Is Russia an ally or foe, nowadays?

[Vrej1915]

Re: Is Russia an ally or foe, nowadays?

Vrej, please read my post one more time for what am I really saying. You are asking an irrelevant question, because I am accusing lragir of criticizing (criticizing is not enough word) our government of not negotiating with Iran exactly now, when relations of Iran and west are thawing. Why was not lragir critisizing government before, about not trying to buy more gas or getting more close relationship with Iran? Why not then, but now when it's safe with west to criticize our government with this subject?
Before current Iran-west thawing, it would not serve western interests to bring the subject of closer relations with Iran for a euroservant "lragir" right?
Badalian automatically admits "Whatever Iran has stated or not stated for three years is one thing, and what it is saying now is something else. Iran has a new president, there is a new international situation relating to Iran and in the region in general", "three years ago the presidents of Iran and the United States did not telephone each other and a few months ago they did. Three years ago the relations between Iran and the West were escalating while now the opposite tendency is noticed."
He views Armenia-Iran relations from point of west not from Armenia's interests. Otherwise Badalian or anybody from "lragir" would bring up the issue and criticise the government for not "doing enough starting from 1995".
Also, "lragir' is not just critisizing. It basically repeats word for word whatever azeri and turkish media are spreading about our government for their own propaganda. Things like "Armenian government does not exist", "Armenian government is a vassal of russia", "Armenians want to annex Karabakh to russia", "Armenia is never independent", "Armenian government is an usurper" etc, etc.

Dear, You are turning things upside down.
You would be better inspired, if you conter the arguments of the article, rather than the container, as you do so often.

The question was ever present, I sent you back at the time of the construction of the Gas pipe between Kajaran and Tavriz. Back then the Russians did their most, to minimize the diameter of the tube, and back then, the same did criticize the Government.
Later, the same corrupt guys, sold in a magic transaction, the Armenia/Iran Gas Pipe, that WAS NOT PART OF HAYRUSGAZART, to the latter, and the same guys did criticise, just as today...

Why now?
Because it is now that Serjik is selling the last remnants of our statehood, and it is now, that the Iranian ambassador is proposing gas at 100 USD...

And why is azeri point of view, to begin with? Does a reality automatically stops being such, just because the azaris or turks state it, and use the sad reality in their propaganda?
Look at the other side of the medal. The Armenian media is full of arguments, about the corrupt character of Ilham Aliyev and his regime. Does that mean automatically, (from an azari point of view), that all that is marazm, slander, just because the enemy says so??

Was not Serjik the Voralez, who did every effort, to please Putin, and save his seat, just on Dec 2, Sept 3....? Or was it not reality??
Was that not the Tavajan Sejik, with his hilarious laugh, sitting and pleasing Mr Gul, in the center of Yerevan, to please the West and Russia in the same time? Was not him who changed the emblem of the Armenian football federation, taking off Mount Ararat, to please the Turks? (A symbol that did survive under communist regime, but Serjik dared, because he has no sense of National pride, and he is not the unique in his case. Most comsomol made minds, today at most decision making posts, are the product of the same extruder....., that's why they do survive so well). And what was the result of all that indignity??
Was not Serjik the one stating that Akna(aka Agdam) was not his fatherland (in his words, ours)? just to give credentials in Moskwa and the West, earning his seat as President, as one ready to any concessions and the least nationalist ?? (at least from his point of view..)
Was not Serjik, while sill minister, the stupid guy, believing in Armenicum?, Do you remember that thing?? For a couple of years, was not him, who made all the fuss about that marvelous scam?? All over the TV?? If anything this sole example is enough, how unwise, to say the least, he really is.... Do you remember all the money that he invested, for that ridiculous forgery, while honestly believing (and this is the real sad point, the fact that he beleived in it!!) in that extravgant, kazakho/russo/mafioso/copperfieldo scam??
Or is it the chess boards he likes to display every here and there, that gains him his credentials?

Do you genuinly think he does mind a fraction of a second, about National interests???

[Hakob]

Re: Is Russia an ally or foe, nowadays?

Dear,
You posted the english translation of the article I just posted.
Or you did not understand my question, or you play fool.
So please let me put it more extensively.
You accuse, the West of criticizing the Armenian government's cooperation with Iran in the past. A point that is only partially true, but that's not the matter.
Then you accuse Lragir of being sold out to the West, and thus anything it can publish is qualified as marasm by yourself.
I ask you, to post a Lragir article, from that past period, where, according your logic, as a blind servant of the Western interests, Lragir should have criticized the Armenian Policy of cooperation with Iran in Energy Sphere.

Vrej, please read my post one more time for what am I really saying. You are asking an irrelevant question, because I am accusing lragir of criticizing (criticizing is not enough word) our government of not negotiating with Iran exactly now, when relations of Iran and west are thawing. Why was not lragir critisizing government before, about not trying to buy more gas or getting more close relationship with Iran? Why not then, but now when it's safe with west to criticize our government with this subject?
Before current Iran-west thawing, it would not serve western interests to bring the subject of closer relations with Iran for a euroservant "lragir" right?
Badalian automatically admits "Whatever Iran has stated or not stated for three years is one thing, and what it is saying now is something else. Iran has a new president, there is a new international situation relating to Iran and in the region in general", "three years ago the presidents of Iran and the United States did not telephone each other and a few months ago they did. Three years ago the relations between Iran and the West were escalating while now the opposite tendency is noticed."
He views Armenia-Iran relations from point of west not from Armenia's interests. Otherwise Badalian or anybody from "lragir" would bring up the issue and criticise the government for not "doing enough starting from 1995".
Also, "lragir' is not just critisizing. It basically repeats word for word whatever azeri and turkish media are spreading about our government for their own propaganda. Things like "Armenian government does not exist", "Armenian government is a vassal of russia", "Armenians want to annex Karabakh to russia", "Armenia is never independent", "Armenian government is an usurper" etc, etc.

