Let us all reason, for the well being of humanity.

[winoman]

Ackam continued...

Why is discussion of the Arrnenian Genocide a taboo? Why do we Turks have the feeling that lightning has struck our bones whenever the theme is addressed? What are the reasons for this sensitivity and indisposition?

Since the possibilities of a discussion free from portentous problems are not being pursued, there must be deeper underlying reasons for the extreme reactions, evasions, and denials

The first and most important point concerns the lack of historical consciousness in Turkish society. I would characterize amnesia as a social disease in Turkey. The inability to remember refers not only to the period of World War I but also to incidents from the 1860s and 1870s that have long since been forgotten. To begin with, the founders of the Turkish Republic have severed our connections and bonds to history

I hereby maintain that the "wish to forget history" is directly related to the genocide of the Armenians. In order to be freed from the connotations of the term genocide, the founders of modem Turkey undertook a kind of cleansing as they ushered in the republic.

...the genocide...constitutes a social trauma of major proportions

...the official line is that Turkey emerged from a period of upheaval in history from which "a new personality was created from nothing. "I maintain here that we have not yet recovered, that we have not yet acquired the "new personality that has divested itself of the spell of the old crises," and that as long as we do not talk about the Armenian Genocide, our chances of creating a new "other" remains rather tenuous...

The Turks were gripped by powerful impulses of wishful thinking during the years of World War 1. They wanted to free themselves from the shackles of their weak and powerless position, They wanted to establish a new strong hegemony and thereby cast off their feelings of humiliation and disgrace. We can speak of the fact that a strong collective narcissism was developed, primarily through the vehicles of Pan-Turanism and Pan-lslamicism.

One of the most important reasons for the tabooing of the Armenian Genocide lies in the coupling of this event with the establishment of the republic. Toa certain extent, the establishment of the republic depended heavily on the genocide. The founders of the republic knew that, and they were not averse to expressing it openly. For example, one of the leaders of the Ittihad veTerakki stated: "If we had not cleaned up the eastern provinces of Armenian militia who were cooperating with the Russians, there would have been no possibility of founding our national state." A speech was delivered in the first parliament of the young republic, the thrust of which was that we accept the label of "murderers" since it served the purpose of saving the fatherland: You know that the problem of [Armenian] deportations threw the world in an uproar and all of us were labeled murderers. We knew before this was done that world opinion would not be favorable and this would bring loathing and hatred upon us. Why have we resigned ourselves to being called murderers? Those are things that have only happened in order to secure something that is more holy and valuable than our own live at the future of the fatherland. These "brave" words that the Turkish Republic was built on the genocide of the Armenians were reflections of the enthusiasm of the years during whichthe Turkish Republic was founded. In the course of time, however, we have sketched out an entirely contrary portrayal. Our nation state "had been created from nothing and in opposition against the imperial forces," an achievement of which we could be proud. The Turkish state was the symbolic proof of a national existence, that "we had dug ourselves" out of the national void "with our fingernails."

A discussion of the Armenian Genocide could reveal that this Turkish state was not a result of a war fought against the imperial powers, but, on the contrary, a product of the war against the Greek and Armenian minorities. It could show that a significant part of the National Forces consisted either of murderers who directly participated in the Armenian Genocide or of thieves who had become rich by plundering Armenian possessions.

First, the Turkish national movement was organized by the Ittihad ve Terakki party that had carried out the wartime genocide. If we look at the regions in which those organizations were established and the sequence of the acts of their founding, it becomes clear that these events initially took place everywhere a perceived Armenian or Greek danger existed. Of the first five resistance organizations that were founded after the Mudros Armistice agreement, from the 30th of October,1918 to the end of the year, three were directed against the Armenian and two against the Greek minorities. The local cadres of Ittihad ve Terakki constituted the main elements among the founders of these associations.

The second important connection between the genocide and the national movement concerned the formation of a new class of wealthy men in Anatolia who had enriched themselves thanks to the genocide. Even Turks point to thefact that the economic motive played an important role in the Armenian Genocide. An important figure in the national movement, Halide Edip, said,"...there was a strong economic one ... this was to end the economic supremacy of the Armenians thereby clearing the markets for the Turks and the Germans."

The third important link between the genocide of the Armenians and the republic is a natural outcome of the first. The initial organizers of the national movement were people who had directly participated in the enactment of the genocide.

I think that the tabooing of the Armenian Genocide in a republic whose foundation was created in this way is "understandable." The devastation that would ensue if we had to now stigmatize those whom we regarded as "great saviors" and "people who created a nation from nothing," as "murderers and thieves" is palpable. It seems so much simpler to completely deny the genocide than to seize the initiative and face the obliteration of the ingrained notions about the Republic and our own national identity. I would like to conclude my talk at this point with an open question: What significance do the effects of such a policy have for society today and in the future, especially when such "denial" means that the frame of mind and the pattern of behavior that led to the genocide against the Armenians continue to exist?

[RookieArcher]

I thank you for the quotes above.
My purpose here was to learn "yourside of story and its sources".
Your reply above was what i expected from you before as well, not insults.
Please keep the level of discussion as high as this one, dont belike that of peopleyou critisize.

You are not talking to deaf ears. I have receptive ears and heart. I have mind and logic, i can judge what was possible what was not,therefore i can visualize in my mind what might happened and what could not be happened.

Give me some online list of readings that are not biased - either Turkish or Armenian bias- proof of Genocide. I will appreciate that.

I also appreciate recommended reading list from bell-the-cat (if he is reading this posts) whom i see as reosonable/intelligent man.

Regards.

[Anonymouse]

Not biased? The simian asks a strange question. What isn't biased my fez wearing Asiatic?

[winoman]

I thank you for the quotes above.
My purpose here was to learn "yourside of story and its sources".
Your reply above was what i expected from you before as well, not insults.
Please keep the level of discussion as high as this one, dont belike that of peopleyou critisize.

You are not talking to deaf ears. I have receptive ears and heart. I have mind and logic, i can judge what was possible what was not,therefore i can visualize in my mind what might happened and what could not be happened.

Give me some online list of readings that are not biased - either Turkish or Armenian bias- proof of Genocide. I will appreciate that.

I also appreciate recommended reading list from bell-the-cat (if he is reading this posts) whom i see as reosonable/intelligent man.

Regards.

