Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

[Vrej1915]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

Ո՞ւմ է հանձնելու Թուրքիան Արևմտյան Հայաստանը

ՆԱԻՐԱ ՀԱՅՐՈՒՄՅԱՆ, Մեկնաբան
Մեկնաբանություն - Չորեքշաբթի, 02 Հուլիսի 2014,

Այս ամիս աշխարհը նշելու է Առաջին համաշխարհային պատերազմի 100-ամյակը, որի հետևանքով փլուզվեցին կայսրություններ, այդ թվում, Օսմանյանը: Հայկական տարածքները բաժանվեցին Խորհրդային Ռուսաստանի և նորաստեղծ Թուրքիայի Հանրապետության միջև: Վիլսոնի նախագծով՝ ի դեմս Հայաստանի տարածաշրջանում հզոր տեխնոլոգիական ու քաղաքակրթական կենտրոն ստեղծելու ամերիկացիների փորձերը ռուս-թուրքական դավադրության պատճառով հաջողության չհասան: 100 տարի անց տարածաշրջանում նույն բանն է տեղի ունենում:

Իրաքն ակնհայտորեն 3 մասի է բաժանվում, իսկ Թուրքիան շտապում է պայմանավորվել քրդերի ու սուննի առաջնորդների հետ: Թուրքիան պատրաստ է ճանաչել Իրաքի մասնատումը, սակայն պայմանով, որ քրդական հավակնությունները չեն տարածվի Թուրքիայի վրա:

Օգոստոսին Թուրքիայում նախագահական ընտրություններ են, և ներկայիս վարչապետ Էրդողանն արդեն առաջադրել է իր թեկնածությունը: Նրա հակառակորդ Ֆեթուլլահ Գյուլենը լռում է: Նա կամ վճռորոշ պահին է սպասում, կամ էլ պայմանավորվածություն կա: Թուրքիայի ընտրությունները, հնարավոր է, համընկնեն Իրաքի մասնատման ու Քրդական պետության ստեղծման հետ:

Կմտնի՞ արդյոք ներկայիս Թուրքիայի մի մասը նոր Քուրդիստանի կազմ: Չի բացառվում, դատելով նրանից, որ Թուրքիայի խորհրդարանում իրավական հիմքեր են նախապատրաստում Օջալանի հետ բանակցությունների համար: Իսկ դա նշանակում է, որ Առաջին աշխարհամարտից 100 տարի անց Թուրքիան պահպանվելու համար կարող է քրդերի օգտին զիջել իր մի մասը: Ընդ որում, չի բացառվում, որ Թուրքիան կհամաձայնվի Քրդստանին տալ Արևմտյան Հայաստանը:

Հայաստանը կրկի՞ն բաժանված կմնա Ռուսաստանի ու Թուրքիայի միջև: Մյուս տարի նշվելու է Հայոց ցեղասպանության 100-ամյակը, և հիմա արդեն խոսվում է Թուրքիայի դեմ Հաագայի դատարանում իրավական փաթեթ ներկայացնելու մասին: Անկարան չի սպասելու, սահմանին սադրելու է Հայաստանին, սակայն գլխավորը՝ փորձելու է նորից պայմանավորվել Ռուսաստանի հետ:

Նախնական պայմանավորվածությունն արդեն կա: 2011 թվականին՝ Մոսկվայի պայմանագրի 90-ամյակին, որով Հայաստանը բաժանվել է Ռուսաստանի ու Թուրքիայի միջև, ՌԴ նախկին նախագահ Դմիտրի Մեդվեդևը վարչապետ Էրդողանին նվիրեց փաստաթղթի բնօրինակը, որպեսզի ոչ ոք այն չկարողանա վիճարկել: Դա նշան էր այն բանի, որ ռուս-թուրքական գործարքը շարունակվում է:

Տարածաշրջանը, սակայն, արագ փոխվում է: Նույնիսկ թուրքական խորամանկ դիվանագիտությունը չի հասցնում իրադարձությունների հետևից: Իրաքի մասնատումը կարող է տարածաշրջանային պայթյունի դետոնատոր դառնալ, և Թուրքիան Ռուսաստանի հետ միասին լրջորեն կարող է տուժել թեկուզ միայն այն պատճառով, որ աշխարհում ոչ ոք այլևս չի թաքցնում այդ երկու երկրների միջազգային մեկուսացման քաղաքականությունը: Երկուսն էլ ժամանակին կայսրություններ են եղել, սակայն այդպես էլ աշխարհին նորարարական ոչ մի բան չեն առաջարկել՝ հույս դնելով միայն բիրտ ուժի և ուղղահայացի վրա: Այժմ նրանց համար դժվար է պահել նույնիսկ տարածաշրջանային տերության կարգավիճակը:

Թուրքիան, սակայն, տեղում նստած չէ: Վերջին մի քանի տասնամյակների ընթացքում օգտվելով Արևմուտքում հակառուսական ու հակաիրանական տրամադրություններից՝ Անկարան կարողացել է կոմունիկացիոն կենտրոն դառնալ՝ իր տարածքն առաջարկելով որպես տրանզիտ: Ողջ խնդիրը, սակայն, այն է, որ թուրքական, ինչպես նաև ռուսական տրանզիտը դուր չի գալիս Արևմուտքին ու Իրանին: Եթե տարածաշրջանում պայթյուն լինի, նրանք կփորձեն տրանզիտի այլ ճանապարհներ գտնել, իսկ այդ ճանապարհներն անցնում են միայն Հայաստանով ու Նախիջևանով:

Մինչդեռ ինչ-որ անձնական պատճառներով Հայաստանը հեռացրել է Իրաքում իր դեսպանին և դեռ չի նշանակել նորին: Այս կերպ ասած, մի երկրում, որի վրա կարող է Արևմտյան Հայաստանի հողերին հավակնող պետություն առաջանալ, Արևելյան Հայաստանը դեսպան չունի: Շատ իմաստուն քաղաքականություն է:
- See more at: http://www.lragir.am/index/arm/0/com....pjcgbbVu.dpuf

[Vrej1915]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

13 June 2014

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27836520

Could Iraq conflict boost Kurdish dreams of independence?


By Jim Muir
BBC News, Irbil


As Iraq descends deeper into chaos and the fires burn closer to Baghdad, the Kurds in the north have quietly taken advantage of the tumult to expand and tighten their control in the oil-rich Kirkuk province, long the object of their dreams and aspirations.

The move was both defensive and ambitious, carrying strong elements of both opportunity and risk.

"Part of the motivation was to avert a humanitarian disaster," said a senior source in Irbil.

"Had we not filled the vacuum left by the Iraqi army's departure, everybody would have flooded into the Kurdistan region. We had half a million people banging on our doors.

"It's a lot simpler to send 100 peshmergas (Kurdish military forces) to hold the fort and keep security, so that people could stay put. Once our units went in, the displaced started going back."

But there's clearly more to it than that. The Kurdish media have been hailing the step as a historic reunification of Kurdish lands.

xxxel in their crown
Kirkuk city, which has a mixed population of Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen, has long been a thorny issue in Iraqi politics.

Iraqis walk on a street in the northern city of Kirkuk on 13 June 2014
Iraq's Kurds have long-hoped to control the oil-rich city of Kirkuk
Its special status as a disputed city was recognised in the post-Saddam Hussein Iraqi constitution, which called for the situation in the city to be "normalised" by:

The return to the south of Arabs settled there by the deposed ruler
The restoration of expelled Kurds
A census
A referendum on whether the province should join the Kurdistan autonomous region.
But that has never happened, and Kirkuk, as well as other disputed areas along the Arab-Kurdish ethnic fault line, have been flashpoints for friction between Kurdish forces and Iraqi government troops.

Now, the latter have melted away, leaving Kirkuk to fall into the hands of the Kurds like a ripe fruit.

Map showing the Kurdish inhabited areas on the borders of Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Armenia.
With the rest of Iraq apparently disintegrating along sectarian lines, and the central government in Baghdad in disarray, it will clearly be a long time before an Iraqi authority can challenge the Kurds' absorption of what they have long seen as the rightful xxxel in their crown.

The Kurdistan region has already angered Baghdad by going its own way and selling its oil and gas directly to and through its northern neighbour Turkey, with which the regional government (KRG) has developed a close partnership despite historic Turkish suspicions of Kurdish nationalism.

