Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia
KURDS SEIZE OIL-BEARING REGIONS OF SYRIA. THEIR AIM - TO SECURE EQUAL RIGHTS WITH SYRIANS, AND IDEALLY TO OBTAIN FULL AUTONOMY
by Konstantin Volkov
Izvestiya
July 25 2012
Russia
Syria's Kurds have begun an organized advance in the northeast of
the country, occupying cities left without government control. The
aim is the creation of an autonomous formation along the lines of
the one that exists in northern Iraq.
"The central authorities are currently leaving cities in the territory
traditionally inhabited by Kurds," Radwan Ali Badini, an activist of
the Kurdish Liberation Movement, told Izvestiya. "And we are helping
these population centres to create a new administration."
According to Badini everything is happening peacefully and there are
no clashes with the armed opposition or with the regular army.
Furthermore the Kurds, who live along the whole length of the
Syrian-Turkish border, regard themselves as something along the lines
of a border guard.
"To some extent Damascus has an interest in our presence along the
border line, otherwise Ankara might get the idea of taking advantage
of the unrest to enter Syria," Badini explains.
The Kurdish movement gained strength in the 1950s when its demands
were finally formalized as follows: the granting of broad autonomy,
equal rights with the main population of Syria, education in the
national language, and the right to self-determination within the
country. Over the past year some of the demands have been met. In
particular, Damascus granted Syrian citizenship to some of the Kurds
and promised them autonomy.
Nonetheless many of them still do not have the right to use their
own language in education or in business and also they cannot build
Kurdish schools or publish books in their native language.
That is why they are now continuing to insist on the continued
fulfilment of their demands, although they are also interested in
the resolution of the Syrian conflict by peaceful means.
At the same time, the influence of the new force is extending further
and further. The next objective is the city of Qamishli, centre of
Syria's oil industry.
"If we enter it, it will be by peaceful means," Badini says. "But
I wish to stress that the city now represents itself, there are
interruptions to the fuel supply, and it is difficult for the
residents, finding themselves in conditions of anarchy, to cope with
their problems themselves."
The emergence of a Kurdish autonomous formation is a very real
prospect, the activist believes. All the preconditions exist to assert
that this region will consent to nothing less. All the conditions
currently exist for us to obtain our rights without the use of force.
"Some of the Kurds really want democracy and the preservation of
Syria's integrity, while some are geared to secession and full
independence, as happened in Iraqi Kurdistan," Mahmud Khamo, member
of the Syrian National Council, says.
According to Khamo there are fighters active among the Kurds who
underwent training in Iraqi camps for the training of the peshmerga
(semi-guerrilla formations of Kurdish separatists), as well as
activists of the Workers Party of Kurdistan (PKK).
True, they will hardly be able to establish themselves along the
Syrian-Turkish border; Ankara will not permit the unification of the
Kurds living in Turkey with their Syrian fellow tribespeople. As far
as obtaining full autonomy is concerned, not only the Bashar al-Asad
regime but also the Syrian opposition is against this.
"In Syria the Kurds are about 10-15 per cent, that is not enough for
secession," Khamo suggests. "In the northeast of the country there are
also Arabs, Armenians, Assyrians, and Chaldeans, and the Kurds do not
form a majority, although they are the most active in political terms."
If a referendum on secession from Syria was held they would not be
supported, according to the Syrian National Council member. Nor will
it happen by force; the Free Syrian Army, which is fighting against
the al-Asad regime, will not permit separation.