But you have already claimed that the Armenian genocide never happened and that I am a believer of fables. You hae made it plain that you will consider anything that acknowledges the claim of genocide as biased in favor of the Armenian position. So why should I waste my time with you? You have already made up your mind - you have said so. If you are honest in what you are now claiming you will look at my responses to NoThink Turk and actually read what I wrote and examine the various links I have already given. There is ample proof - in fact quite a bit more proof that clearly indicates and prooves Genocide - delibertly planned and carried out on the part of the CUP and (willingly - even gleefully) participated in by the Turkish and Kurdish people at large. I have explained the reasons for this many times - and my latest post of Ackam's analysis should make good sense for any who claims to have the ability to see through (Turkish government fed) lies and propoganda. If you cannot see the great difference in the level of analysis of the sources I provide from the largely joke level analysis provided by the so-called Turkish scholars advocated by NoThinkTurk and the like (and seemingly all you have read and consumed) - well then the problem is yours. Its really not so difficult - and I know many Turks who have very much "seen the light" on this one....all it takes is a bit of a brain and the ability to divorce oneself from blind nationalism....so surprise me (and convince me again of your honesty on this - for at this moment I believe your position to be a sham).

[winoman]

An analysis of comments made by Halil Berktay

I do not know (for certain) the source of these comments but I believe they provide some useful insights (the person who wrote this was Turkish BTW) - note I do not have the full text - only first 2 parts (shame) - highlights are mine...(I don't agree with the analysis 100% - but the points are good to think on regardless)

I have been to a closed-circle discussion with Professor Halil Berktay (public enemy number one since he acknowledges the Genocide as a Genocide) last night (20/02/2001) and share my impressions with you.
As the (all Turkish) audience was already prone to acknowledging the Genocide, he did not have to munch his words and pronounced the G-word. There was no hysteria.

He went on to discuss the Genocide, various Armenian and Turkish positions, the consequences of Genocide recognition and relevance of the issue to the present.

His analysis of the issue can be read under these headings (these are mine):
1. Turkish and Armenian Positions
2. Context of Genocide
3. Fact of Genocide
4. Aftermath
5. What is a Genocide and What Not?
6. On CUP members concerned
7. On Turkish stance
8. Possible Consequences of Recognising the Genocide
9. The Changing Attitude of the Turkish Authorities
10. Conclusions

1. Turkish and Armenian Positions: As the issue is long polarised, most historians on both parties belong to the extreme stances. The Armenian extreme stance is “event not context”, and the Turkish one(s) are “context and event”, which tends to degenerate into “context not event”, or, worse still “context, no event”.

Event not context: Those Armenian historians who hold this position see the Genocide issue first as a criminal and only then a historical issue. To them there is only the “event”, and the “context” in which it appears is largely irrelevant, as no “context” ever justifies or legitimises such an “event”, and they see in any attempt to analyse the “event” within the framework of a “context” a hidden apologetism, or worse still, denialism. In plain English, their position is this: “The Turks carried out a genocide of the Armenians. This is a crime before it is a historical [and therefore analysable] phenomenon. There can be no reason for a Genocide, and the very thought of such a reason is tantamount to the crime itself. Thus, the proper place to discuss the Genocide is not a university, forum or panel, but the courtroom. And any attempt to sit down at the same table to talk with the Turks is treason, for it automatically implies a revision of our stance.”


Context and/not/no event: Most Turkish historians, and quite a few western historians, hold the first position. It goes without saying that most Turkish historians who hold this position are apologists or worse, denialists, they are no scholars in the true sense of the word, but the propagandists of the official Turkish position for a variety of reasons. Such Turkish historians usually degenerate into the second and third versions (not/no) of this position are apologists or worse, denialists, they are no scholars in the true sense of the word, but the propagandists of the official Turkish position for a variety of reasons. Such Turkish historians usually degenerate into the second and third versions (not/no) of this position.

Most western historians, however, see that they must analyse the issue within the framework of the context in which it occurred, because nothing comes out of nothing: there must have been things that must have led to the genocide, and to say that is one thing, to condone or justify the crime is wholly another. After all, the prosecution first collects the evidence, and then seeks the motives behind the murder before pronouncing the verdict. In this, they attempt to follow the same logic they apply when dealing with the Jewish Holocaust.

The event not context stance precludes any possibility of dialogue as a result of its inherent conviction that any attention paid to the context and not the event might – intentionally or not – serve the denialist stance.
The context not/no event stances, especially the latter one; also preclude the possibility of honest dialogue, in fact, there is little point in engaging such a dialogue, as these stances are primarily designed to deny the Genocide. If they cannot do it by relying on facts (and they can’t), then they attempt to drown the issue within the context and deliberately distract attention from the main topic at hand.

Turkish historians should not use the context to defend an apologetic stance, and Armenian historians should not abstract the issue from its context to present it as explicable only by the criminality of the perpetrators.

2. Context of Genocide: The Armenian Genocide took place in 1915, when the Ottoman Empire was in its death throes. The Empire had been losing ground (literally) to the West, and there had been a constant loss of territory since the late 17th Century. One outcome of this, but not immediately apparent in a cursory glance at the issue, was the plight of the millions of Muslims who had lived in these lands for a few centuries already as Ottoman subjects. These people were subjected to the most awful treatment by the new victors, the Christian local populations who had just gained their independence and exacted their vengeance of the Ottomans on the remaining Muslims on “their” territory, and most of these Muslims then had to flee these lands to the safety of the ever-shrinking Ottoman Empire. The huge numbers that came in created great economic, social, and to a certain extent, political stress in the decaying Empire; and these people also brought to Anatolia a hatred of the Christians that was by and large not present there at all: Muslims and non-Muslims had been living side by side without any major quarrels, and the state of the non-Muslims in the Empire was perceptibly better than that of the Jews in Europe or the Indians or Blacks in the Americas.

Their self-worth largely destroyed by an unending stream of defeats at the hands of the Europeans, economically and socially traumatised by incessant warfare, persecutions, forced conversions, deportations, massacres, and last by not least, the prejudice on the part of the local Anatolian Muslim population they encountered in their “safe haven” (this last is mine), these new arrivals were filled with hatred toward the Christians whom they saw as the reason for all the evils that befell them; which they passed onto the Anatolian Muslims.

This state of affairs carried on throughout the 18th and espacially the 19th Centuries, by the middle of which the imminent disintegration of the Empire was an open secret. All thinking men, and there were many, thought of just one thing: how to save what was left of the Empire.