Now it seems likely that the acquisition of Kirkuk, both the city and the province with its rich oilfields, will boost the trend towards outright independence for the Kurdistan region.

Dominant forces
"Absolutely, it brings independence a step closer," said a well-placed source.

"We have lost hope in the sanity of the people governing Iraq. We don't want to be part of the failure of something for which we're not responsible. Nobody gave more than us in the effort to keep Iraq together, but now we're giving up, there's no hope."

But the move is not without risks.

It brings Kurdish forces into direct proximity with the militants who have taken over in Mosul and other adjacent areas.

In recent years, Kirkuk has already seen many suicide and other bomb attacks attributed to Sunni radicals, which are very rare inside the KRG autonomous area itself.

Kurdish Iraqi security forces patrol a street in Kirkuk on 13 June 2014
Iraqi Kurdish forces say they took control of Kirkuk as the army fled
If instability spreads, it could affect the current boom in investment and economic activity in Kurdistan, which has flourished while the rest of Iraq has largely stagnated and been mired in turmoil.

If the Sunni areas are starting to go their own way, much will depend on the composition of the dominant forces taking part in that process.

Other strands
So far, the public face that has resonated around the world has been that of the ultra-radical al-Qaeda offshoot known as ISIS, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.

But as with the anti-US insurgency from 2004 on, there are clearly other strands to the revolt, which explains the resonance it is having, and the speed of its movement through the mainly Sunni areas on which it is concentrating.

The Kurds have no sympathy for the ISIS radicals, but they are in touch with other elements, including tribal leaders and commanders of the Military Councils of Iraqi Revolutionaries (MCIR), which includes many experienced former Iraqi army officers.

The Kurds have been given assurances from the latter that they will not encroach on the borders of the KRG autonomous region, according to an MCIR spokesman.

Images allegedly showing ISIS militants in the northern Iraqi city of Samarra
Tribal leaders and former army officers are believed to be fighting alongside ISIS militants in the Sunni revolt
The MCIR claims that overall, its fighters are the most significant element in the revolt, with tribal militants in second place, and ISIS only third despite the media attention they command.

When Sunni rebels took over the city of Fallujah, west of Baghdad, in January, Prime Minister Nouri Maliki asked the Kurds to send peshmerga forces to help drive them out, sources say.

But the request was turned down. The Kurdish leadership's message to the MCIR conversely was that Irbil would not be against the Sunnis taking the road of establishing their own autonomous area, following the lead of Kurdistan itself.

That would clearly not apply if ISIS emerged as the dominant force in self-administering Sunni areas. Its philosophy and practices are so extreme that it has even been disavowed by its parent leadership, the international al-Qaeda movement headed by Osama Bin Laden's successor Ayman al-Zawahiri.

A future scenario where the Kurdish forces helped "moderate" elements such as the MCIR to oust ISIS is not hard to envisage.

Already there are signs of a potential conflict between strands of the rebel movement, although they are cooperating for the time being.

"There is no friction or clashes between us at the moment, but we plan to avoid them until we are settled and operations are finished, then we will kick them out of Mosul," said an MCIR source.

"We are warning their leaders that if they perpetrate any violations, they will become our first enemy, so they are behaving so far."

Stir hostility
Politically, the clerical body which is the spiritual point of reference for mainstream militant Sunni groups, the Association of Muslim Clerics (AMC), has put out a statement which clearly takes issue with the radical declaration put out by the ISIS spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the day before.

He called for revenge and score-settling in Baghdad, and for the militants to march on the holy Shia city of Karbala to the south of the capital.

That would clearly be a recipe for sectarian carnage and civil war between Sunnis and Shias, something the AMC said is absolutely not on the agenda.

Iraqi Shia pilgrims crowd the streets of Karbala in 2005
Karbala is among the holiest cities for Shia Muslims
"Calls for the revolutionaries to head for Karbala, Najaf and elsewhere are rejected, unacceptable and irresponsible on the part of those issuing them," the AMC statement said.

"It would stir hostility to the revolution and make it fail, diverting its goal from helping the oppressed to stirring up sectarian conflict between the sons of our one people, quite apart from the fact that everybody knows that most of the Iraqi people in the south reject Maliki and his gang, and suffer his oppression like the rest of us."