[Translated from Russian]
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Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia
Թուրքական վերլուծաբաններին մտահոգում է «Քրդական գարնան» հնարավորությունը
Հուլիս 28, 2012
Թուրք վերլուծաբանները լրջորեն մտահոգված են Սիրիայում քրդերի ակտիվացմամբ` կարծելով, թե ստեղծված իրավիճակը կարող է քրդական պետության ձեւավորման սկիզբ լինել, այն դեպքում, երբ Թուրքիայի կառավարությունը որեւէ քայլ չի ձեռնարկում:
«Այն, ինչից մենք վախենում էինք տարիներ շարունակ, այսօր տեղի է ունենում ոչ կոմպետենտության եւ սահմանափակ մտածողության պատճառով»,-կարծում է CNNturk-ի գլխավոր խմբագիր, վերլուծաբան Մեհմեդ Ալի Բիրանդը:
Նրա խոսքով, որքան շատ Բաշար Ասադն իր ուշադրությունը կենտրոնացնի Դամասկոսի պաշտպանության վրա, այնքան շատ քրդերը հնարավորություն կունենան լցնել վակուումը, որը ձեւավորվել է Սիրիայի` Թուրքիայի հետ սահմանին: «Քաղաքական սխալ հաշվարկների պատճառով մենք կորցնում ենք հարցի լուծումը: Կամ էլ թուրքական կառավարությունն այնպիսի նուրբ շախմատային խաղ է կատարում, որը մենք ի վիճակի չենք հասկանալ: Եթե դա այդպես է, պատրաստ եմ ներողություն խնդրել: Եթե ոչ, ապա կշարունակեմ գոռալ, որ իմ երկիրը գտնվում է բաժանման եզրին, եւ մեղավորները պետք է պատասխանատվության ենթարկվեն»,-գրում է Բիրանդը «Hurriyet Daily News»-ում:Leave a comment:
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Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia
Leave a comment:
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Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia
CHANGES IN TURKEY'S BORDERS?
by MURAT YETKÄ°N
Hurriyet
July 26 2012
Turkey
The fact that some Syrian border posts are no longer controlled by
troops loyal to Bashar al-Assad but by Syrian Kurdish rebel groups, and
that Kurdish flags have been raised in some Syrian border towns with
Kurdish populations, has seriously disturbed the Turkish government.
One group in particular has attracted Turkey's attention, the
well-organized Democratic Union Party (PYD), which according to
spokespersons "shares the same ideology" with the Kurdistan Workers'
Party (PKK). The PKK has been waging an armed campaign against Turkey
for the last three decades, claiming more than forty thousand lives
to date.
Concern about the rise of the PYD caused Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan
to convene an emergency meeting in Ankara with his top security and
foreign policy team members. Another matter of concern to Ankara
was the fact that some of the Syrian Kurdish militants in Syria have
been sheltered and trained by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
in Iraq, while the KRG's leader Masoud Barzani has promised Erdogan
that he will convince the PKK (based in his territory) to give up
its "armed struggle" against Turkey. The government is going to take
some "additional measures" against the PKK presence along the Turkish
borders with Syria and Iraq, according to a statement issued following
the meeting.
Turkey's border with Iraq was settled in an agreement with the United
Kingdom when it was the mandatory power there, following a serious of
Kurdish uprisings (supposedly assisted by British-backed agitators)
in 1926, three years after the regime change in Turkey from Sultanate
to Republic. The border with Syria was settled when the people of
the border province of Hatay voted to be a part of Turkey rather than
remain with the newly founded Syria under French mandate in 1938.
Actually, the territories of the failing Turkish Empire under the
Ottoman dynasty almost a century ago were "shared" among Britain,
France and Czarist Russia, via a secret agreement to the Sykes-Picot
plan of 1916, which was then exposed in the Brest-Litovsk peace
agreement in 1918 by the Soviet leadership who seized power in Russia
through the Bolshevik revolution of 1917.
Another wave of border changes came about with the collapse of
the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Some were peaceful, like the
reunification of Germany and the "Velvet Divorce" that gave birth
to the Czech and Slovak Republics. But Yugoslavia was split into six
parts via a human disaster that has not come to an end even today.
Borders in the Caucasus are also not in a stable condition yet, with
ongoing disputes between Azerbaijan and Armenia and Russia and Georgia.
Following the instability of borders in regions northwest and northeast
of Turkey, now the Arab Spring has caused instabilities on Turkey's
southern and southeastern borders, which consist mostly of straight
lines drawn in the sand by Mr. Sykes and Mr. Picot according to
their strategic value as determined by energy resources. As the
territorial integrity of Syria and Iraq is in greater jeopardy with
every passing day, the borders become more unstable and the Kurds
arise as independent actors in regional politics.
Yet there are three countries in the region which have the capability
to expand, rather than shrink: Israel, Iran and Turkey. There are
already political and economic actors trying to push Turkey to claim
some energy-rich parts of Iraq and Syria, which would mean a regime
change such as a federated Turkey, with Kurdish and possibly Arabic
members. But Ankara instinctively resists the idea of border changes,
which could drag the whole region into a chain reaction of wars. The
region is heading towards a dangerously unstable phase because of
the civil war in Syria.Leave a comment:
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Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia
Flying Blind: Why Armed Drones May Detract from Turkish Security
By Aaron Stein on June 27, 2012
Eager to land the decisive blow in its long-standing battle with its Kurdish insurgency, Turkey is seeking to purchase armed drones from the United States. Intent on replicating the central element of the United States’ counterterrorism strategy in Pakistan and Yemen, Ankara aims to use targeted strikes to thwart the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) insurgency. While Turkey’s procurement effort dates back to 2010, the issue has become more complex following the ill-fated raid that killed 34 smugglers near the town of Uludere in December of last year.
