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Regional geopolitics

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  • Vrej1915

    November 29, 2020

    Israelis may justify their relationship with Azerbaijan in realpolitik consideration: In its crudest terms, it is a relationship based on a weapons-for-energy calculation. Jerusalem sold Baku billions of dollars’ worth of top-shelf military equipment, and Israel received almost half of its oil needs from Azerbaijan. The long-term detriment to ties may soon surpass any short-term gains, however.

    by Michael Rubin
    STEPANAKERT, NAGORNO-KARABAKH—Armenia’s defeat in the 45-day Nagorno-Karabakh War was largely the result of its forfeiting dominance over the skies. Armenia does not have Azerbaijan’s vast oil wealth. Its economy remains strangled by a Turkish and Azerbaijani land blockade. That economic reality influenced Armenia’s military strategy to focus on parity with Azerbaijan’s ground forces. Azerbaijan’s air force, after all, both small and equipped with legacy Soviet Sukhoi-25s, MiG-21s and MiG-24s. Nagorno-Karabakh’s topography, meanwhile, resembles Switzerland. Even with smaller ground forces, the Armenians believed they could hold the higher ground. It was a fatal miscalculation. Not only did Azerbaijan augment its air force with Turkish F-16s, but its purchase and use of dozens of Israeli kamikaze and surveillance drones tipped the balance of the war against Armenia.

    Israelis may justify their relationship with Azerbaijan in realpolitik consideration: In its crudest terms, it is a relationship based on a weapons-for-energy calculation. Jerusalem sold Baku billions of dollars’ worth of top-shelf military equipment, and Israel received almost half of its oil needs from Azerbaijan. The long-term detriment to ties may soon surpass any short-term gains, however.

    Many Armenians—and ordinary outside observers—focus on the moral argument: The victims of one Holocaust not only turning a blind eye toward but also selling weapons to the potential perpetrators of another. That the Azeris (and Turkish Special Forces) started the war almost one hundred years to the day after Turks invaded the newly-independent Republic of Armenia against the backdrop of the Armenian Genocide colored Armenians’ understanding of the war. President Reuven Rivlin’s assurances to his Armenian counterpart Armen Sarkissian that Israel’s military trade was “not aimed against any side” further rang hollow given the rapid delivery of arms in the days prior to and perhaps during the conflict. Realists in Israel and elsewhere might dismiss moral arguments given the immediacy of other interests but, in the case of Israel’s Azerbaijan involvement, cynical short-termism will come at a high price.

    Consider Israel’s own border considerations: The need for “defensible borders” has, for nearly a half-century, been among Israel’s top priorities in any peace settlement. The late Yigal Allon was a founder of the Palmach, the pre-independence Jewish special forces, and his subsequent political career included eight years as deputy prime minister and three years as minister of foreign affairs. In 1976, he wrote a Foreign Affairs article entitled “Israel: The Case for Defensible Borders” which articulated Israeli fears and shaped its understanding of how land-for-peace might develop. Dore Gold, an academic who advised both prime ministers Ariel Sharon and Benjamin Netanyahu, and Israeli political and military veterans associated with his Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, have authored several reports on defensible borders as a critical need for viable peace.

    Armenia has long made similar security calculations to Israel: The districts which separate Armenia from Nagorno-Karabakh are crucial to the security of both. At issue is not only the high ground and communication links, but the Kelbajar [Qarvachar] district which the Russia- and Turkey-imposed ceasefire agreement awarded to Azerbaijan is also the source of 85 percent of the entire Republic of Armenia’s water supply. Not only does Azerbaijan now have the power to cut-off Armenia’s water supply, but Armenians officials worry that Azerbaijan or the radical Syrian Arab Islamists whom they employed as mercenaries, could simply dump toxic or radioactive waste into the stream and poison Lake Sevan which serves as Armenia’s main reservoir. Israel, of course, has previously raised water security issues with regard to the Sea of Galilee and the Golan Heights. Now, however, the precedents it has established by backing Azerbaijan against Armenia so that Baku could impose a solution that ignores defensible borders and water security undercut Israel’s future negotiating position. Azerbaijan may happily have purchased Israel’s drones, but the cost to Israel’s long-term security is far greater than Israelis realize.

    Nor is it clear that the peace-keeping lines will work. The Russian peacekeepers I encountered both in Stepanakert and in the Kelbajar district were professional. They were friendly toward locals. They let children sit on top of their BTRs, drank vodka with older residents in order to build rapport, and systematically reached out to NGO, both Western and local, in order to establish mechanisms to coordinate. That said, their lines are thin. The Russians have neither been able to stop kidnappings of Armenian civilians by Azeri forces or their mercenaries, even along the safe-passage Lachin corridor nor have they been able to prevent skirmishing around the Sotk goldmine. Should chaos envelop Russia when President Vladimir Putin dies, the Russian peacekeepers could evaporate as quickly as they came and leave Armenia exposed.

    The situation along the Azerbaijan-Armenia border is a far cry from the buffer zone which Israel required from Egypt upon the return of the Sinai. Israel’s assistance to Azerbaijan in the war and the lack of buffer or demilitarized zones in the districts separating Armenia from Nagorno-Karabakh likewise will set a precedent to enable the avoidance of demilitarized zones in portions of the West Bank which will ultimately become part of a Palestinian state.

    Israel’s embrace of Azerbaijan has not only been commercial but also strategic as the two countries cooperated against a common adversary in Iran. Many Israeli officials, of course, believe the Islamic Republic poses an existential challenge. The clerical regime in Iran, however, has also threatened Azerbaijan because that country’s secular Shi’ite regime provided an alternate model which many Iranians craved. Supporters of strong Israel-Azerbaijan ties juxtaposed the two countries’ surveillance, monitoring, and espionage cooperation against Armenia’s traditionally strong ties to the Islamic Republic.