The AMC insisted that forgiveness and tolerance should be the keynote in administering the "liberated" areas, and that nothing should be done to prejudice people's livelihoods or impose dress codes on them, even if they were not in line with strict Islamic precepts.

In another clear reference to ISIS, it said that no group should claim to represent the entire revolt and take strategic decisions without consultation.

It also called for the immediate release of the 49 Turkish nationals seized by ISIS from the consulate in Mosul, saying this risked alienating a powerful neighbour and provoking intervention.

But even the AMC embraced the goal of reaching Baghdad, "because the ruling regime is there, the source of oppression and crimes against the people, so there is no other way of lifting the yoke as long as the regime fails to look after others."

Room for compromise
So the seeds of an incipient struggle within the rebel movement are clearly there, though the AMC stressed the need to avoid the kind of chaos and in-fighting afflicting opposition groups in the anti-government uprising in Syria.

Clearly, the current Sunni revolt has much more to it than the intrusion of foreign jihadist "terrorists", as Prime Minister Maliki has claimed.

The Americans and others are aware that the turmoil reflects Mr Maliki's failure to draw major Sunni political forces into the political process and give them a stake, one of several factors inhibiting them from producing a forceful and determined response to his appeals for help.

Despite their visible differences, the various elements in the Sunni revolt are agreed on the need to push towards Baghdad, a campaign that is likely to see movement from the western side - Anbar province - as well as from the north.

But as with the Kurds in the north, the course of events will depend a great deal on which strand predominates within the rebel movement.

If ISIS prevails, open-ended sectarian strife can be expected. But if the more moderate groups assert themselves, there may be room for compromise and accommodation.

[Vrej1915]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

13 November 2013

Syrian Kurdish party plans transitional administration



Syria's largest Kurdish party has said it plans to form an transitional administration.

The administration would rule Kurdish-majority areas in the northeast until the broader conflict is over.

Kurdish groups in northern Syria have tried to stay out of the civil war between the government and rebels.

However, Islamist rebels have moved into Kurdish-controlled areas in recent months, causing increasing clashes between them and Kurdish militias.

The Kurdish Democratic Union party (PYD) announced the move after two days of talks in the town of Qamishli in north-eastern Syria.

Alan Semo, the PYD's UK-based representative, told the BBC his party was not seeking to carve out a separate Kurdish state.

Mr Semo said the region would be "integrated in future in a united, democratic, plural Syria", adding that neighbouring Turkey, which has fought a long war against Kurdish rebels, had nothing to fear from the move.

"I think Turkey will realise that this step is not a threat to any regional or international or global stability, it is temporary," he added.

The PYD planned to introduce a constitution and regional parliament, with representation for non-Kurds in the area, he went on.

However, it is not clear whether all Kurdish factions will take part in the administration.

"I think that such a rushed, one-sided move will be seen as... an obstacle to the Syrian opposition," Nuri Brimo, a member of another Kurdish grouping, the Kurdish National Council (KNC), told AFP.

A de facto autonomous Kurdish zone was created when government forces withdrew from the area in the summer of 2012.

Last month Kurdish fighters took control of a border crossing with Iraq from an Islamist rebel group.

Syria's Kurdish minority makes up around 10% of the population and is largely concentrated in the country's far north-east, near the borders with Turkey and Iraq.

The fighting between jihadist rebels and armed Kurdish militia has added another layer to Syria's complex civil war.

[Vrej1915]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

28 October 2013

Iraqi Kurdistan: State-in-the-making?