After months of relative quiet, the issue was recently thrust back into the collective consciousness of Turkey’s non-Kurdish majority when a piece by Adam Entous and Joe Parkinson appeared in the Wall Street Journal. The article cites Pentagon sources claiming that a video feed from an American-piloted unarmed drone provided the initial intelligence that led to the disastrous strike. The unarmed drones were loaned to Turkey in 2012 to provide intelligence coverage of Turkey’s porous border with Iraq. The four drones are flown by pilots from the private American company Battlespace Flight Services from a facility in Ankara dubbed the data fusion cell. The cell, which was established in 2007 and is jointly manned by American and Turkish military personnel, is responsible for transmitting intelligence gleamed from American manned and unmanned airplanes operating in Iraq.
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan dismissed the claims of American involvement, arguing instead that the intelligence that led to the strike came from a Turkish—i.e. Israeli-made Heron—unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The Prime Minister—backed by reports and op-eds in sympathetic media outlets—claimed the WSJ story was a political ploy by some in the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill to prevent the sale of armed drones to Turkey.
Yet, Erdogan manipulated the American position for entirely domestic reasons. Unofficially, the United States has opposed the sale of armed drones in general; instead, the U.S. markets unarmed variants to its allies abroad. Turkey has been no exception. The United States’ unstated policy seeks to balance concerns of defense contractors—who are obviously eager to market all forms of drones abroad—with international norms intended to limit the proliferation of drone technology.
In keeping with unofficial policy, the Obama administration has refused to submit an arms sale package to Congress that includes the armed drones. Even if the administration were to submit such a package, however, its uncertain if it would pass given Turkey’s diminished reputation among some Republican lawmakers. Thus the Obama administration has opted for compromise half-measures. To its valuable ally, Turkey, the U.S. opted to loan and pilot unarmed predator drones used in the Iraq War. Eager to address Turkish needs but unwilling to buck convention, the Obama administration’s policy enabled it to bypass Congressional approval while reassuring Turkey of the United States’ commitment to its most pressing security threat.
The domestic backdrop for Turkey’s repeated requests has been the breakdown of the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) Kurdish opening and the re-militarization of the Kurdish issue. After appearing to change tactics and address the issue politically in his first term, Erodgan’s approach has reverted back to that of Turkey’s old gaurd: defeating the PKK militarily. This approach leads Ankara to covet armed drones as the weapon of choice for its own “war on terror.”
Yet, adding armed drones to Turkey’s vast arsenal will yield few, if any, greater successes in its military campaign against the Kurdish insurgency. At the same time, use of armed drones poses a threat of unconsidered and unintended political and security consequences. For example, the United States has received permission from the Pakistani, Yemeni, and Somali leadership to violate their respective sovereign airspaces when conducting drone missions. Will Turkey conclude similar agreements with Iraq, Iran, or Syria? Turkey’s ongoing political difficulties with all three countries are likely to complicate such a request. Is Turkey willing to carry out cross border attacks without permission? If not, where does the military plan to use these drones and what are the legal implications of the Turkish military using missile strikes to assassinate its own citizens? How will Turkey handle the fall out after the first drone strike misses its target and kills civilians in the Kurdish majority southeast?
Beyond these pressing domestic concerns, Turkey’s leadership has paid far too little attention to the spread of drone technology globally. Countries like China, Russia, India and Pakistan have invested in drone technology as part of a larger effort to replicate the capabilities of the United States’ current UAVs. Iran has also developed drones to help compensate for its weak air force. Hezbollah has acquired Iranian-made drones capable of carrying out kamikaze attacks. In the United States, a 26-year-old man was charged with plotting to load explosives on a remotely controlled plane and fly it into the Pentagon or the Capitol.