It is in this context that we see the likes of Enver and Talat emerge. They were, in Berktay’s words, “rootless and ruthless”, all Balkan (mostly Macedonian) refugees, who got an inkling of the western mind through the military education they had (mostly in the Balkans) and could see the birth, growth and nature of nationalism there. Berktay quoted passages from two stories of Omer Seyfeddin. The first is about a young Ottoman Turkish officer stationed in Bulgaria, who had developed a sort of a platonic relationship with a beautiful Bulgarian girl across the street where he was stationed: the girl would hang washing in the balcony and cast long, smouldering looks at the young officer, singing a beautiful song. This eye-to-eye platonic “romance”, as the officer sees it, lasts until the officer finally decides to seek the intermediacy of a Bulgarian to meet with her, upon which the Bulgarian (the Good Bulgarian of the story) says she is no good for him, for she is the daughter of a guerilla leader who was hanged by the Ottomans the year before, and the song she sang (which the young officer had mistakenly reasoned to be a love song) turned out to be “nash nash tsarigrad nash” (ours, ours, Istanbul shall become). Upon this, he is shocked, but cannot help admire her unyielding stance and adherence to her nation’s cause, and despise his weakness for having even contemplated a romantic relationship with a girl from the enemy camp for sheer lack of national consciousness!
The second story, the plot of which is irrelevant, centers on a group of young officers on their way to Anatolia, talking about how Anatolia is the last refuge of the Turkish nation, and that that was the land they should have developed etc., the real revelation of the story comes with the emergence of the fact that not one of them had even been to Anatolia before! This was the atmosphere in which the last Ottoman officers’ world view was developing.
The likes of Talat and Enver had grown up and lived in an almost unbroken episode of violence: 1908: deposition of Abdulhamid II, the “Red Sultan”, 1909: the Good Event: the Revolution of the reactionaries and the interference of the military, 1912 through 1915: the Balkan, Libyan and World wars, and finally, the Genocide.

These people knew violence as the only means of reaching their goals, and they had only one goal: to grab a piece of the decaying Empire for the Turkish nation, the only candidate for which was Anatolia. They had only one goal and one way to reach it: violence. They had no Plan B. That union of means and ends made them incapable of doing anything but violence (the last two lines are my addition). One man, however, differed from them in one radical fashion: Mustafa Kemal. He saw a means in violence to reach the end, but violence was not the only means he was open to, and very early on he started to think that violence could not be the the only way to have what you got: you have to want what you can keep yours through other means than violence. That was probably the main reason why he concentrated on Anatolia as the future homeland of the Turks, and not concentrated any effort to salvage any other part of the Empire, and paid no heed to the pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic dreams of Talat and Enver.

I related to Berktay the Armenian theory that Talat and Enver wanted to get rid of the Armenians that were on their way to Central Asia, and Berktay said that he did not agree with it: he thought that there were so many things that made the Armenian Genocide an inevitability (no justification intended) that one did not need to invoke that.

His opinion was that there was already so much accumulated hatred that the slightest spark would cause an explosion of gigantic proportions: “Armenians were left holding the bag (his phrase)” of this accumulated hatred of Christians, and when it exploded, it was far more severe than anything that had preceded it.

Berktay was asked what he thought of Armenian separatism and terrorism that had preceded the deportations, and he said that he did not think all that much of that: there were not nearly a million Turks killed (as claimed by denialist or apologetic Turkish historians) by the Armenians, first of all considering the then population of that part of Anatolia (which he estimated at about three million in all, at any rate below five million), there could not have been that many Muslim deaths, or else, how do you explain the population of the area after the foundation of the Republic? Besides, the Armenians were never nowhere near so strong as to carry out a massacre of these proportions. Besides, the Armenian gangs attacked villages whose male population was out in the fighting fronts of the Empire, and there are usually not more than fifty to a hundred people in a typical Anatolian village of that area, so they had to destroy at least a thousand villages to hit the million mark! He said that the Muslim deaths at the hands of the Armenians in Anatolia amounted to a few thousands at the most.

So the Armenian Genocide appears as something that could be seen from a mile away.

This concludes my survey of his version of the Context.

(my note - all I have - or can locate at the moment)

[winoman]

more Berktay

Originally published in "Radikal" newspaper on October 9, 2000
Turkish original available on internet at

http://www.radikal.com/tr/2000/10/09/insan/erm.shtml

Again - Berketay's is an entirely Turkish perspective. he has much good insight - but I do not believe he focuses on certain important aspects of the Genocide - namely the economic ones. He also downplays Pan-Turanism instead seeing the attempt to rid Armenians from the Anatolian core as the objective. He also treats Armenians as a single (political/aware) block - and this was not at all so. He also is an apologist for the current Republic and Ataturk (and the Ottoman Army as well) - not acknowledging the latter massacres commited by the Nationalists and the role of the Army in killing Armenian males who were in the Armay as well as participating in certain massscres. Still a very worthwhile perspective for both Turks and Armenians to read and understand (highlights are mine) - also I am excerpting and shortening from the full article which is quite long)


The Armenian incidents were, for the first time, discussed by Turkish and
Armenian historians together at a symposium in Chicago last March. Professor
Halil Berktay participated in this event. Professor Berktay, a specialist
in Turkish history of the 19th and 20th centuries, has taught at Harvard
University, the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, and Bogazici
(Bosporus) University in Istanbul. He is currently on the faculy of Sabanci
University in Istanbul. After receiving bachelor's and master's degrees in
economics at Yale University, he completed his doctorate in history at the
University of Birmingham. He has published three books in Turkish.

Radikal - How and in what year did the events that form the
basis of the genocide claim begin?

In fact, there is an entire 19th century that forms the background to the Armenian events. The violence reached its peak in 1915, but there were
incidents underway from 1890 onwards. In other words, things started long
before the night of 24/25 April 1915, which Armenians mark as a symbolic day
of mourning. The Allied landing at Gallipoli during the First World War created the fear among the Ottomans, who had suffered continuous losses throughout the 19th century and were now left with little but Anatolia, that `Now we're even going to lose Istanbul, and we won't even be able to hang on to Anatolia'. For this reason, there's an integral connection between the Ottoman psychosis of having its back to the wall, being desperate and harrassed, and the policy that the military dictatorship of the Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihat ve Terakki) would launch against the Armenians on the eastern front. The 24/25 April date was when this desperation was crystallized.

Radikal - Well, why did the Armenian organizations support not their own country but rather the forces of the enemy during the First World War? (my note - a bit of a loaded question and not entirely true)

Whatever the problem had been with the Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, Albanians, Macedonians, and Arabs, all of whom had also been Ottoman subjects, the problem with the Armenians was the same. The Ottoman Empire suffered a complex process of dissolution during the 19th century. Trade, the money economy, and capitalism first developed among the non-Turkish and non-Muslim population groups within the Empire. In this way, these groups became more open to nationalist movements, and initiated efforts to establish their own national states. As for the Armenians, they experienced this process somewhat later. This is important, since the sufferings experienced during the uprisings in the Balkans had created a great deal of accumulated rancor within the Turkish Muslim population. The fate of the Armenians cannot be understood without taking into account this buildup of rancor.

Did the Armenian gangs kill a great many Muslims during those events?

Yes, they did. This was such a process that it's imposible to say just who
cast the first stone, and who was guilty first. Everyone has his own story
to tell. The Turks have their accounts, and the Bulgarians, Greeks, and Armenians have theirs. In each of these accounts, those who tell them are
the victims; they themselves committed no crimes, and were always on the
receiving end.