By Kevin Connolly

BBC Middle East correspondent, Irbil, northern Iraq
Wherever you are in the world it takes nerve to invest in the amusement park industry - roller coasters can go down as well as up.
But the Chavy Land Park in the Iraqi-Kurdish city of Sulaymaniyah offers a particularly challenging balance of risk and reward.
On the one hand there isn't much competition for the leisure dollar in the Iraqi tourism industry - not yet at least.
On the other, the violence and chaos of the last few decades is still a painfully recent memory.
You get an echo of that in the recorded announcement at the gate which reminds you that you're not allowed to bring weapons into the park.
But Chavy Land is an impressive achievement.
The neon lights of an imposing Ferris Wheel and an eye-wateringly high roller coaster gleam against the inky night sky like precious stones on a xxxeller's cushion.
A haven of peace
It is attracting Iraqis from southern cities like Baghdad and Basra. Slowly the Kurdish region of Northern Iraq has already established a reputation for being more stable and more secure than the rest of the country.
It's beginning to look as though the Kurdish people of the region are quietly working to build a new nation-state here which would represent a challenge to the boundaries and borders created by the Great Powers at the end of World War One.
Hassan Mohamed Darner, chief executive of Chavy Land is in no doubt: "The Northern part of Iraq is... Kurdistan," he says proudly. "It's safe - people come here to study and they come here to trade."
Asked if the rest of the world should go ahead and grant Iraqi Kurdistan official diplomatic recognition he says simply, "Yes, definitely. And they should do it now."
It's certainly true that this is a time of renewed upheaval in the Middle East but the change is not yet on the scale of the deal-making and nation-building that followed the Great War.
The Kurds emerged as losers from that process, specifically because a secret carve-up between Britain and France called the Sykes-Picot agreement, made no provision for an independent Kurdish state.
They were divided between Syria and Turkey, Iran and Iraq - a tough diplomatic neighbourhood in which to nurse forbidden dreams of statehood.
There is no doubt that the chaos in modern Iraq and the weakness of the federal government in faraway Baghdad presents the Iraqi Kurds, at least, with an opportunity to take their regional autonomy and quietly turn it into something more.
Every round of sectarian violence in the rest of the country - like the car-bombings at the weekend which killed at least 50 people - underlines that weakness and deepens Kurdish resolve.
'New rules'
The Turkish political scientist Soli Ozel offers this judgement on the importance of this moment in the Middle East.
"For all intents and purposes," he argues, "they have their own state in Northern Iraq and they're likely to have some kind of autonomous zone in Syria.
Therefore the Kurds as a nationality have now re-appeared on the world stage. They're undoing Sykes-Picot for themselves."
On this changing political landscape it feels as though everyone is learning the rules of a new game.
Turkey, for example, fought for decades to crush an armed Kurdish insurgency within its borders and as part of a kind of cultural war it tried to ban the very word "Kurd", preferring the ludicrous 'Mountain Turk' instead.
Turkish operations have in the past included incursions into neighbouring Iraqi Kurdistan which it's accused of providing safe havens for the Kurdish fighters.
But Turkey is also Iraqi Kurdistan's most important trading partner - buying its oil and gas and investing heavily in its construction boom.
The relationship works - for the moment - because each side has something that the other needs.
But there is clearly an underlying tension there too.
United Kurdistan?
Many Kurds still harbour the dream of a homeland which unites the Kurdish elements of Turkey, Syria and Iran as well as Iraq - although they're pragmatic enough to recognise that as no more than a distant pipe dream.
Turkish support will only continue as long as the aspirations to nation-building are strictly confined to Iraqi Kurdistan.
The regional government in the capital Irbil is playing its cards skilfully.
Hemin Hawrami from the country's largest political party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), says its all a matter of balancing those long-term political dreams against the practical diplomatic realities of the moment.
"If you ask any Kurd whether they want to have an independent Kurdistan, definitely you will get the answer 'Yes'," he told me. "But Kurdistan's strategy is to pursue this path in a peaceful way. We don't want to be the reason for the break-up of Iraq."
Of course you don't have to be a political genius to spot that that leaves open the possibility that they'd be pleased enough if Iraq broke up for other reasons.
For now, it feels as though Iraqi Kurdistan believes it can work on building a new nation-state as long as it doesn't say out loud that it is building a new nation state.
It takes in refugees - mostly fellow Kurds - from neighbouring Syria. It has its own flag, anthem and armed forces, and most importantly of all, it has oil.
A new pipeline is being built to take Kurdish oil to Turkey although it's impossible for an outsider to establish if that's going to be a joint project with the rest of Iraq or an independent pipeline with oil going direct to Turkey and money coming direct to Irbil.
However that issue is decided, you get a clear sense that in Iraqi Kurdistan there is suddenly a renewed energy to the old dream of statehood.
But it's a dream which is struggling to come to life at a difficult time in a dangerous region

[Vrej1915]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

Star (in Turkish), Turkey
Oct 24 2013


Be Careful!