Already, the capability for similar small scale attacks using unmanned aircraft is within reach of terrorist organizations like the PKK—or its more radical offshoots. A terrorist group could simply purchase a large radio-controlled aircraft, attach plastic explosives, and fly it into a public area. Given the history of reprisal killings in Turkey and the PKK’s history of attacking civilian targets, a scenario involving some sort of radio controlled response to future Turkish drone strikes is a possibility worthy of consideration by the government, academics and military tacticians.
Absent international norms on the use of armed drones, the proliferation of UAV technology creates new abilities for destructive and harder to prevent terrorist attacks. However, discussion of precedent has been wholly absent from debates in Turkey. While Washington is the ultimate trendsetter, Turkey’s procurement and development of armed drones would add to the perceived international legitimacy of targeted killings from 10,000 meters above ground. If Turkey were to use armed drones in Kurdish areas, it would lose standing to challenge such strikes elsewhere. While the idea of Turkey challenging American strikes against mutually-loathed al Qaeda operatives is unlikely, a scenario involving China using armed drones to attack separatist Uighurs would certainly elicit concern from Ankara.
Turkey’s current policy elevates short-term tactical gains over the long-term implications of using armed drones. With the GDP growth rate expected to slow down, Ankara should be asking tougher questions about the price of its military procurements compared with their expected payoff. Armed drones are more expensive to fly than the F-16, are more prone to crashing, and carry fewer munitions. Its vaunted sensors are less effective at border monitoring than cheaper manned airplanes outfitted with thermal imaging technology.
Equally important, the quality of drone video is too poor to accurately assess the difference between friend and foe. Turkey will have the luxury of operating in an environment with no air defenses—so the drone will be able to operate at lower altitudes—but that does not preclude accidental airstrikes on civilians. After Uludere, Turkey’s leadership should proceed more cautiously in its effort to arm itself with a similar platform that features the same intelligence capabilities that led to the killing of 34 people.
Is Ankara prepared to endure a repeat of Uludure? Without careful delineation of the legality and chain of command, the government is bound to repeat its recent mistakes. Without a public debate over whether it supports armed drone warfare, the government can expect a backlash at least as strong as the one it experienced in recent months. At the very least, the AKP should mimic the tactics of the Obama White House and release details about the drone kill list, the chain of command, and the involvement of the Prime Minister in authorizing strikes to friendly media outlets. Thus far, Turkey has opted to cloak these details in a shroud of secrecy, rather than address questions posed by the local media and the political opposition.
Before pressing forward in its quest for drones, Turkey might consider the global and domestic ramifications of deploying these weapons. Politically, introducing and using armed drones belies the optimism, rhetoric, and messaging on which the ruling party campaigned in previous elections. Attacking the PKK issue politically and investing in more effective tools to protect its citizens would better serve Ankara’s long and short-term political interests. A sustained political effort to engage Turkey’s Kurds without using armed drone strikes would likely yield greater political and military returns than short-term tactics using platforms that duplicate Turkey’s current capabilities. Doing so would indicate that Turkey’s leadership is serious about its pledges to increase minority rights and deepen Turkish democracy.
__
Aaron Stein is a Ph.D candidate at King’s College, London and the Nonproliferation Program Director at the Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies an independent think tank in Istanbul. You can follow him on Twitter @Aaronstein1.
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Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia
Turkey: For Ankara, Will Drones Be a Military Blessing or Curse?
June 28, 2012 - 5:28pm, by Yigal Schleifer The Turko-file Kurdish Issue Turkey-U.S. Relations Turkish Domestic Politics Turkish Military
Are armed drones the answer to Turkey's continuing fight against the militants of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)? That certainly seems to be the signal coming out of Ankara, which has been pushing Washington to provide it with American-made Predator unmanned aerial vehicles, which can be armed with air-to-ground missiles.
To a large extent, Ankara's military strategy regarding the PKK fight seems to be evolving in a direction that mimics that used by the United States in Pakistan and Yemen, where drones have become a central weapon in Washington's counterterrorism efforts. Like the US has learned in Pakistan, though, Turkey has recently also discovered that relying on drones can lead to trouble. As described in this previous post, the use of UAV's has become a topic of intense debate in Turkey after the Turkish military last December killed 34 Kurdish villagers that were mistakenly thought to be PKK militants. The deadly attack on the 34, part of a convoy of smugglers heading towards the Turkish border from Iraq, came as a result of intelligence provided by an American drone on loan to Turkey that first noticed the convoy.