[Vrej1915]

Re: Is Russia an ally or foe, nowadays?

Is There Official Yerevan?

Hakob Badalyan, Political Commentator
Comments - Wednesday, 08 January 2014, 16:21


The Armenian prime minister described the statement by the Iranian ambassador that the gas price depends on negotiations and gas could cost 400 for one and 100 for another as a “diplomatic mistake”, noting that over the past three years Armenia has presented the opposite claim to Armenia – raise the price of gas which is supplied to Armenia and Armenia pays Iran 3 kW/hour electricity per one cu m of gas.
Tehran has not reacted to the “diplomatic mistake”. However, the ambassador of Iran had made several crisp and clear statements at the end of the past year, including on gas and electricity. He said the correlation of the aforementioned deal is not favorable for Iran, and Iran does not need to import electricity but Armenia needs it and Tehran helps. At that time the ambassador announced that the price of gas depends on negotiations.
Official Tehran needs to make it clear once again whether they are ready to negotiate buying gas from Iran more cheaply than the Russian gas. On the other hand, Iran has hinted that everything depends on official Yerevan’s wish. Tehran will not bother much to sell cheap gas to Armenia while official Yerevan refuses to negotiate cheap gas.
Whatever Iran has stated or not stated for three years is one thing, and what it is saying now is something else. Iran has a new president, there is a new international situation relating to Iran and in the region in general, Armenia is going to join the Customs Union after which Russia will set to annex Artsakh. Iran could have revised its approaches over three years. Three years ago the presidents of Iran and the United States did not telephone each other and a few months ago they did. Three years ago the relations between Iran and the West were escalating while now the opposite tendency is noticed.
Official Yerevan should take everything into consideration. Or it would take into account if it existed. However, there is no wish to negotiate cheap gas with Iran because official Yerevan does not exist and instead there is an annex to Moscow, a department of the Russian foreign minister, and Moscow does not have such a wish. Why should Moscow be interested in Armenia buying cheap gas from Iran?
Moreover, Moscow has prevented such possibilities through the Armenian-Russian gas deal which stipulates that Armenia will buy gas from Gazprom only until 2043. In this context, the statements of the Iranian ambassador are a “diplomatic mistake” so it is hard to find a publishable definition of the Armenian-Russian gas deal.
Due to the policy of the government aimed at depriving Armenia of the status of international political subject and transforming it to an attaché of Moscow’s policy the Republic of Armenia is facing the danger of a “geopolitical mistake” only because the people who have usurped government in Armenia are deprived of dignity of the nation.
- See more at: http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/com....tP1MUI2W.dpuf

Dear,
You posted the english translation of the article I just posted.
Or you did not understand my question, or you play fool.
So please let me put it more extensively.
You accuse, the West of criticizing the Armenian government's cooperation with Iran in the past. A point that is only partially true, but that's not the matter.
Then you accuse Lragir of being sold out to the West, and thus anything it can publish is qualified as marasm by yourself.
I ask you, to post a Lragir article, from that past period, where, according your logic, as a blind servant of the Western interests, Lragir should have criticised the Armenian Policy of cooperation with Iran in Energy Sphere.

[Hakob]

Re: Is Russia an ally or foe, nowadays?

Can you please post an article in Lragir, of that period, criticizing RA policy of cooperation with Iran in Energy sphere??

Is There Official Yerevan?

Hakob Badalyan, Political Commentator
Comments - Wednesday, 08 January 2014, 16:21


The Armenian prime minister described the statement by the Iranian ambassador that the gas price depends on negotiations and gas could cost 400 for one and 100 for another as a “diplomatic mistake”, noting that over the past three years Armenia has presented the opposite claim to Armenia – raise the price of gas which is supplied to Armenia and Armenia pays Iran 3 kW/hour electricity per one cu m of gas.
Tehran has not reacted to the “diplomatic mistake”. However, the ambassador of Iran had made several crisp and clear statements at the end of the past year, including on gas and electricity. He said the correlation of the aforementioned deal is not favorable for Iran, and Iran does not need to import electricity but Armenia needs it and Tehran helps. At that time the ambassador announced that the price of gas depends on negotiations.
Official Tehran needs to make it clear once again whether they are ready to negotiate buying gas from Iran more cheaply than the Russian gas. On the other hand, Iran has hinted that everything depends on official Yerevan’s wish. Tehran will not bother much to sell cheap gas to Armenia while official Yerevan refuses to negotiate cheap gas.
Whatever Iran has stated or not stated for three years is one thing, and what it is saying now is something else. Iran has a new president, there is a new international situation relating to Iran and in the region in general, Armenia is going to join the Customs Union after which Russia will set to annex Artsakh. Iran could have revised its approaches over three years. Three years ago the presidents of Iran and the United States did not telephone each other and a few months ago they did. Three years ago the relations between Iran and the West were escalating while now the opposite tendency is noticed.
Official Yerevan should take everything into consideration. Or it would take into account if it existed. However, there is no wish to negotiate cheap gas with Iran because official Yerevan does not exist and instead there is an annex to Moscow, a department of the Russian foreign minister, and Moscow does not have such a wish. Why should Moscow be interested in Armenia buying cheap gas from Iran?
Moreover, Moscow has prevented such possibilities through the Armenian-Russian gas deal which stipulates that Armenia will buy gas from Gazprom only until 2043. In this context, the statements of the Iranian ambassador are a “diplomatic mistake” so it is hard to find a publishable definition of the Armenian-Russian gas deal.
Due to the policy of the government aimed at depriving Armenia of the status of international political subject and transforming it to an attaché of Moscow’s policy the Republic of Armenia is facing the danger of a “geopolitical mistake” only because the people who have usurped government in Armenia are deprived of dignity of the nation.
- See more at: http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/com....tP1MUI2W.dpuf