Column by Orhan Miroglu

[Translated from Turkish]

The PKK [Kurdistan People's Congress, KGK] and the BDP [Peace and
Democracy Party] have been saying that the process that has been
underway for the past year has been a process of dialogue, and that
the time has finally come for negotiating.

To the extent that can be seen, topics that could be negotiated under
the current conditions, such as disarmament, the future in Turkey of
the KCK [Assembly of Communities of Kurdistan] structure, the
dismantling of Makhmur [refugee camp], bringing about the return to
the country of Kurdish political activists living in Europe, some of
whom have served as parliamentary deputies, and the economic
development of the region, are not being much mentionedaœ

The Kurdish side understands negotiations primarily in terms of a
"special status."

And it conceives of this autonomy as "building a democratic nation."

There will be a special status, and the KCK will administer this
special status, and will carry out nation-building on behalf of some
Kurds! And what the remainder of society says or thinks about this
makes no difference!

The others are no doubt seen as a portion of society that will become
adapted to a "democratic nation" to be constructed with a Jacobin
approach.

And the adaptation to the revolution or the "nation-building" of
peoples who are unable to adapt to national or class revolutions has
been possible, since the French Revolution of 1789 in the world, and
since the Dersim massacre in our own country, via "revolutionary
terror"!

And it is the Kurdish people who have been harmed the most by the
"revolutionary terror" or "revolutionary violence" that has been
implemented over the past 30 yearsaœ

***

The fact is that the letter that [imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah]
Ocalan wrote, which was read before the people on 21 March in
Diyarbakir, amounted, in terms of its substance and the future of the
Kurdish movement, to a strategic paradigm change, and put an end to an
era.

Ocalan called for a farewell to arms, and stated that, henceforth,
Kurdish politics should take a democratic place and follow a line that
eschewed violence.

But afterwards, very little in accord with the contents of this letter
was implemented.

Three conferences have been held -indeed, now a Democratic Islam
Conference is being held at Ocalan's request -but nothing regarding
the new paradigm foreseen in the letter, or regarding "internal
issues," has come onto the agenda in those conferences. A number of
messages and demands from the other side came out of those
conferences, and that is all.

The PKK has dragged its feet in withdrawing. Today we are debating
whether or not the cease-fire, rather than the withdrawal, is going to
continue.

Unfortunately, a broad circle of people both inside and outside the
country, including Turkish intellectuals ranging from leftists to
liberals, have done all that they could and ensured that the PKK will
remain, with its weapons, in Turkey for another year.

And under just these conditions, Kurdish politics, during a period in
which Turkey has entered into the run-up to elections, is demanding
negotiations.

Even if a negotiating table should be set up, talking about the
conditions of disarmament, or of laying down arms, which is a sine qua
non issue of negotiations, and even an agreement that would be reached
on this issue, would not in actual practice be of any benefit.

Because it is impossible for the armed groups to withdraw during the
winter months. Turkey is going to experience two elections within a
single year; in the Middle East, gigantic developments that have the
potential to impact the Kurdish issue as well are expected. [Syrian
President Bashar] Al-Asad is up to his neck in the Kurdish issue. He
is sending a special aircraft to Arbil, and is making attractive
proposals to the KDP [Kurdistan Democratic Party] and the PYD
[Democratic Union Party]. The translation of the proposals is as
follows:

If you turn hostile towards Turkey, I am prepared to govern Syria
together with you!

Ocalan is trying to pursue a cautious policy in order for the process
in Turkey to be able to be controlled, and so that things do not get
off track, but the PKK and the BDP have turned their faces more
towards Syria and the Rojava [Kurdish term for 'west,' used in
reference to northern Syria]. The thesis that there can be no solution
without the Rojava is being played up, and even Turkish intellectuals
are seen to have taken up this thesis with enthusiasm.