In a highly illuminating article, Turkey-basd analyst Aaron Stein takes a look at Turkey's efforts to develop its drone fleet and some of the politics behind it, asking the important question of whether Turkish policymakers have really thought through the implications of introducing armed UAV's into their country's military strategy. From Stein's article:
In keeping with unofficial policy, the Obama administration has refused to submit an arms sale package to Congress that includes the armed drones. Even if the administration were to submit such a package, however, its uncertain if it would pass given Turkey’s diminished reputation among some Republican lawmakers. Thus the Obama administration has opted for compromise half-measures. To its valuable ally, Turkey, the U.S. opted to loan and pilot unarmed predator drones used in the Iraq War. Eager to address Turkish needs but unwilling to buck convention, the Obama administration’s policy enabled it to bypass Congressional approval while reassuring Turkey of the United States’ commitment to its most pressing security threat.
The domestic backdrop for Turkey’s repeated requests has been the breakdown of the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) Kurdish opening and the re-militarization of the Kurdish issue. After appearing to change tactics and address the issue politically in his first term, Erodgan’s approach has reverted back to that of Turkey’s old gaurd: defeating the PKK militarily. This approach leads Ankara to covet armed drones as the weapon of choice for its own “war on terror.”
Yet, adding armed drones to Turkey’s vast arsenal will yield few, if any, greater successes in its military campaign against the Kurdish insurgency. At the same time, use of armed drones poses a threat of unconsidered and unintended political and security consequences. For example, the United States has received permission from the Pakistani, Yemeni, and Somali leadership to violate their respective sovereign airspaces when conducting drone missions. Will Turkey conclude similar agreements with Iraq, Iran, or Syria? Turkey’s ongoing political difficulties with all three countries are likely to complicate such a request. Is Turkey willing to carry out cross border attacks without permission? If not, where does the military plan to use these drones and what are the legal implications of the Turkish military using missile strikes to assassinate its own citizens? How will Turkey handle the fall out after the first drone strike misses its target and kills civilians in the Kurdish majority southeast?
Beyond these pressing domestic concerns, Turkey’s leadership has paid far too little attention to the spread of drone technology globally. Countries like China, Russia, India and Pakistan have invested in drone technology as part of a larger effort to replicate the capabilities of the United States’ current UAVs. Iran has also developed drones to help compensate for its weak air force. Hezbollah has acquired Iranian-made drones capable of carrying out kamikaze attacks. In the United States, a 26-year-old man was charged with plotting to load explosives on a remotely controlled plane and fly it into the Pentagon or the Capitol.
Already, the capability for similar small scale attacks using unmanned aircraft is within reach of terrorist organizations like the PKK—or its more radical offshoots. A terrorist group could simply purchase a large radio-controlled aircraft, attach plastic explosives, and fly it into a public area. Given the history of reprisal killings in Turkey and the PKK’s history of attacking civilian targets, a scenario involving some sort of radio controlled response to future Turkish drone strikes is a possibility worthy of consideration by the government, academics and military tacticians.
Leave a comment:
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Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia
4 TURKISH SOLDIERS KILLED IN PKK CLASHES
PanARMENIAN.Net
June 27, 2012 - 14:01 AMT
PanARMENIAN.Net - Four Turkish soldiers were killed in clashes with
suspected members of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) on
June 27 in the southeastern province of Siirt, according to Hurriyet
Daily News.
The fighting occurred in Siirt's Eruh neighborhood, with militants
attacking military personnel with heavy weapons. Although the Turkish
troops fired back, four of them were killed. Additional security
forces were sent to the area as clashes continued, the report said.Leave a comment:
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Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia
TURKISH JOKE of the Day
Turkey: Kurd with lemon accused of supporting terror
A Turkish prosecutor has demanded that a Kurdish man who is deaf, illiterate and unable to speak be jailed for 25 years for supporting terrorism.
Possession of a half-lemon was cited as evidence against Mehmet Tahir Ilhan. Lemon can ease the effects of tear gas.
Mr Ilhan is charged with making propaganda for the banned Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and with taking part in an illegal organisation.
Mr Ilhan, a bazaar porter from the city of Mersin, denies the charges.
Using sign language at a hearing in the south-eastern city of Adana, he said he had got caught up in a violent pro-Kurdish demonstration.
Under Turkey's anti-terrorism law it is an offence to show any sign of support for the PKK.