    Here, Israeli officials’ misreading of the regional dynamics creates a self-fulfilling prophecy: By embracing Azerbaijan and Turkey but remaining silent on those two countries’ blockade of Armenia, they force Armenia to rely on Iran as an economic lifeline. Nearly one-third of Armenians make their living in agriculture. To export produce by air because of the blockade would be expensive and make the good uncompetitive. Iran, then, becomes the only real option. The same is true with regard to minerals and most manufactured goods. A more far-sighted Israeli policy would be to help Armenia bypass reliance on Iran by demanding Turkey and Azerbaijan open their borders to Armenian goods.

    The final aspect of Israel’s short-sightedness involves the more than 7,700 Arab or Turkmen mercenaries transported into Azerbaijan from Syria by Turkey in order to wage religious jihad against Christians. The identities of these mercenaries are increasingly known: Many come from Syria and some previously fought for Al Qaeda-linked groups or the Islamic State. Israelis may depict Azerbaijan as secular and respectful of freedom of religion but, for President Ilham Aliyev to embrace militiamen who destroy churches, behead prisoners, and engage in anti-Christian polemic as they cut off ears and gauge out eyes of captured prisoners, suggests the opposite. At the very least, Azerbaijan’s embrace of Islamist mercenaries might not only destabilize the country in the long run, but it could also make Israel more vulnerable. Simply put, there is no such thing as a good terrorist and by turning a blind eye toward Aliyev’s most recent actions, Israel is undercutting its own war on terror: how can it complain that Hamas terrorists in the Gaza Strip are beyond the pale when Jerusalem simultaneously albeit indirectly cooperates with such mercenaries against Armenia?

    Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan have developed over decades. Perhaps the tight embrace of the two states once made sense, but times have changed. Armenia is a democracy, while Azerbaijan has become a family-run dictatorship. Armenia embraces religious freedom while Azerbaijan works with Islamist extremists. Azerbaijan’s hatred toward Armenians further allows Iran to exploit divisions. At the same time, whereas Israel once had few options to fulfill its energy needs, it now can rely not only upon Cyprus and its own Eastern Mediterranean gas fields, but also the United Arab Emirates. Abu Dhabi’s human rights record is far from perfect, but at least it does not incite genocide.

    Israel need not break ties with Azerbaijan; there is still much about which the two countries can cooperate. But, just as the United States did not let its Arab partners dictate the U.S. relationship with Israel nor let Pakistan and India dictate Washington’s ties to the other, neither should Azerbaijan presume to dictate Israel’s relationship with Armenia. Rather than be partisan in the dispute, Israel’s goal should be to have cordial relations with all parties. So long as Jerusalem supports Baku uncritically, however, not only will Israel bring a lasting moral shame upon itself, but it will also create precedents corrosive to its own long-term strategic interests.

    Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). You can follow him on Twitter: @mrubin1971.

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  • Vrej1915
    Պայքարի նոր ճակա՞տ Հայաստանի շուրջ. Պեկինը կքանդի՞ Երևանում մեծ դեսպանատունը
    • 2020-11-30
    • Հեղինակ՝ ԱՐԱՄ ԱՄԱՏՈՒՆԻ

    Պակիստանյան և չինական սոցիալական ցանցերում բավականին նկատելի ալիք է, որում ներգրավված օգտատերերը խոսում են այն մասին, թե իբրև Հայաստանը պատերազմում պարտության համար մեղադրում է Հնդկաստանին՝ մատակարարած Swathi ռադիոտեղորոշիչ համակարգերի անբավարար աշխատանքի համար: Դրանք սարքեր են, որոնք տեղորոշում են հակառակորդի հրետանային կայանները և խոցում դրանք: Թե որտեղից է պակիստանյան և չինական սոցցանցային տիրույթին հայտնի դարձել Հնդկաստանից Հայաստանի դժգոհությունը, պարզ չէ: Փոխարենը կարող ենք ենթադրել, թե ինչից է ծնվել այդ դժգոհության գաղափարը: Հնդկաստանի հետ խնդիր ունեն թե՛ Պակիստանը՝ որն ըստ էության եղել է Ադրբեջանի դաշնակիցը Արցախի դեմ պատերազմում, և թե՛ Չինաստանը: Չինաստանը այդ պատերազմում չի դաշնակցել Ադրբեջանի հետ, բայց պահել է չեզոք լռություն, ինչը անհավասար դիմակայությունում ըստ էության կարող է լինել աջակցությանը հավասարազոր: Դա, իհարկե, Պեկինի գործն է, վերջին հաշվով, սակայն ամբողջ հարցն այն է, որ այժմ չինական և պակիստանյան տիրույթում փորձ է արվում ստեղծել հայ-հնդկական լարվածություն: Եթե անգամ դա արվում է Հնդկաստանի հետ իրենց հարցերը լուծելու համար, ապա անթույլատրելի է այդ հարցերը լուծել Հայաստան-Հնդկաստան լարվածության ռիսկեր առաջացնելու գնով:

    Մյուս կողմից, այստեղ հարց է՝ լուծվում են Հնդկաստանի՞ հետ կապված իրենց խնդիրները, թեկուզ սոցցանցային մանրախնդրությամբ, թե՞ Հնդկաստանը դիտարկվում է Կովկասի ուղղությամբ ռեգիոնալ խաղի մեջ ներգրավվելու մրցակից: Նոյեմբերի 9-ից հետո՝ իհարկե Արցախի դեմ պատերազմի հետևանքով, ստեղծվել է ռեգիոնալ բոլորովին նոր իրավիճակ, որը շոշափում է ընդգրկուն շահեր: Խոսքն, ընդ որում, ոչ միայն բուն կովկասյան ռեգիոնի մասին է, այլ ավելի լայն ճյուղավորման և ընդգրկման, որ ներառում է Կովկասի հետ սերտ կապակցված անվտանգային այլ միջավայրերի:

    Դրանք ճյուղավորումով են, մերձավորարևելյան գոտուց մինչև Եվրոպա, Ռուսաստանից մինչև կենտրոնասիական գոտի: Նոր իրավիճակի և զարգացումների պատրաստվում են գրեթե բոլոր սուբյեկտները, որոնք այս կամ այն ներգրավվածությունն ունեն ռեգիոնալ այն դիապազոնում, որ ճյուղավորվում է Կովկասից կամ, մասնավորապես, արցախյան գոտուց: Իսկ Կովկասի հանդեպ հետաքրքրություն թե՛ Հնդկաստանը, թե՛ Չինաստանը դրսևորում են վաղուց: Իհարկե, այստեղ կարող ենք խոսել տարբեր քաշային կատեգորիաների մասին, և Չինաստանի ներուժն այստեղ, անշուշտ, չափելի է ԱՄՆ ու Ռուսաստանի հետ: Այդ համատեքստում առավել նկատելի է բավականին խոշոր խաղացողի՝ Չինաստանի քաղաքական պասիվությունը:

    Պեկինը պատերազմի շրջանում բավարարվեց հրադադարի կոչով, առանձնապես չցուցաբերելով որևէ ուղղությամբ դիվանագիտական աշխուժություն կամ նախաձեռնողականություն: Անկասկած է, որ այդ առերևույթ պասիվությունն ամենևին չի կարող նշանակել, որ Չինաստանը հետաքրքրված չէր տեղի ունեցողով և հնարավոր այս կամ այն զարգացումով, չէր հետևում ծավալվող ռազմական և ռազմա-քաղաքական, դիվանագիտական խաղին: Հարցն այն է, սակայն, թե որոնք են եղել եզրահանգումներն ու ինչ ծրագրեր ունի Պեկինը: Բանն այն է, որ Չինաստանի ռեգիոնալ ծրագրերի առումով բավականին խոսուն է Երևանում կառուցվող դեսպանատունն իր մասշտաբով: Չինաստանը Երևանում կառուցել է եվրասիական տարածաշրջանում մեծությամբ երկրորդ դեսպանատունը Մոսկվայից հետո: Այն հազիվ թե լինի պարզունակ մեծամոլության վկայություն և, թերևս, խոսում է Չինաստանի ֆունկցիոնալ անհրաժեշտությունների մասին, առավել ևս պայմանավորված Հայաստանի ռեգիոնալ դերակատարմամբ և հեռանկարներով: Բայց հարցն այստեղ այն է, որ Արցախի դեմ պատերազմից հետո այդ իմաստով տեղի են ունեցել առանցքային փլուզումներ՝ թե՛ ռեգիոնալ անվտանգային ճարտարապետության, թե՛ ուժերի հարաբերակցության, թե՛ Հայաստանի դերի առումով՝ բնականաբար ներառյալ Արցախը: Հետևաբար, առաջանում է հարց, թե արդյո՞ք Չինաստանը ենթադրում է իր վերանայումները, այդ թվում՝ Հայաստանի ֆունկցիոնալ հենակետային նպատակահարմարության իմաստով: Արդյո՞ք Պեկինը «կքանդի» իր դեսպանատունը Երևանում, վերանայելով ռեգիոնալ ներկայացվածության առաջնահերթությունները և ուղղությունները:

    Հատկանշական է, որ պատերազմից ի վեր, առ այսօր չի եղել հայ-չինական պաշտոնական շփում, թեկուզ Հայաստանում դեսպանի մակարդակով:

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  • Vrej1915

    AL-Monitor Turkish army accused of throwing Kurdish farmers from helicopter
    by Amberin Zaman
    Sept. 24, 2020

