace. First, the ruling Justice and
Development Party (AKP) and the broader Turkish public had come to
recognize that trying to end the insurgency with force was a dead end
and that the government would have to make a more determined effort to
find a political solution to the Kurdish conflict.

Second, the Kurdish issue is closely linked to Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan's political ambitions. Under AKP bylaws, Erdogan cannot
run for another term as prime minister when his second term ends next
year. Instead, he is widely expected to try to run for president. If
he wins, he will be the first popularly elected president in Turkish
history, capping his political career and giving him the chance to
shape Turkish politics until 2023, the hundredth anniversary of the
founding of the Turkish Republic.

The one problem is that, currently, the presidency is largely a
ceremonial post. Erdogan has thus signaled his intention to amend the
Turkish constitution to give the president stronger executive powers
and to diminish the authority of the prime minister. The AKP lacks the
votes in parliament to make such changes to the constitution; to do
so, it needs the support of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party
(BDP), which has 33 seats in parliament. A peace accord with the PKK
and promises to revise the constitution to expand Kurdish cultural
rights and to broaden the definition of Turkish citizenship would help
Erdogan's government secure the BDP's allegiance. In effect, to build
the presidency he wants, Erdogan will need to strike a grand bargain
with the Kurds. However, this prospect worries many Turks, who believe
that a new constitution along these lines would concentrate too much
power in the hands of one man and open the way to greater
authoritarianism.

The final factor that has improved the prospects for peace is a
rethinking in AKP circles of Ocalan's role in any attempt to bring the
PKK insurgency to a close. In November 2012, Ocalan helped end a
67-day hunger strike of more than 600 Kurds. His personal intervention
demonstrated his influence and the necessity of involving him directly
in any peace plan. It was thus not surprising when, a month after
Ocalan's mediation, Erdogan announced the opening of exploratory talks
with Ocalan aimed at ending the PKK insurgency. On the Turkish side,
Hakan Fidan, head of Turkey's National Intelligence Organization and a
close confidant of Erdogan's, is leading the discussions. He and
Ocalan have focused on developing a strategic road map for a peace
accord.

Of course, peace is still far from a done deal. Several issues could
derail an accord. For one, the question of amnesty could pose
difficulties. Many Kurdish groups -- and Ocalan himself -- insist that
PKK fighters must be granted amnesty as part of any
agreement. However, much of the Turkish population considers the PKK
fighters terrorists and strongly opposes letting them walk.

In addition, Ocalan might want peace and he might have great sway
within the Turkish PKK, but the organization is no longer his baby. It
has become a transnational movement with networks and operations
across the region. Not all of them are under his control. Even if
Ocalan can persuade large segments of the PKK to support a peace
agreement, some hardcore nationalist groups might still be unwilling
to lay down their arms. After all, many PKK commanders see no future
for themselves outside of the armed struggle.

Regional developments have also complicated the peace talks. In Syria,
the withdrawal of Syrian government forces from five Kurdish-dominated
towns along the Syrian-Turkish border in July 2012 created a political
vacuum that the Democratic Union Party (PYD) -- which has close ties
to the PKK -- rushed to fill. The speed and ease with which the PYD
was able to establish control raised Turkish suspicions that Assad
might have orchestrated the withdrawal to strengthen the PKK at the
expense of Turkey and the Sunni-dominated Syrian opposition. Now
Turkish officials worry that the PYD-held areas could become a base
for PKK attacks against Turkish territory and security forces. Turkey
has threatened to intervene militarily if such attacks take place,
raising the chance that any scuffle could quickly expand.

In Iran, as in Turkey, the government has faced a Kurdish
insurgency. The movement there is led by the Free Life Party of
Kurdistan (PJAK), an offshoot of the PKK. On occasion, Turkey and Iran
used to coordinate efforts and share intelligence to combat PKK and
PJAK attacks. However, the two countries' relationship has grown
strained over Syria, leading to a sharp reduction in
cooperation. That, in turn, has weakened Turkey's ability to deter PKK
attacks. Moreover, according to Turkish officials, Iran has started
clandestinely supporting the PKK. Iran has little interest in the PKK
insurgency coming to an end, since that would eliminate one of
Tehran's main levers for putting pressure on Turkey.