[Vrej1915]

Re: Is Russia an ally or foe, nowadays?

Looks like we are going back to "lragir"'s zombie anti government mumblings. Yea it is very short time that Iran has new leader, and before that our government did everything to keep relations worm, despite Western efforts to isolate Iran. Even western diplomats were admitting that Armenian government was masterfully maintaining and progressing relations with Iran against US wishes. Now this sold out media (sold to west) tries to portray that our goverment has not been doing enough. Bunch of marazm. In this last diplomatic game between Yerevan and Tehran about energy, lragir is coming out of its skin to prove Iran's side and discredit our government.

Can you please post an article in Lragir, of that period, criticizing RA policy of cooperation with Iran in Energy sphere??

[Hakob]

Re: Is Russia an ally or foe, nowadays?

09:29 08/01/2014 » ECONOMY
Western economies: A tale of thieves and tapers

By Patrick L Young
From RT

2013 was the year where the threat of removing the QE punchbowl provoked market panic, while the EU was instrumental in sinister programs of theft above and beyond even the rapacious 'Central Bankers’ party'...

We began 2013 with the euro crisis yet to be cured, and indeed as we end the year it remains the fiscal elephant in the room. A volcano apparently dormant but clearly still active beneath the crater. Quite when it will next erupt nobody knows, but even Christine Lagarde of the IMF was keen during December to remind us that the crisis was far from resolved.

However, 2013 was the year where certain governments continued to be immolated on a symbolic funeral pyre as euro authorities sought to keep the flawed single currency alive at any price. Bank customers in Cyprus, ranging from Russian companies, through a significant quantity of the companies quoted on the Warsaw Stock Exchange and many individuals across the world found their assets appropriated. Rather than burn bondholders and others holding risk capital (Germany protected its bankers as they did in Ireland and elsewhere), the depositors found their deposits being stolen. The theft axis was one which carried on throughout the year. In an audacious deployment of arcane EU accounting rules previously exploited by Hungary, the Polish government de facto confiscated over half the nation’s private pension funds in an attempt to make up for their inadequate fiscal management.

Ultimately, most global citizens ended the year with their pockets having been picked in some way by rapacious governments, albeit through stealthy means... The daft policy of Quantitative Easing continued apace. In the vanguard remained the Federal Reserve handing bankers a cool 85 billion dollars every month to perpetuate the largely bankrupt system. During 2013, the US alone every month spent twice the annual GDP of Serbia in a balance sheet shuffle which a non-economist might prosaically term a confidence trick.

Even some traditional congressional spendthrifts have realised they can’t maintain this suicidal ‘rob Peter to pay bankers’ policy. Thus the second half of 2013 was spent obsessing about the ultimate financial terror (aside from the bankers’ previous hegemony). Outgoing Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke plotted a way out of the ‘crazynomics’ created by the ill-considered QE policy knee jerk after the credit crunch.

At first mention of a taper, markets panicked and, just like 2008, politicians lost their nerve. The taper was hastily postponed while the Fed endeavoured to counsel the markets to avoid what remains a case of Stockholm syndrome between banks and government. Ben Bernanke’s parting retirement gesture has been to taper by a rather derisory 10 billion dollars per month in the New Year.

For those lost in the arcane minutiae of quantitative easing (who isn’t?), it remains true that government oversaw a crazy party during the last decade where politicians maintained a delusion that they could inflate property markets with impunity. Banks joined the party and the result was chaos when inevitably the boom cycle led to bust. Sadly the party has long ended in the real economy but the bankers are being lubricated by a central banker punchbowl which the Fed is trying to gradually siphon out of the bar.

However, the damage has already been done and hence the terror of theft mentioned earlier will likely soon become post taper terror. Western politicians of left and right have successfully created a dangerous whirlpool of QE debt which has fed massive asset inflation - from fine art to classic cars through all manner of investment markets.

A day of QE reckoning is coming and the mood on the streets is understandably angry as normal business has been left behind in the bizarre escalation of a central bank spending spree which has only proven the ultimate impotence of government to create tangible wealth. Ironically it is the very banking elite the G20 pledged to curtail (Pittsburgh 2009) which have profited as everybody else has felt their wealth reduced through higher taxes, lower savings rates and the colossal failure of this unprecedented government interventionist phase to actually deliver any benefits to the economy at large. At least one could argue that some governments have finally succeeded with redistribution of wealth - problem is the people have paid to keep bankers and the absolute richest on their pedestals.

Sooner or later the taper will give way to terror and an incredible rebalancing will begin. However 2013 was dominated by what amounts to tawdry theft.
By Panorama.am

[Hakob]

Re: Is Russia an ally or foe, nowadays?