    [Allegations that Turkish soldiers took two Kurdish farmers up in a helicopter and threw them out fit a broader pattern of operations against the Kurdistan Workers Party in rural areas.] Turkish prosecutors have begun to investigate allegations that a pair of Kurdish farmers were brutally beaten and thrown out of a military helicopter in the southeastern province of Van on Sept. 11 in a case that has recalled the horrors inflicted on locals at the height of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) insurgency in the 1990s. Images of the bloodied faces of Osman Siban, 50, and Servet Turgut, 55, circulating online have provoked an uproar in the Kurdish community, with lawmakers from the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) demanding that a parliamentary commission be set up to investigate the affair. Turgut is in critical condition in a hospital in Van. “My father is in a coma. He has brain trauma, 11 broken ribs, a punctured lung and doctors say his chances of survival are poor,” said Turgut’s only son, Huseyin in a telephone interview with Al-Monitor. “We demand justice but the state wants to bury the truth, to cover it up,” he said. Siban, who was discharged from a military hospital this week, is suffering from dizzy spells and memory loss. “He is absolutely terrified. He’s lost his sense of time and place. When he speaks it’s childlike blubbering,” said Hamit Kocak, one of three lawyers who lodged charges of deliberate manslaughter, torture and dereliction of duties against the alleged perpetrators on behalf of the men’s families. Siban is recovering from his injuries in the coastal city of Mersin, where he spends his winters, and was not available for comment. The government denies the allegations and is investigating the men separately for “aiding and abetting a terrorist organization.” The catchall label has been leveled against thousands of Kurdish politicians, activists, journalists and others who continue to be prosecuted and jailed, often on flimsy evidence since a two-and-a-half-year cease-fire between the PKK and the state collapsed in July 2015. The incident in Van occurred following a military operation against PKK targets near Surik, a hamlet in the township of Catak, where both men eked out a living farming their land. Three Turkish soldiers and three PKK militants died in the clash. Eyewitnesses in Surik said that same day, a military helicopter landed near their hamlet at 2 p.m. A group of soldiers emerged and ordered villagers to gather in the main square. They made them get down on their knees and show their identification. They singled out two of the villagers and started to beat them, shouting, “We are in pain, who are we to take it out on if not you? We are going to burn your village down.” According to testimony relayed to Al-Monitor by Kocak, the soldiers came back in the late afternoon, dragging Turgut by the neck from the nearby field where he had been making bales of hay. They asked for Siban, who was in his home drinking tea. The pair were bundled into a helicopter and flown away. When villagers tried to follow, the soldiers pointed guns at them and threatened to kill them. Kocak believes the pair was likely singled out because local informants had snitched on them. “Let’s assume they are guilty — and they are not — these are poor farmers trying to make ends meet. Is this the treatment they deserve? Getting beaten to death?” fumed Servet’s brother Naif in a telephone interview with Al-Monitor. Local officials presented a markedly different version of events. The Van governor’s office asserted in a statement that Turgut was seen near the scene of the clashes “displaying suspicious activities” and had “fallen off a cliff” while trying to flee security forces. Siban was also spotted in the area. “Despite resisting capture,” he was detained “in keeping with regulations” and had been put on a military helicopter with Turgut and the corpse of a PKK fighter. They were flown to the Van gendarmerie’s provincial command. Siban and Turgut were then transferred to the state hospital in Van, where the latter is being treated. The statement did not clarify why Siban required hospitalization. Kocak said that a delirious Siban recalls being “repeatedly beaten by 10 to 20 men.” “When asked if he was thrown out of a helicopter, he says he was, but then minutes later he says he wasn’t,” Kocak noted. With Turgut in a coma, it's impossible to corroborate either version. A medical report dated Sept. 17 issued by the state-run hospital where the men were treated asserts, however, that Siban was admitted after “falling from a height.” The report, which was seen by Al-Monitor, goes on to say that the emergency medical technician who brought him in had indicated that Siban had “fallen from a helicopter.” Mustafa Yeneroglu, a deputy for the newly created centrist DEVA Party led by former Economy Minister Ali Babacan, has filed a separate parliamentary motion asking Defense Minister Hulusi Akar to respond to the allegations. "The horrific claim that two of our citizens were tortured and thrown out of a helicopter must be investigated in an effective manner," he tweeted. “Whether they were thrown out of a helicopter or not, it’s clear that these men were savagely assaulted during their detention and one of them may very well die because of it,” said Omer Faruk Gergerlioglu, an HDP lawmaker and member of the parliament’s human rights commission. “Yet, the message from the government is, ‘We will do whatever it takes to preserve the unity of the Turkish state, to combat terrorism. Nobody can stop us, we are above the law.’ The 1990s concept is back with a vengeance,” Gergerlioglu told Al-Monitor in a telephone interview. “The difference now, though,” he added, “is that since the [failed 2016] coup, state impunity extends to everyone, not only the Kurds.” The 90s were a brutal time. Security forces torched and forcibly evacuated at least 2,500 villages as part of a scorched-earth campaign that displaced well over a million people, including the Turguts and the Sibans, who moved to Mersin when their village was razed in 1988. Rogue elements carried out extrajudicial killings, kidnapped dissidents and subjected Kurds to numerous other abuses in a failed effort to quell the PKK’s 36-year insurgency. Throwing people out of helicopters was one of them, according to a 2005 report by Human Rights Watch. Siban and Turgut’s ordeal has reopened old wounds for Newroz Xebat Yildirim, a Stocholm-based Kurdish psychologist. Yildirim described how in 1993, his cousin Mejdel dangled by a rope tied to his ankle from a military helicopter as soldiers grilled him over his supposed support for the guerrillas. Yildirim, who had been 14 at the time, was in their native village near the township of Nusaybin, where the nightmare unfolded. “Unsatisfied, they took his pregnant wife to the creek and stripped her naked and made her sit in it while they forced Mejdel to watch,” Yildirim told Al-Monitor, his voice breaking during a telephone interview. “Then they shot at his hand and pulled at it until it literally came off and could not be stitched back to his arm. The foot by which he was swung from the helicopter was so mangled you could see the bone.” Mejdel’s wife lost the baby. Yildirim says he is still waiting for the Turkish state to issue an apology. During the early days of AKP rule, when the government embarked on radical reforms aimed at winning Turkey full membership in the European Union and Erdogan initiated direct peace talks with the PKK, an apology might have been within reach. But Erdogan’s alliance with right-wing ultra-nationalists struck in the aftermath of the coup “has reversed all of that,” said Ozturk Turkdogan, the president of Turkey’s Human Rights Association. The veteran rights campaigner expressed deep skepticism over the outcome of the prosecutors’ inquiry into the alleged abuses against Siban and Turgut. Turkdogan told Al-Monitor that their story fits a broader pattern of anti-PKK operations in rural areas. “When the military loses their own in clashes, they typically go to the closest village, declare it a no-go security zone and abuse locals.” In normal circumstances, he explained, prosecutors go to the scene of the alleged abuse and file a report. “But in a no-go zone, it’s the security forces who took part in the operation who do the reporting," Turkdogan added. “More often than not the file gets shut down and even when not, justice is rarely served.”;!!LIr3w8kk_Xxm!6VPVglw3G7W3lLKHolXCSLhR qXL8RwUFie4aaOoNRumcqn3JHCTHXh6BqfanRQ$

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  • Vrej1915
    Turkey and Azerbaijan continue quiet expansion in Georgia

    Batumi, 23.08.2020

    Turkey's presence in Ajaria has increased dramatically over the past fifteen years. Prior to that, the former head of the region Aslan Abashidze restrained Turkish infiltration into the region, thinking that the sale of a meter of land to them was tantamount to the loss of all of Ajaria. However, after his departure, the situation has changed radically, political scientist Lev Sloboda notes

    Batumi. Photo:

    Ajaria has become of interest to the Turkish capital. It is profitable not only to invest money in business, but also to spend holidays. On weekends, Turks love to go to Batumi, as casinos in Turkey are banned.

    To imagine the place of Turkey in the life of Ajaria, it is enough to walk through the streets of Batumi. The square of the city's central mosque is no different from the Turkish square. Turkish speech is heard everywhere. The population of Ajaria is more afraid of Turks than fictional Russian aggression.