Laws criticised
The BBC's Jonathan Head in Istanbul says Turkey's judiciary often administers harsh penalties on bafflingly slight evidence.
However, even by Turkish standards, this case is extraordinary, he says.
If Mr Ilhan is found guilty, the court is expected to pass a sentence close to the 25 years that the prosecutor has asked for.
Over the past 18 months, hundreds of Kurdish activists, journalists and politicians have been detained under anti-terrorism legislation.
The use of Turkey's anti-terrorism laws has been widely criticised. The Council of Europe said it was having a "chilling effect" on freedom of speech.
Our correspondent says the Turkish government is trying to encourage Kurdish moderates with such concessions as Kurdish language classes in school, while at the same time isolating the more hard-line PKK members.
But the sometimes incomprehensible actions of its judiciary will inevitably undermine such efforts, he adds.
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Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia
Commentary: Armenians, Kurds, Cypriots, Greeks can form anti-Turkey coalition
October 28, 2011 - 17:30 AMT
PanARMENIAN.Net - Kurds and Kurdistan have never felt so much promise. Federalism in Iraq is secure. Iraqi Kurdistan attracts billions of dollars in investment, Masud Barzani no longer needs a borrowed Turkish passport to travel abroad, and the Kurdistan Regional Government has offices which act as virtual embassies in Washington, London, and other major capitals. It is ironic, therefore, that against this progress, Kurds wield so little influence over the issues about which Kurds inside and outside Iraqi Kurdistan most care, says a commentary posted on the website of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
“After Kurdistan Workers Party [PKK] members attacked Turkish military outposts in the early morning hours of October 19, Nechirvan Barzani, a former prime minister who retains the power of that post, rushed to Ankara to try to defuse any retaliation. He failed. So too did regional president Masud Barzani, who placed an emergency phone call to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,” Michael Rubin writes in the article titled “Is It Time for an Anti-Turkey Coalition?”
“The failure of Kurdish leaders to fulfill their diplomatic agenda extends beyond the latest Turkish incursion. After all, even before the Hakari attacks, the Turkish Army stationed more than 1,000 troops stationed on mountains and around villages several kilometers across the Iraqi and Iraqi Kurdish border,” the article says.
“While Arab states focused on the simultaneous rupture in the Israel-Turkey partnership, Turkey's bellicosity toward Cyprus was the subject of greater concern not only in Nicosia and Athens, but also in many other European capitals. Apart, neither Cyprus nor Kurdistan has much leverage. Turkey's 37-year occupation of Cyprus is seldom front page news in Washington, London, or any other country. While former Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer tries to broker an agreement, and occasionally UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon makes statements about the need to resolve the conflict, lack of international interest condemns Cyprus to continued division.”
“Of all Turkey's neighbors, it is the Armenians who have the greatest influence in Washington. Corollary Armenian Diaspora groups are also influential in London, Paris, and across Europe. In the United States, at least, the Armenian lobby has failed repeatedly in its principle goal to win American recognition of Armenian Genocide by Ottoman Turks in World War I,” it says.
According to the author, the Armenians can join the Kurds, Cypriots, and perhaps Greeks as well in eschewing coalitions in a failed attempt to go it alone. “If those victimized or threatened by Turkey, however, would pool their resources and demands, each group may find its influence amplified exponentially. Kurds who seek recognition of the Anfal as genocide might solicit the support of Armenian counterparts, but also must be willing to offer support as well. Kurdish officials should be outspoken in support of Greek Cyprus, and should leverage Cypriot and Greek influence to ensure that a Turkish withdrawal from Iraq and Kurdistan becomes a European Union platform.”
“Kurds should be proud of their achievements, but they are not as solid as they once were. That the Kurds have no friends but the mountains will simply be an epitaph unless Kurdish leaders become far more apt at building alliances than they are now,” the article concludes.
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Re: Prospects of a Kurdish state and what it means for Armenia
Is it time for an anti-Turkey coalition?
by Michael Rubin
The Kurdistan Tribune
October 27, 2011
Kurds and Kurdistan have never felt so much promise. Federalism in Iraq is secure. Iraqi Kurdistan attracts billions of dollars in investment, Masud Barzani no longer needs a borrowed Turkish passport to travel abroad, and the Kurdistan Regional Government has offices which act as virtual embassies in Washington, London, and other major capitals. It is ironic, therefore, that against this progress, Kurds wield so little influence over the issues about which Kurds inside and outside Iraqi Kurdistan most care.