Պաշտոնական Երեւան կա՞, որ ցանկություն լինի

ՀԱԿՈԲ ԲԱԴԱԼՅԱՆ,
Մեկնաբան
Չորեքշաբթի, 08 Հունվարի 2014,

Իրանի դեսպանի հայտարարությունը, թե գազի էժան գինը կախված է բանակցությունից եւ մեկի համար կարող է 400 դոլար լինել, իսկ մեկի համար էլ 100, Հայաստանի վարչապետը որակեց «դիվանագիտական վրիպակ», ասելով, թե Իրանը վերջին երեք տարիներին հակառակ պահանջ է ներկայացրել Հայաստանին՝ թանկացնել գազը, որը մատակարարվում է եւ որի մեկ խմ-ի դիմաց Հայաստանն Իրանին տալիս է 3 կիլովատ ժամ էլեկտրաէներգիա:
Թեհրանը «դիվանագիտական վրիպակին» դեռ չի արձագանքել: Բայց, Իրանի դեսպանը նախորդ տարվա վերջին մի քանի բավական հստակ հայտարարություններ էր արել, այդ թվում գազ էլեկտրաէներգիայի դիմաց թեմայով: Նա ասել էր, որ դա Իրանին ձեռնտու հարաբերակցություն չէ եւ Իրանն ընդհանրապես էներգիայի ներկրման կարիք չունի, բայց քանի որ դա պետք է Հայաստանին, Թեհրանն օգնում է: Հենց այդ ժամանակ էր դեսպանը հայտարարել, որ գազի գինը կախված է բանակցությունից:
Պաշտոնական Թեհրանին երեւի թե հարկ կա եւս մեկ անգամ հստակեցնել, թե արդյոք իսկապես պատրաստ են Հայաստանի հետ բանակցել ռուսականից էժան գազի գնի վերաբերյալ: Մյուս կողմից սակայն, Իրանը առավել քան պարզ ակնարկեց, որ ամեն ինչ կախված է պաշտոնական Երեւանի ցանկությունից: Թեհրանն իրեն չի կոտորելու, որ Հայաստանին էժան գազ վաճառի, եթե պաշտոնական Երեւանը համառորեն չի ուզում բանակցել այդ էժան գազի վերաբերյալ:
Ինչ է ասել Իրանը երեք տարի, ինչ չի ասել` մի հարց է, իսկ ինչ է ասում հիմա` մեկ այլ հարց: Բանն այն է, որ Իրանում նոր նախագահ է, նաեւ նոր միջազգային իրավիճակ Իրանի շուրջ, նոր միջազգային իրավիճակ տարածաշրջանում ընդհանրապես, Հայաստանը դառնում է ՄՄ անդամ, որից հետո Ռուսաստանը ձեռնaմուխ է լինում Արցախի բռնակցմանը: Այդ ամենը «երեք տարի առաջ» չէ, եւ Իրանը լիովին կարող է վերանայել իր մոտեցումները: Երեք տարի առաջ Իրանի եւ ԱՄՆ նախագահները մոտ 40 տարի իրար հետ չեն խոսել, իսկ մի քանի ամիս առաջ խոսեցին: Երեք տարի առաջ Իրանի եւ Արեւմուտքի հարաբերությունը լարվում էր, իսկ այժմ հակառակ միտումներ են նկատվում:
Այդ ամենը պաշտոնական Երեւանը պետք է հաշվի առնի: Ավելի շուտ պետք է հաշվի առներ, եթե գոյություն ունենար: Բայց պաշտոնական Երեւան այլեւս գոյություն չունի, այլ գոյություն ունի պաշտոնական Մոսկվայի կցորդ, ՌԴ արտգործնախարարության մի վարչություն: Դրա համար էլ չկա Իրանի հետ էժան գազի գնի շուրջ բանակցելու ցանկություն: Որովհետեւ դրա ցանկությունը չկա Մոսկվայում: Իսկ ինչու պետք է Մոսկվան շահագրգռված լինի, որ Հայաստանն էժան գազ ստանա Իրանից:
Ավելին, Մոսկվան նույնիսկ արգելափակել է այդ հնարավորությունները հայ-ռուսական գազային պայմանագրով, որով Հայաստանին պարտավորեցրել է մինչեւ 2043 թվականը գնել միայն Գազպրոմի գազը: Այդ ֆոնին, եթե Իրանի դեսպանի հայտարարությունները որակվում են «դիվանագիտական վրիպակ», ապա դժվար է հրապարակման ենթակա բնորոշում գտնել հայ-ռուսական գազային համաձայնագիրը որակելու համար:
Հայաստանը միջազգային քաղաքականության սուբյեկտությունից զրկելու եւ մոսկովյան քաղաքականության կցորդի վերածելու իշխանության քաղաքականության հետեւանքով, Հայաստանի Հանրապետությունը կանգնած է «աշխարհաքաղաքական վրիպակի» վերածվելու վտանգի առաջ: Եվ դա միմիայն այն պատճառով, որ պետական արժանապատվության զգացումը որպես վրիպակ դուրս է մնացել Հայաստանի պետական լծակները յուրացրած անձանց նկարագրից եւ աշխարհընկալումից:
- See more at: http://www.lragir.am/index/arm/0/com....6SRQnogz.dpuf

Looks like we are going back to "lragir"'s zombie anti government mumblings. Yea it is very short time that Iran has new leader, and before that our government did everything to keep relations worm, despite Western efforts to isolate Iran. Even western diplomats were admitting that Armenian government was masterfully maintaining and progressing relations with Iran against US wishes. Now this sold out media (sold to west) tries to portray that our goverment has not been doing enough. Bunch of marazm. In this last diplomatic game between Yerevan and Tehran about energy, lragir is coming out of its skin to prove Iran's side and discredit our government.