    In Georgia, the second ethnic group after Georgians in terms of number are Azerbaijanis. They speak a dialect in Georgia that is closer to Turkish than to Azerbaijani. In the east of the country - in the areas of Kquemo-Kartli, Marneuli, Bolnisi, Dmanisi, Gardabani, Azerbaijanis make up the majority of the population. It is not for a reason that politicians in Tbilisi fear that The Borchalin Azerbaijanis may try to join Azerbaijan.

    Georgian Azerbaijanis mostly do not know or speak Georgian, preferring to communicate with Georgians in Russian language. This is partly due to the fact that in many local schools the Azerbaijani language is taught as the main language, and Georgian, English and Russian are taught as foreign languages.

    Azerbaijan has the same policy of peaceful, "cultural" expansion in Georgia as Turkey. Georgia has numerous refueling stations for the Baku company SOCAR, transit through Georgian oil and gas territory, Azerbaijanis manage business facilities in Tbilisi, in the resort areas of Batumi, Kobuleti, Urek and other cities, and own shares of state and private enterprises. Baku structures use this powerful economic lever for political purposes to manipulate the Georgian authorities.

    On the other hand, Georgia has a serious demographic problem, which continues to deteriorate against the background of the influx of Azerbaijanis. Turkey is also promoting the "repatriation" of Meskhetian Turks in the Samzme Jawahk region.

    Another hot topic in Georgia (primarily in Ajaria) is the construction of mosques, overseen by the Turkish government. During his visit to Turkey in 2014, the patriarch of the Georgian Orthodox Church, Elijah II, said that the Muslim community in Georgia has more than 311 active mosques, while there are no Georgian churches in Turkey. In the 2016 election campaign, the Patriots Alliance was central to the construction of a new mosque in Batumi. The party warned of excessive Turkish influence in Ajaria. Subsequently, the issue of Turkish expansion was raised many times by progressives and party groups.

    The percentage of Georgian business in Batumi decreases over the years: 70% of investments are Turkish. There is nothing Georgian and Adjara left on many of the city's central streets. Even the names of the restaurants speak for themselves: "Mecca," "Doner-Duryum," "Mevlana el Madin," "Keremin Jeri" and so on. The peculiarity of this business is that for their facilities Turkish businessmen prefer to hire their own compatriots, taking them out of the country and helping to get a second citizenship, and Georgian workers are at best satisfied with low-paid work of service personnel. That is, Turkish circles feel quite confident in Ajaria and do their best to make financial flows circulate within the Turkish community.

    Most of the Batumi embankment, with all modern and luxurious buildings, also belongs to the Turks. It is no coincidence that Turkish President Recep Erdogan,speaking about those cities that remain in the hearts of the Turks (Syrian Aleppo, Greek Thessaloniki and Iraqis Of Mosul), also mentioned the Georgian Batumi.

    If someone from Ankara or Istanbul wants to go to the east of the country to look at the fortress in Riza or relax in the seaside town of Hopa, they can safely book a flight to Batumi marked "Hopa". And this flight will not be considered international. At the Turkish airport you will pass passport and customs control, and in Batumi no Georgian representative of customs even has the right to touch you with a finger. Directly from the airport you can get on a Turkish bus and if you wish to go to Hopa, Riza, etc.
    Khomeriki: Turkey will occupy Batumi if Russia does not support GeorgiaNo borders, no customs! Batumi is already considered an internal zone of Turkey, claims Georgian expert
    This is not just a business approach, but a program supported by the government, as the entrepreneurial interests of Turks in Ajaria are actively subsidized from Ankara. Moreover, the Turkish authorities even provide low-interest loans to compatriots who left for Ajaria to buy a home.

    The process of Islamization of Georgia continues. Turkey's geopolitical interests extend not only to Libya, Syria and the Aegean Sea, but also to the Caucasus. So we should not be surprised by the gradual ingation of Georgia.

    Leo Sloboda is a political scientist, especially for IA Realist

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  • Vrej1915

    The Second Drone Age

    How Turkey Defied the U.S. and Became a Killer Drone Power

    Leave a comment:

  • Azad
    Looks like it will be all out war between turkey and Syria in the next day or two.
    I like where Russia is standing while Iran is quiet. It is time to arm the kurds inside turkey.

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  • Vrej1915
    How Turkey took Syria’s civil war to Libya

    "I want my son back. I don’t want him to be killed and don’t want him to kill Syrians. We have had enough bloodshed," said the mother of one Syrian fighter in Libya.

    Sunday 23/02/2020

    From one war to another. Turkish-backed fighters from al-Mutasim Brigade take part in a training at a camp near Marea in northern Syria, last September. (AFP)

    BEIRUT - When Syrian fighters were recruited to fight Libya in late 2019, many eagerly signed up, thinking this was going to be a quick 3-month adventure that paid good money.
    They were recruited by Turkey to fight alongside the forces of Libyan Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, engaged in an uphill battle against the Libyan National Army of Field-Marshal Khalifa Haftar, who is backed by Russia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
    The Syrian Organisation for Human Rights (SOHR) said Turkey was paying recruits up to $2,000 per month to save Tripoli from a Haftar takeover. The number of Syrian fighters crossed the 1,000-man mark in October and at least one Syrian has been killed in the Libyan battlefield, SOHR said.
    Five months later, none has returned to Syria and more are being shipped off to Libya, only this time to fight alongside Haftar against their fellow Syrians, creating a mini Syrian civil war on Libyan territory.
    Two sides of the Libya war

    “We have entered a new stage in the Syrian conflict,” said Ibrahim Hamidi, senior diplomatic editor at Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper, “a stage where Syrians are fighting the war of others in faraway places. With no doubt, this will add to existing complications in the Syrian national patchwork.”
    A recent report in Asharq Al-Awsat stated that additional Syrian fighters arrived in Libya in February, recruited by Russia from Douma in the Damascus countryside. Fifty of them signed 3-month contracts and are to receive $800 per month.
    Those Syrians will be exempted from mandatory military service back home, given that they are mostly former opposition fighters who reconciled with the Russian and Syrian armies two years ago. They, of course, will be fighting fellow Syrians in Libya.
    The Douma factor