...

Before 1915, there were the 1880's and 1890's. In the 1890's, during the
reign of Abdulhamit II, there were great massacres of Armenians whenever
indications of nationalist uprisings were perceived. There was a type of
blood feud that developed between the Armenians and the Ottoman
administration. In particular, Kurdish tribes and the Hamidiye Regiments
(Hamidiye Alaylari), which were composed of Kurds, were unleashed against
the Armenians. In fact, throughout this `century of dissolution', rather
than regular military forces, it was such irregular, undisciplined forces
that the Ottoman administration used, relying on their prmitiveness and
violence. Meanwhile, with Czarist Russia moving into the Caucasus, there
was a great wave of immigration not only from the Balkans but also from the
Caucasus region. These people, bearing a great deal of rancor from the
sufferings that they themselves had just experienced, moved into Eastern
Anatolia. And in addition, it's necessary to understand something not just
about the Ittihat ve Terakki, but also about the three-man military
dictatorship of Enver, Cemal, and Talat that headed it. These were not
traditional Ottoman notables. They were a new type of elite.

How were they different?

They were extremely ambitious and predatory. They were positivists, without
roots, and had risen only as a result of their education and thanks to the
army. They lived a life of violence. This violence was of a sort that had
been imposed on them by the great powers and the revolts in the Balkans, and as a result they became extreme nationalists. They were fighting desperately for the survival of the Empire. In fact, this period of the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century was a time of
rapacious, social-Darwinist nationalisms in Europe, in which it was `kill or
be killed'. It was a time in which massacres, large and small, were carried
out, and in which the Turkish Muslim population was also very much a victim.
The Ittihat ve Terakki triumvirate of Enver, Cemal, and Talat was an
extraordinary administration that had been born in these conditions of war
and struggle.

Radikal -The Ottoman state, led by these Unionists, ordered the deportation of the Armenians from their region to other areas, after the Armenian revolts and the assistance that Armenian bands gave to the Russians. Do we know how many Armenians were deported in this way?

At that time there were 1 million and 750 thousand Armenians living in
Eastern Anatolia. The deportation order issued by the ruling military
triumvirate was drawn up so as to include all the Armenians in the region,
without exception. These things are documented in writing. There was no
mention of massacres or slaughter. The provincial governors and garrison
commanders were directed to deport the Armenians to the region south of
Turkey's current borders. However, it's clear that, in addition to these
official orders, separate, non-written orders were given to the most rapacious members of the `Teskilat-i Mahsusa' (`Special Organization'), who
worshipped violence and were not bound by adherence to any normal moral
code.

Radikal - For the Armenians to be killed?

Yes. Historian Taner Akcam has demonstrated this in a very sound way.
There was on the one hand a legal decision and implementation, and on the
other another mechanism entirely that proceeded in an illegal manner.
How many Armenians died during the deportations?

At least 600 thousand.

How did they die? Who killed them?

Those who issued these orders had them carried out via a special
organization, the Teskilat-i Mahsusa.. Think of it as a combination of the forces involved in the recent Susurluk scandal and the Turkish Hizballah
organization. It is clear that Bahaettin Sakir, who operated as the
Teskilat-i Mahsusa's man for Enver, Cemal, and Talat, set up death squads in
the region. Some of these people were convicted criminals who were saved
from the gallows and released from prison just to carry out such
activities.. Do you know what types of people carried out these crimes? It
was the equivalent of today's `Yesil', Abdullah Catli, and the Turkish
Hizballah organization. The whole affair is that simple and clear.
Bahaittin was just like today's `Yesil' or Catli. In addition to them,
Turkish and Kurdish tribes also attacked the convoys of Armenians being
deported. In addition to these actual massacres, there were the terrible
losses caused by the deportations carred out in appalling conditions of
deprivation. Everywhere in the Western world, there are photographs of these incidents which we can't bear to look at. The first time I encountered
these visual records, I cried and could hardly breathe for several minutes.
They are no different from the images of the concentration camps, or the
massacres in Africa. For there are huge numbers of people in these
pictures.

Well, didn't the Ottoman state try and punish those officials found guilty
of the deaths of Armenians?

Of course. These massacres were not the work of the regular Ottoman army and bureaucracy. Historically, in such situations, the regular army and
bureaucracy hate and despise those `special teams' and gangs that carry out such deeds. We can see that the Ottoman army and bureaucracy understood just how terrible a thing this was , that they were repelled at the `special teams' set up independently of the governors and garrison commanders, and that there were even governors and commanders who issued an arrest order for Enver and Talat's man Bahaettin Sakir in 1915-16 and tried to capture him.

Did the Ottoman leaders make any statements to defend themselves?

The Ottoman regular army and state bureaucracy, both as a result of the
repugnance it felt toward these events and in order to clear themselves
before the rest of the world, tried as best it could to capture, try, and
punish those responsible for this disaster. And there were definitely those
who were punished. After the end of the war in 1918 and the Ottoman defeat and subsequent flight of Enver, Cemal, and Talat, who were the primary ones responsible, the parliament (Meclis-i Mebusan) established an investigatory commission just for this purpose. There was later a military trial in Istanbul. This was a famous trial. Books on it have been published in
English and Turkish.

What were the losses of the Muslim population in that area during this same period?

They may be 10,000 or 20,000. But it's not a question of `They only killed a few, and the Ottomans killed a lot'. The issue is as follows: The
activities of the Armenian guerrilla bands were generally localized, small-scale, and isolated. But for hundreds of thousands to die, there would
have to be a population of this size, which couldn't be attained merely by
wandering around the villages and hamlets. In addition, it's deceptive to
turn the matter into a question as to whether or not Enver and Talat Pasha
gave a written order to the `Yesil' or Catli of the day. They never did so,
and no such document will ever be found. In this regard, the witnesses of
the day are extremely important. There is a huge body of eyewitness
accounts and visual material concerning the Armenian incidents that never
reaches the Turkish public. Turkish public opinion is essentially ignorant
of what the people of Germany, England, France, and America see and read.

Radikal - Why has the Armenian genocide once more come onto the world's agenda now? Is it a desire to come to terms with it in a moral sense, or is it a preparatory phase for demands for land and compensation?