F. STEPHEN LARRABEE holds the Distinguished Chair in European Security
at the RAND Corporation.

[Vahram]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

I don't think this is going to work at all. Considering that the Kurds in Sooria have joined with Asad!

[Vrej1915]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

IT WAS THE KURDS THEMSELVES WHO DID NOT ASK FOR A KURDISH STATE: TURKISH HISTORIAN

http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid=761709E0-A6BC-11E2-A3F0F6327207157C

Tuesday, April 16, 21:36

It was the Kurds themselves who did not ask for a Kurdish state, says
Professor Dogu Ergil, one of the most renowned political sociologists
from Turkey.

Ergil explains that the Kurds "cooperated" with the Turks against
the Armenians to deport them and seized the goods and property left
behind by the Armenians. He says that the Treaty of Lausanne was
crafted with the consent of the Kurds. "They did not want a Kurdish
state for several reasons. But the primary reason was the ambition
of some to create a separate Armenia in the same lands. The Kurds
wanted to prevent this from happening," says Ergil.

Zaman quotes the Turkish professor as saying that the Kurds played
an extensive role in the expulsion of Armenians from Turkey and the
appropriation of their properties.

"Kurds and Armenians used to live together in East Anatolia. They
cooperated with Turkish official circles in the deportation of
Armenians and played a primary role in the redistribution of the
property and land of the deported Armenians. Their return would mean
that everything should be restored and reversed. They converted their
children to Islam and took them into Kurdish families. And, of course,
there was no Turkism back then; there was a state approach based on
an understanding of Islam. This was pretty understandable for the
Kurds. They have lived like this for centuries. No room was left for
Kurdishness when Turkishness in a political sense was invented because
this place was declared as being the land of the Turks," says Ergil.

[bell-the-cat]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

IT WAS THE KURDS THEMSELVES WHO DID NOT ASK FOR A KURDISH STATE: TURKISH HISTORIAN

http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid=761709E0-A6BC-11E2-A3F0F6327207157C

Tuesday, April 16, 21:36

It was the Kurds themselves who did not ask for a Kurdish state, says
Professor Dogu Ergil, one of the most renowned political sociologists
from Turkey.

Ergil explains that the Kurds "cooperated" with the Turks against
the Armenians to deport them and seized the goods and property left
behind by the Armenians. He says that the Treaty of Lausanne was
crafted with the consent of the Kurds. "They did not want a Kurdish
state for several reasons. But the primary reason was the ambition
of some to create a separate Armenia in the same lands. The Kurds
wanted to prevent this from happening," says Ergil.

Zaman quotes the Turkish professor as saying that the Kurds played
an extensive role in the expulsion of Armenians from Turkey and the
appropriation of their properties.

"Kurds and Armenians used to live together in East Anatolia. They
cooperated with Turkish official circles in the deportation of
Armenians and played a primary role in the redistribution of the
property and land of the deported Armenians. Their return would mean
that everything should be restored and reversed. They converted their
children to Islam and took them into Kurdish families. And, of course,
there was no Turkism back then; there was a state approach based on
an understanding of Islam. This was pretty understandable for the
Kurds. They have lived like this for centuries.

The primary reason that the Kurds did not want a state of their own was because they did not see themselves as a nation. They saw themselves as Muslims. The primary reason they did not want to be inside an Armenian state was because they were Muslims and Armenians were not.

Only when the Turks moved away from their primary identity as being Muslims towards a new primary identity of being Turks did the Kurds slowly start to think of themselves as Kurds. And it took a long time. even in the mid 1920s, the Kurds in Iraq were in an armed uprising because they wanted to be reincorporated into Turkey, and were killing Christians with the same fevour as they did during WW1.

[TomServo]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

Does anyone know anything about the Kurds of Azerbaijan? The 2009 Azerbaijan census says there's just over 6,000 Kurds in the country. This figure is obviously pretty low but that might be because the Shia Kurds (who form the majority, I think) are being counted as Azeri.