Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

[TomServo]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

Anyone know where I can find an objective and scholarly work (whether an article or monograph) on the Zaza? Amazon has a book called The Zaza Kurds of Turkey listed, written by a certain Mehmed Kaya (who I am assuming is Kurdish). I couldn't find any academic reviews of the book online.

Here is part of the introduction: "The Zaza-speaking Kurds are a people who can bring us closer to ancient Middle Eastern civilizations. The Zaza region is an area on which Persians, Armenians, Arabs, Mongols, and Turks have left their marks. But these groups have been perceived as intruders and oppressors. Throughout history, the local population has successfully fought against intruders to preserve its distinctive character."

[TomServo]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

YouTube comment sections are the worst.

The amount of (mostly eastern European or Near Eastern) Orthodox Christians living vicariously through PKK fighters is rather startling.

[Vrej1915]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

Opinion: Kurdish issue resolution may help tackle Armenian question

May 4, 2013 - 16:12 AMT

PanARMENIAN.Net - Hopes that Turkey could ever solve its almost
intractable Kurdish issue have never been as high as they were in the
first quarter of 2013. If this peace process can continue with all its
ups and downs but without rupture, it could that suggest that another
perennial issue as old as the Kurdish issue, the Armenian question,
can also be tackled, Turkish journalist Cengiz Çandar says in `No
Incentive for Turkey, Armenia To Normalize Relations' article
published by the Assyrian International News Agency.

`Of course, there is a fundamental difference. The Kurdish issue
directly concerns 15 million people living in Turkey as Turkish
citizens and more than 30 million other Kurds living in the region and
majority populations of tens of millions living in those countries.
The Armenian question is about the perishing of a national community
on the land they have been living for time immemorial. Today, the
question is more about its deep psychological scars rather than its
physical aspects,' he says.

`For the Armenians, a large part of historical Armenia, what they call
Western Armenia, covers a substantial portion of today's eastern
Turkey. It is not unusual for countries and lands to change names but
for the Armenians and Turkey, the issue is more than losing land but
the almost total annihilation of a nation on the land where they used
to live,' he says.

`In the meanwhile, we have to remember that the assassination in 2007
of Turkey's most influential and best known democratic figure,
Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, constituted a breaking point in
Turkey's Armenian issue that heralded the emergence on the political
stage of the "Turkish Armenian" identity, even though they are but a
60,000-strong minority living only in Istanbul, down from 1.5 million
in 1915,' Çandar continues.

`Since that time, an increasing number of Turks and Kurds of Turkey,
in solidarity with Armenians, began to discuss the Armenian issue and
to observe April 24 as Genocide Remembrance Day, first in the center
of Istanbul and then, this year, in many provincial capitals, led by
Diyarbakir.

Turkey faces a complex structure of Armenia-Diaspora-Turkey's
Armenians. For the late Hrant Dink, normalization of relations between
Turkey and Armenia was a life mission. A year and half after his
assassination we came very close to his ideals,' Çandar says.

`2015 will be the 100th anniversary of the genocide, and Armenian
mobilization in the international arena in 2015 will be a potential
irritant for Turkey. But, then, Turkey's own domestic developments and
bringing in the Diaspora to share April 24 observances, also means
that genocide will no longer be something Turkey owes to Armenia. In
other words, the need for closure of the Genocide File is no longer an
incentive or sine qua non for normalization of Turkey-Armenia
relations. No Turkey-Armenian normalization is detected in the
horizon. And there won't be unless there are mutually enticing and
strong incentives,' he concludes.

http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/news/157084/

[Vrej1915]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

Քրդական զինված պայքարը հայտնվել է բարդ իրավիճակում
Իգոր Մուրադյան
Երկուշաբթի, 22 Ապրիլի 2013