After Kurdistan Workers Party [PKK] members attacked Turkish military outposts in the early morning hours of October 19, Nechirvan Barzani, a former prime minister who retains the power of that post, rushed to Ankara to try to defuse any retaliation. He failed. So too did regional president Masud Barzani, who placed an emergency phone call to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Turkish President Abdullah Gül vowed revenge and dispensed with the notion for proportionality that Turkey demands from others. "No one should forget that those who are inflicting this pain upon us will suffer in multitudes," Gül declared. Thereafter, Turkish jets bombed targets in Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkish tanks reportedly crossed the border. While Turkish officials say they have killed several hundred PKK members, such declarations cannot be taken at face value. Turkish authorities label any Kurd killed in such bombardment as a terrorist, regardless of reality. Civilians often pay the price. Turkey has yet to apologize or pay compensation, for example, to the families of the seven Kurdish civilians killed in an August strike. Nor has the Kurdish government forced Turkey to provide proof the any recent attacks inside Turkey had a cross-border component.
The failure of Kurdish leaders to fulfill their diplomatic agenda extends beyond the latest Turkish incursion. After all, even before the Hakari attacks, the Turkish Army stationed more than 1,000 troops stationed on mountains and around villages several kilometers across the Iraqi and Iraqi Kurdish border. Indeed, as much as Turkey's Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu frames his country's foreign policy as seeking good relations with all its neighbors, the fact remains that Turkey is the only aspirant to the European Union that unabashedly occupies other countries. Turkish occupation in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan, as well as in Cyprus suggests the true meaning of neo-Ottomanism.
Turkey's occupations, however, provide the Kurdistan Regional Government with an opportunity. On September 2, 2011, Egemen Bağış, Turkey's Minister for European Union Affairs, threatened Cyprus with military action. Should that European Union member not stop oil exploration in international waters off its coast, Bağış said, that Turkey might respond militarily. "That's what a navy is for," he quipped.
While Arab states focused on the simultaneous rupture in the Israel-Turkey partnership, Turkey's bellicosity toward Cyprus was the subject of greater concern not only in Nicosia and Athens, but also in many other European capitals. Apart, neither Cyprus nor Kurdistan has much leverage. Turkey's 37-year occupation of Cyprus is seldom front page news in Washington, London, or any other country. While former Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer tries to broker an agreement, and occasionally UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon makes statements about the need to resolve the conflict, lack of international interest condemns Cyprus to continued division.
Of all Turkey's neighbors, it is the Armenians who have the greatest influence in Washington. Corollary Armenian Diaspora groups are also influential in London, Paris, and across Europe. In the United States, at least, the Armenian lobby has failed repeatedly in its principle goal to win American recognition of Armenian genocide by Ottoman Turks in World War I.
Alas, the Armenians can join the Kurds, Cypriots, and perhaps Greeks as well in eschewing coalitions in a failed attempt to go it alone. If those victimized or threatened by Turkey, however, would pool their resources and demands, each group may find its influence amplified exponentially. Kurds who seek recognition of the Anfal as genocide might solicit the support of Armenian counterparts, but also must be willing to offer support as well. Kurdish officials should be outspoken in support of Greek Cyprus, and should leverage Cypriot and Greek influence to ensure that a Turkish withdrawal from Iraq and Kurdistan becomes a European Union platform.
In mature diplomacy, coalitions are essential. The Kurdish Caucus in Congress is more symbolic than effective. True diplomacy should extend beyond wining and dining congressmen whose concern about Kurdistan is fleeting and limited by the next election. With the Americans withdrawing from Iraq—a milestone that should evoke memories of 1975 in Kurdistan and 1991 in Iraq—it is essential that Kurdistan's rulers understand their limitations. There are issues more important than oil deals and real estate. While it is natural that rulers inexperienced on the world stage fret more about the intricacies of protocol than broader issues, it is time the Kurdish representatives stationed abroad are able to talk fluently about broader issues. Kurdish communities should lend their support to Greek Cypriots, and demand that they, in exchange, make clear that Turkish policy has gone awry not only in the Eastern Mediterranean, but in other areas as well.
Kurds should be proud of their achievements, but they are not as solid as they once were. That the Kurds have no friends but the mountains will simply be an epitaph unless Kurdish leaders become far more apt at building alliances than they are now.
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