[Vrej1915]

Re: Is Russia an ally or foe, nowadays?

Պաշտոնական Երեւան կա՞, որ ցանկություն լինի

ՀԱԿՈԲ ԲԱԴԱԼՅԱՆ,
Մեկնաբան
Չորեքշաբթի, 08 Հունվարի 2014,

Իրանի դեսպանի հայտարարությունը, թե գազի էժան գինը կախված է բանակցությունից եւ մեկի համար կարող է 400 դոլար լինել, իսկ մեկի համար էլ 100, Հայաստանի վարչապետը որակեց «դիվանագիտական վրիպակ», ասելով, թե Իրանը վերջին երեք տարիներին հակառակ պահանջ է ներկայացրել Հայաստանին՝ թանկացնել գազը, որը մատակարարվում է եւ որի մեկ խմ-ի դիմաց Հայաստանն Իրանին տալիս է 3 կիլովատ ժամ էլեկտրաէներգիա:
Թեհրանը «դիվանագիտական վրիպակին» դեռ չի արձագանքել: Բայց, Իրանի դեսպանը նախորդ տարվա վերջին մի քանի բավական հստակ հայտարարություններ էր արել, այդ թվում գազ էլեկտրաէներգիայի դիմաց թեմայով: Նա ասել էր, որ դա Իրանին ձեռնտու հարաբերակցություն չէ եւ Իրանն ընդհանրապես էներգիայի ներկրման կարիք չունի, բայց քանի որ դա պետք է Հայաստանին, Թեհրանն օգնում է: Հենց այդ ժամանակ էր դեսպանը հայտարարել, որ գազի գինը կախված է բանակցությունից:
Պաշտոնական Թեհրանին երեւի թե հարկ կա եւս մեկ անգամ հստակեցնել, թե արդյոք իսկապես պատրաստ են Հայաստանի հետ բանակցել ռուսականից էժան գազի գնի վերաբերյալ: Մյուս կողմից սակայն, Իրանը առավել քան պարզ ակնարկեց, որ ամեն ինչ կախված է պաշտոնական Երեւանի ցանկությունից: Թեհրանն իրեն չի կոտորելու, որ Հայաստանին էժան գազ վաճառի, եթե պաշտոնական Երեւանը համառորեն չի ուզում բանակցել այդ էժան գազի վերաբերյալ:
Ինչ է ասել Իրանը երեք տարի, ինչ չի ասել` մի հարց է, իսկ ինչ է ասում հիմա` մեկ այլ հարց: Բանն այն է, որ Իրանում նոր նախագահ է, նաեւ նոր միջազգային իրավիճակ Իրանի շուրջ, նոր միջազգային իրավիճակ տարածաշրջանում ընդհանրապես, Հայաստանը դառնում է ՄՄ անդամ, որից հետո Ռուսաստանը ձեռնaմուխ է լինում Արցախի բռնակցմանը: Այդ ամենը «երեք տարի առաջ» չէ, եւ Իրանը լիովին կարող է վերանայել իր մոտեցումները: Երեք տարի առաջ Իրանի եւ ԱՄՆ նախագահները մոտ 40 տարի իրար հետ չեն խոսել, իսկ մի քանի ամիս առաջ խոսեցին: Երեք տարի առաջ Իրանի եւ Արեւմուտքի հարաբերությունը լարվում էր, իսկ այժմ հակառակ միտումներ են նկատվում:
Այդ ամենը պաշտոնական Երեւանը պետք է հաշվի առնի: Ավելի շուտ պետք է հաշվի առներ, եթե գոյություն ունենար: Բայց պաշտոնական Երեւան այլեւս գոյություն չունի, այլ գոյություն ունի պաշտոնական Մոսկվայի կցորդ, ՌԴ արտգործնախարարության մի վարչություն: Դրա համար էլ չկա Իրանի հետ էժան գազի գնի շուրջ բանակցելու ցանկություն: Որովհետեւ դրա ցանկությունը չկա Մոսկվայում: Իսկ ինչու պետք է Մոսկվան շահագրգռված լինի, որ Հայաստանն էժան գազ ստանա Իրանից:
Ավելին, Մոսկվան նույնիսկ արգելափակել է այդ հնարավորությունները հայ-ռուսական գազային պայմանագրով, որով Հայաստանին պարտավորեցրել է մինչեւ 2043 թվականը գնել միայն Գազպրոմի գազը: Այդ ֆոնին, եթե Իրանի դեսպանի հայտարարությունները որակվում են «դիվանագիտական վրիպակ», ապա դժվար է հրապարակման ենթակա բնորոշում գտնել հայ-ռուսական գազային համաձայնագիրը որակելու համար:
Հայաստանը միջազգային քաղաքականության սուբյեկտությունից զրկելու եւ մոսկովյան քաղաքականության կցորդի վերածելու իշխանության քաղաքականության հետեւանքով, Հայաստանի Հանրապետությունը կանգնած է «աշխարհաքաղաքական վրիպակի» վերածվելու վտանգի առաջ: Եվ դա միմիայն այն պատճառով, որ պետական արժանապատվության զգացումը որպես վրիպակ դուրս է մնացել Հայաստանի պետական լծակները յուրացրած անձանց նկարագրից եւ աշխարհընկալումից:
- See more at: http://www.lragir.am/index/arm/0/com....6SRQnogz.dpuf

[Haykakan]

Re: Is Russia an ally or foe, nowadays?