Քուրդ քաղաքական գործիչներn ու քաղաքական կուսակցությունները հաղթահարել են միամտության ու ոչ հասունության ժամանակաշրջանը եւ դարձել են միջազգային քաղաքականության ակտիվ ու հասուն մասնակիցներ, եւ առաջ են քաշում բավական մտածված ու հեռատես նախաձեռնություններ: Ներկայիս փուլում քուրդ քաղաքական գործիչները փորձում են խաղարկել տարբեր երկրներում տարբեր խմբերի համակարգված գործողությունների հեռանկարային սխեման:

Իհարկե, Իրաքյան Քրդստանի կառավարությունը, զգալի ֆինանսական ռեսուրսների տիրապետելով, փորձում է դառնալ ողջ քրդական ազգային շարժման առաջնորդը եւ բավական հաջողությունների է հասել: Այժմ Իրաքյան Քրդստանի քաղաքական գործիչները որոշիչ ազդեցություն ունեն Սիրիայի, Իրանի եւ Թուրքիայի քրդական կազմակերպությունների վրա՝ փորձելով նույնիսկ նրանց անունից հանդես գալ միջազգային ասպարեզում:

Տարբեր երկրների որոշ քուրդ ֆունկցիոներների կարծիքով, քուրդ ժողովուրդը վերջապես քաղաքական ղեկավարության միասնության հույսեր ունի: Սակայն Քրդստանի աշխատավորական կուսակցության առաջնորդների մեծամասնությունն ակնհայտորեն գոհ չէ դրանից ու չի կարողանում համակերպվել, որ Իրաքյան Քրդստանի քաղաքական գործիչները չափից դուրս սերտ են համագործակցում Թուրքիայի կառավարության հետ:

ՔԱԿ-ում շարունակվում է խորը պառակտումը, ինչը գործնականում հանգեցրել է մի քանի լիովին ինքնուրույն խմբերի այդ անվան տակ: Թուրքիայում ձեւավորվել է ազգային-ազատագրական պայքարի «իռլանդական» սխեման, որտեղ Աշխատավորական կուսակցության մի մասը հանդես է գալիս «Ժողովրդավարության ու խաղաղության կուսակցություն» անունով, որն այժմ իրենից ներկայացնում է չզինված քաղաքական շարժում:

Հետաքրքիր է այն, որ հենց այդ կուսակցությունն է ամենաքիչը պատրաստ համագործակցել Իրաքյան Քրդստանի քաղաքական գործիչների հետ եւ կարծես թե ֆինանսապես անկախ է Իրաքյան Քրդստանի կառավարությունից: Իհարկե, ժամանակի հետ շատ բան կփոխվի, սակայն ընդհանուր առմամբ Թուրքիայի քրդական խմբերը մեծ անվստահությամբ են վերաբերվում Իրաքի քրդական գործիչներին:

Չնայած միջազգային հանրության «խորհուրդներին» ու Թուրքիայի քաղաքականությանը, թուրքական քրդերը չեն շտապում ընդունել Իրաքյան Քրդստանի քաղաքական գործիչները գերակայությունը՝ հասկանալով նպատակների ու շահերի արմատական տարբերությունների առկայությունը: Իրաքյան Քրդստանի կառավարությունն անմիջական կապ ունի որոշ բավական կասկածելի ու հազիվ թե «լեգիտիմ» որոշումների հետ, որոնք կապված են Թուրքիայի տարածքից զինված խմբերի դուրսբերման հետ, եւ դա Թուրքիայի քրդերի կողմից չի կարող դիտարկվել որպես նրանց շահերի արտահայտում:

Թուրքիայից քրդական զինված խմբավորումների ակնկալվող դուրսբերումը ոչ այլ ինչ է, քան մոտակա շահերի համար հաշվարկված բլեֆներից մեկը: Քրդական զինված շարժումը հերթական անգամ հայտնվել է բարդ իրավիճակում եւ հնարավոր է մտադիր է դադար վերցնել անհրաժեշտ հանգստի համար: Եթե ինչ-որ խմբավորումներ դուրս էլ բերվեն, ապա չեն գերազանցի ընդհանուր թվի 20%-ին:

Պետք է ընդգծել, որ ներկայում ՔԱԿ-ը ֆինանսավորման լրիվ նոր աղբյուրներ է ստացել, այդ թվում Արեւմուտքի երկրներից եւ շատ քիչ է կախված Իրաքյան Քրդստանի աղբյուրներից: Բացի այդ, ՔԱԿ-ը, բաժանված լինելով մի քանի խմբավորումների, այժմ շատ գումարային «օբշակներ» ունի, ինչը ֆինանսավորման աղբյուրները գործնականում անխոցելի է դարձրել: Դրա հետ մետեղ, սպառազինութան մատակարարումն այլեւս խնդիր չի հանդիսանում, եւ դրա միա մասը ստացվում է Թուրքիայի տարածքից:

Պետք է նշել նաեւ, որ վերջին ժամանակներս Իրանը նշանակալիորեն ճշգրտել է իր քաղաքականությունը քրդերի հանդեպ՝ ուղղելով իր կոպիտ սխալները, ինչը հանգեցրել է հարաբերությունների կարգավորմանը, այդ թվում պանիրանիզմի գաղափարների տարածման բազայի վրա: Ամենայն հավանականությամբ, Իրանում քրդական խնդիրներով են սկսել զբաղվել ոչ միայն կառավարական կառույցները, այլ նաեւ հասարակական, այդ թվում, լիբերալ, արեւմտամետ ուղղության կազմակերպությունները:

Թուրքիայում քրդական միջավայրում զգալիորեն ուժեղացել են իսլամամետ խմբավորումները (բնականաբար, սուննի ճյուղի), ինչը, հնարավոր է, բլեֆներից մեկն է, որը տարածվում է արաբական նավթային հարուստ միապետություններից ֆինանսական միջոցներ ստանալու համար: Ինչպես մյուս դեպքերում, քրդերը կառուցում են իրենց քաղաքականությունն Իրանի ու Սաուդյան Արաբիայի եւ նրա արբանյակների միջեւ հակասությունների վրա:

Ընդհանուր առմամբ, արեւմտյան հանրությունը կանգնած է քրդական խնդիրների հանդեպ սկզբունքային նոր հայեցակարգի մշակման հեռանկարի առաջ, եւ չնայած Արեւմուտքի արտաքին քաղաքականության ակտիվության կրիտիկական անկմանը, այդ թվում մերձավորարեւելյան քաղաքականությունում, քրդական խնդրով հարկ կլինի զբաղվել, հակառակ դեպքում սին է հենց արեւմտյան լիբերալ արժեքային համակարգը:

Քուրդ ժողովուրդը կանգնած է իսկական ցեղասպանության վտանգի առաջ, եւ կարեւոր չէ, թե որ երկրում դա կլինի, ինչը աղետ կդառնա համաշխարհային հանրության համար: Մինչ այժմ արեւմտյան հանրությանը մեծ դժվարությամբ է հաջողվում վերահսկողության տակ պահել Թուրքիայի իրական նպատակները, սակայն որքա՞ն կբավականեցնեն ջանքերը մոտ ապագայում:

Այժմ, որքան էլ տարօրինակ է, Թուրքիայի ծայրահեղական գործողությունների զսպման գլխավոր գործոնը թուրքական հասարակությունն է, սակայն այն երբեք վճռորոշ նշանակություն չի ունեցել: Այդ մասին պետք է մտածեն Թուրքիայի հարեւան բոլոր պետությունները, երբ դրանցից ոչ մեկը նույնիսկ հայեցակարգի ու պատկերացումների նմանվող որեւէ բան չունի, թե ինչպես վարվել նման իրավիճակում:

[TomServo]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

Does anyone know anything about the Kurds of Azerbaijan? The 2009 Azerbaijan census says there's just over 6,000 Kurds in the country. This figure is obviously pretty low but that might be because the Shia Kurds (who form the majority, I think) are being counted as Azeri.