It's difficult to say. But these efforts are forcing the Turkish state and
Turkish society to become ever more defensive on this topic, and to withdraw inwards and take a harder line. The political polarization on this issue is so strong that it is extremely difficult to find the courage to speak on it. Because there is a great political polarization. One pole is the policy of
`confirming and acknowledging the genocide', while the other is the policy
of `genocide denial'. This polarization, which gives rise to an intellectual
terrorization, makes it impossible to talk on any common ground. I think it
would be wrong for Turkey to apologize. The U.S. Congress is behaving like
some sort of morals police which carries out virginity tests. The Congress
is being asked to say `Yes, this was a case of genocide' on something that
happened 85 years ago in an entirely different part of the world. It's
unbelievable naivety for any parliamentary body to see itself as having the right to decide such things on historical matters which are properly the
concern of scholarship. In fact, the Turkish Republic should also stop
talking about the Armenian issue.

Radikal - How is that?

Turkey has been taking a number of different positions at the same time on this issue. It says `it never happened', and then suggests that `it
happened, but there were serious provocations'. When the President recently said that `The topic should be left to historians', he was right. The
Turkish Republic can say one very simple thing today: The Republic was
established in 1923. This incident occurred in 1915. The army and state
organizations of the Republic did not commit these acts. The Republic of
Turkey is a new state, and not in any legal sense the continuation of the
Ottomans or the Union and Progress administration. What occurred or did not
occur in 1915, during the tumult of the First World War, does not concern us
as a state or a government. We did not carry out these incidents, and we
are not responsible. But discussion on this topic is free. Anyone can
discuss it as they wish. We have no official position on the topic.

[winoman]

hm - this is certainly not an Armenian source...

Permanent Peoples' Tribunal,
Verdict of the Tribunal.
April 16, 1984

(excerpt)

Preamble

The most fundamental of all assaults on the right of peoples is the crime of genocide. Nothing is graver in a criminal sense than a deliberate state policy of systematic extermination of a people based on their particular ethnic identity.

Yet, it may still be asked, why so many years after the alleged genocide, should the Tribunal devote its energies to an inquiry into the allegations of the Armenian people. After all, the basic grievance of massacre and extermination is fixed in time sixty-nine years ago in 1915. The Tribunal is convinced that its duties include the validation of historic grievances if these have never been properly brought before the bar of justice and acknowledged in an appropriate form by the government involved.

In this instance, the basis for an examination and evaluation of these Armenian allegations is especially compelling. Every government of the Turkish state since 1915 has refused to come to grips with the accusation of responsibility for the genocidal events.

In recent international forums and academic meetings, the Turkish government had made a concerted effort to block inquiry or acknowledgement of the Armenian genocide.

Furthermore, the current Turkish government has not taken cognizance of these most serious charges of responsibility for extermination the Armenian people. On the contrary, additional charges implicate the present Turkish government in continuing these exterminist policies.

Particularly relevant in this regard are the charges of deliberate destruction, desecration, and neglect of Armenian cultural monuments and religious buildings. The Tribunal adopts the view that charge of the crime of genocide remains a present reality to be examined and, if established, to be appropriately and openly acknowledged by leaders of the responsible state. The victims of a crime of genocide are entitled to legal relief even after this great lapse of time, although this relief must necessarily reflect present circumstances.


The Facts

I. Historical Introduction

(some skipped)

But with the decline of the Empire in the nineteenth century, conditions grew steadily worse and the climate became one of oppression. The growth in population and the arrival of successive waves of Turkish refugees from Russia and the Balkans as well as the sedentarization of nomads (Kurds, Circassians, etc.) upset the balance of populations and increased the pressure of competition for land, creating numerous problems of tenure in the agrarian sector. The result was a deterioration in the fortunes of the Armenian population, who were mostly peasants and farmers. Modernization and reform were made difficult by the fossilized structure of the Empire. The few attempts at reform (formation of a modern army, taxation in coin) merely impoverished the peasantry further. At the same time, the emergence of national feelings in the Balkans was leading increasingly to the independence of peoples who had hitherto been under Ottoman rule. The empire was being steadily weakened, not least due to its foreign debt.
From 1878, following the Russian-Turkish war the Armenian question became a factor in the question of the Orient. Article 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano (1878) provided that a series of reforms would be carried out in Armenian areas under Russian guarantee.

However, following a reversal of alliances, the Treaty of Berlin (1878) relieved Turkey of part of its obligations and charged Great Britain to supervise the reforms; but they were never implemented.

A revolutionary movement began to develop within the Armenian community (Dashnak and Hunchak parties). Following the Sasun insurrection in 1894, approximately 300,000 Armenians were massacred in the eastern provinces and in Constantinople on the orders of Sultan Abdul Hamid. Protests by the Powers led to more promises of reforms which, again, were never kept; the guerilla ('fedayis') struggle continued. From the turn of the century onward, Armenian revolutionaries also began to cooperate with the Young Turk party in the definition of a federalist plan for the Empire. Following the hopes generated by the constitutional revolution of 1908 Young Turk ideology, under pressure of the exercise of power and external events as well as from the radical wing of the movement, began to develop toward a form of exclusive nationalism which found expression in Pan-Turkism and Turanism.
The Armenians' situation in the Eastern province had not changed either as the result of the revolution or of the overthrow of Abdul Hamid in 1909 (massacres of Adana), and demands for reforms were again made by the Entente Powers. These demands were eventually heard in February 1914, and two inspectors were appointed to supervise their implementation. The appointments were considered by the Ottoman government as unacceptable interference.

At the outbreak of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire was uncertain as to which side to join. At the beginning of November 1914, under German pressure, it sided with the Central Powers. This placed the Armenians in a difficult position. They occupied a territory which Turkey considered as vital to the realization of its Turanist imperialistic ambitions with regard to the peoples of Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Furthermore, the division of the Armenian people between the Ottoman Empire (2,000,000 Armenians) and Russia (1,700,000) inevitably meant that the two sections of the population found themselves on opposing sides. At the Eighth Congress of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation at Erzerum in August 1914, the Dashnak party rejected Young Turk requests to engage in subversive action among the Russian Armenians. From the beginning of the war, the Turkish Armenians behaved in general as loyal subjects, signing up with the Turkish army. The Russian Armenians, on their side, were routinely conscripted into the Russian Army and sent to fight on the European fronts. In the first months of the war, Russian Armenians enrolled with volunteer corps which acted as scouts for the Tsarist army - the Russian answer to the plan Turks had submitted to Armenians in Erzerum some months earlier. The Erzerum refusal and the formation of these volunteer battalions were used as arguments by the Young Turks to allege Armenian treachery. Enver, who had been appointed Supreme Commander of Turkish forces, achieved a breakthrough into Transcaucasia in the middle of winter, but was defeated at Sarkamish as much by the weather conditions as by the Russian army. Of the Turkish Third Army's 90,000 men, only 15,000 remained. In the depressed aftermath of the defeat in the Caucasus, the anti-Armenian measures began.