    No breakdown is available as to who the Syrian fighters are nor what cities or towns they originate from. However, Douma is a former hub for the Syrian opposition and its sons are fighting on two sides of the Libyan conflict, shooting at each other outside of Tripoli. This will have ripple effects on Douma, which has not recovered from the trauma of war, nor has it been reconstructed.
    “Sending them to Libya -- a battlefield to which they have no connection whatsoever -- will undoubtedly reflect negatively on their home communities” said Amer Elias, a political analyst in Damascus. “It will reduce their popularity because people will accuse them of abandoning both their cause and community.”
    Maher, a Syrian barber from East Ghouta, whose cousin is fighting in Libya, told The Arab Weekly: “We are not happy with his decision but we cannot blame him. He is doing it only for the money.”
    “He was uprooted from his home, which was demolished, and sent to live in Jarabulus (a Turkish-occupied city in northern Syria). He cannot find a job and needs to feed his four little children,” Maher said. “When you are sinking, you take anything that is offered to you -- even if it’s a straw.”
    Maher insisted that his cousin went to Libya “so that he can live and make money. He sought martyrdom in Syria but he doesn’t want to die in Libya.”
    Abu Nader, a former member of the armed opposition in Homs, now reconciled with the government, disagreed. Working as a taxi driver in Damascus, he said: “When all of this started, we took up arms to defend our homes and children, not to fight for [Turkish President] Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
    “Halfway through the war, we realised that Erdogan was using us and willing to trade us for any deal that satisfied his ambitions. He doesn’t care about the people of Syria. Anybody who still takes money from him is a traitor to the blood of Syrians.”
    The Syrian fighters sent to Libya can be broken down into four main groups. Two are mercenaries from the Al-Mutassim and Sultan Murad Divisions who are in Libya out of obedience to Erdogan. The third group is engaged in Libya because they are ideologically committed to jihad, mainly being fighters from the Sham Legion. The fourth are Russia-paid mercenaries fighting in Libya for purely financial reasons.
    No sense at all

    “My son went to Libya,” said Um Ubada, a Palestinian-Syrian housewife from the demolished Yarmouk Refugee Camp in Damascus. “He was told he was going to fight someone called Khalifa Haftar. I don’t know who Haftar is and I don’t care. I want my son back.
    “I don’t want him to be killed and don’t want him to kill Syrians. We have had enough bloodshed. He didn’t go there to fight Syrians but to fight Libyans.”
    “The recruitment of Syrian rebels in the Libyan war makes no sense to Syrians or Libyans,” said Hassan Hassan, director of the Non-State Actors Programme at the Centre for Global Policy in the United States. “Turkey did great damage to both causes by sending mercenaries to Libya, especially at a time when northern Syria was being attacked by the Syrian regime and when Turkey failed to force Russia to abide by its promises of de-escalation.
    “It also remains unclear why Libyans need a few hundred fighters from Syria. The whole thing makes no sense and is greatly damaging.”

    Written By Sami Moubayed
    Sami Moubayed is a Syrian historian and author of Under the Black Flag (IB Tauris, 2015).

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  • Vrej1915
    Azerbaijani police violently break up post-election protest

    Several opposition figures and journalists were beaten following a sit-in protesting parliamentary elections that saw widespread cheating.

    Durna Safarova Feb 12, 2020

    Protesters gather in front of the Central Election Commission HQ in Baku to protest elections they saw as falsified. ( police have violently broken up protests following contested parliamentary elections, further tarnishing the vote that was intended to create an image of positive reforms in the country.
    On the afternoon of February 11, a few dozen protesters – including several of the defeated opposition candidates – gathered in front of the office of the Central Election Commission (CEC) in Baku for a sit-in. They demanded that the results of the parliamentary elections two days earlier be annulled after independent observers registered widespread cheating, including ballot-stuffing and multiple voting.
    While elections in Azerbaijan have regularly been falsified, protests against them have been relatively rare. This time, though, expectations among some in the opposition were higher, given a relative loosening of restrictions against the opposition and the presence of monitors from the OSCE, who did not observe the last parliamentary elections in 2015. Those high expectations led to a greater sense of resentment when the results turned out to be more of the same, said Akif Gurbanov, head of the Baku-based Institute for Democratic Initiatives.
    “People understand that the promises the government has been making aren’t honest, so they are disappointed,” he said.
    President Ilham Aliyev, whose New Azerbaijan Party and its allies maintained total control of the parliament following the vote, denied that there was any reason to doubt the results. “If the Azerbaijani people were dissatisfied with these elections, they would raise their voices,” he said during a meeting with Turkish members of parliament. “This shows again that these elections reflect the will of the Azerbaijani people and that is the most important thing.”
    But many of the losing candidates disagreed.
    “We are protesting total fraud in the country, fraud in the elections,” said Rabiyya Mammadova, one of the candidates, in an interview with BBC Azerbaijan.
    As the hours passed, the protesters wrapped in blankets against the chill, more people came to join them. An official from the CEC came out of the building to invite some of the protesters in for a meeting, but they rejected the offer. Mammadova told Eurasianet that opposition candidates had made many complaints to the CEC in the course of the campaign, which they didn’t respond to, giving them little reason to expect help now.
    The authorities considered the protest unauthorized, and once night fell police were called to the scene, where they detained many of the participants. Several were beaten by the police and sustained injuries.
    “Some big buses arrived, and police came out of them and started attacking the protesters,” said Aynur Elgunesh, a freelance journalist who was covering the event, in an interview with Eurasianet. Elgunesh said she tried to stay away from the fray, as she has a leg injury that reduces her mobility. Despite that, an officer approached her and told her to “go to hell,” she said. She showed him her press card but to no avail. “He punched me in the head, I staggered and fell down,” she said. “Then policemen were kicking me … it hurt so much.”
    Arzulla Buludlu, a member of the opposition Musavat party, also was wounded while being detained.
    “Three policemen assaulted me,” Buludlu told Eurasianet. “When I asked them why they were doing it, one of them kicked me with his knee in my ribs. I fell down and he kicked my head.” Others who were detained demanded that the police get an ambulance for him, but they refused, he said. Eventually he was taken to the hospital and examined under police supervision. “The doctors said I should be hospitalized at least three days, but the police shouted at the doctors that I had to leave the hospital,” he said.
    Mammadova, the candidate, had her hand broken. Mustafa Hajibeyli, another member of Musavat and the editor of a website,, also was beaten and shared photos of his bruised face. Another journalist, Sevinc Vaqifqizi, was bruised on her face and arm. The OSCE reported that at least eight journalists had been injured.