If, since after all no solution is possible without the Rojava, then
it is truly difficult to understand what the desire to negotiate is
focused on. Because not only is the address for a solution in the
Rojava not Turkey, but years and years could pass without any solution
in the Rojava, an even more bloody war could develop, or that
geographical region could, in the short term, turn into a depopulated
regionaœ

Why should the Kurdish citizens of a Turkey that is sitting down to
negotiate with the EU sacrifice the solution of their own problems,
and their own futures, to the uncertain future of Syria, which is a
country fractured by poverty and hunger in which clergymen issue
fatwas that "you can eat the flesh of dogs and cats," and just how
realistic is it, I wonder, to expect such a political solution from
them?

Certainly it is impossible to remain merely looking on at the
humanitarian tragedy taking place in the Rojava and in Syria; in this
regard, sensitivity can be shown in every area, and methods can be
sought to alleviate the tyranny.

But how appropriate is it to index politics to the Rojava?

I remember Hrant [referring to slain Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant
Dink] more frequently these days.

We were together at a panel discussion in Diyarbakir. He was offering
advice to his Kurdish brothers and said: "Be careful; the world's
playing with the Armenian people led to a process that destroyed a
million and a half Armenians, so be careful!"

God willing, I am mistaken, and my concerns are groundless. But what I
see is that the ancient hegemons of the world and of the Middle east
are preparing to play a bloody and murky game with the Kurds, and are
working to send the Kurds against Turkey in an ethnically-based waraœ

So be careful!


[Translated from Turkish]

[Vrej1915]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

Ի՞նչ կհասնի Հայաստանին «թուրքական տորթից»
Նաիրա Հայրումյան
Ուրբաթ, 20 Սեպտեմբերի 2013,


Մեծ Մերձավոր Արեւելքում մոտենում է «իքս» ժամը, երբ իրականացվելու է դրված նպատակներից մեկը եւ տեղի է ունենալու անցում այլ նպատակների:
Սիրիան մտադիր է զինված ընդդիմությանը հաշտության կոչ անել: Հաշտության հասնելու համար կողմերը պետք է վերացնեն հակամարտության պատճառը: Առավել հավանական է այն վարկածը, ըստ որի ընթանում է Սիրիան ֆեդերատիվ բաժանման խաղը՝ ալավիական, իսլամական եւ քրդական:
Արդեն բաց խոսվում է այն մասին, որ Սիրիայի հյուսիսում քրդական ինքնավարությունը դե ֆակտո կայացել է: Մնում է միայն Ասադի համաձայնությունը երկրի ֆեդերալացման հարցում: Ըստ ամենայնի, նման համաձայնություն ստացվել է, Իրանի ու Ռուսաստանի «շնորհիվ»:
Սիրիայի հյուսիսում քրդական ինքնավարության ստեղծումը եւ նրա դե ֆակտո ինտեգրումը Իրաքի Քրդստանին կհանգեցնի նրան, որ ռազմական գործողությունները կտեղափոխվեն Թուրքիայի տարածք: Էրդողանը ոչ սպառնալիքներով, ոչ էլ խոստումներով չի կարող կանխել իրադարձությունների նման ընթացքը: Առավել եւս, որ Թուրքիայի դեմ պատերազմ կսկսվի միանգամից մի քանի ճակատով:
Թուրքական քաղաքներում վերսկսել են հակակառավարական ակցիաները, որոնք արդեն դուրս են գալիս էկոլոգիայի շրջանակներից: Թուրքիան ահռելի տնտեսական վնասներ է կրում ամերիկյան պետական կառույցների որոշումների արդյունքում:
Քրդերը հայտարարել են, որ կանգնեցնում են գրոհայիններին դուրս հանելը, քանի դեռ Անկարան չի արել պատասխան քայլ: Վանի գավառում քուրդ երեխաները բոյկոտել են դպրոցական պարապմունքները, պահանջելով քրդերեն ուսուցում: Թուրքիայի քրդերը պահանջում են ինքնավարություն եւ ֆեդերալացում: Էրդողանը դիմադրում է, սակայն համաշխարհային մամուլում Թուրքիան արդեն համարվում է «չկայացած կայսրություն» եւ կանխատեսվում է դրա մայրամուտը:
Այս ֆոնին պատահական չէ հայկական գործոնի աշխուժացումը: Մասնավորապես, Եգիպտոսի դատարանում քննվում է հայերի ցեղասպանության զոհերի ժառանգների փոխհատուցման հարցը: Թուրքական մամուլը գրում է, որ ծպտյալ հայերն իրենց երեխաներին նվիրում են սեփականության վկայականներ, որոնք շուտով կհայտնվեն դատարաններում:
Հայաստանն, ինչպես միշտ, սպասում է, ավելի ճիշտ ինդիֆերենտ դիրքորոշում է որդեգրել: Մաքսային միություն մտնելու որոշում կայացնելուց հետո Հայաստանը հրաժարվեց անկախ արտաքին քաղաքականությունից: Եւ չի բացառվում, որ «թուրքական տորթի» բաժանումից Ռուսաստանի հետեւում թաքնված Հայաստանը ոչինչ չի ստանա: Ավելին, Ռուսաստանը կօգնի Թուրքիային, հայկական շահերի հաշվին: Ինչպես արդեն եղել է մեկ անգամ:
- See more at: http://www.lragir.am/index/arm/0/pol....WyD8GOvV.dpuf