II. The Genocide

Beginning in January 1915, Armenians soldiers and gendarmes were disarmed, regrouped in work brigades of 500 to 1,000 men, put to work on road maintenance or as porters, then taken by stages to remote areas and executed. It was not until April that the implementation of a plan began, with successive phases carried out in a disciplined sequence. The signal was first given for deportation to begin in Zeytun in early April, in an area of no immediate strategic importance. It was not until later that deportation measures were extended to the border provinces.
The pretext used to make the deportation a general measure was supplied by the resistance of the Armenians of Van. The vali of Van, Jevdet, sacked outlying Armenian villages and the Van Armenians organized the self-defense of the city. They were saved by a Russian breakthrough spearheaded by the Armenian volunteers from the Caucasus. After taking Van on May 18th, the Russians continued to press forward but were halted in late June by a Turkish counter-offensive. The Armenians of the vilayet of Van were thus able to retreat and escape extermination.
When the news of the Van revolt reached Constantinople, the Union and Progress (Ittihad) Committee seized the opportunity. Some 650 personalities, writers, poets, lawyers, doctors, priests and politicians were imprisoned on April 24th and 25th, 1915, then deported and murdered in the succeeding months. Thus was carried out what was practically the thorough and deliberate elimination of almost the entire Armenian intelligentsia of the time.

From April 24 onwards, and following a precise timetable, the government issued orders to deport the Armenians from the eastern vilayets. Since Van was occupied by the Russian army, the measures applied only to the six vilayets of Trebizond (Trabzon), Erzerum, Bitlis, Diarbekir, Kharput, and Sivas. The execution of the plan was entrusted to a 'special organization' (SO), made up of common criminals and convicts trained and equipped by the Union and Progress Committee. This semi-official organization, led by Behaeddin Shakir, was under the sole authority of the Ittihad Central Committee. Constantinople issued directives to the valis, kaymakans, as well as local SO men, who had discretionary powers to have moved or dismissed any uncooperative gendarme or official. The methods used, the order in which towns were evacuated, and the routes chosen for the columns of deportees all confirm the existence of a centralized point of command controlling the unfolding of the program. Deportation orders were announced publicly or posted in each city and township. Families were allowed two days to collect a few personal belongings; their property was confiscated or quickly sold off. The first move was generally the arrest of notables, members of Armenian political parties, priests, and young men, who were forced to sign fabricated confessions then discreetly eliminated in small groups. The convoys of deportees were made up of old people, women, and children. In the more remote villages, families were slaughtered and their homes burned or occupied. On the Black Sea coast and along the Tigris near Diarbekir boats were heaped with victims and sunk. From May to July 1915, the eastern provinces were sacked and looted by Turkish soldiers and gendarmes, SO gangs ('chetes'), etc. This robbery, looting, torture, and murder were tolerated or encouraged while any offer of protection to the Armenians was severely punished by the Turkish authorities.

It was not possible to keep the operation secret. Alerted by missionaries and consuls, the Entente Powers enjoined the Turkish government, from May 24, to put an end to the massacres, for which they held members of the government personally responsible. Turkey made the deportation official by issuing a decree, claiming treason, sabotage, and terrorist acts on the part of the Armenians as a pretext.

Deportation was in fact only a disguised form of extermination. The strongest were eliminated before departure. Hunger, thirst, and slaughter decimated the convoys' numbers. Thousands of bodies piled up along the roads. Corpses hung from trees and telegraph poles; mutilated bodies floated down rivers or were washed up on the banks. Of the seven eastern vilayets' original population of 1,200,00 Armenians, approximately 300,000 were able to take advantage of the Russian occupation to reach the Caucasus; the remainder were murdered where they were or deported, the women and children (about 200,000 in number) kidnapped. Not more than 50,000 survivors reached the point of convergence of the convoys of deportees in Aleppo.

At the end of July 1915, the government began to deport the Armenians of Anatolia and Cilicia, transferring the population from regions which were far distant from the front and where the presence of Armenians could not be regarded as a threat to the Turkish army. The deportees were driven south in columns which were decimated en route. From Aleppo, survivors were sent on toward the deserts of Syria in the south and of Mesopotamia in the southeast. In Syria, reassembly camps were set up at Hama, Homs, and near Damascus. These camps accommodated about 120,000 refugees, the majority of whom survived the war and were repatriated to Cilicia in 1919. Along the Euphrates, on the other hand, the Armenians were driven ever onward toward Deir-el-Zor; approximately 200,000 reached their destination. Between March and August 1916, orders came from Constantinople to liquidate the last survivors remaining in the camps along the railway and the banks of the Euphrates.

There were nevertheless still some Armenians remaining in Turkey. A few Armenian families in the provinces, Protestants and Catholics for the most part, had been saved from death by the American missions and the Apostolic Nuncio. In some cases, Armenians had been spared as a result of resolute intervention by Turkish officials, or had been hidden by Kurdish or Turkish friends. The Armenians of Constantinople and Smyrna also escaped deportation. Lastly, there were cases of resistance (Urfa, Shabin-Karahisar, Musa-Dagh). In all, including those who took refuge in Russia, the number of survivors at the end of 1916 can be estimated at 600,000 out of an estimated total population in 1914 of 1,800,000, according to A. Toynbee.

In Eastern Anatolia, the entire Armenian population had disappeared.

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UN Permenent Peoples Tribunal - continued

III. The Evidence

The Tribunal is invited to pronounce judgement on the charge of genocide brought on the basis of the events of 1915-1915.

The Tribunal considers that the facts presented above are established on the basis of substantial and concordant evidence. This evidence has been produced and analyzed in the various reports heard by the Tribunal, to which numerous documents have been submitted.

A near-exhaustive bibliography of these sources has been drawn up by Professor R.G. Hovannisian, The Armenian Holocaust, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1981.

Not counting the Ottoman archives-which are inaccessible-the main documents are as follows:

The German archives, which in view of the status of Germany as ally of the Ottoman Empire, are of prime significance. Especially worthy of note are the reports and eyewitness observations of Johannes Lepsius, of Dr. Armin Wegner, of the charitable organization 'Deutscher Hilfsbund', of Dr. Jacob Kunzler, of the journalist Stuermer, of Dr. Martin Niepage, of the missionary Ernst Christoffel, and of General Liman von Sanders; the latter related how the Armenian populations of Smyrna and Andrinopolis were spared as a result of his resolute personal intervention.

The reports of German diplomatic and consular personnel who were the eyewitnesses of the conditions of the dispersion of the Armenians at Erzerum, Aleppo, Samsun, etc.

The American archives, which also contained very ample material in confirmation of the above (reports by missionaries, consuls, and charities) and 'Internal Affairs of Turkey, 1910-1919, Race Problems', State Department, and the memoirs of the American Ambassador in Constantinople, Henry Morgenthau.

The British authorities' Blue Book on these events, published in 1916 by Viscount Bryce.