Typical stuff you hear from all western propaganda tools. The source tells it all.

Armenian U-Turn On EU Not As 'Objective' As Thought
December 30, 2013 -
Armenia European Union Russia
A EurasiaNet Partner Post from: RFE/RL

Armenia's last-minute decision to join a Russian-led customs union at the expense of much closer ties with the European Union has been widely attributed in the West to strong pressure and bullying by Russia. The dominant view among policymakers, diplomats, and pundits there is that President Serzh Sarkisian had no choice but to cave in because of his country's heavy dependence on its main geopolitical ally.

The picture is more complex on closer inspection, however. Sarkisian's parochial interests appear to have been at least as much in play as economic and security considerations. The haste with which his administration is holding accession talks with the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan and its reluctance to seek significant Russian concessions in the process suggest that he is driven at least in part by a deep sense of personal insecurity.

Moscow increasingly indicated its displeasure with Yerevan this summer as the latter intensified and completed negotiations with the EU over a far-reaching Association Agreement. EU representatives repeatedly made clear that the agreement was "not compatible" with possible Armenian membership in Moscow's customs union. Armenian leaders did not object to this precondition before the EU announced in late July the "substantive completion" of the association talks.

The stage was thus set for the agreement's initialing at the EU's November summit in Vilnius. Vyacheslav Kovalenko, Russia's ambassador to Armenia until March 2013, had joined a host of Kremlin-linked pundits in warning earlier in July that Yerevan would risk alienating Moscow if it stayed out of the Russian-led trade bloc.

Sarkisian's decision to opt for the customs union was privately communicated to Brussels on August 31 and made public following his September 3 talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin held near Moscow. Sarkisian has made only two brief public statements (none of them in Armenia) explaining his dramatic volte-face. "I have repeatedly said before that when you are part of one system of military security it is impossible and ineffective to isolate yourself from a corresponding economic space," he told a joint news conference with Putin.

Strong Enough Levers?

Russia does have strong economic and military levers to exert strong pressure on its sole South Caucasus ally, but their potential impact should not be overestimated. Armenia might have faced the kind of Russian trade sanctions that have been imposed on Moldova and Georgia in recent years had it pressed ahead with the EU accord. But Russia absorbs less than one-quarter of Armenian exports, mainly buying agricultural products, prepared foodstuffs and alcoholic beverages. A Russian ban on these imports would have hit Armenia's agriculture hard, but it would not have been enough to wreck the struggling Armenian economy as a whole.

According to Armenian government data, Russia accounted for 23 percent of Armenia's foreign trade in January-October 2013, compared with the EU's almost 29 percent share. Much of the Russian-Armenian trade volume is generated by supplies of Russian natural gas used for producing over one-third of Armenia's electricity, heating homes in the winter, and powering, in the liquefied or pressurized form, the majority of vehicles in the country.

Russia's Gazprom monopoly mostly reversed a 50 percent rise in the gas price, officially announced in April, shortly after Armenia decided to join the customs union. At almost $190 per 1,000 cubic meters, it is currently well below international market prices. Armenian Energy Minister Armen Movsisian has claimed that Armenia could not switch to large-scale gas imports from neighboring Iran because the latter would charge it as much as $400 per 1,000 cubic meters.

The Iranian ambassador in Yerevan, Mohammad Reisi, held two news conferences within four days early this month to effectively deny Movsisian's claims. Reisi implied that the Iranian gas price for Armenia might have been set lower than the current Gazprom tariff. The Armenian government has not even attempted to negotiate with Tehran over significant gas deliveries, he said.

Remittances sent home from Armenian migrant workers in Russia are a more important factor behind the Russian economic influence. They accounted for more than 80 percent of the $1.7 billion in noncommercial cash transfers to the country in 2012, a sum equivalent to over 16 percent of its gross domestic product.

There were fears in Armenia that Moscow could seek to halt those remittances, including by deporting en masse Armenians working in Russia. But most of Russia's estimated 2million-2.5 million Armenians are Russian citizens. The Russian Federal Migration Services puts the number of Armenian nationals who resided in the country as of October at around 500,000. Their mass deportation would have been both politically and technically problematic. Even Georgian and Moldovan migrants have not been sent home in their thousands to date.

...Or Dangerous Enough?

Russia's strongest leverage against Armenia has to do with national security. The unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has forced the Armenian side to rely heavily on close military ties with Moscow, enabling it to receive large quantities of Russian weapons at knockdown prices or even free of charge, and thus stay in an intensifying arms race with oil-rich Azerbaijan.

It emerged in June that Russia has begun delivering $1 billion worth of tanks and other offensive weapons to Azerbaijan. Putin raised Armenian fears of more such arms sales when he paid a high-profile visit to Baku in mid-August. Armenian pro-government politicians now say that the integration pact with the EU would have put the Russian-Armenian military alliance at risk and encouraged Azerbaijan to unleash another war for Karabakh. The implication is that the Russians threatened to end military aid to Armenia and sell more weapons to Azerbaijan.

Assuming that such threats were indeed made, they involved an element of bluff. Russia began selling weapons to Azerbaijan even before the start of the Armenia-EU association talks in 2010, and the recently disclosed Russian-Azerbaijani arms deliveries were reportedly signed in 2011. Besides, Russian arms supplies to Armenia intensified even when the Sarkisian administration was on course to conclude the Association Agreement.