    “I am very concerned by last night’s detentions, violent incidents and mistreatment by law enforcement representatives,” said Harlem Désir, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, in a statement on February 12.
    Images and video of the chaos were widely shared on social media, but police denied that anyone was injured. Elgunesh said she personally told the police spokesman, Ehsan Zahidov, about her injuries. “I called him and told what had happened to us,” she said.
    Police ultimately forced all of the demonstrators on to buses, where they were driven around for two hours before being freed outside the city center.
    “What was the point of these atrocities?” wrote Ali Karimli, the head of the People’s Front Party of Azerbaijan, on Facebook. “Let’s leave aside the law, that has long been ignored. But there is also reason and logic, which is not being used to rule the country.”
    Gurbanov of the Institute for Democratic Initiatives said the authorities seemed to initially accept the protesters’ presence, but as more people began to arrive and more were livestreaming the event, they got worried. “They felt there was a risk that if it wasn’t prevented then, it would create a new wave and so they had to crack down,” he told Eurasianet.
    “As always, the government has a great fear of street protests because they always see in them a potential revolution,” said Leila Alieva, a political analyst and visiting scholar at the University of Oxford. “The protesters are the new elite, young and educated people, whom the government should be attracting. But instead they are driving them further into the opposition.”

    Durna Safarova is a freelance journalist who covers Azerbaijan.

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  • Vrej1915
    Russia-Turkey Alliance Is Beginning to Unravel in Syria

    The collapse of the “Astana format” would jeopardize the conflict settlement system in Syria that Russia has spent so much time constructing.

    By Marianna Belenkaya
    Feb. 13, 2020

    Baderkhan Ahmad / AP / TASS Will the Moscow-Ankara alliance in Syria remain intact? This is the main question following clashes this month between the Syrian and Turkish militaries in Idlib.
    The United States, meanwhile, is clearly hoping to take advantage of the situation, with Washington expressing unconditional support for Turkey — and taking up yet another opportunity to condemn Russian actions in Syria.
    What happened?
    Damascus intensified its offensive in Idlib in late December. When the latest ceasefire agreement between Moscow and Ankara collapsed about one month later, Turkey began deploying military equipment to the area to support Syrian opposition militias and to strengthen its own observation posts — some of which were now located on territory controlled by Damascus.
    In the past 10 days, Turkish military and civilian advisors there have come under fire by Syrian artillery at least twice and casualties have been reported. In retaliation, Turkey has hit Syrian positions, leading to at least 10 times as many casualties among pro-Assad forces.
    Who is to blame?
    Ankara has unequivocally blamed Damascus for the escalation, though in early February, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan lay part of the blame on Russia for the first time — for giving free reign to Bashar al-Assad.
    Erdogan has also leveled accusations at Iran, thereby threatening to undermine the so-called “Astana format” that includes the three countries. Until only recently, Ankara had repeatedly stated its desire to maintain that trilateral relationship.
    Turkey initially played for time in hopes of reaching an understanding with Russia. Ankara hosted two rounds of talks between the two countries’ foreign ministries and security forces, but they came to nothing. Even a phone conversation between Erdogan and President Vladimir Putin did not produce a compromise.
    Ankara has since essentially issued an ultimatum demanding that Syrian forces return to the positions they occupied before their offensive — that is, behind the line of Turkey’s observation posts — by the end of February. Erdogan has added that if Turkish troops or anyone else is injured as a result of further actions by Damascus, Turkey would “hit the regime forces everywhere… regardless of what was decided in the Sochi agreement.”
    What is Russia’s position?
    Moscow has not yet shown any desire to make concessions. It initially tried to smooth over the situation by saying that the Turkish military had failed to warn its Russian colleagues in time about any possible troop movements. Russia later shifted the blame on terrorist groups.

    Russia Accuses Turkey of Breaking Syria Deals, Rejects Erdogan Claim

    Read more

    According to a statement made by Russia’s Foreign Ministry on Feb. 6, “the Russian and Turkish militaries made another attempt in mid-January to introduce a ceasefire in the Idlib de-escalation zone. The terrorists, however, not only did not reduce their military activity, but increased their attacks.”
    Moscow’s intent has been to show that Russia and Turkey suffered equally from the escalation, because terrorist actions resulted in the deaths of not only hundreds of Syrian troops and civilians outside the de-escalation zone, but also of Turkish and Russian military experts. Moscow has maintained this position for the past week. What’s more, Russian state-controlled media reports have suggested that the escalation between the Syrian and Turkish militaries was a provocation.
    What’s next?
    The collapse of the “Astana format” would jeopardize the conflict settlement system in Syria that Russia has spent so much time constructing. The cooperation between the three countries involved had successfully resulted in “on the ground” compromises over the past three years, as well as at least some progress on the humanitarian and political front. No other grouping of mediators has been able to achieve anything of the sort in Syria. In fact, before the “Astana format” took shape, Russia had engaged with the U.S. to resolve issues “on the ground,” but it turned out that Washington did not have anywhere near the same level of influence over the armed opposition in Syria as Turkey.
    The West believes that the actions of the “Astana format” have only strengthened the hand of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who has regained control of 70% of the country’s territory in the past three years.