The minutes of the Trial of the Unionists (Ittihadists) on charges brought by the Turkish government following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire.

At the time of this trial, which took place between April and July 1919, the Turkish government collected evidence of the deportation and massacres and tried those responsible - the majority in their absence - by a court martial. The court convicted most of the defendants, including Talaat, Enver, and Jemal, who were sentenced to death in absentia.

The reports submitted to the Tribunal by four survivors of the massacres who lived through the events as children.


IV. The Turkish Arguments

The Tribunal has examined the Turkish arguments as set forth in the documents submitted to it.

The refusal of the Turkish government to recognize the genocide of the Armenians is based essentially on the following arguments: lower estimate of death toll; responsibility of Armenian revolutionaries; counter-accusations; denial of premeditation.

The number of Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire in 1914 has been variously estimated at 2,100,000 by the Armenian Patriarchate; 1,800,000 by A. Toynbee; and about 1,300,000 by the Turks. In spite of different estimates of the number of victims, the Armenians and almost all the Western experts agree on the proportion; approximately two thirds of the population. The Turks claim that the consequences of the 'transfer' were on a much smaller scale, resulting in the disappearance of 20-25 percent of the population due to generally poor wartime conditions. The Turkish state also points out that losses were heavy on the Muslim side. This argument appears to overlook the fact that Armenians have almost entirely disappeared from Anatolia. The population of Turkey is currently about 45 million, of whom less than 100,000 are Armenians.

In order to shift responsibility away from itself, the Turkish government alleges that Armenians committed acts of sedition and indeed of treason in time of war. However, the Tribunal has found that the only armed actions undertaken within the Ottoman Empire were the Sasun revolt and the resistance of Van in April 1915.

A further argument advanced by the Turkish state is the accusation that it was the Armenians who supposedly committed genocide against the Turks. It is true that in 1917 (i.e. more than a year after the deportation and extermination of the Armenians was completed) a number of Turkish villages were annihilated by Armenian troops. The Tribunal considers that these acts, however blameworthy, cannot be considered as genocide. Furthermore, the Tribunal notes that these acts were committed some considerable time after the mass slaughter suffered by the Armenians.

Lastly, the Turkish state rejects the charge of premeditation, impugning the authenticity of the five telegrams sent by the Minister of the Interior, Talaat, which were certified as authentic by experts appointed by the Court at the trial of Soghomon Tehlirian at Berlin-Charlottenburg in 1921. Tehlirian was acquitted of the murder of Talaat in view of the crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Young Turk government. The German Ambassador, Wangenheim, for his part, left no doubt, as early as July 7, 1915 as to the premeditation of the events: 'these circumstances and the manner in which the deportation is being carried out are a demonstration of the fact that the government is indeed pursuing its goal of exterminating the Armenian race in the Ottoman Empire.' (Letter concerning the extension of the deportation measures to provinces not under threat of invasion by the enemy [No. 106 in the collection Deutschland und Armenien, 1914-1918] in the Wilhelmstrasse archives and published by the Rev. Lepsius.)

In 1971, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (concluded): 'In modern times, attention should be drawn to the existence of fairly abundant documentation relating to the massacre of the Armenians, considered as the first genocide of the twentieth century.'

In Law


I. On the Rights of the Armenian People

The Tribunal notes that the Armenian population groups which were the victims of the massacres and other atrocities which have been reported to it constitute a people within the meaning of the law of nations.

...

The Tribunal wishes to stress the special obligations which are placed upon the Turkish state in this regard arising from the general rule of the law of nations as well as from individual treaties to which it has been party and which date back approximately one hundred years. In this connection, the Tribunal draws special attention to the fact that by virtue of Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, the aforementioned state entered into an obligation as early as 1878 to assign the Armenian people within the Ottoman Empire a regime guaranteeing its right to flourish in a climate of security under the supervision of the international community. The Tribunal also notes that promises of self determination which were made to the Armenian people at the time of the First World War were not kept, since the international community unduly permitted the disappearance of an Armenian state which in principle had been clearly recognized both by the Allied and associated Powers and by Turkey in the Treaty of Batum.

The fact that the right of this state to peaceful existence within recognized borders as a member of the international community has not been observed, no more than was the right of the Armenian population to exist peacefully within the Ottoman Empire, cannot however be considered as effectively extinguishing the rights of the Armenian people, or of relieving the international community of its responsibility toward that people.
The Tribunal records that the fate of a people can never be considered as a purely internal affair, entirely subject to the whims, however well intentioned, of sovereign states. The fundamental rights of this people are of direct concern to the international community, which is entitled and duty bound to ensure that these rights are respected, particularly when they are openly denied by one of its member states.

In this particular case, this conclusion is still further corroborated by the fact that, even before the right of peoples to self determination was explicitly affirmed by the United Nations Charter, the rights of the Armenian people had already been recognized by the states concerned under the supervision of representatives of the international community.

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UN Perm Peoples Tribunal - cont (pt3)

II. On the Charge of Genocide

(I'm ommiting the definitions that we all know by now..)

It is sufficient for the purposes of the Tribunal to establish that this rule was indisputably in force at the time when the massacres described to it were committed. Indeed, it emerges clearly from the deeds that have been done and the statements that have been arising from the Armenian question, however justifiable these may or may not be or have been for various reasons, that the 'laws of humanity' condemned the policy of systematic extermination pursued by the Ottoman government.

...Moreover, the condemnation of crimes committed during the First World War bears out the belief of states that such crimes could not be tolerated legally even though no written rules explicitly forbade them. The Tribunal recalls in this connection that such condemnation was pronounced on crimes against humanity as well as war crimes; it should furthermore be emphasized that Article 230 of the Treaty of S่vres expressly invoked the responsibility of Turkey in massacres perpetuated on Turkish territory. Certainly this treaty has not been ratified, and the obligation of punishment which it stipulated has therefore never operated; however, this fact does not detract from the clear manifestation afforded to us today by the content of that treaty that the states of that time were indeed conscious of the illegality of the crime which we now call genocide.

For these reasons, the Tribunal considers that genocide was already prohibited in law from the time of the first massacres of the Armenian population, since the 1948 convention served only to give formal expression, and indeed in a qualified formulation, to a rule of law which is applicable to the facts which formed the basis of the charge brought before this tribunal.

b) The Charge of Genocide of the Armenian People

The following observations would seem to be necessary on examination of the evidence which has been submitted to the Tribunal, the substance of which is reported below.

There can be no doubt that the Armenians constitute a national group within the definition of the rule outlawing genocide. This conclusion is all the more evident since they constitute a people protected by the right to self determination which necessarily implies that they also constitute a group, the destruction of which is outlawed by virtue of the rule pertaining to genocide.