[bell-the-cat]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

IT WAS THE KURDS THEMSELVES WHO DID NOT ASK FOR A KURDISH STATE: TURKISH HISTORIAN

http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid=761709E0-A6BC-11E2-A3F0F6327207157C

Tuesday, April 16, 21:36

It was the Kurds themselves who did not ask for a Kurdish state, says
Professor Dogu Ergil, one of the most renowned political sociologists
from Turkey.

Ergil explains that the Kurds "cooperated" with the Turks against
the Armenians to deport them and seized the goods and property left
behind by the Armenians. He says that the Treaty of Lausanne was
crafted with the consent of the Kurds. "They did not want a Kurdish
state for several reasons. But the primary reason was the ambition
of some to create a separate Armenia in the same lands. The Kurds
wanted to prevent this from happening," says Ergil.

Zaman quotes the Turkish professor as saying that the Kurds played
an extensive role in the expulsion of Armenians from Turkey and the
appropriation of their properties.

"Kurds and Armenians used to live together in East Anatolia. They
cooperated with Turkish official circles in the deportation of
Armenians and played a primary role in the redistribution of the
property and land of the deported Armenians. Their return would mean
that everything should be restored and reversed. They converted their
children to Islam and took them into Kurdish families. And, of course,
there was no Turkism back then; there was a state approach based on
an understanding of Islam. This was pretty understandable for the
Kurds. They have lived like this for centuries.

The primary reason that the Kurds did not want a state of their own was because they did not see themselves as a nation. They saw themselves as Muslims. The primary reason they did not want to be inside an Armenian state was because they were Muslims and Armenians were not.

Only when the Turks moved away from their primary identity as being Muslims towards a new primary identity of being Turks did the Kurds slowly start to think of themselves as Kurds. And it took a long time. even in the mid 1920s, the Kurds in Iraq were in an armed uprising because they wanted to be reincorporated into Turkey, and were killing Christians with the same fevour as they did during WW1.

[Vrej1915]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

IT WAS THE KURDS THEMSELVES WHO DID NOT ASK FOR A KURDISH STATE: TURKISH HISTORIAN

http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid=761709E0-A6BC-11E2-A3F0F6327207157C

Tuesday, April 16, 21:36

It was the Kurds themselves who did not ask for a Kurdish state, says
Professor Dogu Ergil, one of the most renowned political sociologists
from Turkey.

Ergil explains that the Kurds "cooperated" with the Turks against
the Armenians to deport them and seized the goods and property left
behind by the Armenians. He says that the Treaty of Lausanne was
crafted with the consent of the Kurds. "They did not want a Kurdish
state for several reasons. But the primary reason was the ambition
of some to create a separate Armenia in the same lands. The Kurds
wanted to prevent this from happening," says Ergil.

Zaman quotes the Turkish professor as saying that the Kurds played
an extensive role in the expulsion of Armenians from Turkey and the
appropriation of their properties.

"Kurds and Armenians used to live together in East Anatolia. They
cooperated with Turkish official circles in the deportation of
Armenians and played a primary role in the redistribution of the
property and land of the deported Armenians. Their return would mean
that everything should be restored and reversed. They converted their
children to Islam and took them into Kurdish families. And, of course,
there was no Turkism back then; there was a state approach based on
an understanding of Islam. This was pretty understandable for the
Kurds. They have lived like this for centuries. No room was left for
Kurdishness when Turkishness in a political sense was invented because
this place was declared as being the land of the Turks," says Ergil.

[Vahram]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

I don't think this is going to work at all. Considering that the Kurds in Sooria have joined with Asad!

[Vrej1915]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

Why Erdogan Wants Peace With the PKK

The End of An Insurgency


Article Summary: Last week, Abdullah Ocalan, the jailed leader of the
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), declared a cease-fire in his party's
nearly three-decade-long struggle with the Turkish state. His
announcement came at an opportune time, not least because Turkish
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan seems ready to pursue peace with
the Kurds as a way to consolidate his own power. Still, regional
developments might be a stumbling block around which neither party can
maneuver.

Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2013

By F. Stephen Larrabee

Last week, Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party
(PKK), declared a cease-fire in his party's nearly three-decade-long
struggle with the Turkish state. Before then, the insurgency -- which
had claimed some 40,000 lives -- had seemed intractable. Ankara's
attempts to put it down had only inflamed Kurdish nationalism and made
the PKK stronger. But with Ocalan now apparently ready to try to
resolve differences peacefully, the prospects that the uprising will
come to an end have improved.

Ocalan's announcement came at an opportune time. Several factors had
already made the moment ripe for peace. First, the ruling Justice and
Development Party (AKP) and the broader Turkish public had come to
recognize that trying to end the insurgency with force was a dead end
and that the government would have to make a more determined effort to
find a political solution to the Kurdish conflict.

Second, the Kurdish issue is closely linked to Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan's political ambitions. Under AKP bylaws, Erdogan cannot
run for another term as prime minister when his second term ends next
year. Instead, he is widely expected to try to run for president. If
he wins, he will be the first popularly elected president in Turkish
history, capping his political career and giving him the chance to
shape Turkish politics until 2023, the hundredth anniversary of the
founding of the Turkish Republic.

The one problem is that, currently, the presidency is largely a
ceremonial post. Erdogan has thus signaled his intention to amend the
Turkish constitution to give the president stronger executive powers
and to diminish the authority of the prime minister. The AKP lacks the
votes in parliament to make such changes to the constitution; to do
so, it needs the support of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party
(BDP), which has 33 seats in parliament. A peace accord with the PKK
and promises to revise the constitution to expand Kurdish cultural
rights and to broaden the definition of Turkish citizenship would help
Erdogan's government secure the BDP's allegiance. In effect, to build
the presidency he wants, Erdogan will need to strike a grand bargain
with the Kurds. However, this prospect worries many Turks, who believe
that a new constitution along these lines would concentrate too much
power in the hands of one man and open the way to greater
authoritarianism.

The final factor that has improved the prospects for peace is a
rethinking in AKP circles of Ocalan's role in any attempt to bring the
PKK insurgency to a close. In November 2012, Ocalan helped end a
67-day hunger strike of more than 600 Kurds. His personal intervention
demonstrated his influence and the necessity of involving him directly
in any peace plan. It was thus not surprising when, a month after
Ocalan's mediation, Erdogan announced the opening of exploratory talks
with Ocalan aimed at ending the PKK insurgency. On the Turkish side,
Hakan Fidan, head of Turkey's National Intelligence Organization and a
close confidant of Erdogan's, is leading the discussions. He and
Ocalan have focused on developing a strategic road map for a peace
accord.

Of course, peace is still far from a done deal. Several issues could
derail an accord. For one, the question of amnesty could pose
difficulties. Many Kurdish groups -- and Ocalan himself -- insist that
PKK fighters must be granted amnesty as part of any
agreement. However, much of the Turkish population considers the PKK
fighters terrorists and strongly opposes letting them walk.

In addition, Ocalan might want peace and he might have great sway
within the Turkish PKK, but the organization is no longer his baby. It
has become a transnational movement with networks and operations
across the region. Not all of them are under his control. Even if
Ocalan can persuade large segments of the PKK to support a peace
agreement, some hardcore nationalist groups might still be unwilling
to lay down their arms. After all, many PKK commanders see no future
for themselves outside of the armed struggle.

Regional developments have also complicated the peace talks. In Syria,
the withdrawal of Syrian government forces from five Kurdish-dominated
towns along the Syrian-Turkish border in July 2012 created a political
vacuum that the Democratic Union Party (PYD) -- which has close ties
to the PKK -- rushed to fill. The speed and ease with which the PYD
was able to establish control raised Turkish suspicions that Assad
might have orchestrated the withdrawal to strengthen the PKK at the
expense of Turkey and the Sunni-dominated Syrian opposition. Now
Turkish officials worry that the PYD-held areas could become a base
for PKK attacks against Turkish territory and security forces. Turkey
has threatened to intervene militarily if such attacks take place,
raising the chance that any scuffle could quickly expand.