Moscow is clearly not interested in an Azerbaijani military victory in the conflict as it would leave the Armenians with no major reason to host Russian troops in their territory and to maintain broader Russian-Armenian military cooperation. The Association Agreement could in no way jeopardize that cooperation as it offered Armenia no prospect of eventual membership of the EU, let alone NATO. Gagik Minasian, a senior lawmaker affiliated with the ruling Republican Party of Armenia (HHK), emphasized this fact when he ruled out the possibility of Russian economic sanctions in an August 20 interview with RFE/RL's Armenian Service.

A Personal Angle

Sarkisian's subsequent efforts to make Armenia part of the customs union as soon as possible -- without the kind of haggling engaged in by Ukraine and even Kyrgyzstan -- raised more questions about the theory that his strategic U-turn stems only from regional geopolitics. "We are struggling to keep up with our Armenian partners," Putin commented tartly on the accession talks during a December 2 visit to Yerevan.

The gas-price discount is the only major Russian reward announced so far. Yet even it comes with a catch: unprecedented privileges granted to Gazprom in the Armenian energy sector. Russia has not even rescheduled a $500 million debt extended to Armenia in 2009. The authorities in Yerevan repaid it in October with proceeds from the first-ever sale of Armenian eurobonds.

Sarkisian is giving the impression that he is keen to restore the Kremlin's trust, shaken by his European integration drive, at any cost and as quickly as possible. Concern for his power seems a plausible explanation for this tactic. Sarkisian succeeded in neutralizing his political opponents during his first presidential term. But virtually none of them has recognized the legitimacy of his disputed reelection in February 2013 and ruled out the possibility of challenging him in the streets.

An open confrontation with Moscow could have emboldened some opposition forces, notably the Prosperous Armenia Party of Gagik Tsarukian, a wealthy businessman close to Sarkisian's predecessor, Robert Kocharian, who reportedly spends much of his time in Moscow. Some local observers believe that the Kremlin is also in a position to engineer mass defections from the ruling HHK's parliamentary faction.

The Armenian president does not need a powerful external enemy, especially now that he seems intent on extending his rule beyond 2018. The day after announcing his customs-union U-turn he formed an ad hoc commission on constitutional reform. The Armenian media has since been rife with speculation, not denied by presidential allies, that Sarkisian wants to turn the country into a parliamentary republic and become a powerful prime minister after completing his second and final presidential term, just as former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili sought unsuccessfully to do.

The Armenian Constitution can be amended only through referendums. Sarkisian will not find it easy to muster the support of at least one-third of the country's 2.5 million eligible voters needed for the passage of amendments. Any attempt to rig the referendum would most probably spark street protests and unite the fragmented opposition against him.

-- Emil Danielyan

Editor's note: Copyright (c) 2013. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.

[Vrej1915]

Re: Is Russia an ally or foe, nowadays?

Armenian U-Turn On EU Not As 'Objective' As Thought
December 30, 2013 -
Armenia European Union Russia
A EurasiaNet Partner Post from: RFE/RL

Armenia's last-minute decision to join a Russian-led customs union at the expense of much closer ties with the European Union has been widely attributed in the West to strong pressure and bullying by Russia. The dominant view among policymakers, diplomats, and pundits there is that President Serzh Sarkisian had no choice but to cave in because of his country's heavy dependence on its main geopolitical ally.

The picture is more complex on closer inspection, however. Sarkisian's parochial interests appear to have been at least as much in play as economic and security considerations. The haste with which his administration is holding accession talks with the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan and its reluctance to seek significant Russian concessions in the process suggest that he is driven at least in part by a deep sense of personal insecurity.

Moscow increasingly indicated its displeasure with Yerevan this summer as the latter intensified and completed negotiations with the EU over a far-reaching Association Agreement. EU representatives repeatedly made clear that the agreement was "not compatible" with possible Armenian membership in Moscow's customs union. Armenian leaders did not object to this precondition before the EU announced in late July the "substantive completion" of the association talks.

The stage was thus set for the agreement's initialing at the EU's November summit in Vilnius. Vyacheslav Kovalenko, Russia's ambassador to Armenia until March 2013, had joined a host of Kremlin-linked pundits in warning earlier in July that Yerevan would risk alienating Moscow if it stayed out of the Russian-led trade bloc.

Sarkisian's decision to opt for the customs union was privately communicated to Brussels on August 31 and made public following his September 3 talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin held near Moscow. Sarkisian has made only two brief public statements (none of them in Armenia) explaining his dramatic volte-face. "I have repeatedly said before that when you are part of one system of military security it is impossible and ineffective to isolate yourself from a corresponding economic space," he told a joint news conference with Putin.

Strong Enough Levers?

Russia does have strong economic and military levers to exert strong pressure on its sole South Caucasus ally, but their potential impact should not be overestimated. Armenia might have faced the kind of Russian trade sanctions that have been imposed on Moldova and Georgia in recent years had it pressed ahead with the EU accord. But Russia absorbs less than one-quarter of Armenian exports, mainly buying agricultural products, prepared foodstuffs and alcoholic beverages. A Russian ban on these imports would have hit Armenia's agriculture hard, but it would not have been enough to wreck the struggling Armenian economy as a whole.