[Vrej1915]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

LE NOM D'UN ARMENIEN DONNE A UN HOPITAL

Kurdistan Syrien

Le Groupe Actukurde a poste sur Facebook le message suivant a propos
d'un armenien dont le nom a ete donne a un hôpital.

" Le nom du medecin armenien Hrant Qurunfulyan a ete donne au centre
medical d'Amude, au Kurdistan syrien, qui a ouvert ses portes mercredi
18 septembre.

Membre du croissant rouge kurde, le medecin d'origine armenien Hrant
Qurunfulyan est decede le 28 aout. Il a travaille pendant 30 ans
comme medecin dans cette ville.

Un responsable du mouvement de la societe democratique du Kurdistan
Occidental (TEV-DEM), a affirme que le medecin armenien est un
exemple de la fraternite et de la vie commune, lors de la ceremonie
d'ouverture. "

jeudi 19 septembre 2013, Jean Eckian ©armenews.com

http://www.armenews.com/article.php3?id_article=93208

[bell-the-cat]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

Hasn't there been any interest from anthropologists, for example? Or is there pressure to not write about them?

Don't know, but I'm not really the person to ask about this. Though I'm distrustful of anything with the work "Kurd" in it, and I have never seen any work that details the migration patterns and the ever expanding areas inhabited by "Kurds" (whether they are real Kurds or ones just claimed to be Kurds by other Kurds to support their irredentist claims). One thing will be certain - those Solihan Zaza "Kurds" will have come from somewhere else, probably in the very recent past. That book, if it is a propaganda work, will not mention that. This lack of any mention of Kurdish migration and their expanding territory is probably the key way to distinguish a Kurdish propaganda work from a genuine academic work (if one exists).

[TomServo]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

Hasn't there been any interest from anthropologists, for example? Or is there pressure to not write about them?

[bell-the-cat]

Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia

Anyone know where I can find an objective and scholarly work (whether an article or monograph) on the Zaza? Amazon has a book called The Zaza Kurds of Turkey listed, written by a certain Mehmed Kaya (who I am assuming is Kurdish). I couldn't find any academic reviews of the book online.

Here is part of the introduction: "The Zaza-speaking Kurds are a people who can bring us closer to ancient Middle Eastern civilizations. The Zaza region is an area on which Persians, Armenians, Arabs, Mongols, and Turks have left their marks. But these groups have been perceived as intruders and oppressors. Throughout history, the local population has successfully fought against intruders to preserve its distinctive character."

I doubt that anything produced in English (0r any European language) will be something more than a propaganda work. And its title and the first few pages indicates that that particular book is propaganda (or maybe an otherwise bland ethnological study of the population of an obscure part of Turkey, with the Kurdish propaganda bit pasted onto it to make it more saleable).

Solihan and its surrounding villages are completely modern settlements, inhabited by migrants placed there by the Turkish authorities (probably in the 1940s and 50s). It's in a strangely green flat valley amid very desolate mountainous landscapes full of old lava flows. There used to be lots of storks nesting there - but the expanding town has covered over most of the area they once inhabited (the town has probably quadrupled in size since the 1980s). The district is called Menaskut on Lynch's 1901 map. It is but a short distance away from the Mush valley, a heartland area of historical Armenia. Becasue of that closeness, I would have expected its original population to have been Armenian, but probably a very sparse population.