In Iran, as in Turkey, the government has faced a Kurdish
insurgency. The movement there is led by the Free Life Party of
Kurdistan (PJAK), an offshoot of the PKK. On occasion, Turkey and Iran
used to coordinate efforts and share intelligence to combat PKK and
PJAK attacks. However, the two countries' relationship has grown
strained over Syria, leading to a sharp reduction in
cooperation. That, in turn, has weakened Turkey's ability to deter PKK
attacks. Moreover, according to Turkish officials, Iran has started
clandestinely supporting the PKK. Iran has little interest in the PKK
insurgency coming to an end, since that would eliminate one of
Tehran's main levers for putting pressure on Turkey.


F. STEPHEN LARRABEE holds the Distinguished Chair in European Security
at the RAND Corporation.

[Vrej1915]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

Geopolitical Shifts in Mideast
Will Benefit Kurds


By: Jihad el-Zein Translated from An-Nahar (Lebanon).
اقرا المقال الأصلي باللغة العربية
No matter where the rains fall in our region these days, the bloom is always Kurdish. In the Kurds’ view, be they elites or commoners, this political era is theirs — an era that would see the redressing of 90 years of injustices perpetrated against them since after the First World War. Here, then, is the Kurdish view of the situation in the region on this new-year celebration of Nowruz today.