According to Armenian government data, Russia accounted for 23 percent of Armenia's foreign trade in January-October 2013, compared with the EU's almost 29 percent share. Much of the Russian-Armenian trade volume is generated by supplies of Russian natural gas used for producing over one-third of Armenia's electricity, heating homes in the winter, and powering, in the liquefied or pressurized form, the majority of vehicles in the country.

Russia's Gazprom monopoly mostly reversed a 50 percent rise in the gas price, officially announced in April, shortly after Armenia decided to join the customs union. At almost $190 per 1,000 cubic meters, it is currently well below international market prices. Armenian Energy Minister Armen Movsisian has claimed that Armenia could not switch to large-scale gas imports from neighboring Iran because the latter would charge it as much as $400 per 1,000 cubic meters.

The Iranian ambassador in Yerevan, Mohammad Reisi, held two news conferences within four days early this month to effectively deny Movsisian's claims. Reisi implied that the Iranian gas price for Armenia might have been set lower than the current Gazprom tariff. The Armenian government has not even attempted to negotiate with Tehran over significant gas deliveries, he said.

Remittances sent home from Armenian migrant workers in Russia are a more important factor behind the Russian economic influence. They accounted for more than 80 percent of the $1.7 billion in noncommercial cash transfers to the country in 2012, a sum equivalent to over 16 percent of its gross domestic product.

There were fears in Armenia that Moscow could seek to halt those remittances, including by deporting en masse Armenians working in Russia. But most of Russia's estimated 2million-2.5 million Armenians are Russian citizens. The Russian Federal Migration Services puts the number of Armenian nationals who resided in the country as of October at around 500,000. Their mass deportation would have been both politically and technically problematic. Even Georgian and Moldovan migrants have not been sent home in their thousands to date.

...Or Dangerous Enough?

Russia's strongest leverage against Armenia has to do with national security. The unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has forced the Armenian side to rely heavily on close military ties with Moscow, enabling it to receive large quantities of Russian weapons at knockdown prices or even free of charge, and thus stay in an intensifying arms race with oil-rich Azerbaijan.

It emerged in June that Russia has begun delivering $1 billion worth of tanks and other offensive weapons to Azerbaijan. Putin raised Armenian fears of more such arms sales when he paid a high-profile visit to Baku in mid-August. Armenian pro-government politicians now say that the integration pact with the EU would have put the Russian-Armenian military alliance at risk and encouraged Azerbaijan to unleash another war for Karabakh. The implication is that the Russians threatened to end military aid to Armenia and sell more weapons to Azerbaijan.

Assuming that such threats were indeed made, they involved an element of bluff. Russia began selling weapons to Azerbaijan even before the start of the Armenia-EU association talks in 2010, and the recently disclosed Russian-Azerbaijani arms deliveries were reportedly signed in 2011. Besides, Russian arms supplies to Armenia intensified even when the Sarkisian administration was on course to conclude the Association Agreement.

Moscow is clearly not interested in an Azerbaijani military victory in the conflict as it would leave the Armenians with no major reason to host Russian troops in their territory and to maintain broader Russian-Armenian military cooperation. The Association Agreement could in no way jeopardize that cooperation as it offered Armenia no prospect of eventual membership of the EU, let alone NATO. Gagik Minasian, a senior lawmaker affiliated with the ruling Republican Party of Armenia (HHK), emphasized this fact when he ruled out the possibility of Russian economic sanctions in an August 20 interview with RFE/RL's Armenian Service.

A Personal Angle

Sarkisian's subsequent efforts to make Armenia part of the customs union as soon as possible -- without the kind of haggling engaged in by Ukraine and even Kyrgyzstan -- raised more questions about the theory that his strategic U-turn stems only from regional geopolitics. "We are struggling to keep up with our Armenian partners," Putin commented tartly on the accession talks during a December 2 visit to Yerevan.

The gas-price discount is the only major Russian reward announced so far. Yet even it comes with a catch: unprecedented privileges granted to Gazprom in the Armenian energy sector. Russia has not even rescheduled a $500 million debt extended to Armenia in 2009. The authorities in Yerevan repaid it in October with proceeds from the first-ever sale of Armenian eurobonds.

Sarkisian is giving the impression that he is keen to restore the Kremlin's trust, shaken by his European integration drive, at any cost and as quickly as possible. Concern for his power seems a plausible explanation for this tactic. Sarkisian succeeded in neutralizing his political opponents during his first presidential term. But virtually none of them has recognized the legitimacy of his disputed reelection in February 2013 and ruled out the possibility of challenging him in the streets.

An open confrontation with Moscow could have emboldened some opposition forces, notably the Prosperous Armenia Party of Gagik Tsarukian, a wealthy businessman close to Sarkisian's predecessor, Robert Kocharian, who reportedly spends much of his time in Moscow. Some local observers believe that the Kremlin is also in a position to engineer mass defections from the ruling HHK's parliamentary faction.

The Armenian president does not need a powerful external enemy, especially now that he seems intent on extending his rule beyond 2018. The day after announcing his customs-union U-turn he formed an ad hoc commission on constitutional reform. The Armenian media has since been rife with speculation, not denied by presidential allies, that Sarkisian wants to turn the country into a parliamentary republic and become a powerful prime minister after completing his second and final presidential term, just as former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili sought unsuccessfully to do.

The Armenian Constitution can be amended only through referendums. Sarkisian will not find it easy to muster the support of at least one-third of the country's 2.5 million eligible voters needed for the passage of amendments. Any attempt to rig the referendum would most probably spark street protests and unite the fragmented opposition against him.

-- Emil Danielyan

Editor's note: Copyright (c) 2013. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.