There is no doubt regarding the reality of the physical acts constituting the genocide. The fact of the murder of members of a group, of grave attacks on their physical or mental integrity, and of the subjection of this group to conditions leading necessarily to their deaths, are clearly proven by the full and unequivocal evidence submitted to the Tribunal. In its examination of the case the Tribunal has focused primarily on the massacres perpetrated between 1915 and 1917, which were the most extreme example of a policy which was clearly heralded by the events of 1894-1896.

The specific intent to destroy the group as such, which is the special characteristic of the crime of genocide, is also established. The reports and documentary evidence supplied point clearly to a policy of methodical extermination of the Armenian people, revealing the specific intent referred to in Article II of the Convention of December 9, 1948.
The policy took effect in actions which were attributable beyond dispute to the Turkish or Ottoman authorities, particularly during the massacres of 1915-1917. The Tribunal notes on the one hand, however, that in addition to the atrocities committed by the official authorities, the latter also used malicious propaganda and other means to encourage civilian populations to commit acts of genocide against the Armenians. It is further observed that the authorities generally refrained from intervening to prevent the slaughter, although they had the power to do so, or from punishing the culprits, with the exception of the trial of the Unionists. This attitude amounts to incitement to crime and to criminal negligence, and must be judged as severely as the crimes actively committed and specifically covered by the law against genocide.

On the evidence submitted, the Tribunal considers that the various allegations (rebellion, treason, etc.) made by the Turkish government to justify the massacres are without foundation. It is stressed, in any event, that even were such allegations substantiated, they could in no way justify the massacres committed. Genocide is a crime which admits of no grounds for excuse or justification.

For these reasons, the Tribunal finds that the charge of genocide of the Armenian people brought against the Turkish authorities is established as to its foundation in fact.

For These Reasons

in answer to the questions which put to it, the Tribunal hereby finds that:

the Armenian population did and do constitute a people whose fundamental rights, both individual and collective, should have been and shall be respected in accordance with international law;

the extermination of the Armenian population groups through deportation and massacre constitutes a crime of genocide not subject to statutory limitations within the definition of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of December 9, 1948. With respect to the condemnation of this crime, the aforesaid Convention is declaratory of existing law in that it takes note of rules which were already in force at the time of the incriminated acts;

the Young Turk government is guilty of this genocide, with regard to the acts perpetrated between 1915-1917;

the Armenian genocide is also an 'international crime' for which the Turkish state must assume responsibility, without using the pretext of any discontinuity in the existence of the state to elude that responsibility;

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Arnold Toynbee

The exact quantitative scale of the crime thus remains uncertain, but there is no uncertainty as to the responsibility for its perpetration. This immense infliction of suffering and destruction of life was not the work of religious fanaticism. Fanaticism played no more part here than it has played in the fighting at Gallipoli or Kut, and the "Holy War" which the Young Turks caused to be proclaimed in October, 1914, was merely a political move to embarrass the Moslem subjects of the Entente Powers. There was no fanaticism, for instance, in the conduct of the Kurds and chettis, who committed some of the most horrible acts of all, nor can the responsibility be fixed upon them. They were simply marauders and criminals who did after their kind, and the Government, which not only condoned, but instigated, their actions, must bear the guilt. The peasantry, again (own brothers though they were to the Ottoman soldiery whose apparent humanity at Gallipoli and Kut has won their opponents' respect), behaved with astonishing brutality to the Armenians who were delivered into their hands; yet the responsibility does not lie with the Turkish peasantry. They are sluggish, docile people, unready to take violent action on their own initiative, but capable of perpetrating any enormity on the suggestion of those they are accustomed to obey. The peasantry would never have attacked the Armenians if their superiors had not given them the word. Nor are the Moslems townspeople primarily to blame; their record is not invariably black, and the evidence in this volume throws here and there a favorable light upon their character. Where Moslem and Christian lived together in the same town or village, led the same life, pursued the same vocation, there seems often to have been a strong human bond between them. The respectable Moslem townspeople seldom desired the extermination of their Armenian neighbors, sometimes openly deplored it, and in several instances even set themselves to hinder it from taking effect. We have evidence of this from various places — Adana, for instance, and AF. In Cilicia, the villages of AJ. and AK. in the AF. district, and the city of Angora. The authorities had indeed to decree severe penalties against any Moslem as well as any alien or Greek who might be convicted of sheltering their Armenian victims. The rabble naturally looted Armenian property when the police connived, as the rabble in European towns might do; the respectable majority of the Moslem townspeople can be accused of apathy at worst; the responsibility cannot rest with these.

The guilt must, therefore, fall upon the officials of the Ottoman Government, but it will not weigh equally upon all members of the official hierarchy. The behavior of the gendarmerie, for example, was utterly atrocious; the subordinates were demoralized by the power for evil that was placed in their hands; they were egged on by their chiefs, who gave vent to a malevolence against the Armenians which they must have been harboring for years; a very large proportion of the total misery inflicted was the gendarmerie's work; and yet the gendarmerie were not, or ought not to have been, independent agents. The responsibility for their misconduct must be referred to the local civil administrators, or to the Central Government, or to both.

The local administrators of provinces and sub-districts — Valis, Mutessarifs and Kaimakams — are certainly very deeply to blame. The latitude allowed them by the Central Government was wide, as is shown by the variations they practiced, in different places, upon the common scheme. In this place the Armenian men were massacred; in that they were deported unscathed; in that other they were taken out to sea and drowned. Here the women were bullied into conversion; here conversion was disallowed; here they were massacred like the men. And in many other matters, such as the disposal of Armenian property or the use of torture, remarkable differences of practice can be observed, which are all ascribable to the good or bad will of the local officials. A serious part of the responsibility falls upon them — upon fire-eaters like Djevdat Bey or cruel natures like the Governor of Ourfa; and yet their freedom of action was comparatively restricted. Where they were evil — intentioned towards the Armenians they were able to go beyond the Central Government's instructions (though even in matters like the exemption of Catholics and Protestants, where their action was apparently most free, they and the Central Government were often merely in collusion); but they might never mitigate their instructions by one degree. Humane and honorable governors (and there were a certain number of these) were powerless to protect the Armenians in their province. The Central Government had its agents on the spot — the chairman of the local branch of the Committee of Union and Progress, the local Chief of Gendarmerie, or even some subordinate official on the Governor's own administrative staff. If these merciful governors were merely remiss in executing the instructions, they were flouted and overruled; if they refused to obey them, they were dismissed and replaced by more pliant successors. In one way or another, the Central Government enforced and controlled the execution of the scheme, as it alone had originated the conception of it; and the Young Turkish Ministers and their associates at Constantinople are directly and personally responsible, from beginning to end, for the gigantic crime that devastated the Near East in 1915.