In the last decade, the first truly independent Kurdish state in modern times was established under the formula of a “federal region” within the Iraqi state. Yet, if it weren’t for the region’s share of the central government’s oil, nothing would remain of this formula, except nominal ties marred by a relation of daily confrontations.
During the two years since the Syrian revolution erupted, Syrian Kurds in the extreme north and northeastern parts of the country have enjoyed self-rule in their areas, which extend discontinuously over hundreds of kilometers from Afrin to al-Qamishli along the border with Turkey. The term "Western Kurdistan" was even created during the Syrian revolution to describe these regions, which possess historical roots dissimilar to those of Kurdish areas in Northern Iraq. This is because a large portion of their inhabitants came from Turkey and took refuge there after World War I to escape the Kurdish-Turkish clashes that erupted in the first decade following the establishment of Kamal Ataturk’s republic.
Throughout the revolution, and despite the fact that control over Kurdish areas fell mostly to the Democratic Union Party — which does not agree, and even clashes, with the Free Syrian Army militias, especially the Islamic fundamentalist factions among them — the Syrian revolutionary leadership committees established abroad were always keen to give precedence to Kurdish individuals. This led to the appointment of Abdulbaset Sieda as head of the Syrian National Council and then Ghassan Hitto as head of the interim government for the liberated areas. It is also well known that many disagreements erupted within the opposition’s institutions between Arabs and Kurds concerning the future identity of Syria and its regime.
But the happiest development, which might turn out to be the most important event for Kurds in the region, is the ongoing transformation in the relationship between the leader of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), the imprisoned Abdullah Ocalan, and the ruling Justice and Development Party in Turkey, headed by Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Information in the Turkish press confirms that an agreement has been reached between Ocalan and Ankara, following negotiations started by members of the Kurdish bloc in Turkey’s parliament with officials from the country’s intelligence services, concerning a series of unprecedented steps to establish peace between the two sides, especially in southeastern Turkey. The whole of Turkey is now waiting for Ocalan to address his party’s fighters, instructing them to withdraw beyond Turkey’s borders (to the Kandil Mountains in Northern Iraq) on the occasion of the Kurdish Nowruz celebration on March 21, in return for Ankara’s consent to a series of steps that would strengthen the democratic gains achieved by Turkish Kurds on the political and cultural fronts. This would hinge on the condition that the PKK abandons its secessionist agenda.
This bold step by Erdogan would undoubtedly not have occurred — or hastened — had the situation in Syria not changed two years ago. It is true that Kurdish political and military pressure inside Turkey has a long history. It is also true that Erdogan strives to amend the constitution and instill a presidential system of governance with him as president. However, the situation that has arisen on the Turkish-Syrian border after March 17, 2011, pushed Erdogan, after much hesitation, into going further and implementing bolder steps in his negotiations with Ocalan. For Erdogan, two years ago, had gone so far as to adopt a hardline discourse against the armed Kurdish insurrection, similar to that espoused by extremist Turkish nationals against any form of recognition of a distinctive Kurdish political identity in Turkey.
The Syrian crisis has revealed, and the Turkish leader has discovered, that Turkey’s border with Syria — from Aleppo’s countryside to al-Qamishli (approximately 500 kilometers long) — is, in large part, Kurdish.
The practical experience gained on the ground during the last two years, and Erdogan’s orders to Turkish intelligence services to systematically take charge of the border region with Syria and help Syrian opposition forces spread their control over those regions or even “surrender” them to the opposition on the Syrian side, have made the Turkish president realize that his support of the Syrian revolution against the regime has given Turkish Kurds — and the PKK specifically — a source of backing and a demographic, political and military depth that he had not expected.
This means that Turkey, as it entered into this wide-ranging international and regional operation to curb Iranian influence over Damascus, not only found itself suddenly at loggerheads with the Russians and their decision to back the Syrian regime, but was also surprised by the negative developments taking place on its border. Ankara was worried about the growing possibility that a Western Kurdistan be established, affording the PKK fighters a safe haven at a time when Turkey sought to establish a buffer zone on its northern border with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. These developments manifested themselves through a dangerous escalation of armed Kurdish attacks inside Turkey, despite the fact that, in theory at least, the guerillas originated in Northern Iraq.
Through experience, Erdogan understood that preventing his policies toward Syria from mutating into a strategic burden for Turkey — in this, its most worrisome of internal affairs — requires that unprecedented initiatives be undertaken in his negotiations with prisoner Ocalan.
Turkey still awaits the results of this negotiating experiment between its strong government and the Kurds, which echoes the courageous decision that former French president Charles De Gaulle took to negotiate with the Algerian National Liberation Front after 1958. These negotiations led to very difficult times internally for France, culminating in a series of attempted coups d’état by extremist French colonial officers who were backed by a portion of French society unable to digest the idea of Algerian independence.
The fundamental difference in the Turkish case is that the reconciliation project completely precludes any secessionist proclivities by the Kurds, despite the fact that it remains unclear what agreements were reached pertaining to the manner by which the Turkish state’s Kurdish areas would be ruled.
The agreement is still in its infancy, yet its first victims were the female Kurdish leaders in Paris a short while ago. Nationalist Turkish factions, represented in parliament and the (politically impotent) army, are still observing the events unfold, and we still don’t have any indications as to the depth of the agreement. Thus, we cannot anticipate any final reactions to it; except to say that they range from caution (the Republican People’s Party) to rejection among hardline nationalists (the Nationalist Movement Party).
Turkey’s labor pains just started, but current events seem to indicate that the ensuing birth will be to the Kurds’ liking and will fulfill the nationalist interests that they aspire to.
As a result, the Kurdish elite finds itself needing to contend with the following issues:
The Kurds’ critics could claim that Kurdish aspirations can only be fulfilled at the expense of the “disintegration” of other nations, specifically Iraq and Syria. This means that, since their inception in 1920, Kurdish nationalist movements have always been reliant upon the need to dismantle the region’s countries.
In response, the Kurds could say that it was no accident that their political and economic rise occurred in the era of democratic changes in the Arab world, which means that the oppressive ruling regimes were responsible for Arab repression against them.
Both views are correct! Congratulations to the Kurds and Iranians on the occasion of Nowruz today, and condolences — on Mother’s Day — to all the grieving mothers of the victims of this upswell in nationalist, democratic, Arab, Kurdish, Turkish and Iranian sentiments.
The region has long exploited the Kurds. Now, their time has come to return the favor.


Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/poli...#ixzz2OwAl06qz