    Putin Discovers the Pain of Being Erdogan’s Pal

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    This is generally true, but it is also true that this played out with the approval of Turkey, which, one would think, should have supported the Syrian opposition. However, Ankara’s primary interest was to create a buffer zone on the Syrian border which would prevent Kurdish militants from entering Turkish territory and provide a location — outside Assad’s control — to which Syrian refugees in Turkey could eventually return.
    Although Ankara did carry out several military operations against Syrian Kurds that provided a limited foothold in the area, it is not yet big enough for refugees to return to. One solution would be to add part of Idlib to the territory. Indeed, prior to the recent hostilities, it seemed that Russia and Turkey would reach a new agreement concerning Idlib’s new borders. Ankara’s ultimatum, however, has thrown that into doubt.
    Against this backdrop, Washington has clearly sided with Turkey. During a visit to Ankara, U.S. Special Representative for Syria James Jeffrey called the Russian and Syrian government forces a threat to Turkish troops. Washington has long been trying to break the Ankara-Moscow alliance in Syria, and now they have such an opportunity. The question now is whether Moscow can once again turn the situation in Syria to its favor.

    The views expressed in opinion pieces do not necessarily reflect the position of The Moscow Times.

    Marianna Belenkaya

    Marianna Belenkaya is an expert on Arab affairs and a journalist at the Kommersant publishing house.

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  • Vrej1915

    Could Turkey go to war in Syria?

    • Gökhan Bacık
    • Feb 17 2020 02:22 Gmt+3
    • Last Updated On: Feb 17 2020 02:27 Gmt+3

    In 2008, no one would have believed that Turkey would consider taking military action to secure regime change in another country, that it would maintain near-permanent bases abroad, or would control foreign nationals in jihadist groups alongside its own military.
    But in the past decade, Turkey has adopted a doctrine of asymmetric warfare. This has turned Turkey into a different country.
    Following the deaths of 13 Turkish soldiers in Syrian government shelling in the northwestern Syrian province of Idlib this month, Turkey has entered a new phase and we are left with an entirely new question; could Turkey enter a conventional war in Syria?
    In other words, is a war between Turkey and Syria, in which Russia would play an important role, now possible? The answer to this question for now is that warfare is a possibility that should concern us.
    First, let us visit some important points:
    As far as Russia is concerned, Syria’s future is tied to President Bashar Assad’s regime. Someone else could be president, but maintaining the current regime is Russia’s red line.
    As a result, the solution to the Syrian crisis for Russia is for the Syrian government to regain control of the entire country. In this situation, the Syrian military has been proceeding with Russian support without regard to which areas are under the control of Turkish troops.
    If the Syrian military encounters trouble, Russian forces provide air support to clear the way. Considering developments since December, it is clear that Russia is proceeding with attacks without discriminating between those groups backed by Turkey and those that are not.
    It is clear that Russia’s goal is the restoration of Syrian government control over all of Syria, but Turkey has spent the past five years unable to see that.
    What has happened in Idlib over the past week has come as no surprise. The dynamics at play are a result of disagreements behind the scenes, at meetings such as the series of talks in Astana, Kazakhstan. Although it is well-known that Turkey and Russia could not reach a consensus on many issues, Ankara thought it could continue on its way as if these issues did not exist.
    What is more, the assumption that everything will be resolved in the near future has resulted in short-sighted decisions. For example, compared to the beginning of the war in Syria, at this point every radical group considered useful is receiving indiscriminate Turkish support. But despite this support in arms, money and resources, these groups do not stand a chance in the face of the Russia-supported Syrian military.
    This terrible strategy has taken a toll beyond the loss in life and resources.
    The first is the destruction of the Turkish state’s reputation, which was constructed over a century to project a peaceful and influential image.
    The second is the damage to Turkey’s reputation as a strong state. As Turkey sits at the negotiating table with Russia, the Syrian military attacks Turkey with Russian support. It is important to see that the Syrian military’s actions are belittling for Turkey.
    The Syrian government is clearly challenging Ankara. Russia does not seem to care, and is taking sides. Not a single actor is hesitating due to worries about Turkey’s response.
    Meanwhile, Turkish decision-makers remain bullish.
    For example, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s coalition partner, Devlet Bahçeli, said: “The Turkish nation should be ready to enter Damascus if it becomes necessary, if we do not see other options.” At the time, Turkish soldiers near Idlib, surrounded by Syrian forces, were unable to receive air support due to Russian hindrance.
    Given the clashes in Idlib, Turkish commanders should also reflect on their actions. What kind of strategic short-sightedness would allow Turkish surveillance to end up being surrounded by enemy forces? What are these Turkish forces now observing, in surveillance zones, surrounded by the Syrian military?
    The Turkish general staff’s statement that it responded in kind is seriously concerning if it is using this rhetoric as more than a public relations ploy. It can be read as a clue that the general staff is struggling to articulate the position that they are in.
    So, would Ankara seriously consider a conventional war with Syria?
    Firstly, if we look at the performance and thought processes of its foreign policy leaders since 2011, we could say this would not be a surprising outcome. As it is, the crisis in Syria has naturally brought us far past the point of direct confrontation between Turkey and Syria.
    Still, many pro-government advisors and writers have been arguing for continuing and expanding war with Syria.
    The second critical point is this: what will happen if Russia confronts Turkey with its pro-Damascus red lines?
    When considering this problem, it is important to bear in mind that some Turkey-backed jihadist groups have been attacking both Russian and Syrian targets without distinction.
    To revisit an important point: Russia’s fundamental Syria policy is based on the Damascus government regaining control of the entire country. Consequently, an attack of Syrian government forces is an attack on Russia’s central game plan.
    The root of the problem is this: Turkey has clearly decided that it can solve its issues in Syria, including its Kurdish problem, by maintaining a long-term military presence in the country. This long-term strategy also includes establishing political and civilian administrations in certain areas as well.
    For this reason, we will continue to see Turkey put up with and further complicate the crisis in Syria, creating more problems along the way.

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